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This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forth-
coming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the
central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our rst-personal
perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective
are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality.
The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both
concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various
connections among them. More generally, given that intentionality and ratio-
nality are both normative phenomena, the main theme of the articles is the
relationship between consciousness and normativity and the centrality of this
relationship to our rst-personal perspective.
This focus culminates in the defense of two specic views, experiential
rationalism and experiential intentionalism. The rst is, very roughly, the view
that how our mental episodes are given in consciousness reects their rational
role in our mental lives: it is part of what our mental episodes subjectively are
like that we phenomenally experience them as providing and/or responding to
certain kinds of reasons. The central claim of the second view, on the other
hand, is that the intentionality of our mental episodes is essentially linked to
consciousness and involves a token-reexive element: they intentionally present
not only the world, but also themselves as being a certain way.
Some of the essays also deal with the contrast between our rst- and our
third-personal perspectives and the | to some extent related | division of
labour between philosophy and the empirical sciences. Both perspectives have
their limitations and sometimes conict with each other, raising the question
of what the consequences are for accounts of our rst-personal knowledge and
its internal or external objects.
In this introduction, I provide an outline of these issues and of the essays
dealing with them. My discussion proceeds in two steps. First, I motivate the
two views to be defended | experiential rationalism and experiential intention-
alism | and describe how they conceive of the relationship of consciousness
to rationality and to intentionality, respectively. Second, I provide a summary
of each of the chapters to come and point out how they relate to the views
and issues introduced beforehand. The presentation of the chapters largely
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follows the structure of the collection, which consists of three main parts: one
on the contrast between the rst- and the third-personal perspectives; another
on experiential rationalism; and a third on experiential intentionalism. The
collection also includes an appendix with text that have been co-authored to-
gether with Gianfranco Soldati, and which are thematically closely linked to
the already published or forthcoming essays and are therefore introduced in
the context of the description of the latter.
There are many other important connections between the collected essays,
which are fairly independent of the shared themes which characterise the three
parts. In particular, each part contains essays on aesthetic issues, or on issues
in epistemology, the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of normativity. Cor-
respondingly, some of the articles form part of smaller projects. Chapters 3,
6 and 7, say, aim at the formulation of a satisfactory account of aesthetic ex-
perience and aesthetic evaluation; while chapters 2, 4, 8, 11 and 13 are meant
to establish a particular theory of perception and of sensory experience. By
contrast, the present ordering of the chapters is meant to highlight the fact
that the issue of the relationship between consciousness and normativity mer-
its a more general treatment which reaches across the limits of the various
philosophical disciplines and problems.
It should be clear, given the diversity of the collected articles, that the goal
of this collection cannot be to provide a fully developed defense of experiential
rationalism and experiential intentionalism, or to complete the more specic
projects just mentioned. This would most of all require addressing the main
objections and alternative views in much more detail, and also showing how the
positions put forward here fare with respect to other philosophical problems
| notably the nature of waking consciousness, the source of normativity, the
ontological status of reasons, and the objectivity of our recognition of them.
But the essays of this collection none the less oer substantial support for
experiential rationalism and experiential intentionalism, both in general and
in their application to specic problems. Indeed, the present material may
form the basis of more thorough defenses of the two views; and I intend to
make us of some of it to write a monograph on experiential rationalism in the
near future.
I. Main Themes and Theses
Consciousness and Rationality: Experiential Rationalism
Our mental episodes | perceptions, imaginings, thoughts, sensations, feelings,
and so on | form part of our stream of consciousness. As such, each of
them possesses a specic phenomenal character and resembles other episodes
2
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with respect to dierent aspects of that character.1 One way of picking out
phenomenal character is by identifying it as the most determinate property of
mental episodes which is accessible to us from our rst-personal perspective
| notably through introspection (Williamson, 1990, 48f.). This is compatible
with the more traditional characterisation of phenomenal character in terms
of what the episodes are subjectively like, or how it is for the subject to have
them (Nagel, 1974). It is controversial whether judgemental or other thoughts
possess a phenomenal character. But, together with Gianfranco Soldati, I have
argued that they do (see ch. 12).
The phenomenal character of our mental episodes is not their only impor-
tant feature. They also possess a certain rational role. Episodes may dier in
rational role in two independent ways: they may dier in which reasons (if any)
they provide us with access to; and they may also dier in which reasons (if
any) they are sensitive to.2 The reasons concerned may be epistemic, practical,
aesthetic or perhaps also other kinds of reasons.3 Seeing diers from visual-
ising because only the former provides justication for belief; it diers from
judging because only the latter is governed by reasons for belief; and it diers
from desiring because the two kinds of episode provide us with dierent kinds
of reason. Although there may be mental episodes which are non-rational in so
far as they are not linked to any kind of reasons for rst-order attitudes, they
arguably give us at least reasons to ascribe them to ourselves in introspective
second-order judgements (Peacocke, 2008).
Whether mental episodes belong to the same or to dierent basic mental
kinds | or, alternatively, possess the same or dierent natures | is a matter of
which phenomenal character and which rational role they possess. Of course,
not all dierences in character or role constitute a dierence in basic kind.
Seeing a tree and seeing a book dier both phenomenologically and in whether
they entitle us to judge that there is a tree before us; but the two episodes
still belong to the same basic mental kind, namely (visual) perception. But
if two episodes dier in character or role independently of what they make
us aware of, then they typically | if not always | belong to dierent basic
1I sometimes also speak of their conscious or subjective character.
2The essays are intended to stay neutral on whether reasons are identical with facts that
speak for or against having certain attitudes (Part, 1997; McDowell, 1998a; McNaughton
and Rawling, 2004; Dancy, 2000; Kolodny, 2005), or instead with our subjective take on such
facts (Davidson, 1980; Pollock and Cruz, 1999; Turri, 2009; Gibbons, 2010). But partly to
make things simpler, I assume in what follows that reasons are constituted by facts.
3For instance, there are rational relations among the sensory and intellectual imaginings
involved in a complex imaginative project (e.g., that of imagining the ctional world of a
novel), and rational norms governing those imaginative episodes, both of which may perhaps
to be explained by reference to some quasi-epistemic or hypothetical type of theoretical
reasons. The idea here is that ctional truth works in a similar fashion to real truth and
generates a similar kind of rationality and normativity.
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mental kinds. In the case of sensory episodes, there are exceptions to this claim
with respect to non-presentational phenomenal dierences. The character of
seeing a tree | but not its basic mental kind | depends partly on whether
the experience involves the phenomenon of blur (Peacocke, 1983). But the
experience does not present the tree as being blurred: the tree does not appear
to be blurred in the same sense in which it appears to be green (see ch. 13).
Similarly, if qualia inversion is a possibility, then experiences may dier in their
non-presentational phenomenal aspects without diering in their mental kinds
(Block, 1990). On the other hand, if purely non-presentational episodes are
a possibility, then such intrinsic phenomenal dierences actually do indicate
dierences in nature. Accordingly, dierences in general aspects of character or
role | that is, aspects which are unconnected to which entities or propositions
are presented | are, by and large, correlated to dierences in basic kind.
There is also a correlation between general aspects of phenomenal charac-
ter and general aspects of rational role: a dierence in one of them is at least
normally accompanied by a dierence in the other. For instance, episodes
of seeing, visualising and visually recalling dier both in their general role
and in their general character.4 Even the special case of episodes which are
rst-personally indistinguishable from other episodes | such as perfect hallu-
cinations which are characterised by the fact that we cannot tell them apart
from corresponding veridical perceptions | appears to conform to this corre-
lation claim.5 It is part of their subjective indiscriminability that perceptions
and perfect hallucinations incline us to form the same judgements | if not,
we would be able to distinguish them in this respect (see ch. 11). So, from our
rst-personal perspective, sameness in character seems to come with sameness
in role. Moreover, although there is disagreement about whether this rst-
personal impression is indeed true to the nature of perfect hallucinations and
whether they really share their character and role with perceptions, the recent
intentionalist or disjunctivist contenders in this debate agree at least on the
correlation of these two features of perceptual experiences.6
These considerations raise the question of how to explain the fact that, on
4In addition, even specic rational dierences come with specic phenomenal dierences
| though not necessarily the other way round, as the examples of blur or non-presentational
phenomenal aspects illustrate. Two perceptions which dier in their involvment of blur, but
not in which objects and features they present, have the same justicatory power. At best,
blurred vision has perhaps a subjective rational impact in so far as the experiences concerned
incline us less strongly to form the relevant perceptual beliefs than corresponding focussed
experiences would do.
5I sometimes also speak of `perceptual' or `perception-like hallucinations' when talking
about perfect hallucinations.
6Notable exceptions are the disjunctivist view with intentionalist elements defended in
chapters 8, 11 and 13 and, possibly, the version of disjunctivism defended by John McDowell
(e.g., in McDowell (1998a)).
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the general level, character and role are correlated both to each other and to ba-
sic mental kind; and the fact that this correlation is rst-personally accessible.
Experiential rationalism promises to account for both facts in a satisfactory
manner. The central thesis of this view is that the phenomenal character of our
mental episodes is partly determined by | and therefore reects or indicates
| their rational role. Perceptions, say, have the power to justify beliefs about
the actual world, sensory imaginings do not | or at least not intrinsically (see
Dorsch (2011b)); and this dierence in rational role is salient in a dierence in
what it is like to enjoy the respective episodes (see ch. 4). The truth of this
view would explain why phenomenal character and rational role are correlated,
at least as long as nothing goes wrong; and also why we have access to both
and their correlation from the inside.
The phenomenal aspect of episodes in question may be described as an ex-
perience of rational role, that is, an experience both of justicatory power and
of justication: we phenomenally experience our mental episodes as providing
us with access to, or as being based on, reasons. For example, we experience
judgemental | but not imaginative | thoughts as well-founded (see ch. 5); or
we experience perceptual | but not imaginative | experiences as supporting
belief (see chs. 11 and 4). But the aspect may also be described as an experi-
ence of reasons, independently of whether reasons are identical with facts our
with our subjective take on them. Our feeling of hunger makes us aware of the
fact that we are in need of food; and it does so in such a way that this fact |
or our awareness of it | is given to us as speaking in favour of (deciding to)
eat.
Two features of this experience are particularly noteworthy. The rst is
that it has motivational consequences. We normally rely on perceptions and
judgements | but not on imaginings | when acting or deciding what to be-
lieve or do precisely because we are phenomenally aware of their reason-giving
power. Experiential rationalism provides at least a partial explanation7 of
this impact on our inclinations by maintaining that, when we are perceiving
or judging, it seems to us as if we are aware of facts, and these facts | or
our awareness of them | seem to constitute reasons for us. There are plenty
examples showing that the mere recognition of facts (e.g., that someone is suf-
fering and in need of help) | and possibly even the normative judgement that
these recognised facts constitute reasons | fails to motivate us. By contrast,
the assumed experience of reasons is an experience of them as reasons, and
as reasons for us. This is reected, for instance, in the fact that a perception
automatically inclines us to form certain judgements in the absence of doubts
about its trustworthiness. That is, motivation does not require something in
7A full explanation would also have to identify the fundamental source of motivation |
for instance, the reasons themselves which speak for or against having a certain attiude.
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addition to perception; rather, the failure to move us presupposes the presence
of some further intervening factor.
The second important feature of our experience of rational role is that it
may already be present in small children or higher animals that enjoy con-
sciousness and are capable of responding to facts in ways more complex than
mere reexes or associations.8 Having this experience of rational role presup-
poses neither the possession of the concept of a reason (or other concepts),
nor the ability to reect on or self-ascribe reasons. It suces that the beings
in question can be described in rational terms from the third-personal per-
spective. It is equally unnecessary that subjects have to be able to identify
and produce the reasons concerned, say. We experience occurrent beliefs as
well-founded even if we do not any more know why we have formed them, or
perhaps even what speaks in favour of having them (see ch. 5).
In Defense of Experiential Rationalism
The defense of experiential rationalism put forward in the present articles con-
centrates on the illustration of some of the explanatory resources of this view
and its related advantages over competing positions. But given the selective-
ness of the chosen topics | perception, judgement and aesthetic evaluation |
it is perhaps helpful to mention other phenomena to which experiential ratio-
nalism can be successfully applied, but which are not much more discussed in
this collection. A common theme is thereby that experiential rationalism com-
bines elements of opposing views | notably empiricism and rationalism, as
well as internalism and externalism | and can therefore perhaps avoid some of
the main diculties of either view, while keeping many of their respective ben-
ets. It emphasises the importance of empiricism in so far as it acknowledges
the signicance of experience | in this case the kind of awareness coming with
the presence and enjoyment of conscious mental episodes | in our cognitive
and productive interaction with the world. And it preserves some of the central
ideas of rationalism by highlighting the centrality of the rational dimension of
our mental life. Similarly, internalism is endorsed in so far as justication is
assumed to be partly a matter of our experience of reasons; while externalism
is upheld in so far as justication is also taken to be dependent on whether our
subjective take on reasons corresponds to what is objectively the case (e.g., to
the reason-constituting facts).9
8See, for instance, Beckers et al. (2006, 2009) for some evidence for the claim that children
and animals are capable of such responses. I return to this issue further below.
9The two contrasts of externalism/internalism and empiricism/rationalism are not com-
pletely unrelated. While externalism is typically combined with, or motivated by, empiricist
ideas (e.g., Wittgenstein (1984b)), internalism is often linked to, or inspired by, rationalist
ideas (e.g., Kant (1990)). Note also that the rst contrast has been used to describe other
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Self-Knowledge. Some of the benets of choosing experiential rationalism as an
alternative to more empiricist or more rationalist views become clear when we
consider the phenomenon of rst-personal self-knowledge. The issue of what
justies our rst-personal reference to ourselves with the concept `I' may serve
as a good example of how experiential rationalism provides a good alternative
to more one-sided positions.10 Certain rationalist accounts | which assume
that introspective self-reference is solely grounded in our capacity to refer with
the concept `I' to the thinker of the respective thought, and not also in our ex-
perience of thinking (Peacocke, 2008; see also Kant (1990)'s `I think') | fail to
rule out the reasonableness of questioning our identity with the thinker of that
(or any other) thought (Soldati, 2011). But rst-personal self-reference does
not allow for the reasonableness of such doubt (Martin, 1995). By contrast,
certain empiricist accounts | which assume that self-knowledge is grounded
solely in inner or outer experience (Armstrong, 1993; Dretske, 1995) | face
the problem that introspection does not seem to reveal a self over and above
the introspected mental episodes (Hume, 2007; Shoemaker, 1994a). Experi-
ential rationalism oers an alternative to both approaches by revealing our
self-experience to be an integral part of our experience of reasons. Mental
states can be providers of, or responders to, reasons only within a unied ra-
tional net of states, which again means that they form part of a rationally
unied mind and, hence, of a rational self. Moreover, we cannot reasonably
question our identity with this self, given that it is constitutive of a mind being
ours that we have access to it from the inside (i.e., via conscious awareness
and introspection). Hence, our experience of mental episodes as providing or
responding to reasons amounts to an experience of them as parts of our self
and can therefore ground our introspective self-references.
Rational Justication. Rational justication is another phenomena which is
perhaps best explained in terms of experiential rationalism. This time, the
main competing views are externalism and internalism about justication,
which dier in whether they identify elements external or internal to the mind
as responsible for the normative status of our attitudes or their formation
(Pollock and Cruz, 1999; Conee and Feldman, 2004).11
possible groupings of positions than the one put forward here in the main text | for in-
stance, relative to whether we have easy or special access to what justies us (Chisholm,
1977; BonJour and Sosa, 2003), or to whether we are automatically motivated by what we
take to justify us (Williams, 1980; Wallace, 2006).
10I discuss this issue in more detail in recent and still unnished work.
11The terms `externalism' and `internalism' have been used to describe other ways of
dividing the various positions on justication into two groups { notably the distinction
between views which do, or do not, require for justication that we have internal access
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Externalist views maintain that justication is a matter of the actual pres-
ence of reason-constituting facts (Part, 1997; Dancy, 2000; Kolodny, 2005).
They typically do so because they insist on an intimate connection between
justication and objective value: our formation of a certain attitude is justi-
ed only if it helps us to attain some relevant valuable end (e.g., knowledge
or truth in the case of beliefs, morality or well-being in the case of intentions,
and so on); and this attainment requires the attitude to conform to the facts.
Indeed, the facts are often said to speak in favour of an attitude because they
render it more likely than not that forming that attitude will lead to the at-
tainment of some value (Grundmann, 2009). Consider the example of merely
hallucinating someone calling your name in a busy and noisy location, where
this experience is indistinguishable for you from a corresponding genuine per-
ception. In response, you will probably form the belief that someone is trying
to get your attention, as well as the intention to look out for that person. But,
of course, your belief will fall short of knowledge, and your intention will fail
to lead to a successful search. Indeed, your two attitudes may hinder your
quest for knowledge and practical success by keeping you from forming other
and better ones. According to externalism, this means that your belief and
your intention are unjustied, even though you may (wrongly) take them to
be perfectly reasonable.
Internalist views, on the other hand, claim that what matters for our justi-
cation is which reason-constituting facts we (rightly or wrongly) do | or would
on reection | take to obtain in the shape of our perceptions, beliefs, and so
on (see Williams (1980), Davidson (1980), Conee and Feldman (2004), Gib-
bons (2010), and the references in footnote 3). This claim is usually motivated
by the observation of a close link between justication and our subjective per-
spective: our formation of an attitude is justied only if it conforms to what we
do, or would, identify as relevant facts from our subjective perspective; and we
hold people responsible for their attitudes relative to the reason-constituting
facts accessible to them (Owens, 2000). Return to the example of your per-
fect hallucination of someone calling your name. In that situation, we expect
you to come to believe that someone is trying to get your attention, and to
intend to look out for that person. Indeed, we would assess you as having
done something wrong if you were not to acquire these two attitudes | as-
suming that you are attentive, do not suspect (or have reason to suspect) your
experience to be hallucinatory and have no other pressing practical concerns.
More specically, your failure to form those attitudes would show a certain
unresponsiveness to what perceptually or doxastically seem to you to be the
to the justifying elements (Chisholm, 1977; BonJour and Sosa, 2003); and the distinction
between views which do, or do not, require for justication that the justifying elements have




Externalist and internalist accounts of justication are in competition with
each other in so far as they identify dierent justifying elements: either reason-
constituting facts, or our subjective take on such reasons. But their exclusive
focus on just one of the two elements renders both views equally inadequate.
Externalism is decient in that it does not capture the link of justication
to our subjective perspective, given that it does not take into account how
things seem to us. Internalism, by contrast, fails to connect justication to
the attainment of objectively valuable ends, given that it ignores the potential
mismatch between what we take to be our reasons and what our reasons in
fact are. Experiential rationalism allows us to reject the forced choice between
either the facts or our take on them as decisive factors, and to assume that
justication is a matter of both. Accordingly, our formation or revision of
an attitude is justied just in case two conditions are met: (i) it conforms to
which mental episodes we experientially (or possibly also judgementally) take
to make us aware of facts as constituting reasons for us; and (ii) it conforms
to the actual presence of such reason-constituting facts (i.e., how things seem
and how they are do indeed match). The main concession to be made is that,
in cases where we get it wrong (such as in the hallucination example above),
it merely seems to us as if our attitude formation is reasonable, while in fact
it is not.12
Rational Motivation. Externalism and internalism also face serious diculties
when trying to explain why the awareness of reason-constituting facts is actu-
ally capable of moving us to form respective attitudes.13 That this is puzzling
is revealed by cases in which people respond with dierent | or no | atti-
tudes to exactly the same facts. Not everyone who notices that another person
12The acceptance of both conditions on justication raises the worry that we might actu-
ally be dealing with two unconnected kinds of normativity (Wright, 2004). In response, it is
perhaps possible to adopt a naive realist stance on our awareness of reasons: namely that it
always matches the facts. This is probably best done within a disjunctivist framework (see
chs. 8 and 11). According to disjunctivism, subjectively indistinguishable pairs of mental
states | such as veridical perceptions and perfect hallucinations, states of knowledge and
mere beliefs, or moral intentions and mere commitments | belong to distinct mental kinds
because the rst members of the pairs (i.e., the `good' cases) are essentially relations to ex-
ternal facts, while the second members (i.e., the `bad' cases) are not. Applied to the current
case, disjunctivism maintains that being aware of a reason implies the actual presence of a
reason; while, if things go wrong, we are not really aware of reasons, it just seems so to us.
One important consequence of this view is that the two conditions on justication (i) and
(ii) turn out to coincide.
13Indeed,they face other objections as well | for instance, in connection with skeptical
worries and with the problem of circular or regressive justication, respectively (BonJour
and Sosa, 2003; McDowell, 1998a; Wright, 2004).
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is in need becomes thereby committed to help her; and people may disagree
about which theory to endorse, or how much to value an artwork, although
they base their conclusions on the same pieces of evidence (cf. Part (1997),
Van Fraassen (1980), Budd (1999) and chapter 6). Accordingly, merely be-
coming aware of certain facts does not suce to determine whether we acquire
attitudes, or which attitudes in particular. It has been proposed | both by
internalists and by externalists | that whether we decide to help someone in
response to recognising that she is in need, say, depends on our general causal
dispositions (Bratman, 1987; Broome, 2005) or our previous contingent incli-
nations Williams (1980). But this does not help to understand in which sense
attitude formation is a response to reasons, and why it subjectively matters
for us whether the objective facts speak for or against certain attitudes. This
need for explanation is especially pressing in cases where we are wrong about
the facts, and where it would consequently be better in view of our aim to
attain knowledge, morality, and so on, not to respond to our take on things
(Kolodny, 2007).
A more plausible internalist answer is to claim that what is additionally
needed for rational motivation is that we actually recognise the facts concerned
as constituting reasons for us (Owens, 2000). Accordingly, people may dier
in whether they recognise facts as reasons for their own attitude formation,
and in whether they recognise them as reasons in favour of this or of that
attitude. Externalists, on the other hand, may want to locate the dierence
instead in the presence or absence of a desire to form attitudes in conformity
with what one takes to be one's reasons (Part, 1997). But this suggestion also
presupposes that we recognise facts as reasons for us. Because of this common
assumption, both proposals do not apply easily to the whole range of attitude
formation and cannot identify the common motivational element among the
dierent types of motivation involved | notably the highly reective forma-
tion of beliefs or intentions in deliberate reasoning (Shah and Velleman, 2005;
Owens, 2000), and the non-inferential formation of perceptual beliefs or some
aesthetic judgements (Sibley, 2001c).
Moreover, they both proposals threaten to over-intellectualise our forma-
tion of attitudes, given that they make justication and motivation dependent
on our capacity to recognise facts as reasons. Although there is disagreement
about the precise nature of the required access, it is typically assumed that
it has to be reective and involve normative concepts, such as that of a rea-
son or a norm.14 However, while infants and higher animals lack the required
14Among the candidate characterisations of the required access are: (i) the ability to
identify the justifying elements and their normative power (Chisholm, 1977; Lehrer, 1997;
BonJour and Sosa, 2003; Conee and Feldman, 2004); (ii) the capacity to determine and
grasp the nature and status of the related norms (Korsgaard, 1996); (iii) the ability to
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reective powers and normative concepts, they seem to be perfectly capable
of forming justied or unjustied attitudes. Already very young children re-
spond to what they see, remember and learn things, have preferences and even
can recognise the attitudes of others (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Beckers
et al., 2009; Perner and Roessler, 2011). The case is perhaps less clear with
respect to animals. But even there, we have no problem, say, with assuming
that some dogs are wrong in trusting their owners in the light of their past
experiences of bad treatment (see Hurley and Nudds (2006) for discussion);
and recent evidence suggests that some mammals engage in simple forms of
reasoning (Beckers et al., 2006).
Experiential rationalism avoids the problem of over-intellectualisation and
is thus able to provide a satisfactory explanation of rational motivation by
weakening the internalist demand for some form of access to reasons. It ac-
cepts the internalist idea that what moves us to form attitudes is our awareness
of facts as reasons. But it departs from internalism in claiming that we can
recognise facts as reason-constituting not only by means of conceptual reec-
tion, but also by means of non-conceptual experience; and that, indeed, the
latter constitutes our canonical form of access to reasons. As noted above,
this phenomenal awareness of reasons requires neither specic conceptual or
linguistic capacities, nor the ability to reectively point out reasons to oneself
or others. Hence, it can already be present in infants and animals, once they
are able to consciously believe, intend or value. Moreover, the unity of moti-
vation can be preserved, given that it always happens in response to our |
experiential or reective | recognition of reasons.
Consciousness and Intentionality: Experiential Intentionalism
Experiential rationalism assumes the presence of phenomenal | or experi-
ential | awareness of the rational role of our mental episodes (as well as
of the reason-constituting status of the facts which those episodes make us
aware of). This raises the question of the nature of the kind of awareness
involved. The core tenet of experiential intentionalism is that it is a form of
(non-conceptual) token-reexive intentionality: that we phenomenally experi-
ence our mental episodes as being a certain way means that they intentionally
present themselves as being that way (see chs. 8 and 13). For instance, our
experience of the rational role of our mental episodes consists in their inten-
tional self-presentation as providers of or responders to reasons (see chs. 11
and 4). Similarly, that perceptual experiences are phenomenally given to us as
relations to existing entities in our environment means that it is part of their
recognize which seeming reasons would survive fully informed and rational deliberation




intentional content that they are relational. The presentational aspect of our
episodes is therefore concerned not only with part of the world, but also with
part of our mind, namely with the episodes themselves.
The intentional nature of phenomenal awareness leaves room for the pos-
sibility of error. Hallucinations, for example, present themselves as sources of
support for belief, but in reality do not possess such justicatory power. It is
important to note, however, that the erroneous presentation is not concerned
with aspects of the phenomenal character of the episodes. Rather, the erro-
neous presentation is part of that character. That is, some phenomenal aspect
misleads us about some non-phenomenal aspect. This is not to deny that we
can err about which phenomenal aspects our episodes possess. But such an
error could not be grounded in how the episodes are phenomenally given to
us in the stream of consciousness. While we can misperceive a white object
as being red (e.g., under red illumination), we cannot misexperience a white-
experience as being a red-experience (see ch. 13). This is due to the fact that
the phenomenal aspects of our mental episodes are not objects of phenomenal
awareness, but rather its constituents or determinations. What phenomenal
awareness presents us with is, instead, the non-phenomenal structure of mental
episodes (see chs. 8 and 11).
Some of the collected essays apply this picture specically to perceptual
experiences (see especially chapters 11 and 13). Perfect hallucinations present
themselves as relational and reason-giving. This misleading presentation is
part of their character, while their true lack of relationality and of justicatory
power is part of their structure. Correspondingly, the relationality of (veridical)
perceptions should not be understood in terms of a relational form of awareness
of, or acquaintance with, the world. Perceptual awareness is intentional in
nature.
The central advantage of experiential intentionalism over more orthodox
forms of intentionalism is perhaps that it can properly acknowledge the pri-
ority of perceptions over perfect hallucinations | that is, the fact that, from
the inside, perfect hallucinations seem to be perceptions, and not vice versa.15
This means that what perfect hallucinations are like for us should be spelled
out in terms of perceptions; and important features of perfect hallucinations
are to be explained by reference to their subjective indistinguishability from
perceptions (see chs. 2 and 11). Orthodox intentionalism claims, for instance,
that the phenomenal character common to all perceptual experiences is neu-
tral on whether its bearers are perceptual or hallucinatory, while experiential
intentionalism maintains that this character (rightly or wrongly) identies its
15What makes forms of intentionalism `orthodox' is that they are predominant in con-
temporary philosophy, and not that they have strong anities to the original versions of
intentionalism put forward by the phenomenologists (see chs. 11 and 13 for more on this).
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bearers as perceptions. In chapter 8, I exploit this dierence in order to show
that M. G. F. Martin's important argument in his essay The Transparency of
Experience (Martin, 2002b) | which I elucidate and defend in the same chap-
ter | speaks against orthodox intentionalism, but not against experiential
intentionalism.
Indeed, much of the appeal of disjunctivism seems to be owed to the fact
that orthodox intentionalism cannot accommodate the priority of perceptions
over hallucinations, given that it takes the basic mental kind involved to in-
clude both veridical and hallucinatory perceptual experiences and, therefore,
cannot identify the character or role of those experiences as distinctively per-
ceptual. Another example is that orthodox intentionalism has diculties to
account for the fact that perfect hallucinations possess subjective rational force
(or authority) only to the extent that we take them to be perceptions. By con-
trast, experiential intentionalism assumes that the character common to all
perceptual experiences is characteristic of perceptions (rather than halluci-
nations) since it involves the presentation of the experiences as perceptions
(rather than hallucinations); and that the rational role of perceptions is dis-
tinctive of them since it is not even shared by perfect hallucinations (see chs. 8
and 11). Accordingly, experiential rationalism has the resources to account for
the authoritative role of unrecognised perfect hallucinations in our formation
of beliefs: they present themselves as perceptions, and we therefore rely on
them to the same extent to which we rely on perceptions.
Intentionalism need | and should | not deny the relationality of percep-
tion. But there are several options of how to accommodate this feature within
an intentionalist framework. It might be tempting, for instance, to under-
stand the relation, which is present in perception and absent in hallucination,
primarily in causal terms; and the phenomenal awareness of our perceptual
experiences as relations to the world in terms of an experience of causality
(Searle, 1983). But it would then be dicult to link the relationality of per-
ceptions to their reason-giving force, given that the fact that our experiences
are caused by the world is not enough to establish their power to justify be-
liefs about the world. A better alternative seems to be to assume a rational
dierence in relationality between perceptions and hallucinations. The idea
is that the justicatory power of perceptions is constitutively dependent on
the presence of the objects or facts concerned. That is, external entities are
constitutive of the rational role | rather than the phenomenal character |
of perceptions.
Given that the rational role of our mental episodes is essential to them, the
resulting position constitutes a form of disjunctivism, despite also embracing
intentionalism. This mixed view is possible because its disjunctivist and its
intentionalist elements are concerned with dierent aspects of our perceptual
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experiences. While their phenomenal character is understood in intentionalist
terms and, hence, as common to both perceptions and hallucinations, their
structure is taken to be partly rational in nature and, hence, as establishing a
dierence in basic mental kind between the two types of perceptual experience.
The disjunctivism defended in the present essays (see especially chapters 8 and
11) is therefore an instance of structural disjunctivism | disjunctivism about
the non-phenomenal, structural part of the nature of perceptual experiences.
It is contrasted both with phenomenal disjunctivism | disjunctivism about
the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences | and with general con-
junctivism which assumes that perceptions and hallucinations do not dier in
nature.16
Experiential intentionalism diers from more orthodox versions of inten-
tionalism not only in its involvement of token-reexive intentionality and the
subsequent accommodation of the priority of perceptions over perfect hallu-
cinations, but also in two other important aspects (see ch. 11). First, inten-
tionality is understood as requiring consciousness. According to experiential
rationalism, our mental episodes present themselves and parts of the world as
being a certain way. But this presupposes a conscious subjective perspective
to which they present themselves, and which itself cannot again be explained
in intentional terms.17 In other words, being an intentional presentation of
something requires having a phenomenal character; and having a phenomenal
character means being non-intentionally given to a conscious subject. As a
consequence, while non-conscious or non-mental states may count as repre-
sentational in a dierent sense, they are not intentional according to expe-
riential intentionalism. Second, intentionality is understood as a normative
phenomenon: it consists in the subjection of our mental episodes to certain
norms or requirements which specify when the episodes should or should not
occur relative to the actual state of the world or of our mind. A perceptual
16Main proponents of phenomenal disjunctivism are (Martin, 2002b, 2010) and (Fish,
2009). Other disjunctivists | like (Snowdon, 1980, 1990) or (McDowell, 1998a) | are
not necessarily commited to this version of disjunctivism. See (Dorsch, 2011a) and the
chapters 8 and 11 for more on how best to distinguish the various kinds of disjunctivism
about perceptual experiences and other mental phenomena. Note also that, in chapter 11,
I use 'experiential disjunctivism' in order to refer to what I have labelled here `phenomenal
disjunctivism'. Others have called the same position 'naive realist disjunctivism' (Nudds,
2010).
17It is perhaps promising | also in light of the comments above on the kind of self-
experience involved in our phenomenal awareness of our mental episodes | to argue that
the unity and perspectivalness of our perspective onto the world and our mind is partly
a matter of our access and responsiveness to reasons. And mental episodes may count as
conscious precisely because they are presented to such a rationally unied perspective. But
this would still leave unresolved the issue of what it means for us, as subjects, to count as
being conscious (e.g., when being awake or dreaming).
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experience of something red, for instance, should occur only if it relates us to
something red in our environment in such a way as to put us into the position
to acquire perceptual knowledge about the redness of that object. One advan-
tage of this normative account of intentionality is that it links intentionality
to rational role and to fundamental values, like the value of knowledge or of
morality. For example, both the justicatory power of perceptions and their
subjection to the norm just mentioned have their origin in the fact that it is
of cognitive value for us to stand in the specied perceptual relation to the
world.
To sum up, the combination of experiential rationalism, experiential in-
tentionalism and structural disjunctivism assumes several signicant links be-
tween consciousness and normativity. First, although consciousness itself is not
an intentional phenomenon, the conscious character of our mental episodes is
largely a matter of their intentionality. Second, their intentionality is a nor-
mative feature deriving from fundamental values which our mental episodes
help us to achieve. Third, their intentionality | and, hence, also their char-
acter | also reects their rational role, another of their normative features.
Accordingly, the two main aspects of our mental episodes | namely their
phenomenal character and their rational role | are intentionally connected to
each other. This ensures that our canonical access to the rational role of our
mental episodes is rst-personal. Only in cases where the phenomenal char-
acter of our mental episodes is misleading does the third-personal perspective
become relevant in rational matters. Otherwise, the latter's concern should
mainly be with non-rational aspects of the structure of our episodes | such
as their causal origin, their neuronal constitution, or their evolutionary value
or function.
II. The Individual Chapters
The collected articles are divided into three parts and an appendix, each of
which comprises three chapters. The rst part is concerned with the relation-
ship between, and the limits of, our rst- and our third-personal perspectives.
Its three chapters address this general issue before the background of a more
specic discussion of the nature of colours, of hallucinations and of aesthetic
evaluation, respectively. The next three articles constitute the second part,
which is concerned with the defense of experiential rationalism in the context
of such diverse topics as the phenomenal presence of perceptual reasons, the
conscious character and involuntariness of judgements, our self-knowledge of
mental agency, or the justication of our aesthetic evaluations. The essays of
the third part make the case for experiential intentionalism as the best account
of the character of perceptual experiences. Their argument for experiential
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intentionalism is combined with a defense of structural disjunctivism about
perceptual experiences, and of the idea that sensory and aective instances of
imagining (i.e., instances of objectual imagining) are instances of imagining
the character of sensory or aective episodes (i.e., instances of experiential
imagining). The essays in the appendix have been written in co-authorship
with Gianfranco Soldati, or are yet unpublished (though currently under re-
view for publication). They are included because they neatly supplement the
other chapters and add further support to the defense of a phenomenological
approach to thought, of experiential intentionalism about perceptual experi-
ences, and of experiential rationalism about aesthetic experience, respectively.
Because of their close thematic links to the preceding articles, I describe the
chapters of the appendix in the context of introducing the essays of the three
main parts of this collection.
Part I: The First- vs. the Third-Personal Perspective
Chapter 1: Colour Realism and Colour Resemblance. One prominent ambition
of theories of colour is to pay full justice to how colours are subjectively given to
us; and another to reconcile this rst-personal perspective on colours with the
third-personal one of the natural sciences. The goal of this article is to question
whether we can satisfy the second ambition on the assumption that the rst
should and can be met. I aim to defend a negative answer to this question by
arguing that the various kinds of experienced colour resemblances | that is,
similarities in hue distance, sameness in superdeterminables, and resemblances
between surfaces, volumes and illuminants | cannot be fully accounted for in
terms of the mental representation of the scientically studied properties, with
which colours are identied in response to the second ambition. Given that
how coloured objects are from the third-personal perspective is not sucient to
explain how they subjectively seem to be from the rst-personal perspective,
the conclusion should perhaps be that our colour experiences `project' certain
of their phenomenal aspects onto the perceived objects (Dorsch, 2009).
Chapter 2: The Unity of Hallucinations. My primary aim in this chapter is
to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can
capture both perfect hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable
from perceptions) and imperfect hallucinations (all others). In addition, I
mean to get clearer about the division of labour between philosophy and the
cognitive sciences. Recently, the epistemic conception of perfect hallucinations
{ according to which we cannot say more about their nature than that they are
subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions, but not themselves perceptions
| has gained considerable prominence in the literature. Assuming that this
conception is largely on the right track | at least when it comes down to
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what philosophy can teach us | I focus on two main tasks: (a) to provide
a satisfactory phenomenology of the subjective character of perceptions and
perfect hallucinations and (b) to redress the philosophers' neglect of imperfect
hallucinations. More specically, I intend to apply one of the central tenets
of the epistemic conception | namely that hallucinations can and should
be positively characterised in terms of their phenomenological connections to
perceptions | to imperfect hallucinations as well. That is, I try to show
that we can positively specify the class of hallucinations by reference to the
distinctive ways in which we consciously and rst-personally experience them
relative to perceptions. The task of saying more about their underlying third-
personal nature should then be left to the cognitive sciences.
Two ambitions of the essay are of particular signicance. First, it aims
to answer the question of why we group perfect and imperfect hallucinations
together. Philosophers have been interested in hallucinations mainly within
the context of providing a theory of perception; and for this task, only perfect
hallucinations matter. One important goal of my paper is to shift attention
from theories of perception to theories of hallucination, and to show that pro-
viding an account of hallucinations in all its forms is worthwhile in its own
rights. Central to my argument is a detailed phenomenological description
of the rich phenomenal character of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences.
Such a description has been missing in the recent literature on perceptions and
hallucinations, despite the fact that the phenomenal character of experiences is
essential to them and hence should be the subject of study of any satisfactory
theory of them. Second, the essay intends to highlight the contrast between
our rst-personal perspective onto the phenomenal character of experiences
and our third-personal perspective onto the underlying causal and neuronal
structures. It thereby stresses an important limitation of the philosophy of
mind, given that it cannot say anything substantial about the nature of hal-
lucinations (over and above the observation that they subjectively resemble
perceptions without being perceptual). Another important conclusion is that
hallucinations do not form a mental kind (in contrast, say, to perceptions,
beliefs, or imaginings). For the cognitive sciences reveal that hallucinatory ex-
periences may be subjectively similar to perceptions for very dierent reasons,
indicating large dierences in their non-phenomenal natures.
Chapter 3: The Relevance of Empirical Findings for Aesthetic Evaluation.
Empirical ndings can have an impact on aesthetic evaluation in at least two
ways. First | within criticism | they may inuence how we assess particular
objects, or types of objects. And second | whithin philosophy | they may
inuence which account of aesthetic value and evaluation we prefer. In this
chapter, I address both kinds of relevance, and with respect to a variety of
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possible sources of empirical evidence reaching beyond our own experiences
of the objects concerned | such as art-history, evolutionary psychology or
the cognitive sciences. My discussion concentrates thereby on several features
which are commonly ascribed to aesthetic evaluations, notably: (i) that they
are concerned with concrete objects, and not with types of objects; and (ii)
that they are to be justied in terms of reasons.
Within criticism, both features threaten to severely limit | or even negate
| the applicability of empirical ndings (especially of a more systematic and
scientic nature). The concreteness of aesthetic evaluations manifests itself in
two facts: (i.1) not only the qualities, but also the particularity of the objects
may matter (e.g., because of the particularity of expression and attachment);
(i.2) relatively small qualitative details may matter. Empirical research, how-
ever, is not concerned with (i.1); and it can capture (i.2) only in exchange for
generality (not to speak of the needed resources and, possibly, luck). In par-
ticular, even if it is possible to discover hedged aesthetic principles, empirical
evidence cannot help us to discern when they apply due to the openness of the
hedging condition. The rationality of aesthetic evaluations, on the other hand,
is closely related to the fact that what matters in aesthetic appreciation is
not only to recognise the value of objects (we often know it already), but also
to understand why they possess this value, or how they realise it (we often
disagree about this). But empirical ndings cannot contribute much to the
identication of reasons (rather than what we take to be reasons), nor to the
explanation of how these reasons render the attribution of specic aesthetic
values intelligible, given that both tasks are essentially concerned with norma-
tivity. At best, they may help us to notice features of objects which we then
recognise as reasons | but only if they take the concreteness of the latter
suciently into account (e.g., by investigating the nature and context of an
individual painting).
Within philosophy, empirical studies promise to be more relevant | for
instance, by tracing back sophisticated aesthetic sensibilities to basic aspects of
natural or sexual selection, or by identifying factors as substantially inuencing
our aesthetic evaluations, which our theories of aesthetic value take to be
irrelevant or even detrimental. This may actually link back to the discussion
about aesthetic criticism in so far as the suggested revisions of our theories may
very well lead to the denial of the features (i) or (ii). Empirical facts about the
origin of one of our current practices, however, do not automatically render
that practice intelligible: they may be completely extrinsic to its contemporary
signicance for our lives. And even if they do contribute to the explanation
of our practice, this is not something that we can discover empirically due
to the normative nature of the explanation concerned. The same is true of
the assessment of whether certain evaluations (e.g., those inuenced by what
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we take to be non-aesthetic factors) are of good aesthetic standing (or even
aesthetic in the rst place). Empirical evidence may show that we often fail
to live up to our standards and thus perhaps question them; but it may not
weaken those standards, or replace them with new ones.
The same limitations do not pertain to our rst-hand and rst-personal ex-
perience of aesthetics objects, which is also of an empirical nature. It concerns
particular objects and provides us with reasons; and it enables us to make
sense of the aesthetic value of an object. This appears to suggest that there is
a fundamental divide among our empirical ways of accessing aesthetic objects.
Perhaps, any more indirect or third-personal evidence becomes relevant for
aesthetic evaluation only if it is integrated with our more basic aesthetic expe-
riences (e.g., when art-historical facts concern the particular object in question,
or psychological evidence is focussed on our specic response). Otherwise, em-
pirical ndings may just bring us to question our considered views about the
values of objects or the nature of those values. The so-called `test of time' may
serve as an illustration. Part of why objects survive this test is that people
(whether they are experienced critics or ordinary lay people) continue over the
centuries and cultures to care about their preservation for aesthetic reasons.
This provides us with empirical evidence | though, it seems, not about the
aesthetic value of the objects concerned, but instead about the more general
quality of our own evaluation (e.g., bringing us to reconsider the matter).
Part II: In Defense of Experiential Rationalism
Chapter 4: The Phenomenal Presence of Reasons. Partly building on the phe-
nomenological considerations about the character of perceptions in the previ-
ous chapter, the aim of this essay is to motivate the view that the rational role
of our mental episodes is phenomenologically salient, and to illustrate how this
helps to distinguish sensory from intellectual episodes and categorise them into
more specic and basic mental kinds.
Among the features of our mental episodes that are phenomenologically
salient is their presentationality. In the case of perception, perceptual imagina-
tion, episodic memory or bodily sensation, the respective phenomenal aspects
may be labelled sensory aspects, given that the kind of objectual presentation
concerned is sensory in nature. By contrast, thoughts may instead be taken
to involve intellectual aspects, given that the kind of propositional presenta-
tion concerned is intellectual in nature. In this essay, I shift attention to a
third class of phenomenal aspects | and a second class of non-sensory ones |
which pertain both to sensory and to intellectual episodes (as well as to other
episodes, such as aective or conative ones). They are perhaps best called
rational aspects because they are determined by, and thus reect, the rational
role of the episodes concerned | that is, whether these episodes provide us
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with and/or are responsive to epistemic, practical or other reasons. To take
the example of perceptions, they provide us with reasons for belief because
they bring us into relational contact with facts in the world; and since their
relationality is phenomenologically salient, their reason-giving power is so, too.
While the chapter concentrates mainly on perceptual experiences, it also
extends the discussion to judgemental thoughts, episodic memories and in-
stances of imagining. The defense of experiential rationalism is thereby fo-
cussed largely on the establishment of the particular claim that the rational
aspects of phenomenal character are, in two respects, more signicant and
fundamental than the aspects linked to sensory or intellectual presentation.
First, the various basic mental kinds, to which our episodes belong, can be
individuated by reference to the rational aspects of their phenomenal charac-
ters. For example, seeing and visualising dier in that only the former give
us reasons for belief; while perceptions and judgemental thoughts dier in
that only the latter are also responsive to epistemic reasons. By contrast, the
sensory and intellectual aspects are solely connected to the concrete exempli-
cation of these basic mental kinds | such as to the specication of which
particular beliefs the episodes provide us with reasons for. That is, while
the rational aspects reect the kind-constituting rational role of our episodes
(e.g.,their type or attitude), the sensory and intellectual aspects reect the
specic realisation of that role (e.g., their particular content).
Second, the dierence between sensory and intellectual aspects | and,
hence, between sensory and intellectual episodes | can be spelled out in
terms of the non-neutrality and the reason-insensitivity of the presentational
elements concerned. More precisely, the claim is that phenomenal aspects |
and mental episodes | are sensory because they are (partially or fully) un-
responsive to theoretical reasons, while none the less being non-neutral about
their presented objects as being a certain way (either as part of the present
or past actual world, or as part of some possible or imagined world). The
non-neutrality condition excludes episodes which involve conative forms of
presentation, rather than sensory ones; while the reason-insensitivity condi-
tion rules out judgemental, imaginative and other thoughts. Accordingly, the
rational role of presentational episodes | and, hence, also the rational aspects
of their character | indicates whether the presentation involved is sensory or
intellectual in nature.
What is particularly important here is that theoretical reasons comprise
not only epistemic reasons (i.e., reasons for belief), but also the correspond-
ing quasi-epistemic reasons at work in imaginative projects (i.e., the reasons
governing the coherence between, say, what we visualise and what we suppose
to be the case in a given imagined situation). In particular, while imaginative
thoughts are subject to the rational pressure exerted by episodes of visualising
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which form part of the same imaginative project, the latter are immune to
such pressure. When we visualise a character in a novel as being blonde, we
should not also imagine that she has dark hair | or only in conjunction with
supposing that our episode of visualising is something like an `imaginative il-
lusion'. Such rational tensions therefore do not demand from us to modify our
episode of visualising, but instead to imaginatively reassess their `veridicality'
with respect to the imagined situation.
The resulting view of the rational dimension of the phenomenal character
of our mental episodes can also shed more light on what it means to say that
certain reasons are reasons for us. They become reasons for us only in so far
as their presence and rational impact is phenomenally accessible to us from
our rst-personal perspective. While it is possible to judge that there is good
reason to help a particular person in need without being motivated to help
her, it is not possible to remain so unmoved when phenomenally experiencing
our awareness of her neediness as giving us access to this good reason to help
her (see also the section on rational motivation above).
Chapter 5: Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. This essay provides sup-
port for experiential rationalism by addressing the question of the scope and
nature of our self-knowledge of judging and of mental agency. This question is
addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form
judgemental thoughts (or occurrent beliefs) in direct response to practical rea-
sons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, their involuntariness
cannot be due to their subjection to a truth norm. The reason for this is that
we can fail to adhere to such a norm and still count as judging, leaving at
least in principle room for the impact of practical considerations. Instead,
it is argued that we cannot form judgements at will because we subjectively
experience them as responses to epistemic reasons, and because this is incom-
patible with also experiencing them as direct responses to practical reasons
(as happens, say, when we imagine something). However, this latter awareness
does not extend to indirect agency | such as cheering oneself up by thinking
of something nice, or breaking a window by throwing a stone | which relies
on epistemic or causal processes as means. Judging may | and should |
therefore still count as an indirect mental action.
The essay thus proposes a novel way of accounting for the involuntariness of
our formation of judgemental thoughts (and, subsequently, beliefs): namely in
terms of their phenomenal character, rather than their subjection to epistemic
norms. This is possible because experiential rationalism argues that phenom-
enal consciousness is already permeated with normativity. The application of
experiential rationalism to judgemental and imaginative thoughts presupposes
that they possess a phenomenal character. This presupposition is defended in
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more detail in chapter 12. But it is worthwhile to point out that the argument
presented in this chapter does not assume that phenomenal dierences are as
ne-grained as dierences in propositional content, but only that dierences in
propositional attitude are phenomenologically salient. This has the advantage
of making it possible to avoid most skeptical worries raised in the literature
about the phenomenality of thinking, given that they are concerned with the
salience of concepts or propositions. Indeed, it seems more dicult to deny
that there is a phenomenal dierence between, say, judging that it rains and
imagining that it rains than between, say, thinking that it rains and thinking
that it rains a bit.
The chapter also introduces and defends a new account of our self-know-
ledge of our own intentional actions, by basing the latter on our experience
of direct motivation and control by practical reasons. It uses this account to
determine the scope both of our mental agency and of our awareness of our
own agency. As part of these considerations, the essay spells out an important
distinction between two kinds of results of actions which has been previously
neglected in the literature (in contrast to some close-by distinctions): namely
the distinction between results that are direct responses to practical control
(e.g., the results of visualising a tree, or raising one's arm) and results that
have been brought about by cognitive or causal processes triggered by practical
control (e.g., the results of remembering the name of a person, or breaking a
glass). This distinction is signicant since it demarcates the border of action
awareness (i.e., between results that we experience as actively produced and
results that we experience as occurring passively); and because it helps to make
clear in which sense acts of judging, remembering, and so on, are instances of
mental agency | namely in the second, indirect sense.
One important fact, which the chapter assumes without arguing for it, is
that there is a dierence between dierent kinds of reasons | notably epis-
temic and practical reasons | and, hence, between our experiences of them.
It has recently been become almost standard to recognise that epistemic and
practical rationality are closely intertwined (Owens (2000); Feldman (2000)).
And some philosophers have been moved by this observation | as well as by
ideas originating in James (2005) | to accept that there is no signicant dier-
ence between the two kinds of rationality. Typical claims include that beliefs
formed for reasons of utility, rather than truth, may count as justied; or that
epistemic justication is, fundamentally, a form of practical justication be-
cause, say, truth or other epistemic goals are only of instrumental value (Foley
(1987); Kornblith (1993); Papineau (1999)). By contrast, I would still like to
insist on the presence of at least three signicant dierences between the two
types of rationality (while acknowledging their intimate links). First, epistemic
rationality does not involve instrumental rationality (Owens (2003)). Second,
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epistemic rationality does not allow for tie-braking. In particular, it is not ra-
tional to form one of two evidentially equally well-supported, but inconsistent
beliefs (Harman (1999)). And third, being epistemically justied is incom-
mensurable with being practically justied. There is, for instance, no overall
answer to the question of whether a belief showing one kind of justication
and lacking the other is justied or not. Philosophers may have overlooked
these dierences because they have understood agency in terms of Kantian
`spontaneity' | that is, as the employment of rational capacities on behalf of
the subject, in contrast to his or her passive subjection to merely causal pro-
cesses (cf. Wallace (2006) for a similar distinction). But, partly for the reasons
mentioned, genuine agency and practical rationality should require more than
this, namely additionally something like means-end justiability (Pink (1996)).
Chapter 12: Conceptual Qualia and Communication. Experiential rationalism
assumes that thoughts are phenomenally conscious and thus possess a subjec-
tive character. This assumption has been subject to the skeptical worry that
only sensory episodes | such as perceptual experiences or bodily sensations
| involve phenomenal consciousness (cf., e.g., Carruthers (2000)). Chapter
4 has already tried to make plausible that the question of the existence of
non-sensory aspects of phenomenal character is not limited to thought. If
perceptions possess a subjective character, then they are very likely to pos-
sess non-sensory phenomenal aspects | namely those aspects concerned with
their rational role. However, considerations of this kind do not speak against
all forms of skepticism about phenomenal thought. For even if it is assumed
that thoughts possess a phenomenal character in so far as their rational role
and the involved attitude towards their propositional content is phenomeno-
logically salient, it is still possible to doubt that dierences in what is thought
| that is, dierences in propositional content or in the concepts involved |
lead to phenomenal dierences.
After briey defending the idea that thoughts are not mental dispositions,
but instead part of the stream of consciousness and, hence, mental episodes
with a phenomenal character, Gianfranco Soldati and I concentrate in this
chapter on the issue of whether this character is (roughly) as ne-grained as
propositional dierences and put forward two considerations in favour of a
positive answer. The rst consideration exploits the fact that we can intro-
spectively distinguish between thoughts that dier just in their propositional
content. For instance, we can tell from the inside whether we are thinking that
it rains or whether we are instead thinking that snow is white. Now, denying
that this dierence is phenomenologically salient requires accepting that intro-
spection provides us with access to features of our thoughts, which are neither
aspects of phenomenal character, nor correlated to and thus reected in such
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aspects. But it is unclear how introspection could make such features acces-
sible to us, and which features could be concerned. The second consideration
deals with our ability to individuate and understand assertions of thoughts
with dierent propositional contents and argues that the best explanation of
this ability maintains that our conscious experiences of understanding dier
phenomenally in relation to dierences in what is understood. Our main de-
fense of this view involves responding to three potential objections, namely
that we rely on a simplifying and potentially circular theory of understanding
other minds, that thought is phenomenal only to the extent to which it in-
volves imagery, and that the character of thinking is to unspecic or vague to
capture (many) propositional dierences.
Chapter 6: Sentimentalism and the Intersubjectivity of Aesthetic Evaluations.
This and the following essay defend experiential rationalism about objective
evaluations. Although I concentrate my discussion on assessments in aes-
thetic matters, many of the considerations and arguments should apply equally
well to moral evaluations. Moreover, the defense of experiential rationalism
is largely only indirect, given that much of the argumentation is concerned
with the rejection of the two predominant alternative views, rather than with
the provision of positive reasons for the acceptance of experiential rationalism.
The rst of the two traditional positions to be rejected follows both Hume and
Kant in taking aesthetic evaluations to be based on emotional responses, while
the second instead follows Sibley in assuming that they are grounded in some
form of non-inferential and purely cognitive higher-level perception.18 As a
better alternative to both views, I put forward the idea that we evaluate ob-
jects in response to recognising certain descriptive facts about them as reasons
| that is, as speaking | for or against certain evaluations. Since aesthetic
judgement is largely not a matter of deduction and principles, the rational
assessment involved should be understood as involving a largely unprincipled
form of inference or reasoning, such as it is central to, say, the visually based
estimation of how many people are seated in a football stadium (Bender, 1995).
Chapter 6 is reserved for the discussion of emotion-based accounts of aes-
thetic assessment. Within the debate on the epistemology of aesthetic ap-
preciation, it has a long tradition, and is still very common, to endorse the
sentimentalist view that our aesthetic evaluations are rationally grounded on,
or even constituted by, certain of our emotional responses to the objects con-
cerned. Such a view faces, however, the serious challenge to satisfactorily
deal with the seeming possibility of faultless disagreement among emotionally
18In chapter 7, I adopt Sibley's talk of `perception'. But what he has in mind may equally
well be labelled `intuition' | as long as it is not mixed up with the kind of rational intuition
involved in the understanding and recognition of apriori truths (Bealer, 2002).
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based and epistemically appropriate verdicts. I argue that the sentimental-
ist approach to aesthetic epistemology cannot accept and accommodate this
possibility without thereby undermining the assumed capacity of emotions to
justify corresponding aesthetic evaluations | that is, without undermining
the very sentimentalist idea at the core of its account. And I also try to show
that sentimentalists can hope to deny the possibility of faultless disagreement
only by giving up the further view that aesthetic assessments are intersubjec-
tive | a view which is almost as traditional and widely held in aesthetics as
sentimentalism, and which is indeed often enough combined with the latter.
My ultimate conclusion is therefore that this popular combination of views
should better be avoided: either sentimentalism or intersubjectivism has to
make way. Given that our aesthetic judgements and our related practice of
criticism purport to aspire to intersubjectivity, it seems best to give up on
emotions as grounds for aesthetic evaluations and take them instead to be
grounds for judgements about subjective preferences.
Chapter 7: Non-Inferentialism about Aesthetic Judgement. The chapter on
Frank Sibley's approach to the epistemology of aesthetic properties does two
things. First and foremost, it argues against an experience-based account of
the justication of our aesthetic judgements | another popular, this time non-
sentimentalist alternative to experiential rationalism in aesthetic matters | by
illustrating how it fails to do justice to our practice of pointing to lower-level
features of artworks in support of our ascriptions of higher-level descriptive
or evaluative aesthetic properties to those works. Second and more briey,
it argues for a more rationalist view which construes aesthetic judgements as
based on a form of non-deductive reasoning in response to the recognition
of lower-level features as epistemic reasons for the ascription of higher-level
aesthetic properties. That is, the chapter does not merely exclude one further
rival of experiential rationalism, but also provides positive considerations in
favour of the latter position. Besides, although the discussion is focussed on the
perceivability of aesthetic qualities, my hope is that its points and conclusions
can also be applied to other forms of non-inferential access (e.g., intuition or
feeling), as well as other kinds of higher-level properties (e.g., natural kinds,
aordances, character traits or non-aesthetic values).
Proponents of the idea that our canonical access to higher-level descriptive
or evaluative aesthetic properties is experiential face the problem of reconciling
this idea with the fact that we support our resulting aesthetic judgements when
challenged to do so by reference to lower-level features which contribute to the
realisation of the aesthetic properties. The kind of support provided cannot be
understood as evidential support since that would render aesthetic justication
inferential and non-experiential. For instance, seeing something as (approxi-
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mately) circular or red is sucient to justify the respective perceptual belief;
identifying any lower-level features in virtue of which the object is circular or
red does not add anything to the epistemic standing of our judgement. We can
infer the colour of a surface when we come to know its reectance properties
only if we already know about the correlation between the two kinds of prop-
erties. But acquiring knowledge of this correlation requires access to colours
which is epistemically independent of | and privileged with respect to | our
recognition of reectances (see also ch. 1).
But this raises the question of how our practice of supporting aesthetic
judgements can be made sense of in non-epistemic terms. I discuss and re-
ject four dierent options open to proponents of the experience-based account,
namely to maintain that reference to the lower-level features: (i) helps others
to experience the higher-level aesthetic qualities for themselves; (ii) increases
our condence in our ascription of the aesthetic properties; (iii) enriches our
aesthetic appreciation and renders it more intelligible; or (iv) satises a special
kind of curiosity of ours which is distinctive of our aesthetic engagement with
objects, and distinct from our theoretical interest in gaining knowledge about
which lower-level features realise which higher-level ones. What all four op-
tions have in common is that they cannot capture the normative dimension of
our practice | that is, that we should be able to provide support for our aes-
thetic judgements when reasonably challenged. In addition, they also cannot
explain why our distinctively aesthetic curiosity | in contrast with our theo-
retical curiosity | is limited to certain (levels of) lower-level features. From
the point of view of a scientist or a metaphysician, it is interesting to discover
the molecular structure of a painting, say. But from the point of view of an art
critic, this kind of knowledge is normally completely irrelevant. My contention
is that both aspects of aesthetic appreciation can be satisfactorily elucidated
only on the assumption that lower-level features constitute epistemic reasons
for aesthetic judgements | reasons which we typically recognise as reasons
with the kind of phenomenal experience described by experiential rationalism.
Part III: In Defense of Experiential Intentionalism
Chapter 8: Transparency and Imagining Seeing. In this chapter, I object both
to orthodox intentionalism and to phenomenal disjunctivism. My main concern
is thereby with the powerful and complex argument against intentionalism
| and for disjunctivism | about perceptual experiences presented by M.
G. F. Martin in his article The Transparency of Experience (Martin, 2002b).
This argument consists of two premisses which entail a conclusion that seems
at odds with intentionalism. The rst premiss is that, as reection on the
subjective character of visualising an external thing reveals, visualising is not
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neutral about the presence of the visualised thing in the imagined situation.
According to the second premiss, visualising an external thing consists | at
least in some cases | in imagining a visual perception of it. Both premisses
taken together imply that imagining a visual perception of an external thing
is not neutral about that thing's presence in the imagined situation. But
this appears to contradict the intentionalist assumption that the presence of
a visual perception in a situation is compatible with the absence of a suitable
object of perception in that very same situation.
Indeed, intentionalists typically accept the incompability of Martin's con-
clusion with their own view and, as a result, tend to reject one of the two pre-
misses of Martin's argument. My rst aim in this chapter is to show that they
have been misguided on both counts. They have been wrong about rejecting
one of the premisses because they have not suciently taken into account Mar-
tin's reasons for endorsing them. And they have been wrong about accepting
the incompatibility of intentionalism with the conclusion of Martin's argument
because they have too narrow a conception of intentionalism. It is true that
orthodox intentionalism is incompatible with Martin's conclusion. And, by
defending the two premisses, I try to show that his argument against orthodox
intentionalism is sound. But this does not mean that other versions of inten-
tionalism do not have the resources to accommodate the fact that imagining
perceiving something is non-neutral about the latter. In fact, non-orthodox
versions of intentionalism may very well be able to accommodate the conclusion
of Martin's argument, without giving up on their intentionalist commitments.
In particular, experiential intentionalism | which diers signicantly from
those forms of intentionalism currently en vogue (e.g., those defended in the
writings of Dretske, Burge, Tye or Byrne), most notably in linking intention-
ality essentially to consciousness, and in assuming a self-reexive element as
part of perceptual (and other kinds of) intentionality | can endorse Martin's
argument.
Moreover, it turns out that the considerations about how intentionalism can
accommodate Martin's conclusion can actually be used to formulate an objec-
tion against phenomenal disjunctivism. The noted problem for this version of
disjunctivism is that it cannot explain how it is possible for us to experien-
tially imagine hallucinating something. All that phenomenal disjunctivists can
account for is that we can experientially imagine seeing something and then in-
tellectually imagine that the imagined experience is hallucinatory. The reason
for this is that phenomenal disjunctivism assumes that all we know about the
character of perfect hallucinations is that they are subjectively indistinguish-
able from perceptions. But this knowledge does not suce to experientially
imagine hallucinating something | that is, to imagine the instantiation of the
character of a perception-like hallucinations. However, imaginatively thinking
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of an experientially imagined experience of seeing as an experience of halluci-
nating cannot cancel out the fact that imagining seeing implies the presence
of the seen object in the imagined situation. Given that this presence is in-
compatible with imagining having a hallucination, phenomenal disjunctivists
cannot accommodate imaginative projects of the latter kind. All they can al-
low for is imagining a situation in which there is an experience of seeing and
a seen object, and in which this experience is taken to be hallucinatory. My
second goal in this chapter is, accordingly, to argue that experiential inten-
tionalism should be preferred not only over orthodox intentionalism, but also
over phenomenal disjunctivism.
Chapter 9: The Humean Origins of the Representational Account of Imagin-
ing. The claim that objectual imagining (e.g., visualising) is essentially a form
of experiential imagining (e.g., imagining seeing) has been central to the objec-
tion against orthodox intentionalism presented in the last chapter. This and
the next chapter are meant to provide further support for this claim. In the
essay on Hume and his inuence on later accounts of imagining, I focus on the
prospects of the Representational Account of imagining { the view that imagin-
ing amounts to imaginatively representing some cognitive type of episode, such
as an experience of seeing or a judgemental thought. The claim that visualis-
ing consists literally of imagining seeing is an instance of the Representational
Account, as applied to visual imagining. I trace the origins of this account
to Hume's comments on the nature of imaginative episodes and discuss how
his treatment of imagining survives the general objections to his theory of the
mind (e.g., linked to his notion of `vivacity', or his disrespect of the distinction
between sensory and intellectual episodes). So the defense here of the idea that
objectual imagining should be understood in terms of experiential imagining
is purely negative.
Chapter 10: Emotional Imagining and Our Reponses to Fictions. The next
chapter provides some positive support for this idea, this time applied to
aective instances of objectual imagining. I use the disagreement between
Richard Moran and Kendall Walton on the nature of our aective responses
to ction as a background for my discussion and defend a view on the issue
which is opposed to Moran's account and improves on Walton's. Moran takes
imagination-based aective responses to be instances of genuine emotion and
treats them as episodes with an emotional attitude towards their contents. I
argue against the existence of such attitudes, and that the aective element
of such responses should rather be taken to be part of what is imagined. In
this respect, I follow Walton; and I also agree with the latter that our aec-
tive responses to ction are, as a consequence, not instances of real emotion.
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However, this gives rise to the challenge to be more specic about the nature
of our responses and explain how they can still involve a phenomenologically
salient aective element, given that propositionally imagining that one feels a
certain emotion is ruled out because it may be done in a dispassionate way.
The answer | already suggested, but not properly spelled out by Walton | is
that aectively responding to some ctional element consists in imaginatively
representing an experience of emotional feeling towards it. The central thought
is that the conscious and imaginative representation of the aective character
of an instance of genuine emotion itself involves the respective phenomenologi-
cally salient aective element, despite not instantiating it. In short, aectively
imagining something amounts to experientially imagining an emotional expe-
rience of it.
Chapter 11: Experience and Introspection. This chapter continues my argu-
ment against orthodox intentionalism and phenomenal disjunctivism about
perceptual experiences, this time combined with positive considerations in
favour of experiential intentionalism and structural disjunctivism.19 One cen-
tral fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable
from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued that the hallucinatory expe-
riences concerned cannot | and need not | be characterised in any more
positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been
advocated as the best choice for proponents of phenomenal disjunctivism |
the view that perceptions and hallucinations dier essentially in their intro-
spectible subjective characters. In this chapter, I aim to formulate and defend
experiential intentionalims as an intentionalist alternative to phenomenal dis-
junctivism. Experiential intentionalism does not only enjoy some advantages
over its rival, but also can largely hold on to the epistemic conception of
perception-like hallucinations.
First of all, I spell out in a bit more detail in which sense hallucinations
may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions, and why this leads
us to erroneously judge them to be perceptions (see sections I{III and VIII).
Then, I raise three challenges each for phenomenal disjunctivism and its inten-
tionalist counterpart (see sections IV and V). Phenomenal disjunctivism has
serious diculties with explaining why it is reasonable from our rst-personal
perspective to endorse perfect hallucinations in belief, and with elucidating
how assuming a relational form of awareness helps us to account for two cen-
tral features of perceptions, namely that they are conscious and that their
justicatory power is easily accessible to the subject. Intentionalism, on the
other hand, faces the problems of accounting for the error involved in intro-




spectively judging perfect hallucinations to be perceptions, of accommodating
the possibility of non-perceptual experiences that are introspectively indistin-
guishable from perceptual ones, and of avoiding an error theory about our
phenomenologically based ordinary conception of perceptions. And, nally, I
propose my alternative both to phenomenal disjunctivism and to orthodox in-
tentionalism. As already noted, experiential intentionalism takes perceptions
and perfect hallucinations to share a common character which is partly to be
specied in intentional | and, hence, normative | terms (see sections VI and
VII). The central thought is that the hallucinations concerned are intentionally
| and erroneously | presented to us as relating us to the world. Adopting
this view promises to enable us to meet the six challenges raised before (see
sections VI{VIII), and to get clearer about the available views on the nature
of perceptual experiences (see section IX).
Experiential intentionalism is compatible with the epistemic conception of
hallucinations, as well as with the disjunctivist view that perceptions and hallu-
cinations dier essentially in their third-personal structures. It also maintains
that there are actually two forms of access from the inside and, relatedly, two
aspects to the subjective indistinguishability of mental episodes: (i) that we
cannot distinguish their rst-personal characters in introspective awareness ;
and (ii) that we cannot distinguish their third-personal structures in experien-
tial awareness | that is, in how they are phenomenally given in consciousness.
While phenomenal disjunctivism makes the mistake of ignoring (ii) and reduc-
ing subjective indiscriminability to (i), experiential intentionalism correctly
identies (ii) as the primary source of the subjective indistinguishability of
perfect hallucinations. Accordingly, the intentional error involved in such hal-
lucinations is due to the fact that we consciously experience them as possessing
a relational structure. Experiential intentionalism can also accommodate the
fact that, from our rst-personal perspective, both perceptions and hallucina-
tions seem to be relational, and can account for the subjective rational force of
both kinds of experience | and its easy accessibility | by reference to their
shared intentional presentation of themselves as reason-providers.
Chapter 13: Intentionalism, Experiential Error and Phenomenal Error. In
this essay, Gianfranco Soldati and I address in more detail the fundamental
question of how intentionalism can accommodate the relationality of percep-
tions. The idea that perception is both intentional and relational is central to
experiential intentionalism, especially in its combination with structural dis-
junctivism. Hence, there is a need to prove that this view on percepion is
indeed coherent. Our proposal is, not surprisingly, that the intentionality and
the relationality concern dierent aspects: the rst pertains to the phenom-
enal part of the nature of perceptual experiences, while the latter belongs to
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the non-phenomenal part of the nature of perceptions (and is missing in the
case of hallucinations). One particular challenge, which we take up here, is to
show how the relationality of perceptions becomes phenomenologically salient,
despite being part of their non-phenomenal structure. So much of the chapter
is devoted to a detailed formulation of experiential intentionalism | which we
take to be much closer to the original kind of intentionalism to be found in the
early writings of the phenomenologists (notably Husserl) than contemporary
versions of intentionalism (i.e., what I have labelled `orthodox intentionalism')
| and of its consequences for the philosophy of perception.
As part of this discussion, we distinguish dierent ways in which we may, or
may not, err with respect to the nature of our perceptual experiences. First, we
may be subject to doxastic error: we may form false beliefs about the essential
or non-essential features of our experiences, including their phenomenal char-
acter. Second, we may fall victim to experiential error: the phenomenal char-
acter of our experiences may mislead us about their non-phenomenal features
(e.g., when perfect hallucinations present themselves as relational). Third, we
cannot be subject to phenomenal error: our phenomenal awareness of our ex-
periences cannot ground wrong judgements about their phenomenal character,
given that both consist in how the experiences are given in consciousness (i.e.,
in what it is like for us to have them). But the last observation poses a problem
for phenomenal disjunctivism. According to this form of disjunctivism, when
we wrongly judge our perfect hallucinations to be perceptions, we wrongly
judge them to possess a phenomenal character (i.e., that of perceptions) which
they in fact do not possess. In order to avoid the postulation of phenomenal
error, phenomenal disjunctivists have to locate the source of our judgemental
error in something else than our phenomenal awareness of our hallucinatory
experiences. But it is not clear what else could ll in this role. Experiential
intentionalism, by contrast, has a straightforward answer: we make a judge-
mental error because we are subject to experiential error, that is, because our
phenomenal awareness misleads us about the non-phenomenal nature of our
perfect hallucinations.20
20Each chapter comes with its own acknowledgements. For comments on this introduction,
I would like to thank Davor Bodrozic, Stefaan Cuypers and Gianfranco Soldati. More










Colour Resemblance and Colour
Realism
I.
Our various theories and conceptions of colours are inuenced by the two main
perspectives which we have on them. On the one hand, colours are directly
given to us, in our conscious perceptual experiences, as features of objects in
our environment. As part of these experiences, the colours instantiated by
the objects are presented as having certain qualitative and certain categorial
properties. Among the sensorily presented qualitative features of colours are,
rst of all, their various internal similarities and dierences. Thus, two colours
may be experienced as being closer to each other in their hue, their saturation
or their brightness than a third colour. Their qualitative features also include
the property of being unique (or elemental) or, alternatively, the property of
being binary (or compound). While unique shades of hue are experienced as
not involving any other colour hues, binary shades of hue are experienced as
being qualitatively composed out of the former.
The property of being instantiated independently of our particular experi-
ences and the property of being instantiated by some actually existing objects
are some of the categorical features1, which we non-sensorily experience colour
instances as having. That is, the colours which we perceive are given to us as
mind-independent properties of real objects. Another relevant aspect - though
probably more controversial - may perhaps be that we experience colour in-
stances as determining our perceptions of them. The idea is that, while seeing
the colours of objects, we are aware of the fact that, if the colours would
have been dierent, our experiences of them would have been correspondingly
1The label is not accidental since the properties at issue correspond to some extent to
Kant's categories (cf. the discussion in chapters 2 and 4). It does not matter for what follows
that the categorical features pertain to colour instances, while the qualitative features pertain
to colours.
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dierent as well (cf. chapters 2 and 4).
The categorial features are the same for all perceived colours instances
that we perceive. The qualitative features, of course, dier relative to which
colour we experience. The non-sensory presentation of the categorical features
of colour instances and the sensory presentation of the qualitative features
of the colours involved contribute to the subjective character of the relevant
colour experiences | to what they are subjectively like. This means that
the character of our colour experiences shows both categorical and qualitative
aspects: they are experiences of what appear to be mind-independently in-
stantiated properties standing in certain internal relations to other properties
of the same kind.
On the other hand, the phenomenon of colour is subject of the natural
sciences, notably physics and cognitive science. The empirical investigations
concerned focus on many dierent aspects of colours and colour vision, such
as the relevant physical properties of coloured entities, their interaction with
light, the eects of light on the retina, or the resulting processing of these
stimuli in the visual system of the brain. Some of the corresponding studies
have to rely on our subjective access to colours to get their extensions right
| for instance, if we want to nd out which retinal stimulations are linked to
which particular colours. But the knowledge gained is still empirical and third-
personal in nature, unlike our rst-personal knowledge about the qualitative
and categorical features of colours.
It has been one prominent ambition of theories of colour to pay full jus-
tice to how they are given to us subjectively; and another to reconcile the
insights about colours from the rst-personal perspective with those of the
third-personal one. The goal of this article is to question whether we can sat-
isfy the second ambition on the assumption that the rst should and can be
met. That is, I aim to look exclusively at a position which promises to take
our colour experiences at face value and to accommodate both their qualitative
and their categorical features mentioned above. There are plenty of theories
which deny one or the other aspect; and plenty of responses arguing that this
disqualies them as satisfactory accounts of colours.2 Here, I simply take for
granted that the latter are right. Accordingly, colours are understood as prop-
erties that stand in certain internal relations to each other and are actually
instantiated independently of our experiences of them. The question is then
whether these rst-personally characterised properties can be identied with
third-personally accessible properties.3
2See Hardin (1988) and Byrne and Hilbert (1997b) (especially the introduction) for good
overviews. See also the detailed discussion in Dorsch (2009).
3My underlying doubts concern not only the claim that the subjectively given colours can
be identied with scientically accessible properties, but also the more general assumption
that rst-personal elements of experience may be studied from a third-personal point of
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In section II, I specify the two elements needed for an account of colour
to be able to full both ambitions | namely naive realism and reduction-
ism about colours | and illustrate how the resulting view is commited to
accounting for the qualitative aspects of colour experiences in terms of the
representation of the physical properties identied with colours. Section III
introduces types of surface reectances properties as the best candidates for
the identication with surface colours. In section IV, I distinguish two kinds
of hue resemblance among surface colours | in respect of shared superde-
terminables and in respect of hue distance | and specify how the reductive
naive realism may account for each of them. My focus is thereby on the view
developed by Byrne and Hilbert (1997a, 2003), which constitutes perhaps the
most detailed and sophisticated version of reductive naive realism put forward
recently. Section V then tries to show that their best attempt at explaining the
experienced similarity concerning shared superdeterminables is bound to fail.
The essay closes with section VI by arguing that reductive naive realism does
not fare better with regard to an account of the subjective hue resemblances
among coloured entities of dierent substances (i.e., between surface, volume
and illuminant colours). My conclusion is therefore that the second ambition
is better to be given up, and that | in the case of colours and our experience
of them | our rst-personal and third-personal perspectives do not concern
the same kind of property.
II.
The account of colours to be discussed in this essay endorses naive realism
about colours. The realist aspect of this endorsement is that the view under
consideration assigns colours the status of features that are actually instan-
tiated independently of our particular experiences of them and therefore are
open to genuine recognition.4 And the naive aspect consists in its acceptance
that colours possess also the qualitative (as well as any additional) features
which they are presented as having. Both aspects together ensure that colours
really are as they are subjectively given to us | and thus that the rst ambi-
tion is satised. It is worthwhile to note that naive realism | as understood
here | does not exclude the possibility of aspects of the nature of colours
which are not revealed to us by our colour experiences (cf. Kalderon (2012)).
The view at issue combines this naive realist stance with a reductionist ap-
proach to colours which identies them with third-personally accessible | and
typically, though not necessarily, physical | properties. This means, among
other things, that the subjective presentation of colours in fact amounts to a
view. I address the latter issue in chapters 2 and 11, while I focus here on the former.
4See McDowell (1998d) for discussion of this notion of objectivity.
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presentation | or representation, if one prefers | of the properties identied
with colours. For instance, it is these properties which are given to us as being
similar or dierent in certain respects, or as instantiated independently of our
perception of them. But again, their full objective nature need not be revealed
to us in subjective experience.
The presentational link involved may be understood in dierent ways. Ac-
cording to some positions, it consists in a relation of acquaintance or manifes-
tation of the presented objects and features (cf., e.g., Kalderon (2012)). Others
treat it as a representational link to be spelled out in causal, informational or
teleological terms (cf., e.g., Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995, 2000)). And again
others take it to be intentional in nature, meaning that the mental episodes
concerned are appearances that are subject to a certain kind of norm (e.g., to to
occur only if certain conditions on the world are satised; cf., e.g., chapters 11
and 13). One important dierence between representationality and the other
two options concerns their relation to consciousness. The property of being a
manifestation or appearance of something is taken to be a constituent of the
subjective character of the episodes concerned. Accordingly, only conscious
mental states can involve acquaintance or intentionality. Representationality,
by contrast, need not necessarily pertain to conscious mental states | other
entities, such as non-conscious mental states, photographs or paintings, may
be representational as well.5
For what follows, it does not matter which understanding of the presenta-
tional link is endorsed by the proponents of reductive naive realism (or RNR
for short). It suces to note that they all accept that colours are proper-
ties, which are really as they are subjectively given to us, and which we can
none the less individuate and study by means of the natural sciences. Their
view thus indeed combines the two ambitions introduced above. None the
less, reductionism about colours is most naturally combined with a reduction-
ist approach to the subjective presentation of colours. In accordance with
this, I give preference in what follows to a representational understanding of
the relation between our colour experiences and the third-personal properties
identied with colours.
One of the main motivations for adopting RNR is that it promises an
account of the presentational aspects of the rst-personal character of colour
experiences (and presumably other episodes) in terms of the represented third-
personally accessible properties. Indeed, it is arguable that the provision of
such an account is part of the second ambition, and actually its main point.
5Partly for this reason, it seems more natural to claim (if at all) that the representational
properties of a mental episode determine, rather than constitute, its subjective character
(cf. Tye (1995) for the former, and Dretske (1995) for the latter view). Some philosophers
use the term `intentionality' to denote what I mean by `representationality' (cf. chapter 11
for a discussion of the distinction hinted at here).
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The thought is that how colours are given to us in experience can be eluci-
dated exclusively in terms of how they really are; and that how colours really
are is, ultimately, a matter of their third-personally accessible nature. Ac-
cordingly, the reection in experience of the similarities and dierences among
colours, their unique or binary nature, their mind-independent instantiation,
and so on, is said to be explained by reference to properties open to scientic
investigation.6
This idea presupposes that there is a robust correlation between the pre-
sentational rst-personal aspects of colour experiences, on the one hand, and
the relevant third-personal aspects of whichever properties are identied with
colours and taken to be represented by those experiences, on the other. That
is, how colours are subjectively presented as being should be correlated to how
they are from the third-personal perspective. For the latter can explain the
former only if the two covary relative to each other.
Accepting RNR already comes with assuming such a correlation. The rst
factor which is relevant here is that RNR understands the rst-personal presen-
tation of colours in terms of the representation (or relational or intentional pre-
sentation) of the third-personally accessible properties identied with colours.
The fact that colours are subjectively given as standing in certain similarity
and mixture relations amounts therefore to the fact that the relevant physi-
cal properties are represented by our colour experiences as standing in those
second-order relations. The second important element is that such a represen-
tational link presupposes, minimally, a nomological correlation under normal
conditions between how property instances are represented by the respective
mental states or episodes and how they really are.7
Given that all colour experiences subjectively present colours as having
the same categorical features, the interesting connection obtains between the
variable rst-personal presentation of the qualitative features of colours and
the respective variable representation of part of the third-personal nature of
colours. What we thus get is a rather specic correlation thesis: two veridical
colour perceptions dier in their qualitative aspect if and only if they represent
colour properties that dier third-personally in whichever respect is relevant.8
6Views, which aim to be reductive not only with respect to colours, but also with respect
to conscious experience, typically deny in addition that there are any non-presentational
aspects of the characters of our mental episodes (cf., e.g., Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995)).
But proponents of RNR need to be commited to such a strong form of `representationalism'.
They only have to maintain that the rst-personal features, which colours are experienced
as having, are determined by some of their third-personal features.
7See, for instance Dretske (1995), Tye (1995), Byrne and Hilbert (1997a), and Dorsch
(2009).
8Cf. the `Necessity' thesis in Byrne and Hilbert (1997a). The restriction to veridical
colour perceptions is needed to accommodate the fact that dierent conceptions of the
presentational link may lead to dierent treatments of non-veridical colour experiences. The
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The direction of explanation runs thereby from right to left: our colour ex-
periences have a certain qualitative aspect because they represent their objects
as having certain third-personal properties with certain second-order features
(i.e., similarity and mixture relations). If this correlation thesis turns out to
be false, the qualitative aspect of colour experiences cannot be adequately ac-
counted for in terms of the representation of the third-personal properties with
which colours are identied by RNR. This would not only undermine part of
the reason for endorsing this view, but also cast more generally doubt on the
prospects of fullling the second ambition.
III.
The endorsement of RNR may therefore be challenged in at least two ways. It
may be argued that the correlation thesis is false | for instance, by pointing
out certain counterexamples. And it may be argued that | even assuming
that the correlation thesis is true | the qualitative aspect of colour experiences
cannot be accounted for in terms of the representation of third-personally
accessible properties. But proponents of RNR have been very resourceful in
adapting their views to such objections or counterexamples. One of their main
strategies has thereby been to vary the nature and number of the properties,
which they claim colours to be identical with.9
latter include colour illusions | as they may occur, for instance, when we are looking at
objects in heavily coloured light or in near darkness; and hallucinations of coloured objects
| which may be the result, for instance, of having taken some hallucinogenic substance.
They do not, however, include perceptual experiences which are veridical with respect to
the presented colours and non-veridical with respect to some other perceivable property.
Under which conditions colour experiences turn out to be veridical colour perceptions may
be dicult to specify in substantial terms, but it is not impossible (cf. (Dorsch, 2009, ch.
3.3) and Allen (2010a)).
Besides, what holds in the case of non-veridical colour experiences depends on which
account of the presentational link is endorsed. Intentionalists and representationists agree
that such experiences possess the same nature as veridical ones and, consequently, involve the
same qualitative aspect and present us with the same colours as their veridical counterparts.
Accordingly, the restriction to veridical experiences may be dropped from (COR), and the
thesis be extended to all colour experiences. By contrast, if the presentation of colours
consists in the acquaintance with, or manifestation of, colour instances, non-veridical colour
experiences do not present colours at all, given that they are not so related to some colour
instances. This means, in particular, that they do not present us with qualitative features
of colours. As a consequence for such views, the correlation thesis has no application to
non-veridical colour experiences, but only to genuine perceptions of colour instances. See
chapter 11 for a discussion of the two ways of understanding presentation.
9Incidentally, many of the variations can be found over the years in the writings of David
Hilbert. See, for instance, the development fromHilbert (1987) to Byrne and Hilbert (1997a)
and Byrne and Hilbert (2003).
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Colour science shows that the best candidates for the third-personally ac-
cessible properties, which are correlated with subjectively individuated types
of experience of surface colour and may be identied with the latter, are cer-
tain reectance properties.10 The basic spectral reectance of a surface (i.e.,
its SSR) is identical with the disposition of that surface, relative to each wave-
length of the visible spectrum, to reect a certain proportion of the incident
light and to absorb the rest (cf. Byrne and Hilbert (1997a, 2003), and Kalderon
(2012)).
One well-noted problem with identifying colours with SSRs, however, is
that colour experiences of the same type can be elicited by dierent SSRs (cf.
Byrne and Hilbert (2003): 10f.). That is, very dierent SSRs may elicit an
experience of the object concerned as, say, yellow. Consequently, it cannot be
the SSRs that are identical with the colours presented by our perceptions. This
fact about SSRs has constituted the rst challenge to shape the formulation
of RNR, given that it has played a signicant role in the identication of
colours, not with SSRs, but with certain types of them.11 Such types of spectral
surface reectances (abbreviated as SSR-types) group together SSRs which
elicit, under normal viewing conditions, experiences of the same colour. The
colours are then identied, not with particular SSRs, but with SSR-types. Here
is how Kalderon describes the resulting position to be found in the writings of
Byrne and Hilbert:
'A surface spectral reectance is an object's disposition to reect a
certain percent- age of light at each of the wavelengths of the visible
spectrum. While an object could only have a single determinate
reectance, perceived colors are not determi- nate reectances, but
determinable reectances, or reectance types, that can be rep-
resented by sets of determinate reectances (see Hilbert, 1987).'
(Kalderon (2012): 13)
The description of SSR-types in terms of their extension has its limits, though.
There is no restricton (apart from pragmatic ones) to the ne-grainedness of
the scientic specication of SSRs, given that for any particular subdivision of
the spectrum of relevant wavelengths or of the scale of percentages of reected
light at each of these wavelengths, there is a more detailed one to be had. This
means that SSRs can be dierentiated as minutely as desired (and given the
10Cf. Hardin (1988), Byrne and Hilbert (1997b) and Dorsch (2009). It should be noted
that reference to these properties may help to account only for surface colours, but not for
the colours of light or lm. I address this issue and the problems that it raises for RNR in
section VI.
11Cf. Byrne and Hilbert (1997a): 265f., and also Broackes `ways of changing light' in
Broackes (1992): 454. and 459.
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required measurement tools). We cannot therefore list all the SSRs which form
the extension of a given SSR-type: there are always some more to be listed.
It is more useful to describe SSR-types in relation to their impact on the
receptors in the human retina (cf. Hilbert (1987): 100; Tolliver (1994): 417).
What the various SSRs grouped together in an SSR-type have in common is
that they give rise, under normal conditions, to the same integrated sum of
intensities in each of the three spectral bands | long-wave L, middlewave M
and shortwave S | that correspond to each of the three types of receptors
in the eye of normal human beings as they actually are. SSR-types are thus
dispositions to bring about, under normal conditions, specic triples of retinal
stimulation in actual human beings.
What is important to note about SSR-types is that they can be fully de-
scribed in third-personal terms, that is, without making any reference to sub-
jective experience. Hence, although SSR-types are anthropocentric properties
in that they are to be specied by reference to the human visual system, they
can still count as mind-independent properties of actually existing objects.12
The proposed view should have no diculties to account for the categorical
features of colours and their presentation as part of our colour experiences.
After all, SSR-types show the same categorical features which colours are
given as having in our experiences of them. But problems seem to arise as
soon as we move to the explanation of the qualitative aspects of colours and
colour experience.13
As already mentioned above, one way of arguing against RNR is to question
the truth of the correlation thesis. If it can be shown that there is no robust
correlation between subjectively individuated types of colour experience and
objectively investigated SSR-types even under normal conditions, the two per-
spectives on colours cannot be reconciled with each other. However, as long
as the relationship between mind and brain is not satisfactorily elucidated, it
is dicult to assess the truth of the correlation thesis. Notably, the (seeming)
conceivability of cases where one and the same retinal stimulation leads to
subjectively dierent colour experiences, or where dierent stimulations lead
to one and the same experience, need not entail their logical possibility. And
the absence of good reason to assume that such cases are impossible need not
necessarily undermine the correlation thesis, either. It appears that the burden
of proof lies with the opponents of RNR.
12Whether an account of colours as SSR-types should still count as a genuinely physicalist
position is another matter (cf. Kalderon (2012): 13), which need not be resolved here,
since the anthropentricity of SSR-types does not undermine their status as third-personally
accessible properties.
13For more general discussion of, and possible physicalist answers to, problems related to
the naturalisation of phenomenal consciousness in general, see, for instance, Dretske (1995),
Tye (1995, 2000) and Lycan (1996).
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Moreover, it is easy for opponents of RNR to miss their target by not appre-
ciating in sucient detail the nature of those properties (i.e., the SSR-types)
which RNR identies colours with. As a result, many cases put forward as
alleged counter-examples to the correlation thesis lack force (cf. Tye (1992,
1995) and Lycan (1996): ch. 6). This is in particular true of all thought exper-
iments (including many cases of qualia inversion or absence) that hypothesise
alterations in the viewing conditions, the nature of the human visual system,
the physical laws governing the causal eect of surfaces on light and of light on
our receptors, or the represented SSR-types. For in all these cases, changes in
the qualitative aspect of colour experiences can, against the objectors opinions,
be explained by reference to corresponding changes in their representational-
ity. This point becomes particularly evident if the identication of colours with
SSR-types is made explicit in the formulation of the correlation thesis: two
veridical colour experiences dier in their qualitative aspect if and only if they
represent SSR-types that dier in which specic triple of retinal stimulation
they are dispositions to elicit under normal conditions in actual human beings.
Any deviation from normal conditions or actual human cognition disqualies
the respective cases from being counterexamples to the correlation thesis.
But granting that there is a strict correlation between types of veridical
colour experiences and SSR-types does not mean accepting RNR. In addition
to the correlation, RNR also assumes an explanatory link between the two
elements. In particular, the qualitative aspects of colour experience are said to
be determined solely by the representation of SSR-types (and perhaps related
third-personal aspects of the world). But it may be doubted whether RNR
is successful in explaining why dierences in representationality give rise to
dierences in qualitative character. A central issue here is whether the SSR-
types can be said to possess the qualitative features | for instance, the second-
order properties of standing in the same resemblance relations and showing
either a unique or a binary nature | which we experience colours as having.14
Proponents of RNR may arrange SSR-types in a way isomorphic to the
circular order of hues. The close resemblance of yellow and orange is thus
matched by a close resemblance between the two respective SSR-types, and the
dierence between unique and binary colours is paralleled by a corresponding
dierence among SSR-types (cf. Hilbert (1987)). This arrangement is possible
because SSR-types can be ordered in relation to how much they aect the three
kinds of cones in the human eye.15 Indeed, SSR-types | or the respective
14Another important issue is whether RNR can accommodate the variations in the sub-
jective location of the four unique hues. See Allen (2010b), and references to selectionist
approaches provided in footnote 16 below.
15Further below, I present a formula which can be used to measure the kind of `physical
distance' between dierent classes of SSRs, which corresponds to the `hue distance' among
the correlated colours. And although the formula does not make reference to total intensities
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classes of SSRs | stand in many dierent resemblance relations concerning
their impact on light-sensitive receptors of varying ranges of receptivity. This
has led some proponents of RNR to a selectionist approach to colours (cf., e.g.,
Hilbert and Kalderon (2000)). The central thought is that there are many
dierent ways in which SSRs can be grouped together into types standing in
certain similarities relations. The human visual system has evolved in such a
way as to be sensitive to one particular grouping of SSRs (i.e., the particular
SSR-types discussed so far), while other actual or possible beings with light
receptors of a dierent number and dierent sensitivity ranges track dierent
groupings. This means, in accordance with RNR, that there are many colours
in the world which humans are unable to recognise or discriminate. Our visual
system is, so to speak, selective about which colours it lets us see.16
A complete reductionist account of colours and our experiences of them
might therefore better be supplemented by ecological considerations concerning
why the human visual system has evolved in the way that it has done | that
is, why it tracks these specic SSR-types, as well as these particular similarities
among them, and not others. But this is, arguably, the task of the cognitive
and biological sciences, and not of philosophy. What proponents of RNR
should, however, be expected to do is to identify the second-order properties
of SSR-types which are to be identied with the qualitative features of colours,
and the representation of which explains the corresponding qualitative aspects
of colour experiences. My contention is that this constitutes a challenge for
reductive naive realists, which they are unlikely to be able to meet.
IV.
In order to be able to account for the experienced similarity (and mixture)
relations among colours in representational terms, Byrne and Hilbert assume
that our colour experiences represent hue magnitudes in addition to SSR-
in the three wavelength bands L, M and S, a respective reformulation should be possible.
16It should not be seen as problematic that dierent species are sensitive to dierent sets
of colours | especially in the light of the fact that there are great inter-species dierences
in the number and sensitivity of the relevant light receptors (cf. Allen (2009)). But some
selectionists aim to extend their view to inter- and intrasubjective variations in how we
experience the world as coloured | for instance, to account for dierences in which objects
are taken to be instances of unique colours (Kalderon (2012) for an application to inter- and
Mizrahi (2006) for an application to intra-subjective variation). This is much more trou-
blesome since it threatens to undermine our general assumption that there is one common
set of colours that human beings talk about, refer to, and so on. A defense of the idea that
dierent humans may be sensitive to dierent colours thus needs to show how it can be
squared with the fact that we can successfully communicate about the colours of objects (cf.
Allen (2009)).
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types.17 More specically, each particular colour experience represents objects
as having colours with a certain proportion of the four hue magnitudes | R, G,
Y and B. The represented values of the hue magnitudes are proportinal values
or percentages, and their sum is for each colour instance 100 %. Moreover,
each represented proportion involves two or three hue magnitudes with a value
of 0 %, and only one or two with a positive percentage.18 Thus, a colour
experience may represent an object as having a hue with an R-value of 100
%, or as having a hue with an R-value of 37 % and a Y -value of 63 % |
but no positive proportion of three or all four hue magnitudes. This is due
to the fact that the four hue magnitudes form two pairs of opposites, such
that in each case only one of each pair can be represented as having a positive
quotient. If some object's colour is represented as having an R-value, it cannot
also be represented as having a G-value; and vice versa. The same is true of
the Y - and the B -magnitude. If we understand each pair of opposing hue
magnitudes | that is, magnitudes of which only one can have a positive value
| as forming together one axis of a coordinate system, we can give a simple
graphical representation of the possible values that can be represented by our
colour experiences (see Figure 1).
Each point on the regular diamond stands for a combination of positive
values of hue magnitudes that a colour experience can represent.19 The four
`superdeterminables' | which Byrne and Hilbert have introduced in an earlier
text (Byrne and Hilbert (1997a)) | are identical with the property of having
a positive percentage of one of the hue magnitudes. That is, each of them
is a determinable of one of the four hue magnitudes. Byrne and Hilbert call
the superdeterminables `reddish', `greenish', `yellowish' and `bluish', and I will
follow them in this. But it should be kept in mind that these expressions may
denote two dierent kinds of properties (which are, of course, identied by
RNR): the respective rst-personally accessible qualitative features of colours
(e.g., their being experienced as reddish or bluish), and the third-personally
accessible determinables of the individual hue magnitudes. But the context
should always suce to clarify in which way they are used.
The relationship between hue magnitudes and colours | or, in this case,
17See Byrne and Hilbert (2003) and Byrne (2003) on which I rely in what follows).
18It is interesting to ask whether the other two or three magnitudes are represented as
having the relative magnitude of 0 %, or whether there are not represented at all. The hue
magnitudes may thus dier in this respect from, say, the three spatial dimensions which are
always represented as having some value or another. Byrne and Hilbert seem to assume that
only positive magnitudes are represented (cf. the quote given below), so they presumably
thing the same about the representation of hue magnitudes. But this issue need not be
settled here.
19That it is not a circle is due to the fact that the values of the hue magnitudes are
assumed to denote relative percentages.
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Figure 1. The space of hue magnitutes.
SSR-types | is a bit more complex. Given the nature of human colour vision,
each particular shade of colour that we may perceive objects as having cor-
responds actually one-to-one to a specic proportion of the hue magnitudes.
For instance, pure red is correlated to an R-value of 100 %, while the shade
of orange exactly in the middle between pure red and pure yellow is linked to
the combination of an R-value of 50 % and a Y -value of 50 %. But this means
that there is also a strict correlation between proportions of hue magnitudes
and SSR-types, assuming that the latter are identical with colours. That is,
according to RNR, the two anthropocentrically dened classes of properties
stand actually in a bijective relation to each other.
The proponents of RNR should furthermore expect that this fact can be
accounted for in terms of the nature of the human visual system. As noted
above, SSR-types are dispositions to elicit under normal conditions certain in-
puts in the human visual system, namely retinal stimulations specied in terms
of the total intensities brought about within the three wavelength ranges L,
M and S that humans are sensitive to. Having a hue with a certain propor-
tions of the four hue magnitudes may then correspondingly be understood as
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the disposition to produce under normal conditions a certain output of human
visual processing describable in terms of the R-, G-, Y - and B -values. This
presupposes that the three-dimensional retinal inputs actually lead to respec-
tive four-dimensional outputs of relative hue magnitudes, and that this aspect
of the human mind can be captured by empirical theories. A reductive naive
realist should indeed assume that such an actual connection between the two
kinds of dispositional properties of objects can be discovered.20 If not, the
experienced resemblance relations, which are accounted for in terms of the
represented proportions of hue magnitudes, cannot be linked to the SSR-types
identied with colours. That is, colours could not be said any more to possess
the qualitative features given in colour experience, and naive realism would
have to be given up. Hence, proponents of RNR aiming to explain subjective
aspects of experience by reference to proportions of hue magnitudes as well as
SSR-types should accept, not only that there is a strict correlation between
the two kinds of properties, but also that it is due to the actual way in which
human visual processing works.
The two kinds of dispositions are not identical, however | which is precisely
why Byrne and Hilbert are able to introduce hue magnitudes and superdeter-
minables as additions to SSR-types. To some extent, the dispositions are the
same since they possess the same sets of SSRs as their categorial bases.21 But
they still dier in which parts of the human visual system they are relative
to or depend on. While SSR-types are dened solely in terms of the human
light receptors and their sensitivities, the specication of the proportions of
hue magnitudes has also to make reference to later stages in human visual
processing | notably to the fact that the three-dimensional retinal input is
transformed into a four-dimensional hue output. Because of this dierence in
dependence on the nature of the human mind, the two kinds of disposition
would be dierently mapped to each other or even completely diverge if our
visual processing would alter. In a similar way, the precise correlation between
the disposition of an object to cause a sensor in a digital camera to register a
certain distribution of photons and the dierent disposition of that very same
object to produce a certain image on the screen of the camera depends on how
the electronics in the camera are working. If the latter would be altered, the
two dispositions would go apart, despite having the same categorial bases and
20One possible | though not uncontroversial | interpretation of the visual system, that
| if adequate | would establish the desired connection, makes use of the idea of opponent
processing applied to the case of colours. In fact, Byrne and Hilbert (2003) use it to illus-
trate the possibility of linking SSR-types and hue magnitudes, without endorsing opponent
processing as the best interpretation of what is going on in our brains.
21Because of this, the property of having a hue with a certain proportion of the hue
magnitudes may be understood as being a type of SSRs as well. But to avoid confusion, I
reserve the label `SSR-type' for the dispositions to produce certain L-,M - and S -stimulations.
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actually being co-extensional.
Now, how are hue magnitudes supposed to help proponents of RNR to
account for the subjective resemblance relations among colours? Here is what
Byrne and Hilbert write about how to explain the fact that blue is subjectively
more similar to purple than to green:
`Objects that appear blue are represented as having a high propor-
tion of B (and a lower proportion of either G or R); objects that
appear purple are represented as having a roughly equal propor-
tion of B and R, and objects that appear green are represented
as having a high proportion of G (and a lower proportion of ei-
ther Y or B). There is therefore a perceptually obvious respect
in which blue is more similar to purple than to green. Namely,
there is a hue-magnitude (B) that all blue-appearing objects and
purple-appearing objects, but not all green-appearing objects, are
represented as having.' (Byrne and Hilbert (2003): 15)
What is remarkable about this passage is that the explanatory work is in fact
assigned to the property of having a positive percentage of the B -value | or,
in other words, of exemplifying the superdeterminable of being bluish. This
explanation therefore corresponds exactly to the one that Byrne and Hilbert's
gave in their earlier text where they introduced just superdeterminables, but
not yet the more quantitative hue magnitudes (cf. Byrne and Hilbert (1997a)).
The introduction of the latter is therefore not warranted by explanations of
this kind. This is not surprising if we have a look at the nature of what
has in fact been explained: the similarities and dierences among the hues in
respect of whether they realise the same determinable property, namely that
of being bluish. The situation is dierent if cases of distance resemblances are
concerned. They normally are not to be accounted for in terms of some shared
superdeterminable, but instead in terms of the values of the hue magnitudes
in question.
To get clearer about the distinction between the two kinds of resemblance,
consider the ambiguity of the statement that blue is subjectively more like
purple than green. It may mean that blue is experienced as being closer to
purple than to green on the circle (or diamond) of hues; or it may mean that
blue shares the property of being a reddish hue with purple, but not green.
That these are two independent ways of resembling each other is indicated by
the fact that the former can occur without the latter. A yellowish red (Y = 20
% and R = 80 %) is subjectively closer to a greenish yellow (Y = 80 % and G =
20 %) than to a yellowish green (Y = 20 % andG = 80 %), despite the fact that
the rst hue shares exactly the same superdeterminable with each of the latter
two, namely that of being yellowish. Something similar is true of the case in
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which we compare a pure red, say, with two dierent shades of slightly greenish
blue. The independence of the two kinds of resemblance is also supported
by the fact that a relative dierence in shared superdeterminables can occur
without a relative dierence in hue distance. Purple is subjectively equally
close to orange and to bluish-green (or greenish-blue) when their positions on
the circle of hues are concerned. But it resembles only orange in being reddish.
Compare the analogy of three player positioned on a football pitch. Their
locations may be compared relative to their distance to one of the goallines, or
relative to their distances from each other. Whether they are (experienced as)
being more or less similar to each other in one respect is at least to some extent
independent of whether they are (experienced as) being more or less similar
in the other. For instance, they may be positioned on the same line parallel
to the goalline, or their positions may form an equilateral triangle. In both
cases, the possibility of two kinds of similarity relations is due to the fact that
the respective magnitudes are more than one: the pitch possesses two spatial
dimensions, while hues show four dimensions which eectively (i.e., geometri-
cally) come down to two as well (i.e., the reddish/greenish dimension and the
yellowish/bluish dimension). Consequently, the specic points in the resulting
two-dimensional space may be compared relative to both dimensions taken
together, or instead relative to only one of the dimensions. This is the reason
why subjective resemblance in hue distance is a dierent phenomenon from
subjective resemblance in the sharing of a superdeterminable. The rst may
be accounted for in terms of represented hue magnitudes. But the explanation
of the latter requires instead reference to represented superdeterminables.
Of course, closeness in hue can be construed as the property of sharing a
relatively determinate colour determinable. But this does not undermine the
distinctness of the two kinds of similarity. Sharing some determinable colour
is not the same as sharing some superdeterminable, since the latter are not
among the determinable colour properties: they are merely determinables of
colours. One way of being coloured, for instance, might be to have a hue with
an B -magnitude of 93 % and a G-magnitude of 7 % | or, alternatively, to
be disposed to produce under normal conditions the respective output in the
human visual system. But the distinct property of having a hue with a positive
B -value, or with an B -value of 93 %, is not a colour property. It is not a full
determination of the property of having a colour since there are two ways in
which a particular shade of colour can realise this B -value: either by addition-
ally having an R-value of 7 %, or by additionally having a G-value of 7 %.
And this is in tension with the standard logic of determinables, which requires
that maximally specic determinants can specify only one determinable on
each level of determinacy (cf. Armstrong (1997): 48f.). Hence, while having
one of the possible combinations of hue magnitudes may count as a colour
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property, having a specic hue magnitude cannot. Consequently, the respec-
tive superdeterminables are not colour properties, either.22 They concern only
one dimension of the hue space, while the experienced closeness or distance
between two shades is measured along two dimensions.
Now, the latter may be understood more precisely in terms of the hue
distance of the respective combinations of hue magnitudes. According to the
graphical representation above, the latter can again be understood as being
proportional to the distance of the shorter of the two paths on the outline of
the diamond between the two corresponding points. This distance can in fact
be calculated by means of the following complex formula:23
D = 400 jR1+R2 G1 G2+B1+B2 Y1 Y2j jR1+R2+G1+G2+B1+B2+Y1+Y2j
With the help of this formula, the subjectively accessible distance relations
between hues may be explained in terms of all four hue magnitudes. Consider
again Byrne and Hilbert's own example | this time read as an example of
distance similarity. Blue seems subjectively to be closer to purple than to green
because the respective experiences represent, for each of the three colours,
specic values of the four hue magnitudes such that the distance value D for
the rst two colours is smaller than that for the rst and the third colour.
Here is a list illustrating the mathematics involved:
 Blue: B = 100; Y = R = G = 0
 Purple: B = R = 50; G = Y = 0
 Green: G = 100; R = Y = B = 0
 D (blue/purple) = 100
 D (blue/green) = 200
This example shows that certain particular shades of hues are ordered in the
same way both relative to how they resemble each other in distance, and rel-
ative to whether they possess a common superdeterminable. The respective
similarity statements may therefore be ambigious between the two kinds of
22But of course, colours | or SSR-types | may still be said to be determinations of each
of the hue magnitudes taken individually.
23One way of arriving at this formula is to rotate the coordinate system (x = R - G + B
- Y; y = R + G + B + Y) and then to use the formula for the distance between two points
on a square (400 - |x1 + x2| - |y1 + y2|). The choice of 400 as the maximal value is
due to the fact that each magnitude can take 100 as their maximum value.
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resemblance. This may perhaps explain why Byrne and Hilbert did not pay
attention to the fact that they used superdeterminables instead of hue magni-
tudes to account for the similarity relations that were meant to illustrate the
applicability of the latter, and not the former.
V.
So far, so good. There are two kinds of subjective resemblance between hues.
And while one can be explained in terms of represented combinations of hue
magnitudes, the other can be accounted for in terms of represented superde-
terminables. There is no principle diculty attached to such a multitude of
resemblances and their explanations. But both accounts are none the less
problematic for their own reasons.
The explanation of experienced similarities and dierences in hue distance
by reference to hue magnitudes is superuous, even on RNR's terms. Given the
actual correlation between SSR-types and proportions of hue magnitudes under
normal conditions, the distance between two hues should also be calculable in
terms of a formula mentioning the three wavelenght range dimensions S,M and
L of the SSR-types instead of the proportions of the four hue magnitudes. That
is, subjective resemblance in distance should already be explainable in terms of
SSR-types (even though the mathematics might be more complex). Reference
to represented proportions of hue magnitudes is not needed, especially given
that the SSR-types are already assumed to be represented. There is thus no
reason to think that proportions of hue magnitudes are represented as well.
The proposed account of the experienced sameness or dierence in superde-
terminables, on the other hand, is bound to fail because there is no independent
motivation to accept that superdeterminables are in fact represented by our
colour experiences. The only reason given so far is that it promises to ex-
plain the qualitative aspects of colour experience in representational terms.
But what is fundamentally at stake is precisely whether such an account of
the subjective character of colour experience is in fact to be had. Hence, we
still need to be given a good reason for assuming that our colour experiences
represent superdeterminables.
It cannot be the idea that there are no good alternative explanation of the
subjective resemblance in shared hue superdeterminables. Both the rejection
of naive realism and the rejection of reductionism (or the underlying physical-
ism) oer plenty of initially plausible possibilities to account for the qualitative
character of our colour experience | whether, for instance, in terms of subjec-
tive modes of presentation of objective properties (cf. Shoemaker (1990) and
Dorsch (2009), or indeed in terms of some projectivist account (cf. Boghossian
and Velleman (1989, 1991)).
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Nor does it seem possible to appeal to other aspects of our behaviour or
our discriminatory abilities | over and above the already mentioned quali-
tative elements of our colour experiences | which cannot be explained other
than by reference to the representation of superdeterminables. For instance,
we do not in our daily lives individuate or classify objects according to their
being either bluish or yellowish. Nor is there to be expected any biological or
socio-cultural importance in distinguishing | or being able to distinguish |
bluish from yellowish things. The reason for this is that the extension of the
superdeterminables includes all hues located on one side of the circle between
two opposite unique hues. Accordingly, nearly every other coloured object is
experienced as, say, bluish. And, in contrast to hue magnitudes, superdeter-
minables do not come in grades: an object is either bluish or not. As a result,
it is not surprising that coming to know about the instantiation of a certain
superdeterminable has not any specic cognitive or behavioural signicance for
us: this piece of knowledge is just too indiscriminatory. Superdeterminables
dier in this respect from more determinate properties | such as being ver-
milion | which are crucial, for instance, for the dierentiation of objects (cf.
Thompson (1995): 113).
Finally, colours should not simply be identied with the dispositions to
produce certain proportions of hue magnitudes, rather than with the dierent
SSR-types. This identication might help to solve the problem of the represen-
tation of superdeterminables, since representing the property of having a hue
with specic positive percentages of one or two hue magnitudes would involve
representing the more general property of having some positive percentage or
another of these magnitudes. But it would also render colours too dependent
on the nature of the human visual system.
Consider the possibility of a future change in which SSR-types give rise in
the human mind to which proportions of hue magnitudes. The future humans
would still discriminate objects in respect of their dierent SSR-types, but
they might represent these objects as standing in dierent third-personally
accessible similarity or mixture relations.24 For instance, which SSR-types
would be correlated to a value of 100 % in a single magnitude might be changed.
Following the spirit of the selectionist idea introduced above, the most natural
interpretation of this case for a proponent of RNR is that the future subjects
still perceive the same colours as we do, but pick up on dierent qualitative
features of them than we do. The underlying selectionist thought is that |
just as objects possess innitely many colours only some of which subjects of
a certain type are sensitive to | colours stand in many dierent similarity
24It is important to note that what is at issue here are not conditions on how colours are
subjectively given to us in colour experience, but rather conditions on how colour processing
in the brain works.
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and mixture relations to each other only some which those subjects are able
to recognise. For there is no good argument to the eect that, from the point
of view of RNR, the physical properties identied with colours, which subjects
of a certain type are perceptually sensitive to, resemble each other only in
one way, or count as unique only in one sense. But in the absence of such an
argument, colours should not be identied with the dispositions to produce
proportions of hue magnitudes, since this would require without any good
reason to understand the future humans as being sensitive to dierent colours
than us, and not merely to dierent qualitative aspects of the same colours.
This preference for SSR-types as colours is reected by the fact that, while
it is essential to colour perception that it involves and requires sensitivity to
the intensity of light at dierent wavelengths, the same is not true of visual
processing resulting in the representation of proportions of four hue magni-
tudes. If the detection of certain properties does not happen by means of
sensitivity to light, the properties concerned should not count as colours. But
if their recognition does not involve the specication of the relative values for
four hue magnitudes (in the same way as in the human mind), this does not
suce to doubt their status as colour properties.
Consequently, if colours are to be identied with certain reectance prop-
erties at all, these should be SSR-types, rather than dispositions to produce
certain proportions of hue magnitudes. But this also means that RNR cannot
properly motivate its claim that our colour experiences represent the superde-
terminables in addition to determinate and determinable colour properties.
Hence, the experienced similarities and dierences in superdeterminables can-
not be properly accounted for by the reductive version of naive realism about
colours.
VI.
But the proponents of RNR face a second diculty in relation to the elucida-
tion of colour resemblance. For similarities and dierences between coloured
surfaces are not the only instances of hue resemblance that we experience.
We also see uids or gases in glass bottles, volumes of transparent plastic or
glass, lms, foils and, of course, also light and its sources as coloured. And
the respective colour experiences do not only show the same categorial and
qualitative aspects as those of coloured surfaces, but also reveal subjective re-
semblance relations | in particular, cross-substance ones. The hue of Campari
looks roughly the same as the hue of a red trac light, or that of the shirt
of Manchester United. And they are all experienced by us as standing in the
same similarity and mixture relations with other colour hues, independently
of whatever material or non-material substance instantiates them.
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RNR needs to be able to explain subjective cross-substance resemblances as
well, in order to count as providing an adequate theory of colours and our rst-
personal experience of them. The obvious problem is that transparent objects
or light sources do not | or not merely | reect light: the transmission and
emission of light is of importance as well. Byrne and Hilbert (2003) tackle
this issue by introducing productances, which are characterised in terms of
how much light leaves a coloured object which is illuminated in a certain way.
Accordingly, productances are dispositions of coloured entities to produce a
certain proportion of light for each wavelength of the visible spectrum, and
relative to the incident light. Dierent entities produce light in one or more
of the three dierent ways already mentioned: by reecting or transmitting
incident light, or by emitting light themselves. SSRs are a special case of
productances, given that they are identical with the productances of objects
which do not transmit or emit light.
Productances can then be grouped together in types of productances which
are | analogously to SSR-types | specied in terms of the integrated sum
of intensities in the three bands of the spectrum L, M and S. These types of
productances may then be identied with colours, and it may be attempted
to trace back the qualitative aspects of colour experience to the representation
of productances types in the way suggested with respect to our experiences of
surface colours. But apart from the problems already raised with respect to
the more special case, the introduction of productances to account for cross-
substance resemblances faces a dilemma concerning the identication of the
most determinate colour properties of entities.
Surface spectral reectances are determinations of productances. One way
of having a certain productance is to possess a certain SSR. Similarly, SSR-
types are determinations of types of productances. But instantiating a certain
SSR-type is not the only way of instantiating a specic type of productances.
The latter can also be realised by a suitable combination of a reectance and a
transmission property (e.g., exemplied by a coloured window), or by a suitable
combination of a reectance and an emission property (e.g., exemplied by a
working lamp). Types of productances are therefore less determinate than |
and not identical to | SSR-types. This raises the issue of which of the two
constitute most determinate shades of colour.
If it is really the productances which are identied with colours, we get
the desired result that the variety of dierent material or non-material entities
listed above can indeed instantiate one and the same colour properties. But, in
the case of experiences of surface colours, it remains still true that they are sen-
sitive to and nomologically correlated to SSR-types. The colours that we are
experiencing are given to us as surface, volume or illuminant colours. That is,
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we see the dierence between them, despite their shared qualitative features.25
As a consequence, a proponent of RNR should say that our colour experiences
represent, and discriminate between, not only the types of productances, but
also the more determinate SSR-types. But it then becomes entirely ad hoc to
exclude the latter from being colour properties as well: they do not seem to
dier in any relevant respect from the former, apart from their determinacy
and their restriction to non-transparent and non-emitting surfaces.
If, on the other hand, the SSR-types are taken to be the most determi-
nate colour properties of such surfaces, being of a particular hue becomes a
disjunctive property. For in the case of volumes, lms, light rays and light
sources, very dierent determinants of types of productances | which also in-
volve types or transmission or emission properties | are to be identied with
their most specic colours. Moreover, this disjunctiveness of colours turns up
again on levels of less determinacy. If having a certain SSR-type is already
a way of being coloured, then less specic SSR-types | such as those shared
by all vermilion or red objects | are ways of being coloured, too. And the
same is true for the respective properties of volumes and illuminants, so that
the properties of being, say, vermilion or red become disjunctive as well. That
is, there is surface-vermilion, volume-vermilion and illuminant-vermilion. But
this is not only in tension with the proposed explanation of cross-substance
resemblance, given that one thing to be explained is the fact that dierent en-
tities can possess exactly the same colour properties, independently of whether
they are surfaces, volumes or illuminants. It also goes against our ordinary
practice to not draw these distinctions when categorising objects in accordance
with their colour properties.26
To conclude, the preceding considerations have suggested that reductive
naive realism cannot accommodate two important aspects of our experiences
of colours as similar to, or dierent from, each other. First, it has diculties
to account for subjective resemblances concerning the presence or absence of
superdeterminables because it cannot satisfactorily motivate its assumption
that our colour experiences represent such superdeterminables. And second,
in its attempt to elucidate the cross-substance similarities in hue, it faces the
dilemma of either accepting that the most basic properties, which our colour
experiences allow us to discriminate, are not colours, or maintaining that,
despite appearances, dierent substances instantiate dierent sets of colour
properties. Both resemblance-related objections cast serious doubt on the
truth of RNR.
25The property of being a surface, volume or illuminant colour is thus perhaps better
understood as one of the categorical features of colours.
26There may also be more general problems with the assumption of disjunctive properties
(cf., e.g., Armstrong (1997): 26.).
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As a consequence, the two sides of colours and colour experiences turn
out to be more separate than perhaps hoped for. On the one side, there is
our rst-personal access to experienced hue properties and to their categorical
and qualitative features. And, on the other side, there is our third-personal
access to the nomologically correlated reectance properties with their types
and second-order features. If the arguments presented in this essay are on
the right track, then these two sides cannot be reconciled with each other by
means of an identication of the two kinds of properties concerned. That is,
the second ambition described at the beginning should be given up. This does
not mean that the two perspectives have turned out to be incompatible with
each other. It just means that they are not concerned with one and the same
kind of property.
Should we then identify colours with the rst-personally or the third-
personally accessible properties? The rst option amounts to a dismissal of
reductionism and, presumably, also of the representational understanding of
the link between colour experiences and colours. But what many nd prob-
lematic about this is the refusal to see the need to identify a place for the
qualitative aspects of experience within our scientic picture of the world.
The second alternative, on the other hand, constitutes a rejection of naive re-
alism and, therefore, also gives up any hope of being able to live up to the rst
ambition of taking colour experiences at face value. But this is often taken to
be unattractive because it requires the adoption of an error theory about how
things seem to us from our subjective perspective.27 Both choices are there-
fore rather stark. Which is to be preferred, however, needs to be addressed on
another occasion.28
27Broackes (1992), Campbell (1993), McDowell (2004) and Allen (2007), for instance,
argue for endorsing the rst option, while Hardin (1988), Boghossian and Velleman (1989,
1991), Armstrong (1997) and Dorsch (2009) defend the second. I am now less convinced
than I was in the past whether the second option is really preferable over the rst.
28This paper has been written during a research stay at the University of Berkeley, funded
by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant no. PA00P1-126157). I would like to thank
Keith Allen, Luca Angelone, Frank Hofmann, Mark Kalderon and M. G. F. Martin for very
helpful discussions, and the anonymous referees of Estetica for their written comments.
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Chapter 2
The Unity of Hallucinations
I.
It is common both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences (broadly un-
derstood as ranging from, say, neuroscience to developmental or evolutionary
psychology) to distinguish between two kinds of hallucinations.1 What dier-
entiates them is whether they are subjectively indistinguishable from genuine
perceptions and therefore mistaken by us for the latter. While perceptual
(or `true') hallucinations cannot, from the subject's perspective, be told apart
from perceptions, non-perceptual (or `pseudo') hallucinations can and usually
are. Sometimes, when subjects, say, auditorily hallucinate someone else calling
their name or commenting on their behaviour, they are able to realise, on the
basis of how they subjectively experience their episode of hallucination, that
they are not perceiving real speech: their hallucination is non-perceptual. This
happens, for instance, when subjects suering from schizophrenia or other ill-
nesses hear `inner voices' speaking to them. But in other circumstances, the
subjects concerned are - even under conditions of proper mental health and
rationality - in no position to recognise the hallucinatory status of their ex-
perience without the help of some external evidence: their hallucination is
perceptual. Wrongly hearing the phone ringing while taking a shower, say, is
a good example of this kind of hallucination.2
1The expression 'hallucination' is sometimes used, especially in the psychological litera-
ture, to refer to what is hallucinated. In my usage, it denotes instead the mental episode of
hallucinating.
2See Bentall and Slade (1988): 222, Bentall (1999), and Massoud et al. (2003). Note
that, in the latter example, the presence of some auditory stimulus does not undermine
the hallucinatory status of the experience of the ringing tone. Not only is this not a case of
misperceiving the sound of the running water as the sound of a ringing phone, given that the
former is correctly heard. But the existing stimulus is also not of the right kind to count as a
relevant object of misperception - even if it is actually part of what triggers the hallucinatory
experience. Indeed, there are hardly ever situations in which auditory hallucinations are not
accompanied by additional auditory perceptions (cf. Bentall and Slade (1988): 23f.), so the
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When philosophers speak or write about hallucinations, they usually con-
centrate on perceptual hallucinations. One reason for this is the fact that
philosophers tend to address the topic of hallucination, not for its own sake,
but only in the context of some wider issues. Thus, when they are discussing
hallucinations, they are primarily interested in other topics, such a how - or
whether - we are able to acquire knowledge about the external world, in which
sense our mental states are directed at objects and properties, how best to ac-
count for what our experiences are subjectively like, which features suce for
something to count as a conscious experience, and so on. Especially the epis-
temic question, but also the connected issues in the philosophy of mind, lead
them rst of all to the phenomenon of genuine perception. For perceptions are
precisely those mental episodes which point us to, and bring us into contact
with, the world; and they also constitute the paradigm examples of conscious
episodes with a distinctive phenomenal character. Hallucinations, on the other
hand, do neither. Instead, they become relevant for the epistemic and related
considerations only in so far as they give rise to sceptical scenarios and cast
doubt on the common-sense (or naive) conception of the nature of perceptual
experiences. And, in both cases, only those hallucinations matter which are
indistinguishable from genuine perceptions with respect to their content and
character.3
In the cognitive sciences, by contrast, hallucinations are much more promi-
nent objects of study, and moreover objects of study in their own right. From
the perspective of empirical investigations of the brain and mind - whether
they utilise neuroimaging, observe behaviour, or examine verbal reports - hal-
lucinations simply form one class of mental phenomena among many. And all
these phenomena are ultimately in the same need of being scientically stud-
ied and accounted for as part of our attempt to come to a full understanding
of how our psychology works and is neurally realised. Of course, scientists,
too, are interested in learning how we manage to cognise reality, or why con-
sciousness arises in the way that it does. And this may as well focus some
of their research more on perceptions and perceptual hallucinations than on
non-perceptual hallucinations. But scientists are equally interested in coming
to understand - and to enable the people concerned to cope with - the errors,
abnormalities and pathologies of our mental lives, to which all types of hallu-
cination belong as dierent deviations from the norm of genuine perception.
The study of hallucinations does not only help us to better grasp how per-
ception normally functions. It also makes an independent contribution to a
comprehensive picture of our minds, especially with respect to the psycholog-
absence of the latter cannot be a condition on the presence of the former.
3Cf., e.g., O'Shaughnessy (2003), Martin (2004, 2006), Siegel (2008), Fish (2009), and
chapter 11.
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ically more problematic or puzzling aspects of our mental lives. It is part of
this that non-perceptual hallucinations are as much at the centre of scientic
inquiry as are their perceptual counterparts.4
This raises the issue of the division of labour between philosophy and the
cognitive sciences: what are their specic roles in the investigation of the
nature and features of hallucinations? But it also leads to the question of
what unies the two broad kinds of hallucinations: why do we classify them
both as hallucinations and distinguish them from other mental phenomena,
such as perceptions, imaginings, or memories? This latter issue is especially
pressing because of a simple fact about our cognition of the world. When we
are trying to get into contact with reality, there is only one way of getting it
right - namely perception. But there are many ways in which our minds may
fail to establish any such perceptual relation to the world.5 Hence, it cannot
simply be assumed that all those failures - that is, all hallucinations - share
a distinctive and unifying feature, over and above their lack of a provision of
perceptual access to reality. And any characterisation in terms of the latter
threatens to remain largely negative and, therefore, not very illuminating.
One promising answer to this challenge, which has gained prominence in
the recent philosophical debate on perceptual hallucinations and their rele-
vance for a theory of perceptual experiences, is the epistemic conception of
perceptual hallucinations.6 According to this view, nothing more can - or
need - be said about perceptual hallucinations than that they are subjectively
indistinguishable from perceptions, without actually being perceptions. The
epistemic - and phenomenological - element in this conception is the indis-
tinguishability thesis, which concerns the phenomenal characters of the two
kinds of episode and corresponds to the specication of perceptual hallucina-
tions oered at the beginning. It is this element which provides the positive
characterisation of perceptual hallucinations missing so far: they are precisely
those mental episodes which, despite not being perceptions, seem to share their
character with perceptions - they are given to us in consciousness as if they
were perceptions.
But the epistemic conception of perceptual hallucination still leaves a lot
of work to be done. One reason for this is that it concentrates on the rst-
personal or subjective side of the hallucinations (i.e., their conscious or expe-
4See, for instance, the references in footnote 7, or the introduction to Massoud et al.
(2003).
5Many dierent sources of hallucinations are discussed in the works referred to in footnote
7.
6Cf. Martin (2004, 2006), Fish (2009), Siegel (2008). The label `phenomenological con-
ception' would be equally adequate, given that the relevant rst-personal indistinguishabil-
ity concerns our awareness of the phenomenal characters of the experiences concerned (cf.
chapter 11).
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riential nature), but largely ignores their third-personal or objective side (i.e.,
their physical or neurofunctional nature). This means that, even if philosoph-
ical theories of perceptual hallucinations are limited to a phenomenological
description of our access to the conscious character of these hallucinations,
their underlying structure below the level of consciousness is still open to dis-
covery by the cognitive sciences. This structure includes the various ways in
which hallucinations may come to be realised by the brain, which psychological
abnormalities they are correlated with (if any), how many dierent types of
hallucinations there are as a result, and so on.7
And, despite the modest (or pessimistic) outlook of the epistemic concep-
tion, there are also important tasks left for philosophy. On the one hand, there
is still the need for a satisfactory phenomenology of the subjective character
of perceptions and, relatedly, of the subjectively indistinguishable character
of perceptual hallucinations.8 The resulting phenomenological descriptions
should also be of interest to the cognitive sciences, especially if they man-
age to be more systematic, rigorous and detailed than those currently used
in cognitive psychology and the related disciplines (cf. the discussion of the
latter in section 4 below). On the other hand, philosophy needs to reassess
its treatment - or rather neglect - of non-perceptual hallucinations. The epis-
temic conception, in particular, cannot be applied to them since they can be
subjectively distinguished from perceptions. The existence of non-perceptual
hallucinations thus poses a particular challenge to the formulation of a unied
philosophical theory of hallucinations - especially of a theory which manages
to hold on to the phenomenological insights of the epistemic conception of per-
ceptual hallucinations, while also being able to capture non-perceptual ones.
My aim in this philosophical essay is to pursue both tasks. Assuming
that the epistemic conception is largely right about perceptual hallucinations
(cf. chapter 11), I intend, rst of all, to provide a detailed description of
the subjective character of perceptions and, relatedly, also of the character
of perceptual hallucinations. Then, I aim to use this description to identify
the distinctive phenomenal similarities between perceptual and non-perceptual
hallucinations in order to show that we can positively characterise the latter
7Cf. Jaspers (1996): part III, Bentall and Slade (1988): especially chs. 2 and 5, Bentall
(1999), and Sims (1995): ch. 7, for good overviews; and Manford and Andermann (1998),
Kolmel (1993), Brasic (1998), Collerton et al. (2005) and ytche (2008, 2009) for more recent
investigations of various kinds of visual hallucinations.
8The term 'phenomenology' is ambiguously used in that it is sometimes meant to refer
to the specic phenomenal characters of our mental episodes (e.g., when we speak of the
'phenomenology' of mental agency), and sometimes instead to the phenomenological study
and description of those characters. I will follow the latter, more traditional usage (cf.
Husserl (1970)). Note also that, although the methods of phenomenology are non-empirical,
they should none the less be informed by the results of empirical investigations.
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in mainly phenomenological terms, too. In this way, I hope to render plausible
the view that the resulting account allows us to give a general and unied
specication of the class of all hallucinations.9
This characterisation will not be entirely phenomenological in nature, since
it will also include the negative third-personal specication of hallucinations
as not establishing a perceptual relation to the world.10 However, this aspect
stays completely silent about the positive characteristics of hallucinations and,
moreover, is shared by other non-perceptual mental episodes (such as thoughts,
feelings, and so on). So what is doing the main work in the proposed account
of hallucinations are the phenomenological considerations about the distinctive
way in which we experience them. Phenomenology therefore turns out to be
the key element in the philosophical individuation of hallucinations. The task
of saying more about their underlying nature should then fall to the cognitive
sciences.
In the following section, I intend to clarify what perceptual hallucinations
are and, in particular, what it means for them to possess a character which is
subjectively indistinguishable from that of genuine perceptions. To ll in the
details of this characterisation of perceptual hallucinations, the third section
presents a detailed (though still incomplete) phenomenological description of
how perceptions are given to us in consciousness. The resulting list of phe-
nomenal aspects essential to the character of perceptions is then used, in the
fourth section, to specify which features non-perceptual hallucinations have in
common with perceptual hallucinations, but not with any other kind of mental
episode. These features permit, nally, the formulation of a unied theory of
hallucinations, which keeps the spirit of the epistemic conception alive in that
its positive characterisation of hallucinations makes reference solely to how we
subjectively experience them in comparison to perceptions.
9Berrios and Dening (1996) come to the conclusion that historical, conceptual or be-
havioural analyses do not suce to delineate a clear notion of non-perceptual (or pseudo)
hallucinations, partly because it is dicult to specify what (perceptual) hallucinations are
in the rst place. My hope is that phenomenology will do better. And, even assuming
that Berrios (1998) is right in that Jaspers is not engaged in Husserlian phenomenology, the
observations and insights to be found in Jaspers (1989, 1996) and similar works may still
serve as good starting-points for the formulation of adequate phenomenological descriptions
of hallucinations (cf. also Cutting (1997)).
10Some proponents of the epistemic conception of perceptions hallucinations argue that
the perceptual relation is one of acquaintance with, or manifestation of, parts of the world
(cf. Martin (2010) and McDowell (1998a)). This allows them to understand the relationality
of perceptions as one aspect or constituent of their phenomenal character (cf. chapter 11),
and therefore to insist that their view is completely rst-personal. However, it also means
that they do not leave much room for science to contribute to an account of the nature of
perception.
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II.
Perceptual hallucinations are minimally characterised by three basic facts.
First of all, they are episodes in the stream of consciousness. This means, in
particular, that they have a duration and possess a conscious or phenomenal
character.11 The latter - what the episodes are subjectively like - is notoriously
dicult to capture, but it may here suce to say that it is the most determi-
nate property of the episodes which is accessible from the inside, that is, by
consciously experiencing or introspecting the episodes.12
Then, perceptual hallucinations are distinct from perceptions in that they
do not establish a perceptual relation between the subject and the world.
Views on perception dier on when such a perceptual relation obtains. It is
not enough that the world appears to be - or is presented as being - a certain
way. That it seems to us as if there is a green tree does not imply that there is
in fact a green tree before us, which we have perceptual access to and which we
are in the position to gain knowledge about. Thus, the relation of perceptual
access needs to be spelled out dierently. Some philosophers claim that it
obtains if an object in the environment has caused an experience in the right
way (cf., e.g., Searle (1983)). Others require - perhaps in addition - that the
object stands in a certain non-causal relation to the subject (e.g., such that
the object becomes a constituent of the perception; cf., e.g., Martin (2010)).
This debate need not be settled here. Instead, it suces to rely on our general
grasp of the notion of a perceptual relation as a specic form of knowledge-
enabling access to the world pertaining to sensory experience. Hence, what is
important to register is that perceptual hallucinations dier from perceptions
in not involving this access relation.13
Finally, perceptual hallucinations are - as already mentioned - subjectively
indistinguishable from genuine perceptions. To understand better what this
means, it is worthwhile to consider the two very dierent (though not always
easily separable) ways in which we can acquire knowledge about the episodes
in our stream of consciousness.
One the one hand, we may have access to them from the inside, or from our
rst-personal perspective. This form of access is restricted to our own mental
11Cf. Macpherson (2010) for approval, and for a critical discussion - by reference to
Anton's syndrome - of the opposing view to be found in Fish (2009).
12Cf. Williamson (1990), Martin (2004) and chapter 11.
13Bentall and Slade (1988): 23 and O'Shaughnessy (2003): 350f. characterise the same
dierence in terms of the absence of an external stimulus or perceived object. As one referee
pointed out to me, their lack of a perceptual relation to the world does not prevent halluci-
nations to involve other forms of recognition. When hallucinating a friend, for instance, we
still correctly identify him or her as our friend and, in this sense, stand in some epistemic
relation to him or her - or, perhaps more accurately, to his or her appearance.
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episodes. What we thereby acquire knowledge about is their phenomenal or
qualitative character - that is, what they are subjectively like. We consciously
experience (i.e., 'erleben' in the sense of Husserl (1970)) this character dur-
ing the occurrence of the respective episodes in our stream of consciousness.
And we are able, by means of introspection, to notice points of similarity and
dierence among the phenomenal characters of our various mental episodes.
Phenomenology is concerned with the description of these similarities and dif-
ferences in what our episodes are subjectively like. This involves simply re-
porting the introspective registration of such similarities and dierences (e.g.,
by just noting that some episodes 'feel' dierently from others). But it also
involves a detailed and reective specication of the respects in which our
episodes are similar to or dierent from each other - a theoretical reection
which may have to take into account the conclusions of wider philosophical or
empirical theories.
On the other hand, we may gain knowledge about mental episodes from
the outside, or from a third-personal perspective. We may come to learn some-
thing about mental episodes by observing and interpreting their expression in
behaviour and language, as well as by studying their realisation in the brain
and, more generally, in a naturalistically understood world. Apart from our
largely unscientic understanding of other people which we show in daily life
or in art, these investigations happen as part of the cognitive and related sci-
ences and are typically informed by our wider picture of reality - for instance,
by metaphysical considerations concerning the relationship between mind and
brain, or by evolutionary considerations about the development of either. Our
resulting knowledge of mental episodes may concern a large variety of their
features, among them their physical or chemical structure, their causal or
functional role, and their signicance and value for our (mental) lives. Our
third-personal access to mental episodes is thereby not limited to the episodes
of others (just as it is not restricted to conscious mental states). We can come
to know something about our own mental episodes (e.g., that they are hallu-
cinatory) by observing our own behaviour, studying images of our own brain,
or simply relying on the reports of others about their observations and studies
concerning our mental lives.
Now, it is always possible - at least in principle - to discover the presence
or absence of a perceptual relation to the world from a third-personal point of
view. For instance, when in doubt about one of our own visual experiences, we
may simply try to grasp the object appearing to be before us, or canvass other
people whether they can see the same object. Or, in a more sophisticated
setting, we may ask a scientist to study our visual system or the relevant
environmental conditions.
From our own subjective perspective, on the other hand, we are not always
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able to recognise the hallucinatory status of one of our experiences and, as a
result, will mistake it for a perception. Sometimes, this happens only because
of contingent reasons. We may be too tired or distracted, lack the required
sensitivities or concepts, suer from some relevant impairment or pathological
condition, and so on. But this is merely accidental in so far as others in an
epistemically better situation | or ourselves in a more suitable moment |
would be able to recognise from the inside that the hallucinatory experience
in question is not a perception.14 Because of this fact, these experiences do
not count as subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions, and therefore not
as perceptual hallucinations (but instead as non-perceptual ones).
In other cases, however, it is simply impossible for us, or anyone else,
to come to know from the inside that a certain experience is distinct from
a perception. This impossibility consists in the fact that no human being -
even the most sensitive, attentive and rational one - could, when enjoying our
experience, discover its non-perceptual status solely by introspection of, and
reection on, how it is given in consciousness. It is precisely in this sense that
perceptual hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from genuine per-
ceptions. It is not that we are merely momentarily unable to tell the dierence;
but rather that we could not under any possible circumstances come to know,
from the inside, the former to be distinct from the latter.15
That perceptual hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from gen-
uine perceptions in this strong sense entails that the former always have the
same motivational and rational impact on our mental lives as the latter. In
particular, the hallucinations lead to the same perceptual and introspective
judgements and guide us in the same way in action as perceptions do (unless
we become third-personally aware of their hallucinatory status). If the percep-
tual hallucinations were not doing this, we would, after all, be able to recognise
this from the inside, and therefore also their distinctness from perceptions (cf.
14Good examples are hallucinations suered due to specic pathological conditions, which
impair the subjects concerned also in their ability to recognise their hallucinations as hallu-
cinations - and in such a way that people without these specic conditions would not lack
this recognitional ability (cf., say, Victor (1983): 194 on delirium tremens). In section IV, I
also briey discuss the related possibility of subjects failing to identify their hallucinations
as perceptual ones, but instead taking them to be non-perceptual hallucinations.
15See Martin (2004, 2006), Siegel (2008) and chapter 11. Note that this conception of
subjective indistinguishability does not allow for degrees of insight - contrary, say, to Hare's
characterisation of the dierence between the various kinds of hallucinations (cf. Hare
(1973)). The observation that there are dierences in the extent to which subjects are, or
can become, aware of the hallucinatory status of their experiences, can still be accommodated
by the account of hallucinations to be proposed below. The thought is that this awareness
is possible only in the case non-perceptual hallucinations; and that its variations in degree
can be elucidated in terms of the nature and number of aspects in which they can be
distinguished from perceptions and perceptual hallucinations (cf. section IV below).
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Martin (2004)).
Moreover, since what is rst-personally accessible constitutes the phenome-
nal character of the mental episodes concerned, the subjective indiscriminabil-
ity of perceptual hallucinations from genuine perceptions consists in the fact
that the former possess a character which we cannot rst-personally tell apart
from that of the latter.16 Hence, perceptual hallucinations are to be posi-
tively characterised in terms of the phenomenal character of perceptions. It is
therefore time to consider what is distinctive of this character.
III.
The phenomenal character of perceptions is complex. It is best described in the
light of its similarities and dierences with respect to the characters of other
mental episodes, notably other kinds of sensory episodes (e.g., of memory or
imagining). During my discussion, I will also comment on various specica-
tions of the `reality characteristics' distinctive of perceptions and perceptual
hallucinations, which have been proposed or endorsed by psychologists like
Jaspers, Aggaernaes, Bentall and Slade, Sims, and others.17
First of all, perceptions are presentations. More specically, they present
us with concrete objects and their features. What we are perceiving may dier
greatly from occasion to occasion, but that we are always perceiving something
when we are perceiving is a given. In addition, perceptions present (some of)
the objects and their features in a sensory manner. This does not mean that
perceptions may not in addition involve, or be accompanied by, thoughts or
other intellectual representations; but only that they primarily present things
in a sensory manner. The phenomenologically salient fact that perceptions
are sensory presentations distinguishes them from intellectual and other non-
sensory episodes, such as judgemental thoughts or feelings of longing. And
it corresponds to the rst on Aggernaes' list of reality characteristics, namely
that of showing a quality of 'sensation' rather than 'ideation'.
Then, perceptions are characterised by what may be called a sense of re-
ality. This means, very roughly, that their phenomenal character marks them
as perceptions - that is, as sensory presentations which establish a knowledge-
enabling relation between us and specic parts of the world. This sense of
reality is rather complex and involves at least eight dierent phenomenal as-
pects, the rst ve of which concern the status of the experienced object, and
16But it stays neutral on whether the two kinds of experience share some or all of their
phenomenal aspects. I return to this issue in the last section.
17Cf. Jaspers (1989): especially 252., Jaspers (1996): especially part I, ch. 1, sect. 1,
Aggernaes (1978), Bentall and Slade (1988): especially ch. 1., Sims (1995): ch. 7, Qarrett
and Silva (2003), and Massoud et al. (2003).
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the last three the relationship between the experiences and their objects.
(i) Particularity. The experienced objects appear to possess particularity, that
is, a determinate numerical identity. This means that each of them appears to
be a particular concrete object - namely this object rather than that one - and
not merely some concrete object or another. Without this aspect, perceptions
would not enable us to demonstratively refer to specic objects in our envi-
ronment. In contrast, when we are visualising an apple, it may be impossible
to say - or even may make no sense to ask - which particular apple we are
imagining (cf. Martin (2001)). In analogy to the dierence between pictures
of particular men (i.e., portraits) and pictures of types or kinds of men (cf.
Wollheim (1998): sect. 7), this dierence may perhaps also be described in
terms of the distinction between the perceptual presentation of a token object
and the imaginative presentation of a type of concrete object.
(ii) Locatedness. The phenomenal aspect of particularity is in part grounded
in an appearance of specic spatio-temporal location. When we are perceiving
an object, it appears to be at a particular location in time and (if applica-
ble) also in space.18 This already suces to x the numerical identity of the
object and allow for demonstrative reference to it. When we are visualising
an object, by contrast, we need not visualise it as being at a particular point
in time or space, although we are visualising it as being a concrete object
and thus as being located somewhere in some - possibly non-real - time and
space (cf. Sartre (2004)). That is, our image may stay neutral on the specic
spatio-temporal relations in which it stands to other imagined or perceived
entities. If we are visualising a tree and a house, there may be no answer to
the question of which of them is older, or how distant they are from each other.
(iii) Existence. The experienced objects appear to exist as part of the actual
or real world. In particular, they do not seem to be merely possible or ctional
objects. And we consequently treat them in our interactions with them as
parts of reality. Again, visualised objects do not show this quality of existence
(cf. Sartre (2004)).
(iv) Presence. This appearance of actual or real existence is closely related to
the fact that the perceived objects appear to be temporally - and, if applicable,
also spatially - present. For one way for a concrete object to appear to exist is
for it to appear to be present in our spatio-temporal environment. When we
18Jaspers combines this phenomenal aspect with those of existence and mind-independence
(cf. below) when taking seen objects to appear as located in objective outer space (cf.
Jaspers (1996): 59f.).
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are seeing or touching a table, it seems to be there before us. And when we
are hearing a sound, it seems to occur at the same time as our experience of
it, and perhaps also as being located or originating in our (close) spatial envi-
ronment. In contrast, when we are sensorily remembering an event, it appears
to be past. And when we are visualising a person, she does not appear to be
present in our space and time at all (unless we are actually thinking of her as
existing in the same space and at the same time as us). Japsers' description
of the object appearing to be there substantially ('leibhaftig') before us picks
out this appearance of presence. But it also points to the seeming existence
of the object and - at least in one possible reading - to the apparent three-
dimensionality and therefore spatial locatedness of the object.
(v) Mind-independence. The perceived objects appear to be mind-independent
(or objective) - that is, to exist independently of our current perception of them
(cf. McDowell (1998d)). This is why we are not surprised to nd out that the
objects continue to be there even after we have turned our eyes away from them;
or that others have access to them as well. After-images do not show this fea-
ture. When we are having them, the experienced patch of colour appears to
be distinct from our experience, but it does not seem to exist independently of
our particular experience of it. We cannot return to it and observe it further
after our experience has ceased; and we cannot show it to other people. Ag-
gernaes (1978) characterises this appearance of mind-independence in terms of
an impression of 'existence'. This terminology suggests that he wants to stress
the fact that, if an object appears to be independent of being experienced, it
in fact appears to exist independently of being experienced. But the two phe-
nomenal aspects involved should none the less be kept apart, given that a sense
of existence can occur without an impression of mind-independence (e.g., when
our feeling of love endows a certain person with a special beauty and value). 19
(vi) Determination. The experienced objects appear to be immediately given
to us: we seem to be in direct contact with them. Less metaphorically, this
means that the objects appear to determine or constitute the phenomenal
character of our perceptions of them. In particular, they appear to determine
19Aggernaes also assumes that we take perceived objects to be `public' in the sense that
other people may share our kind of experience of them. Being `public' in this sense is
clearly a consequence of being mind-independent (given that human beings do not dier
much in their perceptual capacities). And it is true that `hallucinating patients may accept
that their experiences are not shared by others around them in the same way as a normal
sensory experience' (Semple et al. (2005): 51). But it is doubtful that this awareness of
a lack of `publicness' really pertains to the phenomenal character of our respective sensory
experiences, rather than merely part of our `accepting' thoughts about - or attitudes towards
- those experiences.
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which properties they are perceptually presented as having (cf. Martin (2010)).
This appearance of determination presupposes the appearances of distinctness,
particularity (as well as concreteness) and actual existence. And it explains
why we are assuming certain conditions to hold of the respective experiences
and their objects. In the case of perceptions, the assumed condition is that
our perceptual experience would change or cease to exist, if the object were to
change or cease to exist. And in the case of an episode of sensory memory, the
assumed condition is that our mnemonic experience would have been dierent
or not come into existence, if the object - as well as our past perception of it
- would have been dierent or would not have existed. However, we do not
make similar assumptions about our episodes of visualising and their objects.
(vii) Relationality. The four phenomenal aspects of distinctness, particularity,
existence and determination ensure that we also experience our perceptions
as relating us directly to - or as bringing us into immediate contact with -
aspects of the world. That is, they constitute an appearance of relationality
which concerns our experience as much as its object. Our perceptions seem to
relate us directly to the world in so far as they present us with distinct and
particular objects which appear to exist and to determine our experience of
them. This appearance of relationality can be further specied. It is part of
the appearance of the determination link that we experience our perceptions
as dependent for their character on their objects. The appearance of rela-
tionality is thus an appearance of object-dependence. And together with the
appearance of mind-independence, we get the complex phenomenal fact that
we experience our perceptions as establishing a relation to mind-independent
aspects of reality.20
(viii) Epistemic commitment. The appearance of being related to a distinct,
particular and actually existing mind-independent object is also at the heart
of another complex phenomenal aspect, namely that of being epistemically
committed to how things really are. The idea is that, if it seems to us that
there is actually a mind-independent object which determines our experience
of it and, notably, which perceivable features it appears to have as part of that
experience, the experience becomes non-neutral with respect to the real world:
it involves a claim about how things really are. The phenomenological salience
of such an epistemic commitment regarding the world explains why we take
perceptions - as well as episodic memories who share this phenomenal aspect -
to provide us with support for respective perceptual or mnemonic beliefs. That
20Cf. Martin (2010) for a similar description, and the chapters 13 and 11 for an account
of the experiential error involved in hallucinations which present themselves to be relational
perceptions.
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is, we rely on them when forming a view on the objects in our present or past
environment because they present themselves as being about, as determined
by and as relating us to our mind-indepenent surroundings, whether in the
present or the past.21
By contrast, instances of visualising lack this appearance of commitment
precisely because their objects are not given to us as actually existing and
as being of this or that particular identity; and also because they hence do
not appear to bring us into contact with reality. This is why we normally do
not trust our episodes of visualising when forming beliefs. The phenomeno-
logically salient relationality of perceptions is therefore not only a matter of
object-dependence, but also of epistemic access.
Finally, the phenomenal character of perceptions includes two fairly indepen-
dent aspects which characterise the ontological status of these experiences.
(ix) Persistence. Our perceptions appear to be in no need of sustainment,
especially not active sustaintment on our own behalf. In Jaspers' terms, they
are 'constant' and easily retained (cf. Jaspers (1996): 59f.). As a consequence,
these experiences do not have a eeting or unsteady character, but instead
show a certain kind of stability. It is true that non-persistent episodes typi-
cally disappear or change rather quickly after their occurrence. None the less,
the phenomenal aspect of persistence should not - contrary to what seems to
be suggested sometimes (cf., e.g., Semple et al. (2005): 93) - be understood in
terms of an extended temporal duration or a lack of alteration. For perceptual
experiences can change rapidly or be very short-lived as well. Instead, what
matters is the appearance of a continual sustainment during the whole occur-
rence of the experiences. The images involved in acts of visualising and milder
forms of hypnagogic imagery dier in this respect. The phenomenal character
of the rst reects the fact that they would disappear if we would stop actively
keeping them in existence (cf Jaspers (1996): 59f.). And that of the second
indicates that they are not upheld by a stable causal or psychological force (cf.
Mavromatis (1986): ch. 3).
(x) Involuntariness. The appearances of existence, mind-independence and
21Bentall and Slade describe this aspect as `the full force or impact of [...] actual (real)
perception' (Bentall and Slade (1988): 23). This comes also very close to Hume's charac-
terisation of the vivacity of perceptions, memories and judgements in terms of their sense of
reality and epistemic role: their vivacity `renders realities more present to us than ctions,
causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior inuence on the pas-
sions and imagination. [...] It gives them more force and inuence; makes them appear of
greater importance; inxes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of
all our actions' (Hume (2007): paragraph 1.3.7.7).
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determination come with an appearance of involuntariness. Our perceptions
appear to be determined by their objects. And these objects appear again to
exist independently of our experiences of them. Hence, the latter appear to be
determined by something which is independent of our respective state of mind,
including our will. And such an impression of determination is an impression of
involuntary determination. In contrast, acts of visualising lack the appearance
of a determination by the experienced object. Instead, they seem to be the
product of our concurrent intentions (or similar guiding episodes) and therefore
involve an appearance of voluntary occurrence and determination (cf. chapter
5).
Now, this appearance of voluntariness may come in several independent
and complimentary guises.22 Basically, it may concern the origin of the expe-
riences concerned, or their sustainment, or their extinction. That these three
aspects can go apart is illustrated by spontaneously occurring images, that
would disappear soon after their occurrence, if we had not begun to actively
sustain and control them; or by unbidden images which we can deliberately
alter or banish (cf. Mavromatis (1986): 71. for hypnagogic examples of both
cases). The resulting sensory experiences involve an impression of an involun-
tariness (e.g., of origin and/or sustainment), but also a sense of active control
(e.g., concerning sustainment and/or extinction). Perceptual experiences, on
the other hand, seem to be involuntary through and through.
Not all phenomenal aspects, which perceptions may show, are relevant for the
characterisation of their distinctive character. In some cases, the reason for this
is that they do not strictly distinguish these experiences from other kinds of
sensory presentation. For example, although perceptions are typically clearer,
more vivid and more determinate in outline than sensory memories, imagin-
ings, non-perceptual hallucinations, and so on (cf. Jaspers (1996): 59f.), this
need not always be so. Perceptions in the dark may be less vivid than instances
of the latter.23 The same is perhaps true of Aggernaes' proposal to treat the
behavioural impact of an experience as an indicator of its sense of reality (cf.
Aggernaes (1978)) - namely if it is understood as saying that perceptions de-
termine our actions to a larger extent than non-perceptual hallucinations or
sensory imaginings. For a very disturbing non-perceptual hallucination may
move us much more strongly to act (e.g, to try do something to get rid of it)
than the perception of, say, a book lying on the table. Perhaps the proposal is
22Jaspers (1996) and Aggernaes (1978) also note the phenomenologically salient involun-
tariness of perceptions and perceptual hallucinations, but do not explicitly distinguish its
independent aspects.
23Good examples are the hallucinations involved in Charles Bonnet syndrome, as noted
by Teunisse et al. (1996) and Macpherson (2010): 13); or the visual hallucination linked to
histrionic personality disorder and described in Sims (1995): 110.
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meant to be limited to our interactions with the experienced objects: while per-
ceptions guide us when, say, picking up objects, non-perceptual hallucinations
do not. However, in this case, the proposal simply reduces to a postulation of
a dierence in epistemic commitment and its practical consequences.
Other aspects are irrelevant because they do not pertain to the phenome-
nal character of perceptions or similar episodes, but rather to our additional
thoughts about - or attitudes towards - them (cf. Jaspers (1989): 198., and
Bentall (1999)). Aggernaes (1978) provides again two good examples. One is
what he calls `independence' - namely that it is a mark of their link to reality
that we do not take perceptions and perception-like states to be the product
of unusual states of mind; while we tend to take non-perceptual hallucinations
to be induced by such abnormal states, such as drugs or some psychosis. How-
ever, this dierence is a matter of our beliefs about the respective experiences
and their context (e.g., our awareness of having taken a drug or suering from
a psychosis), rather than a matter of our subjective experience of the sensory
episode concerned. Similarly, Aggernaes claims that it is a sign of reality if
an object appears to be experiencable in more than one sense modality (i.e.,
if it appears to be `objective' in his terminology). However, perceived sounds
and colours do not appear to us to be less objective or real than shapes. It
is true that features of objects, which are perceivable in more than one sense
modality, can be characterised independently of our experiences of them (e.g.,
roundness consists in the equal distance of all parts of the surface from a given
point). But that we take such features to be speciable without reference to
our experiences of them is not as part of the latter, but instead of our beliefs
about these features and our experiences of them (cf. McDowell (1998d)).
IV.
According to the epistemic conception of perceptual hallucinations, they are
positively characterised by their subjective indistinguishability from genuine
perceptions. This means, in the light of the preceding considerations, that it
is distinctive of them that they possess a phenomenal character which is, from
the inside, indiscriminable from a character that shows the various aspects
listed in the last section (plus any other aspects essential to perceptions) -
notably the sensory presentation of objects and features, the sense of reality
and the impression of persistence and involuntariness. This subjective likeness
is reected in the fact that we treat our perceptual hallucinations in the same
way in which we treat our perceptions. In particular, we rely on them in our
interaction with the world, unless we acquire evidence about their hallucinatory
status.
None the less, it is also part of the epistemic conception that perceptual
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hallucinations still dier from perceptions in their third-personally accessible
lack of perceptual relationality. In fact, this lack of relationality, together
with their subjective indistinguishability from perceptions, suces to distin-
guish perceptual hallucinations from all other mental phenomena. Episodes
of sensory memory, for instance, lack the appearance of presence involved in
perceptions and instead show an impression of pastness; while episodes of
sensory imagining lack the appearances of particularity, existence (as well as
presence), determination and involuntariness, and hence also the appearance
of relationality and the phenomenologically salient epistemic commitment. As
a result, sensory memories and imaginings do not possess the property of being
subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions and dier in this respect from
perceptual hallucinations.
But, as already mentioned at the beginning, the epistemic conception of
perceptual hallucinations cannot be extended to non-perceptual hallucinations.
For although the latter satisfy the condition of third-personal non-relationality,
they do not full the requirement of rst-personal indiscriminability from per-
ceptions: they are precisely those hallucinations which can be subjectively
dierentiated from perceptions. Non-perceptual hallucinations therefore pose
a challenge to the attempt to account for the unity of hallucinations exclu-
sively in terms of the absence of relationality and the presence of a certain
kind of phenomenal character. But this challenge can be met if it is possible
to identify aspects which are shared by the characters of the two kinds of hal-
lucination, but not by the characters of memories, thoughts, imaginings and
all other non-relational episodes. For it should then be possible to characterise
hallucinations in terms of those phenomenal aspects, as well as the absence of
a perceptual relation to the world.
It might be asked, however, whether it is possible to simply deny that
there can be any non-perceptual hallucinations. It is not implausible to argue
that many - or even all - mental illnesses or pathologies, which give rise to
hallucinations, also undermine our ability to correctly recognise them (as well
as other mental episodes) from the inside for what they are. But this may open
up the possibility of an alternative explanation of why subjects seem to notice
a subjective dierence between some of their hallucinations and perceptions.
The idea is to say that this appearance is due, not to a dierence in character,
but instead to the subjects' inability to recognise a sameness in character.
Accordingly, there is no need any more to assume in these cases the presence
of non-perceptual hallucinations in order to explain why these subjects have the
impression of having some. And perhaps, the reasoning goes, this explanation
may be generalised such as to cover all situations in which someone seems to
suer a non-perceptual hallucination.24
24I am grateful to one of the referees for drawing my attention to this possibility of a
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While there may very well be cases in which subjects mistake perceptual
hallucinations for non-perceptual ones, the more general proposal faces the dif-
culty to completely rule out the possibility of non-perceptual hallucinations.
This problem becomes particularly pressing with respect to mentally healthy
and rational subjects who are capable of correctly individuating their mental
episodes by attending to the subjective character of the latter. What needs to
be shown is that such subjects cannot, for some systematic reason, enjoy ex-
periences that subjectively seem to them to be non-perceptual hallucinations,
rather than episodes of perception, memory or imagination. It appears that
the only plausible way of arguing to this eect would be to back up the claim
that none of our individual capacities to subjectively distinguish episodes in
respect of one of the phenomenal aspects essential to perceptions could occur
without the others. But there is no reason to asumme that this claim can
be properly supported. For instance, the sensory presentation of a particular
object does not require its presentation as determinately located or as existing
mind-independently.25 Hence, some of the phenomenal aspects of perceptions
are independent of each other and, therefore, need not all be present or absent
in how we experience a persistent and involuntary episode of sensory presenta-
tion. But this means, precisely, that non-perceptual hallucinations may occur.
So what are the subjective aspects which are distinctive of both perceptual
and non-perceptual hallucinations? They have in common that they are given
to us as sensory presentations of concrete objects and their features. But non-
perceptual hallucinations dier rst-personally from perceptions - at least to
some considerable extent - in respect of the latter's appearance of relationality
and phenomenologically salient epistemic commitment. This means that we do
not experience the former as bringing us into contact with reality in the same
direct and epistemically non-neutral way as perceptions. The qualication is
needed to deal with cases in which the sense of reality seems to be diminished -
such as to give rise to doubts about the actual presence or mind-independence
of what we are experiencing - but not completely lacking (cf. Jaspers (1996):
60 and Fish (1967): 19). It is characteristic of such cases that the subjects
metacognitive account of all non-perceptual hallucinations. Note that the following objection
to this idea does not undermine its satisfactory application to some sub-set of the class of
non-perceptual hallucinations, notably pathological ones (cf. Bentall (1999) for further
discussion).
25Episodes of visualising, which remain vague about the exact location and dimension
of a spatially extended object are not the only good examples. In the already mentioned
case of histrionic personal disorder, the patient hallucinated, in a rather vivid manner, a
person as seemingly standing at her bed, but was unable to spatially locate that person in a
determinate fashion in relation to her perceived real environment: `when she tried to relate
the gure in space to the background of her eld of vision, in this case the walls and curtains
of the room, she realized that she could not do so, it had no denite location in outer space,
that is outside of her' (Sims (1995): 110).
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concerned are not sure to which extent their experience relates them to real-
ity and commits them epistemically, although they have the impression that
neither aspect is completely missing from their experience. Non-perceptual
hallucinations may show a diminished sense of reality, say, if they dier from
perceptions by appearing to lack some, but not all, of the phenomenal aspects
involved in the complex impression of being in direct epistemic contact with
the mind-independent world.26 In particular, while some of their phenomenal
aspects may contribute to the establishment of an appearance of access to
reality, others may again help to undermine this impression - possibly result-
ing in uncertainty about the relationality and the epistemic signicance of the
experience.
To the extent to which non-perceptual hallucinations are subjectively dis-
criminable from perceptions, they can also be rst-personally distinguished
from perceptual hallucinations. These subjective dierentiations may concern
all or only some of the eight (or more) aspects that constitute the sense of
reality involved in perceiving something. And which aspects are relevant may
dier from case to case - with the limitation that some aspects presuppose
others (e.g., locatedness comes with particularity). One consequence of these
considerations is that none of these aspects can gure in an account of the
phenomenal commonalities between the two kinds of hallucination. For there
can be non-perceptual hallucinations which subjectively seem to lack all of
them. Another consequence is that non-perceptual hallucinations may dier
from perceptual ones in various ways, and to a smaller or a larger extent.
This allows for a categorisation of non-perceptual hallucinations into dierent
groups. Some may seem, for instance, as if they present us with particular,
but not determinately located objects; others may instead appear to relate
us to existing, but mind-dependent entities; and so on (cf. the possibility
of a diminished sense of reality discussed above). In addition to perceptual
hallucinations, we may thus distinguish several types of non-perceptual ones.
These considerations do not suce yet to distinguish non-perceptual hal-
lucinations from all other kinds of mental episodes. For there are some non-
hallucinatory sensory episodes which present us with concrete objects, without
thereby purporting to relate us to aspects of reality. Acts of visualising and
other instances of sensory imagining are good examples. But they are examples
of conscious mental agency and, as such, involve an experience of voluntariness
(cf. chapter 5). That is, visualised objects appear to be determined by and
responsive to what we want them to be like as part of visualising them. It is
in this respect that acts of visualising dier rst-personally from perceptions
- and from non-perceptual hallucinations (cf. Bentall and Slade (1988): 19).
However, there are also many sensory presentations that both lack a sense
26See, again, the example in footnote 25.
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of reality and are completely involuntary - for instance, hypnagogic and other
spontaneously occurring images. Some theorists show the tendency to treat
most, if not all, of them as hallucinatory (cf., e.g., Cheyne (2009)). But many
of these images are merely transitional and unstable in character - that is,
they lack the impression of persistence. This has moved other theorists to
take solely the more steady and stable involuntary images to be hallucinations
(cf. Mavromatis (1986): 77.). My proposal is to follow the second line and
to understand non-perceptual hallucinations as precisely those sensory presen-
tations which do not relate us to the world, and the phenomenal character of
which is subjectively indistinguishable from a character that marks its bear-
ers as unbidden, persistent and partly or fully lacking a sense of reality. One
motivation for this choice is simply that it gives more unity to the class of
hallucinations, since all its perception-like members involve an impression of
persistence as well. But it also pays more justice to the basicness of the division
between persistent and non-persistent mental episodes.
Mental episodes involve an impression of persistence either because they
are forced upon us by the world (including our body) or the epistemic or
practical reasons available to us, or because we actively sustain them by means
of imagining. In both cases, their occurrence is in line with their functional
role in our mental lives. Only in unusual or pathological cases do they deviate
from this role and stay in existence due to other, merely causal factors.27
By contrast, eeting or unsteady episodes do not seem to have any specic
function in our minds or to involve any comparable distinction between `good'
and `bad' instances. This dierence is reected by the fact that we do not
pay very much attention to them, while taking our persisting episodes very
serious. We rely on the latter in belief and action when everything seems to
work ne, and start to question or worry about them when something seems
to have gone wrong. Neither is typically true in the case of the former.28
Since hallucinations are conceived of as unsuccessful counterparts to suc-
cessful perceptions, this line of thought is reason enough to maintain that
hallucinations occur only at the level of persistent episodes. Below that level,
there is simply no comparable contrast to be drawn. It is in accordance with
this that we do take our hallucinations serious. For instance, we do rely on
them if we mistake them for perceptions, and we are concerned about their
occurrence if not. The aspects of involuntariness and persistence, which hal-
lucinations seem to share with each other and with perceptions, are therefore
sucient to distinguish the former from other non-perceptual sensory presen-
27See the respective discussion of the dierent ways in which judgemental thoughts may
come into existence in (cf. chapter 5).
28It is interesting to ask whether episodes play an important role in our lives because they
are persisting, or whether they instead are persisting because they are signicant for us.
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tations. Perhaps, this means that hallucinations always involve at least a min-
imal sense of reality. For it might turn out that an impression of persistence is
possible only in connection with the seeming presence of some of the aspects
constitutive of the full appearance of a link and commitment to reality. And
this might already suce for a minimal sense of reality. But this conjecture
requires further phenomenological investigations.
V.
In the light of the preceding considerations, it is now possible to delineate the
class of hallucinations. A mental episode is a hallucination just in case it satisi-
es three conditions: (a) it subjectively seems to be a sensory presentation of
one or more concrete objects as being a certain way; (b) it involves a phenom-
enal impression both of both persistence and of involuntariness in origin and
sustainment; and (c) it does not perceptually relate us to parts of the world,
even if it may seem so (i.e., even if it may involve a sense of reality).29 The
resulting characterisation of hallucinations is largely phenomenological in so
far as the conditions (a) and (b) concern the phenomenal character of hallu-
cinations and the non-phenomenological condition (c) is purely negative, that
is, does not say anything positive about what hallucinations in fact are.
Similarly, the sub-divisions among hallucinations can also be spelled out
in primarily phenomenological terms. Perceptual hallucinations dier from
non-percep-tual ones in their involvement of a full sense of reality, which
makes them rst-personally indistinguishable from perceptions. Perceptual
hallucinations concerning the present state of reality dier from hallucina-
tory episodes of sensory memory in their impression of presence, rather than
pastness. And there may be various types of non-perceptual hallucinations,
depending on the identity and number of the aspects in which they are sub-
jevtively like perceptions and perceptual hallucinations. It is interesting to
note that perceptual hallucinations are phenomenologically closer to percep-
tions than to non-perceptual hallucinations (e.g., the latter do not belong to
the class of perceptual experiences made up by the former). However, that it
is distinctive of perceptual hallucinations that they possess a character which
is subjectively indistinguishable from a perceptual character does not under-
mine their hallucinatory status. They still count as hallucinations because of
their lack of third-personal relationality and their subjective similarities with
29What about mental episodes which satisfy all three conditions, but which - despite
appearances - are not really persistent sensory presentations, or not really involuntary in
their occurrence or their continuing existence? My suggestion is that they should still count
as hallucinations, given that the rst-personal character matters more for our categorisation
of sensory episodes than their third-personal structure.
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non-perceptual hallucinations.
The suggestion has been that the character of hallucinations is subjectively
indistinguishable from the character of perceptions in at least some respects
- namely sensory presentation, involuntariness, persistence, and possibly also
sense of reality. Does this mean that the character of the former shares the
respective phenomenal aspects with the latter? This is not necessary. In par-
ticular, the subjective indistinguishability of perceptual hallucinations need
not be due to a sameness in character, but may instead stem from certain non-
pathological limitations to our rst-personal discriminatory abilities.30 But the
respective debate has been silent on the aspects of involuntariness and persis-
tence. And it seems dicult to deny that the fact that hallucinations subjec-
tively seem to be involunantary and persistent - that is, are rst-personally
indistinguishable in this respect from perceptions - originates in the subjec-
tively accessible fact that they are involuntary and persistent. After all, we
cannot inuence our hallucinations in the same deliberate way in which we
can alter what we are imagining (cf. chapter 5); and our hallucinations enjoy
continual sustainment without the need for active help on our behalf. So that
we take hallucinations to be involuntary and persistent should be understood
in terms of the phenomenological salience of the respective aspects of their
nature.
The situation is less clear with respect to the other phenomenal aspects
in relation to which hallucinations may be subjectively indistinguishable from
perceptions. Perhaps hallucinations are not really subjective presentations
of mind-independent objects or of any objects at all, despite rst-personally
seeming to be so. But, on the other hand, perhaps they are subjectively sim-
ilar to perceptions in the relevant respects precisely because their character
does show the presentational aspects essential to the character of perceptions.
What seems ultimately at issue here is whether the rst-personal presentation
of objects should be understood in relational or in intentional terms, and also
whether two subjectively indistinguishable characters of distinct episodes can,
under certain circumstances, be assumed to be the same, or at least to share all
their rst-personally discriminable aspects. These questions cannot be prop-
erly addressed here.31 But two things are worthwhile to note in relation to
30The constraints on our ability to individuate our own mental episodes from the inside
may be due to simple factors - such as the temporal distance between the experiences
concerned, our unfamiliarity with them, or other contextual reasons (cf. Williamson (1990)).
31Martin (2004, 2006) and McDowell (1998a) argue that there is no good reason to assume
a sameness in character, but good reasons against it. Hence, according to their views,
perceptual hallucinations merely seem to sensorily present us with objects and to merely
seem to provide us with access to reality, while in reality doing neither. In chapter 11, I argue
in favour of the sameness of character between perceptions and perceptual hallucinations
and, on this basis, put forward an account of perceptual hallucinations, that promises to
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them.
First, the argument above for the possibility of non-perceptual hallucina-
tions in terms of the independence of some of the phenomenal aspects char-
acteristic of perceptions may also be understood as an argument for their
possession by non-perceptual hallucinations. After all, we have not yet found
any reason to doubt that there can be experiences with only some of these as-
pects, and also that we can correctly recognise their character when attending
to it from the inside. And second, the assumption that hallucinations may
share some or even all of their phenomenal aspects with perceptions does not
go against the central tenet of the epistemic approach to hallucinations. It
is true that this assumption has the consequence that the subjective indistin-
guishability is to be further elucidated in terms of the possession of a certain
phenomenal character. But it is also still the case that, once it is so spelled
out how hallucinations are given in consciousness in comparison to percep-
tions, philosophy has nothing more to contribute to the issue of what denes
and unies hallucinations.
I have not explicitly argued here for the idea that philosophy's contribution
to the study of hallucinations is limited mainly to the discussed and similar
phenomenological considerations.32 But it has hopefully become clear that
the latter provide at least the ground for our rst-personal categorisations
of sensory episodes into perceptions, hallucinations, and so on, and bring us
much closer to the discovery of their respective subjective (or phenomenal)
natures. By contrast, it is the task of the cognitive sciences to distinguish the
various third-personally individuated kinds of perceptual and non-perceptual
hallucinations and to discover their dierent objective (or physical) natures.33
avoid many of the objections by distinguishing two kinds of rst-personal access and by
incorporating the disjunctivist idea that the two kinds of experience still dier in their
third-personal natures.
32See chapter 11 for a defense of this idea. Martin (2004, 2006) goes even further in
arguing that non-philosophical forms of inquiry cannot disclose anything (more) about the
nature of perceptual hallucinations. But his underlying assumption is that the nature of
experiences is exhausted by what they are subjectively like. That is, he does not allow for
a distinction between their rst-personal (or mental) and their third-personal (or physical)
natures (cf. above and the discussion in chapter 11).
33I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their very good and constructive
comments, and the editors of this volume for their help and support. Part of this material
has been presented at a McDowell workshop at the University of Fribourg, and I am very
grateful to the members of the audience | notably John McDowell and Gianfranco Soldati
| for an encouraging and insightful discussion.
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Chapter 3
The Relevance of Empirical Findings
for Aesthetic Evaluation
I. Introduction
Engaging in philosophical aesthetics means, to a considerable extent, also en-
gaging in other and, in some sense, more fundamental disciplines of philosophy,
such as metaphysics, epistemology or the philosophy of mind.1 Which onto-
logical category paintings, novels or performances of music belong to should
be inuenced by considerations about their status as artworks and about our
aesthetic experiences of them. But it is, ultimately, a metaphysical question,
to be answered before the background of a well-developed metaphysical theory.
The same is true of, say, pictorial experience or our emotional or imaginative
responses to ction. Without a proper theory of visual experience, emotion or
imagination, it is not possible to fully account for the former.
In so far as empirical investigations are relevant for certain issues in meta-
physics, epistemology or the philosophy of mind, they are also relevant for
the respective parts of aesthetics which contain those issues. The relevance
is perhaps not the same since additional `aesthetic considerations' | that is,
considerations distinctive of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline | may
heighten or weaken the importance of the empirical results concerned. But
even if the latter turn out to be irrelevant in certain cases, this fact needs to
be established by aesthetics. Hence, if (and this antecendent is by no means
obviously satised) certain empirical studies or insights are indeed relevant for
a satisfactory theory of a certain mental phenomenon, then aesthetics should
take them into account when it is concerned with those mental phenomena.
1It is interesting to ask whether there is also a general philosophy of normativity (e.g.,
of norms, reasons and values), which should then be included in this list. I am inclinded to
a positive answer, but such a general approach to normative phenomena has not really fully
established itself yet | most debates focus on particular kinds of normative features, such
epistemic or moral ones.
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Accordingly, it is to be expected that philosophers interested, say, in pictorial
experience should not only engage in philosophy of mind and, especially, phi-
losophy of perception, but also have at least a serious look at what cognitive
psychology has to say (or not to say) about this kind of experience. The ques-
tion of whether empirical research is relevant for aesthetics, however, reduces
in such cases largely to the question of whether it is relevant for the more basic
philosophical discipline.
The topic of aesthetic value and of aesthetic evaluation seems to be dier-
ent. At least, there is no well-established philosophy of normativity | that
is, of norms, reasons and values in general, independently of particular types
of them | which the debate about this topic should or could refer to. Hence,
even if the issue of whether empirical ndings are relevant for aesthetic eval-
uation is in fact just a special case of the more general issue of whether such
ndings are relevant for evaluation (or at least objective evaluation), we may
for the time being address it more directly, that is, from within aesthetics.
Another, and perhaps related, dierence is that, while phenomena like
repeatable artefacts, pictorial experience or psychological engagement with
stories are not distinctively aesthetic, aesthetic evaluation is. We may be con-
fronted with abstract individuals, experience pictures or respond to stories in
non-aesthetic contexts. Laws and sounds possess arguably the same ontologi-
cal status as novels or pieces of music (Thomasson (1999)), but typically not
the same aesthetic status. We experience trac or emergency exit signs as de-
pictions, without the resulting experience counting as an aesthetic experience.
And something similar is perhaps also true of the emotional and imaginative
engagement of members of a nation with some nation-dening myth (e.g.,
that of Wilhelm Tell). But the (seeming) recognition of the aesthetic value of
something already suces to establish an aesthetic context.2
In this essay, I intend to concentrate on the issue to which extent the
results of empirical investigations may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation.
The latter gures in aesthetics in at least two dierent ways. It may be the
topic of investigation, or it may instead be the aim of investigation. In the
rst case, we are concerned with philosophical aesthetics and, more precisely,
the philosophical debate about how best to account for aesthetic value and
aesthetic appreciation. In the second case, we are concerned with critical
aesthetics and, more precisely, the aesthetic assessment of a particular object or
type of object. Philosophy and criticism do not dier merely in the generality
of what they are about (e.g., all vs. some instances of aesthetic value). They
also dier in how they approach the issue of aesthetic evaluation | in whether
they investigate the nature of aesthetic value or, alternatively, the aesthetic
2This indicates that what ultimately delineates the subject area of aesthetics is aesthetic
value | just as what delineates the subject area of moral philosophy is moral value.
80
Chapter 3 The Relevance of Empirical Findings for Aesthetic Evaluation
nature of objects.
Empirical ndings may be relevant for one or both forms of aesthetics; and
they may be relevant for them in dierent ways. Within criticism, they may
inuence how we assess particular objects, or types of objects; and whithin phi-
losophy, they may inuence which account of aesthetic value and evaluation
we prefer. My concern is with their relevance for the respective goals of aes-
thetics | that is, to which extent (if any) they should inuence which account
of aesthetic value and evaluation we prefer, and which aesthetic values we as-
cribe to particular (types of) entities. That they sometimes do inuence our
philosophical or critical activities is probably a truism, and not a particularly
interesting one, for that matter. But whether they should do so is controversial
and, moreover, very important for the development of our philosophical and
critical practices.
Philosophers who ask whether empirical ndings are relevant for the aes-
thetic assessment of objects are typically not concerned with the issue of
whether our personal experiences of the works are relevant. Something simi-
lar is true, say, of art-historical or scientic studies limited to the particular
artworks (like the dating of a painting, or X-ray pictures of it). Instead, the
focus of attention is normally on more general and systematic scientic inves-
tigations | for instance, concerning the evolution of artistic practices or our
psychological reactions to art. However | with the possible exception of our
engagement with conceptual art or, more generally, ideas and theories | both
our aesthetic experiences of artworks and our art-historical studies are clearly
empirical in nature. That is, they are empirical | and not apriori | sources of
knowledge. I briey return to this aspect of aesthetic experience at the end of
this essay. Until then, I partly follow tradition in restricting my discussion to
empirical ndings in a narrower sense, which excludes our own perception- and
sensation-based experiences, but includes concrete art-historical and scientic
knowledge about particular artworks.
II. Critical Aesthetics
Critical aesthetics is concerned with the aesthetic assessment of particular
objects or types of objects. The appreciation of a single artwork is not the
only | and perhaps even not the standard | example of criticism. We also
evaluate groups of artworks in respect of the fact, say, that they belong to the
same artist, period, style or genre. In addition, the objects of assessment need
not be artistic or even artefacts. But I limit my discussion here to aesthetic
criticism of artworks.
The latter may involve many dierent cognitive or active elements. First
of all, its goal is not merely to identify the aesthetic value of the objects
81
The Relevance of Empirical Findings for Aesthetic Evaluation Chapter 3
concerned, but also to make sense of this value in terms of their other, less
evaluative features. It is sometimes fairly easy to come to know whether some-
thing is an aesthetically good or bad work, but typically much more dicult
to understand why this is so. This is reected in a peculiar aspect of aes-
thetic evaluation | the fact that, in aesthetic matters, we should rely on our
own experiences, rather than on the testimony of others.3 Of course, we can
come to know about the value of an object through listening to the opinions
of others: we can come to know that it has this or that value. But even the
best descriptions can rarely | if ever | give us sucient access to how the
object in question realises its value. Masterpieces have in common their aes-
thetic excellence. But they manage to be masterpieces in very dierent ways,
rendering them very particular | or `unique' | artworks. Moreover, what
interests us is not always, or merely, the positive or negative aesthetic value
of an object, but its specic realisation of that value. We would spend far less
time with artworks if they would all be beautiful, say, in the very same way.
Aesthetic criticism may dier in this respect from moral criticism, given that
the latter seems to focus more (though also not exclusively) on the morality
of the actions or persons concerned.
Another important element of criticism is that it involves the presentation
and consideration of reasons for evaluation (e.g., reasons for admiring some-
thing, or for judging it to be a masterpiece). Part of our interest in the features
which help to realise aesthetic value is that we can point to them in rational
defense of our assessments. That we feel the need to do so, and demand of
others to back up their evaluations as well, reects the claim to objectivity
inherent to aesthetic evaluation. We do not just let disagreements exist, we
try to resolve them, partly because we assume in our own assessments that
they are right, and all opposing ones wrong. Accordingly, the vindication
of aesthetic evaluations has also the purpose to help others to recognise our
perspective on the relevant features and their relationship to aesthetic worth.
The understanding of why something has a certain aesthetic value is therefore
not merely metaphysical, but also rational. Its object of knowledge are the
properties of the object and their relations of realisation. But they are known
in such a way that it becomes intelligible for us why it has the aesthetic value
in question. The rational aspect explains, for instance, why we are not curi-
ous about all metaphysical facts about artworks when considering them from
an aesthetic point of view. The nature and distribution of the molecules of
a painting are presumably sucient for its possession of a certain aesthetic
value. But we are not interested in its molecular structure because it does not
help us to make sense of the worth of the painting and, hence, to defend our
3See discussions about the principle of acquaintance (e.g., Budd (2003)) and the auton-
omy of aesthetic evaluations (e.g., Hopkins (2001)).
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assessment when challenged to do so by others (cf. chapter 7).
The normativity of aesthetic evaluation
Although criticism may very well involve other elements over and above eval-
uation and metaphysical and rational understanding, the latter are central to
it, and I intend to concentrate exclusively on them. Empirical ndings can
possibly contribute to evaluation and understanding by identifying: (i) the
value of the objects concerned; (ii) their other features; (iii) the relation of
realisation between the features and the value; and (iv) the relation of intelli-
gibility between the features and the value.4 It seems indubitable that we have
empirical access to the relevant other features of aesthetically valuable objects.
We can see their colours and shapes, understand what they represent, come
to learn about their history, or discover their hidden material features. But
knowledge of them alone does not suce for knowledge of the aesthetic values
at issue. What is needed in addition is the recognition that the features realise
a specic aesthetic value or, alternatively, that they provide good reason for
the ascription of such a value.
This explains why it is not enough, say, to investigate the aesthetic pref-
erences of people, or their tendencies to form certain aesthetic judgements.
What any corresponding studies track is what people value, and not what is
valuable. The recognition of the true values of objects requires also the ability
to tell which of the noted evaluations are adequate. We can tell whether an
evaluation is adequate in two ways: by considering the reasons for preferring it
over other evaluations and then forming a rational conclusion about whether
it is best supported; or by investigating the relevant features of the object and
checking whether the evaluation assigns to it the value which the features re-
alise. For both options, it is necessary to recognise the features concerned. But
while the rst treats them as reasons, the second treats them as realisators.
Consider the | rather loose | analogy with colours. Colour experience is
not based on, or responsive to, reasons. But it still allows for a very similar
dichotomy of methods. On the one hand, we may be able to tell whether a
given colour experience is adequate by looking at the conditions under which
it occurs | notably the illumination conditions and the state of mind of the
person concerned. The thought is that suciently good conditions suggest
adequacy. On the other hand, coming to know the reectance prole of a
surface enables us to predict its colour | assuming that the latter is relativised
to normal human beings and may not be properly perceived under suboptimal
conditions (cf. Byrne and Hilbert (2003)). It is true that reectance proles
4Perhaps it is not the features, but our experiences of them, which constitute the reasons.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume here that the former is the case. Nothing in what follows
should depend on this assumption.
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may not be able to x all qualitative aspects of colour, such as the location
of unique hues (cf. Allen (2010b)) or the colour similarities across surface,
volume and light colours (cf. chapter 1). But they suce to determine the
shade of colour to a very high degree. Hence, we can come to know about very
(if not most) specic colours by means of carrying out relevant experiments in
optical physics. So we have an independent route to the truth-value of a given
colour experience.
When applied to aesthetic evaluation, the equivalent of the rst option
is to discover the rational relations which the relevant features of the object
bear to its value. This means that we recognise the features as speaking in
favour of a certain evaluation, rather than others. So the identication of the
aesthetic value would ultimately amount to the identication of other features
as aesthetic reasons. I return to this option in a moment. Before that, it is
helpful to see why the second option is not appicable to the aesthetic case.
The main reason for this is that we normally do not possess knowledge about
which aesthetic value a set of given features does, or is likely to, realise (see the
relevant well-known essays in Sibley (2001c)). While we can deduce the colour
of an object from its other features (e.g., its reectance prole), we cannot do
the same with the beauty of an artwork.5 That is, we cannot bridge the gap
from knowledge of the other features of an object to knowledge of its aesthetic
value. We simply lack the required principles of inference.
What is important to note here is that the recognition of the features as
reasons makes all the dierence. Once we become aware of the fact that the
features speak in favour of certain evaluations, we can balance the resulting
reasons and endorse the assessment which they overall support. This is possible
because of two dierences between treating the features as realisators and
treating them as reasons.
First, the former focusses on the metaphysical relation between the features
and the aesthetic values, hence requiring knowledge of the laws governing this
kind of realisation in order to ascribe the realised property on the basis of
recognising the realising features. We need to know, say, which reectance
proles are nomologically linked to which hues if we want to tell the colour of
an object on the basis of discovering its reectance properties. By contrast,
the latter treatment concentrates on the rational (and epistemic) connections
among the experiences of the various features concerned. All we need to be able
to come to a rational conclusion about the aesthetic value of an object is to be
rational and to recognise the features as reasons. Noticing that the elegance of
5The only exception is perhaps that, if we know that a given artwork shares all its other
features with another work, this suces to conclude that it also possesses the same aesthetic
value. But the corresponding principles are too concrete to be of any interesting practical
use. And it is also not clear whether they should count as genuine principles in the rst
place (cf. Jackson et al. (2004)).
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an outline drawing of a face speaks strongly in favour of a positive evaluation,
while its overemphasized realism supports a slightly negative assessment, it
may be reasonable to judge that the drawing is somewhat beautiful.
Second, in contrast to following the route involving metaphysical knowl-
edge, following the route involving rational balancing need not rely on prin-
ciples involving the overall value of objects. It does not proceed deductively;
and the forms of inference involved are typically not governed by principles |
or at least not to a very large extent. When judging the number of partici-
pants in a demonstration, we may perhaps be able to start with the knowledge
that it is higher than one hundred, and lower than one thousand. For a more
precise informed guess, we have to rely on our various impressions of the mass
of people in front of us (e.g., when we look at it from dierent angles), with-
out the need for, or availability of, principles. Something very similar may
happen when we experience an artwork and come to know its aesthetic worth
by considering the rational force of its features. Our dierent impressions pull
us in dierent directions. But reaching an equilibrium among them does not
presuppose reliance on principles linking the features to the respective value.
It is perhaps possible to formulate | possibly hedged | principles which
describe the contribution of particular features to the aesthetic value of an
object | such as the principle that, everything else being equal, something
elegant is beautiful, or the principle that something symmetrical possesses
a positive aesthetic value (e.g., that of being balanced or harmonious). But
empirical studies have diculties to help us to discover or apply such principles.
One particular problem is that, even if it turns out that a certain aesthetic
value is always coextensional with a specic set of other features, this does
not suce to show that the objects concerned possess the value in virtue of
instantiating those features. For instance, the opposite may be true; or the
two kinds of property may be due to some third aspect of the objects at issue.
Whether the features indeed realise the aesthetic value is, again, a matter of
whether we can make sense of the presence of the latter in terms of the presence
of the former. And this is for criticism to decide, and not for science.
Moreover, there is the problem that many aesthetic principles may only be
valid in a hedged form | that is, relative to other things being equal. This
raises the further question of when to apply these principles. Their adequate
application presupposes the recognition of when things are in fact equal. This
is, in particular, the case if the object does not possess any other aesthetically
relevant features which outweigh or undermine the evaluative contribution of
the features initially considered. But there is often no limit to the number
of such potential competitors. An elegantly drawn line may none the less be
ugly for very dierent reasons | for instance, because of its colour scheme,
aspects of the drawn gures, its background, or indeed its format. Empirical
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investigations can tell us that certain of these competitors are absent. But they
cannot do so for all of them, assuming that the potentially defective colour
schemes, drawn aspects, backgrounds or formats cannot easily be restricted to
a nite number.
Accordingly, empirical ndings cannot contribute much to the identica-
tion of reasons (rather than what we take to be reasons), nor to the explanation
of how these reasons render the attribution of specic aesthetic values intel-
ligible, given that both tasks are essentially concerned with intelligibility (or
normativity). At best, they may help us to notice features of objects which we
then recognise as reasons. Hence, recognising which features are aesthetically
relevant, and how they are relevant, requires more than empirical studies: it
requires rational aesthetic experience.6
The concreteness of aesthetic evaluation
But their normative dimension is not the only aspect of aesthetic evaluations
which poses a serious problem for an empirical approach to aesthetic value.
Another one is their concreteness, which becomes manifest in two facts. The
rst is that relatively small qualitative details may matter for the aesthetic
value of an object. A slight dent in a line may undermine its elegance and,
hence, the positive value of the respective simple line drawing. The second
aspect of the concreteness of aesthetic evaluations is that not only the qualities,
but also the particularity of objects may matter for their aesthetic worth.
This may happen, for instance, in cases where the particularity of artistic
expression becomes relevant. Artworks may be expressive of perspectives onto
the world. That is, they may represent the values, emotions and opinions
of (real or ctional) persons or characters. But, more fundamentally, they
are expressions of the skills of the respective artist | of his or her insight,
inventiveness, wit, sensibility, unoriginality or dilentatism. Part of why we
value certain artworks may be that they are expressive of the specic skills
of a certain artist. And appreciating artistic expression may require taking
into account the particularity of the artist and his or her act of expression.
For instance, it may matter whether a given Cubistic painting was made by
Braque or Picasso.
Empirical research, however, is typically not concerned with particular-
ity. Moreover, it can capture specic details only in exchange for generality.
Studying the nature and context of an individual painting, say, by means of
specic material or art-historical investigations (the former, for instance, in-
volving X-rays or chemical analyses) may indeed help us to notice relevant
6Whether the recognition of particular features as speaking for or against particular
evaluations is underwritten by principles is an independent issue.
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facts about the painting. We may, for instance, discover the gesture which
the depicted heroine was originally painted as making, and this may help us to
better understand the meaning of the ultimately depicted gestures. But taking
the concreteness of the painting into account in this way has the consequence
that the observed results cannot be (easily) generalised to other paintings or
artworks.
III. Philosophical Aesthetics
When shifting attention from critical aesthetics to philosophical aesthetics, it is
perhaps more plausible to expect that empirical ndings do become relevant |
not the least because philosophy | in contrast with criticism | is essentially
concerned with general issues about aesthetic value. The following discussion
concentrates on two particular attempts to establish the relevance of empirical
aesthetics, namely by explaining our general aesthetic interests and sensibili-
ties in evolutionary terms, and by showing that our aesthetic evaluations are
heavily inuenced by factors which more traditional theories of aesthetic value
take to be irrelevant for | or even detrimental to | aesthetic appreciation.
Such empirical insights and considerations may supplement our existing
philosophical accounts of aesthetic evaluation; or they may require a substan-
tial revision of them. In what follows, I aim to show that the latter is much
more dicult to establish than the former. But before entering the details
of the discussion, it is worthwhile to stress that any revisionary consequences
of empirical research for philosophy may also have an impact on criticism. If
we are to change our general conception of what aesthetic value amounts to
and how aesthetic evaluation should work, we also are to change the way in
which we approach particular objects of aesthetic evaluation and assess them
aesthetically. If we were wrong, for instance, to take aesthetic evaluation to be
a rational phenomenon, then we should stop to assign such an important role
to reasons and reasoning when evaluating specic artworks. And if it turns out
that our appreciation of aesthetic skills ultimately amounts to an appreciation
of skills favourable for survival or procreation, then we should perhaps treat
artistic creation as much more mundane than we usually do (e.g., as on a par
with other human achievements, such as those in sport or economy).
Evolutionary accounts of artistic practices
Some evolutionary psychologists have indeed argued that our interest in cre-
ating and appreciating art derives from sexual selection (cf. Miller (2000); see
also Dutton (2003) and Currie (2005)). While it is perhaps dicult to un-
derstand the creation and appreciation of art as an important factor for the
survival of a species or particular members of it (with the possible exception
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of monetary issues), it does not seem unreasonable to explain the occurrence
of artistic practices in terms of their role in the selection of suitable mating
partners. Art displays the skills of the artist, such as creativity, intelligence,
insight, empathy or perseverance. Some | if not all | of these skills are
important in a relationship aimed at the successful upbringing of ospring.
Moreover, art is a reliable indicator of their presence, given that it is not easy
to create (what looks like) good art. Finally, the creation of art is very re-
sourceful, suggesting that the artist has more than enough energy and skill to
support himself: he has time for leisure and for producing seemingly useless
things.7 The tail of a peacock is an obstacle in its survival: it is dicult to
carry around and attracts potential predators. So it is very impressive if a
peacock with a large tail manages to survive and to parade (cf. Zahavi and
Zahavi (1997)). Similarly, the appreciation of art | while taking up some
resources on its own | is worthwhile since it increases the chance to nd a
mate of high quality with respect to procreation.
Considerations like these may very well explain why early humanity started
to engage in artistic practices. But empirical facts about the origin of our
current practices, however, do not automatically render those practices intel-
ligible.8
First of all, the origin of a practice may be completely extrinsic to its
contemporary signicance for our lives. In many cases, we start to engage in
a practice for reasons which do not speak in favour of pursuing the practice
itself, but instead are concerned with some contingent consequences that this
pursuit is likely to have. We want to be near and impress people (e.g., when
we love them), please them or follow their role-model (e.g., when they are
our parents), or present ourselves in a favourable light (e.g., when they are
our boss, or some other gure with authority). Such motivations may lead us
to go to the opera, attend all football games of a certain team, visit church
regularly, or join others for a drink after work, without us taking enjoyment
in those activities as such. But over time, it may happen that those practices
become valuable for us in themselves, and we would continue to engage in
them, even if our original motivations disappear.
Some such practices did not start with us, but with our ancestors. They
changed religion, for instance, because of outside pressure. And this may
explain, in a historical (or causal) sense, why we have been attending mass
from our early childhood onwards. It may indeed also shed light on why this
7The situation changes, of course, once the creation of art becomes itself a means for
survival | for instance, as a source of income. But this just strengthens the claim that
what matters in our engagement with art is that it helps us to reach our evolutionarily
determined goals.
8What becomes crucial here is perhaps the dierence between history and genealogy (cf.
Williams (2002)).
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ritual is important for us nowadays | for instance, when we continue to adhere
to it as a manifestation of our sense of tradition or cultural conservatism. But
this is not necessarily so. In fact, it may actually be the case that the practice
is signicant for us despite its history. Perhaps, for us, religion should never
be a matter of tradition, but only of personal decision and faith.
Of course, the case of the evolutionary origin is dierent in that it con-
cerns, at least to a large extent, factors beyond our own control or the control
of cultural groups. But this does not prevent them from possibly becoming
relatively irrelevant for our current practices. Indeed, it may render them even
more removed from the latter. It is not easy to conceive of a way of making
sense of the many dierent aspects of our evaluative engagement with art in
terms of sexual selection, say. We have a fairly good understanding of the var-
ious reasons why people devote their lives to the creation of artworks | the
need for self-expression, the challenge and satisfaction coming with creation,
the simultaneity of the playfulness and the seriousness of art, the search for
fame and wealth, and so on. Similarly, people spend time on experiencing
art for very dierent reasons | such as curiosity about the human condition,
more specic historical and art-historical interests, the search for real value and
intellectual companionship, the need for entertainment or distraction, consid-
erations about social status, and so on. Many of these motivations for actively
or passively engaging with art are not easily linked to, or explained by, sexual
selection.
Moreover, the motivations also dier greatly from case to case. Artists
have very personal and particular reasons for producing art, and part of the
value of their works may precisely be due to the fact that this specicity is
reected in them. Something similar is true of spectators who are sensitive
of the concreteness of art and the artists, but typically not before the back-
ground of a personal interest in the artist as a potential candidate for mating
(especially if the artist lived in the past). Of course, such an interest may still
always be eective in some unconscious or subpersonal manner | as, perhaps,
some psychoanalytic theories might claim. But to establish such a claim would
require the collection of much more empirical data about what actually moves
us to engage with art and would therefore go far beyond evolutionary psychol-
ogy. And which data is relevant depends on whether it helps us to make sense
of our current practices, or at least sheds new light on them | but from an
aesthetic, and not merely from a biological point of view.
Besides, the insights of evolutionary psychology about our artistic practices
cannot easily be transferred to aesthetic criticism. It is one thing to explain
why people want to play football, but a completely dierent thing to judge
when they play football well. Similarly, even if we have convincing explanation
of why we engage in our current artistic practices, it is far from clear why this
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explanation should have any bearing on how we assess the aesthetic worth of
the artworks involved in those practices. Even if we admire a certain painting
because it reveals the painter as a very skilled person who would be ideal
for procreation, this does not suce to establish that the artwork is of high
aesthetic value | many other activities and their products can manifest skill
and expertise to a similar extent.9
The rationality of aesthetic appreciation
One of the main problems with the conclusions of evolutionary psychologists
has been that accounts of past developments cannot be easily applied to the
present. Many other | and typically more conned | empirical studies avoid
this diculty by focussing on our current engagement with artworks or similar
objects of aesthetic experience. For instance, some ndings suggest that we
tend to like wine more if we take it to be relatively expensive | even if we
can claim some considerable expertise in matters of wine (cf. Plassmann et al.
(2008)). Others indicate that our experience of a wine is heavily inuenced by
whether we take the wine (rightly or wrongly) to be white or red (cf. Brochet
(2001)). And, again, others illustrate that we prefer certain Impressionist
paintings over others relative to our | possibly unknown | familiarity with
them (cf. Cutting (2006)).10
To start with the last example, it cannot be so easily concluded that fa-
miliarity tends to lead only to positive aesthetic evaluations. As far as I can
tell, the studies were done with relatively unknown, but aesthetically valuable
Impressionist paintings. Thus, it still has to be seen whether the experiments
would have the same results if other genres and, especially, really bad paint-
ings would be used. It is less obvious whether the studies about the impact
of beliefs about the price of wine face the same problem. But it is at least
imaginable that a seemingly high price may have the opposite eect | for
instance, the critic in question may judge the wine to be not very good and,
hence, to be heavily overpriced, perhaps further strengthening his negative at-
titude towards the wine. Besides, it is also not clear how, say, well-informed
art-historians would respond to knowledge about the price of paintings when
aiming to carefully determine the aesthetic worth of the latter.
Then, that our assessments of Impressionist paintings tend to be more
positive if we are more familiar with them should not be surprising. After all,
9Interestingly, contemporary artists rarely have the image of being potentially successful
parents, even assuming that they are rich and that what matters is solely the number of
healthy ospring they and the following generations are likely to produce. Several expla-
nations suggest themselves, such as changes towards an individualistic way of living, or the
felt need to concetrate all time and energy on the art itself.
10I am largely following the description of these studies in Kieran (2010).
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familiarity is a condition on proper aesthetic evaluation and, in particular, on
the recognition of aesthetic worth. It often takes time to be able to see the real
value of an artwork. And this is not less true of genres or kinds of artworks
which people are generally more exposed to | say, for reasons of fashion, or
due to the fact that the art concerned is (presumably wrongly) now perceived
as having lost its revolutionary or provocative status. It may be pointed out
that the subjects concerned (i.e., students listening to introductory lectures
in psychology, with the paintings serving as backgrounds for the presented
slides) did not look at the paintings | and did not familiarise themselves with
them | with the aim to appreciate them as artworks. Hence, their familiarity
with the paintings may be of a rather dierent kind than the one presupposed
by proper aesthetic assessment. But then, their resulting preferences should
count as defective from an aesthetic point of view | either because they are
not aesthetic at all due to a lack of claim to objectivity, or because they fail
to live up to that claim inherent in aesthetic evaluation. The same seems
true of cases in which beliefs about the nancial value of objects inuence
our aesthetic assessments of them | the latter should minimally count as
defective. This is actually one reason why, even if it is indeed the case that
price or familiarity inuence our preferences in a biased manner, this does
not undermine accounts of aesthetic value which stress the objectivity and
rationality of aesthetic criticism.
Another reason is that some of the studies test our emotional preferences,
rather than our rational assessments of objects. Pleasure or preference |
that is, what we like | is surely open to irrational factors. But, as I argue
in chapter 6, this is precisely why we should be rather wary when relying on
our emotional feelings for the evaluation of objects.11 There is no problem in
ascribing values on the basis of emotions (or similar states, such as desires)
| as long as we clearly acknowledge that the ascribed values are subjective
and do not necessarily reect how the objects should be assessed from a more
objective point of view. If we are instead concerned with the discovery of the
objective value of an object, emotions are not our best guides and, in fact, may
often mislead us. They may be very successful in drawing our attention to the
positive or negative values of objects, as well as to their other features which
help to realise those values. But due to their openness to irrational factors, we
need to rely on reason to check their reliability.
Of course, we are very good at coming up with invented rationalisations
of our aesthetic judgements. And whether we recognise certain features of an
artwork as a reason to ascribe to them a certain aesthetic value may also be
open to inuence from aesthetically irrelevant factors, such as familiarity or
11Compare also Goldie (2004)'s view that emotions do not ground evaluations, but instead
are themselves partly grounded by reasons for evaluation.
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price. But we can, at least to a considerable extent, overcome these obstacles,
say, by listening to the assessments and justications of others. We should
perhaps not simply take over their opinions. But we should at least use them
to question the epistemic standing of our own views and to reconsider our
reasons for endorsing the latter. Empirical studies | like the one's mentioned
| may in fact play a similar role to such testimony. While they cannot tell us
what aesthetic value is or how we should ascribe it to particular objects, they
may help us to recognise that our aesthetic judgements are easily inuenced
by factors that ideally should have had no bearing. In other words, empirical
evidence may show us that certain of our aesthetic evaluations are not of good
aesthetic standing (or even not aesthetic in the rst place). But it cannot
weaken those standards, or replace them with new ones.
It might be suggested that such investigations actually show that we are
never really able to live up to this ideal and form proper aesthetic judgements.
But this form of scepticism seems to be too strong. First, the studies are
typically concerned with situations in which the subjects are ignorant about
some very important facts about the objects concerned. That people get misled
when assessing a white wine which they take to be red does not show that they
get misled in the same way when assessing a red wine which they take to be red.
In the rst case, they go wrong precisely because they miscategorise the object
concerned. But they do so in good faith and are not to be blamed for their
mistake. After all, the perceptual evidence is striking, and the experimentators
seem to be trustworthy to them. Hence, in the second case in which they
categorise the wine correctly, it is not to be expected that their categorisation
will give rise to any error in their aesthetic appreciation. And second, criticism
does not dier in this respect from physics, say. Truth in the sciences (with the
possible exception of mathematics) is typically only approximate (cf. Oddie
(1986)). It may be easy to falsify a theory, but perhaps impossible to verify it.
So we should not expect criticism to fare better in this respect, especially since
aesthetic truths seem to be more elusive than scientic ones | partly because
they are so closely linked to our rst-personal perspective onto the world (as
illustrated, for instance, by the principle of acquaintance). What the empirical
studies at best illustrate is that it is dicult and time-consuming to come to
a proper aesthetic assessment of a particular object.
IV. Conclusion
The preceding considerations were meant to show that | and also begin to
explain why | the relevance of the results of empirical studies of various kinds
for both the criticism of artworks and the philosophy of aesthetic value is lim-
ited. Concerning criticism, the normativity of aesthetic evaluations has the
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consequence that scientic investigations can at best help us to notice features
of artworks, which we can then independently recognise as aesthetically rele-
vant; while the concreteness of aesthetic evaluations has the consequence that
empirical studies either miss their particular target completely, or shed light
on it only in a very specic way, without the possibility for meaningful general-
isations. Moreover, making sense of the aesthetic worth of objects in terms of
their other features requires non-empirical rational considerations. Concern-
ing philosophy, on the other hand, empirical ndings may perhaps bring us
to reconsider our accounts of aesthetic value and its application to particular
artworks. But neither considerations about the evolution of artistic practices,
nor facts about our emotional and evaluative responses to artworks require us
to develop more empiricist views on what aesthetic value is and how we should
go about ascribing it. Again, the rationality of aesthetic evaluations and the
concreteness of our motivations for engaging with art are partly responsible
for this facts: neither can be easily tested or illuminated by empirical means.
Returning to the issue of aesthetic criticism, the same limitations do not
pertain to our rst-hand and rst-personal experiences of artworks, despite
their empirical character. They concern particular objects and provide us
with reasons; and they enable us to make sense of the aesthetic value of ob-
jects. This appears to suggest that there is a fundamental divide among our
empirical ways of accessing artworks. One hypothesis is that any more indirect
or third-personal evidence becomes relevant for the aesthetic evaluation of spe-
cic works only if it is integrated with our more basic aesthetic experiences of
them | for instance, when art-historical facts concern the particular object in
question, or psychological evidence is focussed on our specic response. That
is, the third-personally gained empirical results may supplement our aesthetic
experiences in that they point us to features which make it intelligible why the
objects concern possess their aesthetic values. By contrast, other, more general
kinds of third-personal ndings may just bring us to question our considered
views about the values of objects or the nature of those values. The so-called
`test of time' may perhaps serve as an illustration of this condition on the rel-
evance of empirical evidence. Part of the explanation of why objects survive
this test is that people (whether they are experienced critics or ordinary lay
people) continue over the centuries and cultures to care about their preserva-
tion for aesthetic reasons (and not merely for nancial or other reasons). So
the survival of a given artwork provides us with empirical evidence | though,
it seems, not (as Hume may have hoped) about its aesthetic value, but instead
about the more general quality of our own evaluation of it. Having previously
failed to appreciate Homer's Ulyssess, realising what it means for it to have
survived the centuries may still bring us to reconsider its aesthetic quality and









The Phenomenal Presence of Reasons
One inuential focus in the recent debates on the non-sensory phenomenal
aspects of our mental episodes has been on the intellectual elements of phe-
nomenal character. More specically, it has been on what it is subjectively
like to think a proposition (in opposition to experiencing objects and their
features), as well as on the extent to which how our thoughts and judgements
are phenomenally given to us depends on how they present the world as be-
ing. Other non-sensory aspects of character, by contrast, have been largely
neglected, despite two important truths about them. The rst is that they
pertain not only to judgements and similar thoughts, but also to perceptions
and other sensory episodes | thus not raising general worries about whether
the episodes concerned possess a phenomenal character in the rst place. Sec-
ond, they are, in several respects, more signicicant and fundamental than the
sensory and the intellectual aspects usually discussed. For this third kind of
aspect reects the general nature of the type of episode concerned, rather than
the specic presentational dierences among its instances. In particular, it
renders the rational dimension of the mental episodes rst-personally salient.
My aim in this essay is to describe these non-sensory and non-intellectual
phenomenal aspects of perceptions and other episodes and to highlight their
link to the rational role of those episodes. Pursuing this aim will involve,
among other things, attempting to characterise the three kinds of phenomenal
aspects at issue. More specically, it is part of my proposal that the dierence
between the sensory and the intellectual aspects can be spelled out in terms of
the non-neutrality and the reason-insensitivity of the presentational elements
concerned. The phenomenal aspects of the third type | which I will call ratio-
nal aspects | may then be distinguished from the other two as those aspects
which determine the type of non-neutrality involved in the respective episodes,
rather than what these episodes are non-neutral about or which specic kind
of non-neutrality they involve. This ts well with the already noted suggestion
that the rational phenomenal aspects reect the general type and role of the
episodes in question | notably, that they provide us with and/or are based
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on epistemic reasons. In short, while the rational aspects of character reect
the rational role of the episodes, the sensory and the intellectual aspects are
instead connected to the specic realisation of this rational role | such as
to the specication of which particular beliefs the episodes provide us with
epistemic reasons for.
The resulting view of the rational dimension of phenomenal character is
an instance of Experiential Rationalism, which is the view that our mental
episodes are phenomenally given to us as having a certain rational nature (as-
suming that they possess any). This means that their reason-giving power and
their responsiveness to reasons form part of their phenomenal character.1 If
this would not be the case, the reasons concerned would not count as our rea-
sons. They become reasons for us only in so far as their presence and rational
impact is phenomenally accessible to us from our rst-personal perspective.
The considerations in this paper are therefore centred around the idea of con-
sciousness being shot through and through with rationality. After a detailed
phenomenological description of the various aspects of the phenomenal char-
acter of perceptions and related episodes (sections I and II), I will conclude
the rst part of this article by making my case for Experiential Rationalism
(section III). In the second half of the paper, I will identify non-neutrality as
a central element in the experience of rational role (section IV) and use it to
divide the phenomenal aspects introduced at the beginning into three cate-
gories (section V), before nally arguing that this grouping corresponds to the
division of the phenomenal aspects into the sensory, the intellectual and the
rational (section VI).
I.
Many of the important features of perceptions are reected in their phenomenal
character | that is, in their most determinate introspectible property which
constitutes what they are subjectively like. Although the following list does
not aim to provide a complete description of the character of perceptions, it
is still meant to highlight most of those aspects of perceptual character which
are central to the role played by perceptions in our mental lives.2
One very straightforward and fundamental phenomenological observation
about perceptions is that they present us with | or are about | objects.3
1See chapter 5 for a defence of Experiential Rationalism about the reason-sensitivity of
judgemental thoughts and mental actions.
2The phenomenological descriptions in this section follow closely those presented in chap-
ter 2.
3This section draws partly on chapter 2. Further below, I will contrast the mere pre-
sentation of objects and features with non-neutral presentations, that involve the additional
claim that things indeed are as they are presented.
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That mental episodes are presentational means, minimally, that they involve
the appearance of objects as being distinct from them. If such an appearance
were lacking, the episodes would possess an entirely intrinsic character with no
link to something external to them (cf. Kant (1990): B38) | as, arguably, in
the case of feelings of boredom or depression. That the objects are (or seem to
be) distinct from the episodes is compatible, however, with the idea that they
are (or seem to be) part of, or dependent on, them. Some disjunctivists, for
instance, claim that our genuine perceptions are constituted by the perceived
objects (cf. Martin (2002b)). But the latter should not be identied with the
former, or they would cease to count as objects of perception.
The phenomenal aspect coming with being a presentation of objects is |
at least in the case of perceptions | subject to further qualication by other
aspects. One such qualication concerns the fact that the presentation of
objects includes the presentation of some of their material features (cf. Husserl
(1970), Searle (1983) and Crane (2001)). We do not simply see objects. We
also see their colour, size, shape, and so on. That is, the perceived objects
appear to be a certain way in our perception.4 Similarly, we do not recall,
imagine or think just of objects, but also of some of their features. And another
qualication is that perceptual presentations enjoy some kind of transparency,
meaning two things. First, when we are attending to the phenomenal character
of our perceptions | to what they are like | the objects and features that
they present us with continue to be in the focus of our attentive awareness.
That is, attending to our perceptions means, at least in part, attending to
the world. And second, when we are introspecting our perceptions, we do not
become aware of entities or features | such as sense-data or presentational
vehicles or properties over and above the property of being a presentation
of certain objects | in virtue of which our perceptions are presentational.
Our experiences of depicted or photographed objects are dierent in that they
involve an awareness of a medium of presentation and of its respective features
responsible for its presentational nature.5
It is also distinctive of perceptions that they present objects and their
features at least partially in a sensory manner. In thoughts and other conscious
intellectual episodes, objects are also presented as having certain features.
But their presentation concerned is not sensory. Which properties objects
4This does not require, however, that the subject identies or categorises the perceived
objects in respect of the features that they appear to have. Seeing a blue book need not
involve the recognition that the book is blue (cf. Dretske (2000b): 99f.).
5Martin discusses both aspects in Martin (2002b): section 1, and the former also in
Martin (2000b). As Martin notes in Martin (2002b): 11, both observations are compatible
with the possibility that, when we are attending to our perceptions, we become aware of
more than the presented objects and features | namely, for instance, also of intrinsic aspects
of the phenomenal character of perceptions.
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may appear to have in perception is restricted by the particular sensory mode
involved in their presentation.6 Furthermore, while some features are accessible
in several modes (e.g., shapes), others are accessible only in one mode (e.g.,
colours or sounds). It is notoriously dicult to spell out the dierence between
sensory and intellectual presentation | say, between the ways in which the
redness of an object is given to us in our perception of its redness and in
our judgemental thought that it is red.7 And it is equally dicult to draw
the distinction between perceivable and unperceivable features. I will return
to both issues further below and oer there a way of making sense of both
contrasts.
Then, perceptions present us with concrete objects. That is, their objects
appear to be extended in time and | at least in the visual and the tactile
case | also in space.8 It is important to note that objects that are presented
as concrete entities need not be presented with a specic identity. And this is
closely related to the fact that they also need not appear to possess a deter-
minate location, duration or size, or to be located in real time or space. The
respective aspects of the character of presentations should therefore be clearly
distinguished.
When we are perceiving an object, it is presented as having a determinate
spatio-temporal extension and location. When we are visualising an object, by
contrast, the resulting image need not present it as having a specic size and
duration, or as being at a particular point in time or space. Indeed, imagined
object need not possess any determinate spatio-temporal features. What is
crucial here is that sensorily imagined objects are not related to each other
or to our own location in real time and space, independently of our intentions
or thoughts about them. The duration of a real sound is independent of
how long we want or take it to be. And since it normally determines the
length of our perception of it, we have access to its duration in virtue of the
duration of the latter. But the same need not be true of an imagined sound.
It is up to us whether the real duration of our imaginative experience of it
corresponds to the imagined duration of the sound. In particular, an auditory
6This is true even of the non-sensorily presented features. For instance, we may perhaps
see the sadness of a friend; but we cannot touch it.
7The expression 'judgemental thought' is meant to make clear that what I have in mind
are temporally extended episodes of thought, rather than the instantaneous onsets of such
episodes. In particular, I do not want to refer to acts of judging, but instead to the thoughts
resulting from such acts and possibly remaining occurrent for a long while. Just consider
the contrast between realising that a person is very attractive and then constantly having
this thought in mind and letting it inuence what one says and does while spending the
evening with him or her.
8In what follows, I will, somewhat loosely, speak generally of spatio-temporal extension
and location. Also, I will use the notion of an object in a wide sense such as to include
events and property instances.
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imagination, which is ten seconds long in real time, may be taken by us to
be an imagination of the whole duration of an imagined sound, which is ten
hour long in the imagined time.9 However, our act of imagining need not
be specic on the relation between the real length of the experience and the
imagined length of the sound. Hence, the question of how long the sound is,
that we imagine with the help of a ten seconds long act of imagining, may fail
to have an answer. Similar considerations apply to size and location. Given
that the distance and the presence or absence of simultaneity between us and
sensorily imagined objects or between the imagined objects themselves may
remain indeterminate, it may not always be possible to settle the issue of the
specic location or size of the imagined entities. In other words, our sensory
imaginings may stay neutral on the particular spatio-temporal relations in
which their objects stands to other imagined or perceived entities. Indeed,
the imagined objects may actually appear to be part of separate and non-real
'times' or 'spaces'.10
That perceived objects appear to be determinate in their extension and
location is closely linked to the fact that they are presentated as being par-
ticulars with determinate identities. When we are visualising a landscape, we
need not visualise any particular landscape, and the question of which specic
landscape we are visualising may be inappropriate.12 But when we are per-
ceiving a landscape, we perceive a particular landscape, and this specicity of
what we are perceiving is rst-personally salient, even though we might not
always be able to subjectively notice dierences in particularity (cf. Martin
(2002a)). If it were not, we would not (be able to) rely on our perceptions when
aiming to demonstratively refer to concrete entities in our environment.13 The
phenomenological salience of the particularity of the perceived objects is partly
grounded in the impression that they are at specic points in time and space.
Perhaps the latter already suces to generate the former.
9Compare the idea of re-experiencing one's whole life during the last moments before
one's death.
10Cf. Wittgenstein (1984c) sections 622 and 628, Sartre (2004): 8., and McGinn (2004):
58f.. Of course, acts of imagining can specify the extension and location of the imagined
objects by including some conscious intentions or thoughts concerning that matter.11 And
perhaps each act of imagining must include some minimal spatio-temporal specication of
this kind | for instance, if we are visualising two objects, there may have to be always an
answer to the question of whether one is to the left of the other.
12Something similar is true of paintings of landscapes and other things (cf. Wollheim
(1998); Martin (2001): 276).
13See Siegel (2002). Compare also the arguments in Martin (2002a) and Soteriou (2000)
for the involvement of particularity in perceptions. The phenomenological salience of the
particularity of the perceived objects has the consequence that accounts, which assume that
perceptions possess only a general content (e.g., Dretske (1995)), are unable to capture this
phenomenal aspects.
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Next, perceived objects are presented as existing | which means that
they and their features appear to be actually or really there (rather than,
say, merely possible or ctional). If we are seeing a blue book, it seems to
us as if there really is a blue book before us.14 Again, this impression is
needed for us to rely on perceptions in the demonstration of objects. But it
also adds something to the presentation of concrete objects with determinate
identities and locations. We may visualise a particular object (e.g., Napoleon)
as being in a particular place (e.g., the middle seat of the front row of the Opera
Garnier in Paris), without taking the visualised object to actually exist.15
But we could not perceive the same situation without such an appearance of
existence. Consequently, there is a dierence in how we interact with perceived
and with imagined entities: we treat only the former as actual parts of reality
(cf. Walton (1990)).
This impression of existence is further qualied. For example, it involves a
sense of mind-independence or objectivity : the perceived objects are presented
as existing, and their features are presented as being instantiated, indepen-
dently of our current experiences of them (cf. McDowell (1998d), Siegel (2006)
and Martin (2010)). This explains why we expect perceived objects and their
features to be accessible by others as well, and to stay in existence even if they
are unperceived. One interesting issue here is whether some non-perceptual
experiences might present their objects as existing, without presenting them as
existing mind-independently. After-images are perhaps possible candidates for
such experiences. It may be argued that, when we are experiencing a yellow
after-image, say, it appears to us as if there is really something yellow there.
But the experienced yellow spot clearly does not seem to be part of our actual
environment (e.g., it 'moves around' in accordance with our eye movements)
and does not appear to exist independently of our experience of it, nor as a
public entity open to further scrutiny. Experiences of subjective values are
perhaps other examples. For us, the people whom we love possess a special
value for us (in addition to any value which they posses simply in virtue of
being alive, or of being human or sentient beings). But this exemplication of
value does not strike us as being objective | for instance, we do not expect
or demand others to value them in the same way as we do.
Another important qualication of the perceptual presentation of an exist-
ing object is that it and its features are given as existing in the present. This
means that perceptions present their objects as existing simultaneously with
14This is part of what Martin (2010) tries to capture with the actuality thesis. Besides, it
is not clear whether the actuality concerned is metaphysical or epistemic in nature. When
we are seeing a tree, do we take it and its features to be part of the actual world, simpliciter;
or do we rather take them to be part of the actual world, for all that we know?
15Cf. Sartre's idea that some acts of visualising may posit their objects as 'non-existing'
(cf. Sartre (2004): 12).
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their own occurrence, and as being a certain way right at that very moment.16
Episodes of sensory memory, on the other hand, present their objects as hav-
ing existed and being a certain way in the past (cf. Martin (2001)). A similar
contrast may be drawn with respect to spatial closeness. Visual perceptions
present their objects as existing presently right there before our eyes (even if
in some considerable distance), and visual memories do the same with respect
to the past. But recollections, or acts of visualising which take their objects
to exist, say, are bound to present them as absent from our actual spatial
surroundings.17
One further signicant phenomenal aspect of perceptions is that they pre-
sent their objects as their determinants. When we are perceiving a blue book,
it seems to us as if our experience would change or would have been dierent,
if the object would change or would have been dierent. More specically,
this means two things. First, it seems to us as if we would not perceive the
object to be a blue book, if it were not a blue book. It is in this sense that
the perceived object is presented as determining which features it appears to
have as part of the perception. And second, it seems to us as if our perception
would not have occurred, if the book did not exist. It is in this sense that our
perceptions seem to be dependent on, and to relate us to, particular objects
in the world. Taking into account the sense of the presence of the object,
the resulting impression may also be described as an impression of a direct or
immediate determination by the perceived objects.18
Besides, the impression of a determination by mind-independent entities
comes also with an impression of involuntariness in origin and persistence |
something which is lacking, for instance, in the case of acts of visualising. We
experience perceptions | in contrast, say, to actively produced and sustained
16Interestingly, this might actually be systematically misleading. Given that the speed of
light is nite, our experiences always lag a bit behind the emission of light by the perceived
objects. And this makes it possible that we continue to experience objects (e.g., distant stars)
which have already gone out of existence. Besides, note that Martin describes the 'presence'
of the perceived object in two dierent ways: in terms of spatio-temporal closeness, and in
terms of constitution or counterfactual determination (cf. Martin (2001): 272f.). I would
like to keep these two aspects apart, given that I do not want to rule out the possibility
that sensory memories are also constituted or determined by their past objects, and that
this fact is subjectively salient.
17Cf. Sartre (2004): 12f., for a subtle discussion of dierent ways in which an object may
appear to be absent from our environment).
18Cf. Martin (2002b) and (Martin, 2001, especially 273.). Note also that Martin un-
derstands immediacy as an aspect of the transparency of experience (cf. (Martin, 2002b,
413)) and that the transparency of memories and imaginings involves only an 'analogue of
immedicay', linked to their non-neutrality towards the past or the imagined, rather than
towards the present (cf. (Martin, 2002b, 413f.) and Martin (2001)). This is related to
his idea that immediacy and transparency are the mark of sensory experience (cf. the rst
approach to the sensory discussed below).
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images | as occurring and as staying in existence in an unbidden manner.
However, since this complex phenomenal aspect of perceptions is not of im-
portance for what follows, I will not further discuss it here.19
II.
This extensive and detailed description of the phenomenal character of percep-
tions can be used to shed more light on the character of other mental episodes.
With one notable exception, episodes of sensory memory, too, possess all
the mentioned phenomenal aspects distinctive of perceptions. The exception in
question is that, while perceived objects appear to be present and, in particular,
simultaneous with our experience of them, recalled objects are presented as
being past | or, if one prefers, as having being a certain way in the past.20 This
phenomenal dierence has the consequence that the two kinds of experience
also dier with respect to how they present themselves as being linked to their
objects. Sensory memories appear to be determined by | and thus appear to
relate us to | objects from (or perceived in) the past, and not the present.
When we recall the visual appearance of a blue book, it seems to us as if we
would not remember the book to be blue, if it had not been blue in the past
when we perceived it to be so. And it also seems to us as if our memory would
not have occurred, if the book had not existed in the past and if we therefore
had not perceived it in the rst place. It is in this | slightly dierent |
sense that episodic memories present their past objects as their determinants.21
Both perceptual and mnemonic presentations seem to us to be dependent on
the apprehended objects and their material features and, in this sense, seem
to provide us with access to the latter. But only the perceptions appear to
directly relate us to entities which seem to be actually present before us at the
time of our experience of them. Episodic memories, by contrast, seem to be
determined indirectly by their objects in so far as these determining objects
appear to belong to (or to have been perceived in) the past.
19See chapter 2 for a more detailed description of this complex phenomenal aspect, as
well as considerations about less central elements, such as the vivacity or clarity of sensory
presentations.
20Perceptions and sensory memories may also dier in other phenomenal aspects, such as
their vividness or clarity. But I take it that such dierences are at best typical. For instance,
there may be vivid memories and unclear perceptions (cf. Budd (1991):104, on seeing and
visualising).
21It is still an open question whether we experience our episodic memories also as being
determined by our past perceptions of the objects concerned; and if so, whether there is
anything more to our experience of our memories as being determined by their objects.
But given that perceptions are (experienced as being) determined by their objects, any
impression of a determination by a past perception is likely to involve the impression of a
determination by the respective perceived object.
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Now, judgemental thoughts (as well as possibly other thoughts) may show
many of the aspects of the phenomenal character of perceptions as well. When
we are thinking of a book as being blue, the book is presented to us as being
distinct and independent of our thought, and also as concrete. For conceiv-
ing of it as a book (or, say, instead as that thing over there) means, in part,
conceiving of it as a certain kind of concrete and independent entity outside
of our mind. The same is true of the appearances of particularity, located-
ness, existence and presence. If we are thinking of the book as that book
actually on the table in front of us, we thereby take the book to exist with a
particular identity and to be present in our actual environment at a specic
spatio-temporal location. This is simply part of the concepts that we employ
in our thought. Of course, not all ways of conceiving of objects involve all or
even some of these elements. If we are thinking of the book as ctional, for
instance, at least the latter four aspects are missing. And when we are judging
that a certain card game is intelligent, the resulting thought does not present
its object as concrete, present or having a determinate location. But all that
is important for current purposes, however, is to note that objects of thoughts
may be presented as possessing all of the features just mentioned.22
None the less, judgemental thoughts | just like episodic memories | dif-
fer from perceptions with respect to the sense of determination they involve.
And this time, the dierence is more radical since judgemental thoughts do
not present their objects as their determinants at all. Instead, we experience
judgemental thoughts as determined by epistemic reasons | even in cases in
which we are unable to identify those reasons, or in which the occurrence of
the thoughts is in fact due to some merely causal factors. For | as I argue at
length in chapter 5 | this best explains why we trust our judgements in belief
and action, and why we take our judgements by default to be reasonable and
not in need of revision. Spontaneous and similarly non-judgemental thoughts,
on the other hand, do not come with such an impression of reasonableness
and of determination by reasons; and we consequently do not trust them when
extending or altering our picture of reality.
Episodes of imagining show a third kind of subjectively salient determi-
nation: we experience them as being determined by practical reasons.23 This
means that they present themselves as responsive to and guided by reasons for
acting, which we are provided with by our conscious and concurrent intentions,
desires, and so on.
22For the plausibility of talking of objects of thought, see, for instance, Husserl (1970) and
Martin (2000b). And for the plausibility of taking thoughts to possess a character, and to
take intellectual presentations to be forms of appearance, see chapters 12 and 5.
23At least if they constitute mental actions (cf. Dorsch (2011b) and chapter 5). But it is
very plausible to assume that many | if not all | episodes of imagining are intrinsically
active (cf. ibid.
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Imaginative thoughts may still share most, if not all, other phenomenal as-
pects with the cognitive episodes (i.e., perceptions, memories and judgements).
Since they may involve the same concepts and referential elements as judge-
mental thoughts, they can present their objects as existing, mind-independent,
particular and present in roughly the same way as the latter can do this (e.g.,
when we imagine that that book on the table before us is red). And we also may
experience some imaginative thoughts as being determined by quasi-epistemic
reasons | that is, by reasons for supposition, rather than reasons for genuine
belief. This may happen, for instance, when we employ them in hypothetical
reasoning, or in the creation or appreciation of ctional stories. Consider the
example of dreaming up a world exclusively lled with transparent objects and
wondering about which theories of the world its inhabitants might come up
with. This will involve imagining the visual experiences of the inhabitants as
well as their resulting beliefs. And it will require altering the imagined beliefs
in response to the imagined experiences. In fact, failing to take the imagined
experiences to be reasons for the imagined beliefs would either mean failure
in our imaginative project, or reveal some degree of irrationality on our be-
half. Now, if our imaginative thoughts are rationally responsive to our sensory
imaginings, this may have the eect that we experience the former as being
based on reasons provided by the latter. But although the reasons in question
function very similarly to our real-life epistemic reasons, they are not of the
same kind, given that they are not reasons for beliefs about reality.24
Epsiodes of sensory imagining, on the other hand, are phenomenally more
removed from their cognitive counterparts than imaginative thoughts are from
judgemental ones. The main reason for this is that their objects are presented
as particular, existing, and so on, only if they are accompanied by additional
thoughts or intentions to this eect (cf. Dorsch (2011b)).25 As already noted,
sensory imaginings are by default unspecic about the particular identities,
locations and extensions of their concrete objects and do not present them as
existing or as mind-independent. And any determination of their particularity
or their other ontological features demands the involvement of some additional
intellectual elements. The same requirement is not in place in the case of
perceptions or sensory memories, since they present their objects always as
determinate, existing, and so on.
24Cf. also Currie & Ravenscroft for the observation that the rational relations in which
imaginative thoughts stand parallel those in which judgemental thoughts stand (cf. Currie
and Ravenscroft (2003): e.g., 49, 81, 93f. and 100).
25I stay neutral here on the question of whether these additional intellectual elements
are (always) part of the sensory imaginings; and if so, whether they by default qualify the
imagined objects as perceived within the imagined world. See Peacocke (1985) and Martin
(2002b) for considerations in favour of a positive answer.
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III.
My next aim is to provide some support for Experiential Rationalism by ar-
guing that the phenomenal character of the various cognitive episodes reveals
their reason-giving power. As already suggested, the character of perceptions
adequately reects important aspects of their respective nature.26 It is indeed
distinctive of perceptions that they relate us to particular and present objects
in the actual world. Moreover, how they present these objects as being is
determined directly by how the latter are. Accordingly, perceptions provide
us with immediate access to mind-independent objects and their material fea-
tures. This gives rise to the fact that we are entitled to rely on them when
forming beliefs about the world. Perceptions provide warrant for our beliefs
precisely because they directly relate us to reality. The situation is very sim-
ilar for episodic memories | with the qualication that they are concerned
with the past, rather than the present. Episodes of the sensory imagination,
however, do not relate us to the actual world and therefore by themselves
lack the power to justify our beliefs about reality.27 And, just as in the case
of perceptions and memories, this aspect of their nature is reected in their
phenomenal character | or so I would like to argue. The idea is that we
experience perceptions and sensory memories, but not sensory imaginings, as
providing us with reasons for belief. And the main consideration in favour of
this claim is that the postulated phenomenal dierence best explains why we
are motivated and justied to trust our perceptions and memories, but not our
imaginings, when forming our views on reality.
Consider for a moment the case of hallucinations. Trusting them in belief
formation can never lead to knowledge about reality, given that they do not
relate us to the world.28 But it may still be rational to rely on them; and
whether it is depends largely on their phenomenal character. If a hallucination
is subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions and thus wrongly seems to
be a perception, it would be irrational for the subject concerned not to endorse
it in belief | unless she becomes aware of its hallucinatory status by other
means, such as observation or testimony (cf. chapter 11). If, on the other hand,
it is rst-personally discriminable and thus marked as something distinct from
26Notable exceptions may be states which are defective in one way or another. Some
hallucinations, for instance, are experienced by us as if they were perceptions and did relate
us to the world, despite of this not being so. I discuss the nature of the resulting error,
which occurs already on the rst-order experiential level, in chapters 11 and 13.
27Though, they may acquire such a power due to their embedding in a suitable mental
project (cf. Dorsch (2011b)).
28And it is arguable that this is due, not merely to a lack of truth, but also to a lack of
justication (cf. McDowell (1998a)). I would like to stay neutral here on the issue of how
epistemic justication and rationality are actually linked to each other.
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a perception, it would be irrational for the subject in question to actually rely
on it in belief formation. However, from a third-personal perspective, both
kinds of hallucinations do not dier signicantly. Hence, that we do trust
hallucinations of the rst, but not of the second kind and are rational in doing
so is to be accounted for in part by reference to their phenomenal character.29
This explanation presupposes that the character of perceptions involves
certain phenomenal aspects, which are partly responsible for our epistemic
reliance on them and on all other episodes with a rst-personally indistin-
guishable character. Moreover, it suggests that the very same aspects are
missing in the case of those sensory episodes which we do not put trust in
when acquiring beliefs about the world | notably subjectively recognisable
hallucinations and sensory imaginings. There are basically two kinds of candi-
dates for these phenomenal aspects. On the one hand, there is the impression
of the determination by an actually and mind-independently existing object |
an impression which is present in perceptions (as well as perception-like hal-
lucinations) and episodic memories, but absent in their openly hallucinatory
or imaginative counterparts (cf. chapter 2). And, on the other hand, there
is the impression of the provision of a certain epistemic reason which, again,
pertains to the former, but not to the latter types of sensory episode. The two
options are compatible with each other. In fact, it is plausible to maintain that
one way of experiencing an episode as providing us with an epistemic reason
is just to experience it as being determined by | and thus also as relating us
to | specic parts of reality. But, more importantly, that the phenomenal
character of our sensory episodes is central to our rational reliance on them
and, in particular, that the relevant experience is one of reason-provision (and
not merely one of determination by reality) should become clear once we focus
on the distinction between epistemic entitlement and epistemic trust.
Whether sensory episodes entitle us to form beliefs about reality and thus
put us into the position to acquire knowledge depends on whether they relate
us to the actual world. But epistemic trust is not a matter of the presence of
entitlement. We may fail to rely on experiences, despite being entitled to en-
dorse them in belief | for instance, when we take them to be hallucinatory or
imaginative. And we may trust experiences which do not provide us with epis-
temic warrant | such as, arguably, hallucinations which are rst-personally
29This is true even if subjective indistinguishability does not mean here sameness of phe-
nomenal character. If the character of the rst kind of hallucination is dierent | though
rst-personally indistinguishable | from that of perceptions, our reliance on it has to be
accounted for in terms of its character (wrongly) seeming to us to be perceptual in nature.
Hence, it is still their possession of a certain kind of phenomenal character | namely one
subjectively indiscriminable from the character of perceptions | which accounts for our ra-
tional trust in it. Besides, I argue in chapters 11 and 13 that perception-like hallucinations
do possess the same phenomenal character as the corresponding perceptions.
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indistinguishable from perceptions. Moreover, we need not count as irrational
in either case. In fact, rationality may very well require us to act contrary to
the (unknown) presence or absence of entitlement. This shows that epistemic
reliance is, rather, a matter of taking entitlement to be present and to be ours.
That is, it is a matter of taking the respective episodes to provide epistemic
reasons, and of taking these reasons to be reasons for us. The relationality
of perceptions and sensory memories plays a central role in explaining why
they entitle us to believe, or provide us with epistemic reasons. But it cannot
account for the subjective element involved in epistemic reliance | that we
take ourselves to be entitled to form the respective beliefs. Only the latter
makes it rational from our perspective to trust our perceptions and episodic
memories.
Now, taking these sensory episodes to warrant beliefs does not require hav-
ing any mental states over and above them | such as higher-order beliefs
about their perceptual or mnemonic nature. It suces to consciously enjoy
the perceptions and memories and to experience them as providing us with
epistemic reasons | which means, in this case, to experience them as pro-
viding us with access to the world. Furthermore, as already suggested, we do
the latter precisely because they present their objects as enjoying actual and
mind-independent existence and as being their actual determinants. Discrim-
inable hallucinations and sensory imaginings, on the other hand, lack these
phenomenal aspects | which is why we do not experience them as providing
us with epistemic reasons and, hence, do not rely on them when forming be-
liefs about reality. Moreover, this dierence in character explains why it would
be irrational for us, say, to endorse sensory imaginings, or to fail to endorse
perceptions: we experience the latter, but not the former, as providing us with
epistemic reasons. The resulting picture treats epistemic reliance still as non-
inferential. For it claims that we rely on perceptions and memories simply
because we experience them as providing us with epistemic reasons while con-
sciously enjoying them | and not because we form any additional judgements
or beliefs about their nature or epistemic status.30
A very similar line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that we experience
judgemental thoughts, but no other thoughts, as providing us with reasons for
belief. Again, what needs to be accounted for is that it is rational for us to trust
our judgements, but not our spontaneous or imaginative thoughts, as premisses
in reasoning about reality. Any answer to this explanatory challenge should
make reference to the fact that we experience only the judgemental thoughts as
being determined by epistemic reasons and, therefore, as being epistemically
reasonable. Indeed, if their phenomenal character were dierent, we would not
30Besides, the account is neutral on whether epistemic reasons are facts in the world, or
the experiences concerned, or something else, such as propositions.
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rely on them, but instead give them up or revise them | assuming that we are
rational. Moreover, in the light of the dierence between epistemic entitlement
and epistemic rationality (cf. chapter 11), the respective experience needs to
be a way of taking the thoughts concerned to provide epistemic reasons for us.
That is, it needs to be an experience of reason-provision.
Consequently, we experience perceptions, memories and jugdements (but
none of their cognitive counterparts) as providing us with epistemic reasons,
and the latter also as being determined by epistemic reasons. The resulting ac-
count of the phenomenal character of our cognitive episodes therefore conforms
to the main tenet of Experiential Rationalism, according to which the rational
role of our mental episodes is subjectively salient as part of their character. In
addition, perhaps the most crucial element in the generation of this experience
of rationality is the the impression of determination | whether by objects or
by reasons. For we experience our cognitive episodes as reason-giving either by
experiencing them as relating us to the world, or by experiencing them as be-
ing supported by reasons for beliefs about reality. And both experiences arise
out of the respective impressions of determination by objects or by reasons.
IV.
So far, I have identied various phenomenal aspects of perceptions and other
mental episodes. And I have argued that most of them are linked, in one way
or another, to the rational role of the episodes concerned. If my argument
has been successful, it has established the existence of a rational dimension of
the phenomenal character of perceptions, sensory memories and judgemental
thoughts. In the remainder of this article, I would like to say a bit more about
this rational dimension. More specically, I would like to characterise further
the dierent ways in which phenomenal aspects may be connected to the pro-
posed experience of rationality and to use this characterisation in an attempt
to group the aspects into three kinds | the sensory, the intellectual, and the
rational aspects. I will start with the issue of what is the common phenomenal
element in our experiences of perceptions, memories and judgements as reason-
providing, given that the underlying impressions of determination involved in
them dier fundamentally from each other. Not only does this question arise
straight from the observation of the intimate link between the rst-personally
salient rationality and determination of our cognitive episodes. But answering
it will also shed more light on what it means to experience episodes as reason-
giving and help us later on with the specication of the three categories of
phenomenal aspects.
My proposal is that the common element in our experiences of episodes
as reason-providing is some form of rst-personally salient non-neutrality or
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commitment. In the case of perceptions and episodic memories, this non-
neutrality arises, again, out of the presentation of the perceived or remembered
objects as determinants of how they are experienced. When we are perceiving
or sensorily membering an object, the latter is presented as determining how
it is perceived or remembered as being. Accordingly, we get the impression
that the object indeed possesses the features that it appears to have as part of
our perception or memory. The respective episodes are therefore non-neutral
about the presentation of their objects as having certain features: they involve
a subjectively salient endorsement of this presentation, which means that they
take their objects to be the way which they present them as being. More
generally, perceptions are non-neutral towards the material features of concrete
and particular parts of the mind-independent and present reality. Episodes of
sensory memory, on the other hand, take a stance on how specic parts of
the actual world have been in the past. That is, they make a claim about
how things actually were, and not about how they actually are (cf. Martin
(2001)). What both types of episode have in common, however, is that their
commitment is concerned with reality: they are non-neutral about particular
real objects being a certain way, whether in the present or the past. This
aspect of their character is part of why we epistemically rely on them when
forming beliefs about the world. Indeed, it is part of why we experience them
as providers of epistemic reasons. Their non-neutrality is therefore epistemic
in nature.
There is a sense in which perceptions and memories may also be said to be
`non-neutral' towards the more fundamental ontological properties of their ob-
jects, such as their particularity and mind-independent existence. But there is
at least one signicant dierence between the already discussed non-neutrality
towards material features and any additional `non-neutrality' towards more
basic ontological properties. For while the former gure in our perceptual or
mnemonic beliefs, the latter do not. Consider the mind-independent existence
of the perceived objects and their features. Although it is true that we take
them to exist mind-independently in our interaction with them, the judge-
ment that they enjoy mind-independent existence is not of the same type as
the judgement that the book is blue, say. In particular, while the latter is per-
ceptually warranted, the former is not. Instead, judging the mind-independent
existence of what we are perceiving requires reection on the nature of our ex-
perience of it. One way of doing this is to attend to one particular aspect of
the phenomenal character of perceptions, namely that they present themselves
as relations to mind-independently existing entities. Unless we are aware of a
reason to doubt the adequacy of this impression, we are entitled to take it at
face value and judge our experience to be a perception of mind-independent
reality. The presentation of the ontological properties of the perceived objects
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is therefore part of the (self-)presentation of the perceptual nature of the per-
ception concerned. And this presentation | just as the resulting justication
| is experiential, which means that it pertains to our rst-personal experi-
ence of what perceptions and other mental episodes are like.31 By contrast,
our perceptual beliefs are concerned solely with how the world is like, and not
with the nature of our relevant perceptions of the world. This dierence in
how our perceptions may ground beliefs about their objects is reected by the
fact that the presentation of the ontological properties is the same for all per-
ceptions and in fact essential to their perceptual nature, while the presentation
of material features is specic to each particular situation and object.
Now, judgemental thoughts are non-neutral in exactly the same sense in
which perceptions and sensory memories are non-neutral: they make a claim
about how reality is like, that is, are commited to reality being a certain
way, namely how they present it to be. The only dierence is that judgemen-
tal thoughts are epistemically non-neutral because they present themselves as
being determined, not by real objects, but by reasons for beliefs about real
objects | such as those reasons provided by presentations which appear to
relate to the world (i.e., perceptions or episodic memories). But the distinct
kinds of cognitive episode still share their rst-personally disclosed epistemic
commitment. And it is, minimally, this phenomenal aspect which constitutes
the substantial common element in their impressions of being providers of epis-
temic reasons. Mere thoughts and non-cognitive episodes are not commital in
this sense. The simple thought that the book is blue presents the books as
being blue, but does not endorse it as being blue. Wondering whether the book
is blue or desiring it to be blue also do not take a stance on whether the book
is blue, despite being about the exemplication of blueness by the book. By
contrast, seeing a blue book and judging a book to be blue involve the claim
that it is as it is presented, namely blue.32
31I discuss this token-reexive presentation and our self-knowledge based on it in more
detail in chapters 11 and 13. Especially the latter work also addresses the dierence be-
tween the perceptual presentation of the material features instantiated in the world and
the experiential presentation of the relational features bridging the gap between mind and
world.
32The distinction between neutral and non-neutral presentation parallels that between
semantic and stative representation to be found in Martin (2002b). Compare also the
example of entering a classroom and nding the sentence 'the book is blue' written on the
blackboard: it is clear that the sentence presents something to be a certain way, but it is
yet undecided whether it is also meant as an endorsement of what is presented.
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V.
The conclusion that the phenomenal character of our cognitive episodes reects
their rational role and, as a central part of this reection, includes an epistemic
commitment enables us now to divide the phenomenal aspects involved into
three groups. The basic division concerns the nature of their contribution
to the non-neutrality of the episodes in question. Some of the aspects are
responsible for the general occurrence and type of the non-neutrality at issue
| notably, that it comes with an epistemic commitment towards the real
world and that it is either perceptual, or mnemonic or judgemental in nature.
Other aspects contribute instead to the more specic determination of what
the respective presentations are non-neutral about and epistemically commited
to.
Consider the case of a perception of a blue book. The book appears to be
blue; and it appears to exist independently of our experience of it. If the book
were not to appear to exist, or were to appear to depend for its existence on
our experience of it, our perception would not come with an epistemic commit-
ment concerning the blueness of the book. This is exactly what happens when
we are visualising a blue book: the book does not appear to exist indepen-
dently of our experience of it, and our experience does not incline or warrant
us to form a judgement about how the world is like. The corresponding phe-
nomenal aspects are therefore crucial to the type of non-neutrality involved
(if any). By contrast, if the perceived book were not to appear to be blue, it
would still appear to have some other property instead (e.g., another colour)
and would thus still commit us to a judgement about what the book is like.
Accordingly, while the appearance of blueness is irrelevant for the fact that
our perception of the book involves an epistemic endorsement, the appearance
of existence and mind-independence is essential to this involvement. None the
less, the appearance of blueness still contributes something to the epistemic
non-neutrality of our perception of the book. For it identies the specic na-
ture of this epistemic commitment | namely that it is a commitment to the
ascription of blueness to the book, rather than that of another property.
The line of thought concerning other phenomenal aspects is similar. As
already suggested, the rst-personal non-neutrality of perceptions is largely
due to the fact that they seem to be determined by their objects.33 If the
perceived book were not to appear to determine our experience of it and,
especially, which material properties it appears to have as part of this expe-
rience, the latter would not commit us to the ascription of those properties
to the book. For if our experience were not phenomenally marked as being
33In the case of imaginings, what gives rise to the non-neutrality is the determination by
the active intentions (cf. chapter 8).
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responsive to and inuenced by the actual properties of the book, it would
not purport to provide us with access to the latter and therefore involve no
claim about its actual properties. Furthermore, the impression of objects as
determinants of experience presupposes a sense of their concreteness and par-
ticularity, including a determinate extension and location. There could not be
an appearance of determination by and dependence on an unspecied object,
that is, an object which fails to be presented as having a particular identity and
determinate spatio-temporal features. Episodes of visualising do not appear to
be determined by their objects partly because they do not as such present us
with particular and specically located objects. Correspondingly, they do not
make a claim about how concrete parts of the real world are like.34 Finally,
the non-neutrality of perceptions is marked as perceptual | rather than as
mnemonic | due to their presentation of objects as presently being a certain
way.
The phenomenal aspects distinctive of perceptions can therefore be grouped
into those which are responsible for their general possession of an epistemic
and, in particular, perceptual non-neutrality; and into those which instead
determine what the perceptions are epistemically commited to, namely the
ascription of certain material features to objects in the world. While the
presentations of material features belong to the second group, the presentations
of (many of35) the more basic ontological properties belong to the rst. It
hopefully becomes clear | even without spelling this out in any more detail
| that exactly the same division is present in the cases of sensory memories
and of judgemental thoughts.
However, the phenomenal aspects of cognitive episodes may di?er in their
relation to epistemic rationality in another way, which is orthogonal to the
distinction just described. More specically, they may be sensitive to epistemic
reasons or not. That a phenomenal aspect is sensitive to epistemic reasons
means that | on the assumption of full rationality | our coming to be aware
of the latter brings about a change in the former. Some examples may help
to illustrate this. If we perceive a slender person with long hair from behind
and take her to be a woman, how the person appears to us will change if we
come to learn that she is actually a man. Again, if we see what looks to you
as a bunch of owers, but then touch them and feel that they are actually
34Episodes of sensory imagining may still commit us to the acceptance of certain facts
about types of objects (e.g., that book covers are rectangular in shape). But the respective
pieces of knowledge are not delivered by the imaginative episodes. Instead, the occurrence
of the latter depends on the exploitation of this knowledge (cf. Dorsch (2011b)). Similarly,
visualising a blue book may incline and entitle us to judge that the experienced book does
not exist. But this would not be a perceptual commitment.
35Unclear cases are, perhaps, the presentation of objects as being concrete, or as having
determinate spatio-temporal locations and extentions.
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made out of plastic, their appearance will change, and thus the character of
our experience. Similarly, what we take to be the facade of a voluminuous
building looks dierent to us from what we take to be a mere facade with no
building behind it. And switching from seeing a depiction of a duck to seeing a
depiction of a rabbit involves a change in phenomenal character. Or, nally, if
we overhear very few fragments of a conversation, namely repeated utterances
of the sounds `gift', and think that the speaker is talking about a present,
our experience will change, once we have realised that he is actually speaking
German and talking about poison instead.
As a matter of fact, the phenomenal aspects responsible for the occurrence
of a perceptual commitment | that is, the aspects concerned with the pre-
sentation of the more basic ontological properties of the perceived objects |
are insensitive to epistemic reasons. When we are perceiving something, it
is presented as a concrete, particular, determinately located, existing, mind-
independent and present determinant of our perception of it. None of these
phenomenal aspects will change if we come to doubt or believe | perhaps on
justied grounds | that there is in fact no such object that we are perceiving,
say.36 A prominent example is the impression of objectivity. Even people,
who believe that colours and other secondary qualities are projections of our
minds onto the world, accept that they continue to experience them as mind-
independently instantiated features.37 More sweeping examples are sceptical
scenarios, which question our claim to knowledge about the external world pre-
cisely by casting general doubt on the adequacy of the (acknowledged) complex
impression of a perceptual access to reality.38
Which material features perceived objects appear to have, on the other
hand, may be dependent on which epistemic reasons we recognise as such. The
scope of perceivability and of perceptual knowledge are dicult to determine
(cf. Millar (2000)). And it has been controversial whether (some types of)
perceptions are cognitively penetrable or impenetrable in the way described.
But assuming that we can see more complex properties, such as being a woman
or being a ower, the respective perceptual presentations will be sensitive to
reasons | as illustrated by the examples given above. That the hair of the
person appears to be long or that the owers appear to be red, however, do
not constitute reason-sensitive aspects of phenomenal character. They stay the
36This is the case even if one denies that hallucinations share any of these phenomenal
aspects (cf. Martin (2006)). For this denial stil leaves room for perceptions which we wrongly
(but justiedly) believe to be hallucinatory.
37Which is why they endorse some kind of error theory (cf. Mackie (1985) and Boghossian
and Velleman (1989)).
38Compare the various forms of Cartesian and Humean scepticism (cf. Wright (2004)).
For a discussion of what it may mean for a phenomenal aspect to be misleading, see chapters
11 and 13.
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same, even if we nd out that | contrary to our experiences | the person has
short hair, or the owers a yellowish tone. Each of the perceptions' phenom-
enal aspects discussed in this article therefore belongs to one | and only one
| of the following three categories: (i) reason-insensitive aspects determin-
ing what the episodes concerned are non-neutral about; (ii) reason-sensitive
aspects determining what the episodes concerned are non-neutral about; and
(iii) aspects which are responsible for the general occurrence and type of the
non-neutrality in question.
The issue of whether episodic memories involve not only aspects of the
rst and the third, but also aspects of the second kind corresponds to the issue
raised above with respect to perceptions. And again, I do not want to rule
out this possibility here. If we learn that what we visually recall is not the
facade of a building, but instead just a mere facade, how it appears to us may
very well change accordingly (e.g., it may stop to appear to be voluminous).
Similarly, how things are presented to us in judgemental thoughts is sensitive
to reasons as well. Indeed, it is responsive to reasons in a more radical way.
In the case of perceptions or memories, there are always some presentational
aspects concerning the material features of the perceived objects which stay
constant. Accordingly, a perception does not disappear, but merely changes
in response to the impact of epistemic reasons. By contrast, no aspect of
the judgemental presentation of material features is resistant to the rational
inuence of epistemic reasons. This explains why judgemental thoughts may
cease to exist altogether, once they are epistemically challenged. But it also
means that judgemental thoughts do not involve phenomenal aspects of kind
(i). Besides, the reason-sensitivity extends to the aspects of kind (iii) in the
case of judgemental thoughts. When we realise that there is in fact no object
on the table before us, we should and normally will give up our judgement
that there is an (existing and mind-independent) book on the table.
The two main phenomenal aspects, which distinguish judgemental thoughts
from perceptions and episodic memories, are intimately linked to each other. It
is part of the nature of judgemental thoughts that they are fully responsive to
epistemic reasons and, at least in rational subjects, are based on epistemic rea-
sons.39 This fact is reected by their phenomenal character in that we always
experience them as responses to epistemic reasons (even if they are not such
responses). But it is also partly constituted by the fact that their presentation
of material properties is, in its entirety, sensitive to epistemic reasons.40 Ac-
cordingly, we would not experience judgemental thoughts as based on reasons,
39Cf. chapter 5 for a discussion of how to deal with self-evident judgements (if there are
any).
40Perceptions and emotions, in contrast, are only partially rational in that how they
present objects to be changes only to some extent in the face of opposing epistemic reasons
(cf. above for perceptions, and chapter 6 for emotions).
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if how they present objects to be were not sensitive to reasons. The experience
of judgements as reason-based thus reects the more fundamental fact of their
reason-sensitivity.41
VI.
The preceding considerations suggest that, at least among the cognitive epi-
sodes, the contrast between the sensory presentations (i.e., perceptions and
episodic memories) and the non-sensory presentations (i.e., judgemental
thoughts) is co-extensional with the contrast between at least partly reason-
insensitive and fully reason-sensitive presentations of material features of ob-
jects. And this promises, again, an account of the distinction between the
sensory and the non-sensory in rationalist terms. In this nal section, I would
like to assess this view. It will turn out that, in order to be able to cap-
ture sensory imaginings as well, the condition of reason-insensitivity has to be
supplemented by the condition of non-neutrality. My hope is then to make
plausible the idea that the three categories of phenomenal aspects identied
in the last section indeed capture the sensory, the intellectual and the rational
elements of phenomenal character. But to start o, it is necessary to say a bit
more about the scope of the sensory.
For there are two legitimate views on this issue, which can be brought to
the fore by the following examples. Actual experiences of pain, on the one
hand, and episodic memories or imaginings of pain, on the other, are at the
same time similar and dierent with respect to their character of painfulness.
That they are phenomenally similar is reected by the fact that we group them
together under the heading of experiences of pain. They both show, as part of
their phenomenal character, an aspect of painfulness. But they also dier in
how they involve such a phenomenal aspect.42 In particular, their involvement
of painfulness has, in each case, a very dierent impact on our behaviour. For
instance, we do not take an aspirin in order to get rid of a recalled or imagined
pain. However, this and similar dierences cannot be accounted for in terms of
degrees of painfulness. Instead, they require the assumption of a dierence in
kind of aspect: actual pain experiences involve a dierent quality of painfulness
than episodic memories or imaginings of pain. Similarly, seeing a red object
41It is interesting to note that perceptions | to the extent to which their presentational
aspects are sensitive to epistemic reasons | will also be determined by epistemic reasons
and will accordingly present not only their objects, but also epistemic reasons, as their
determinants. When we are seeing the facade of a building as the facade of a building, how
it appears to us seems to be determined, not only by how it in fact is, but also by whatever
brings us to take it to be part of a building in the rst place.
42Cf. chapter 8. One issue is whether they involve the same aspect in dierent ways, or
dierent, but similar aspects in the same way.
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and recalling or visualising one have something subjectively salient in common:
they are appearances of something red. But they also dier rst-personally:
they do not involve the same quality of reddishness. That is, on some level of
specication, perceptions, memories and imaginings of a red object involve the
same phenomenal aspect; but on another, more ne-grained level, they involve
dierent, but still very similar aspects | at least much similar to each other
than to those involved in thoughts about red objects.
Examples like these have motivated some to limit the scope of the sen-
sory to actual perceptions (and sensations), and to treat episodic memories or
imaginings as mere copies or echoes of the sensory. Accordingly, the former
and the latter do not share a common sensory core, but show a qualitative
dierence in respect of how they present even the most basic features (such
as colours or textures) of their objects (cf. Martin (2001)). But the very
same examples also give support to the idea that all three types of episode
| and in contrast to all thought | are sensory in a broader sense, and that
the dierences among them concern their dierent ways of realising this more
comprehensive form of sensoriness. In what follows, I will be mainly concerned
with the latter and broader notion of sensoriness. The former is comparatively
easy to capture. A straightforward proposal is to take an episode to be sensory
in the narrower sense | that is, to take it to be a perception | just in case it
possesses the described phenomenal aspects and, in particular, the impression
of an immediate determination by a present object. Martin (2002b, 2001), for
instance, accepts this narrower notion of sensoriness and provides an account
of the corresponding resemblances among perceptions, memories and imagin-
ings in terms of the idea that the latter two are representations of the former
and therefore show an analogue of immediacy, namely represented immediacy.
But this treatment does not address the applicability of the wider notion of
sensoriness, given that it does not identify a phenomenal feature common to
all three kinds of episode. For an impression of immediate determination is
dierent from a presentation of an experience involving such an impression.43
My own interest lies in the possibility of identifying such a common el-
ement, and I will therefore turn my attention to the question of the sense
(if any) in which perceptual, mnemonic and imaginative presentations share
their sensoriness and dier from non-sensory presentations, such as thoughts
or conative episodes. My starting point is the idea that the partial44 reason-
sensitivity of the presentation of material features | that is, of precisely those
features which non-neutral episodes are non-neutral about | is an indicator
43Besides, there is the further issue of how to deal with perception-like hallucinations |
that is, the issue of whether the presence (and not merely the impression of the presence) of
a perceptual relation to the world is required for being a perception as well (cf. chapter 2).
44Or the full one, if it is denied that how we perceive or recall things as being is responsive
to epistemic reasons at all.
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of sensoriness. The resulting view can indeed capture the sensoriness not only
of perceptions and episodic memories, but also of the respective imaginings,
given that the latter are at least partially unresponsive to epistemic reasons
with respect to which material properties they ascribe to their objects. But
the same is true of non-judgemental thoughts and conative episodes, and the
proposal thus faces the immediate diculty of not being able to characterise
the latter as non-sensory.
It is here that non-neutrality becomes important. Both mere or sponta-
neous thoughts and conative presentations are neutral towards their presen-
tational aspects. Neither merely entertaining the possibility that a (certain)
book is blue, nor having a longing feeling for a blue book take some object or
another to be a blue book. They both stay neutral on their presentation of
a blue book.45 This leaves sensory and intellectual imaginings.46 Neither of
them is epistemically non-neutral, at least not by themselves.47 But instead
of being non-neutral towards reality, they can still be understood as being
non-neutral towards an imagined world | that is, as involving an imaginative
commitment. Here is how Martin puts it with respect to visualising:
'When one visualises an ocean like the Pacic, one imagines a blue
expanse. [...] Visualising the water puts you into a position of not
being neutral with respect to the imagined situation. In visual-
ising the expanse of water, one is not non-commital whether the
imagined situation contains a blue expanse of water. Furthermore,
visualising in this way can have consequences for what one accepts
about the imagined situation and hence what one comes to believe
is possible.' (Martin (2002b): 413f.)
The episode of visualising the ocean does not merely present us with a blue
ocean | as, for instance, the conscious desire to see a blue ocean does. It
also takes this blue ocean to be part of the imagined world. If the latter were
not the case, the episode of visualing could have no rational impact on what
we intellectually imagine about the imagined situation | say, as part of an
imaginative project similar to the one described above. In the last sentence
of the quote above, Martin suggests that what is crucial here is, rather, the
rational impact that episodes of visualing may have on our beliefs about the
imagined situation, as well as on our belief of what is possible. But it is not
45Note that entertaining the possibility that a (certain) book is blue is dierent from
judging that a (certain) book can be blue: the proposition entertained during the former
does not involve any modal concept.
46Unbidden images may be treated in the same way as sensory imaginings, independently
of whether the former should be counted among the instances of imagining.
47Though we may visualise something in such a way that it may justify a corresponding
perceptual belief about an actual (i.e., non-modal) fact in the world (cf. Dorsch (2011b)).
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clear how this could distinguish episodes of visualising from conscious desires,
given that the latter may have a rational impact on our beliefs about what
we desire and, possibly, also on our beliefs of what is possible (e.g., if it turns
out that we cannot genuinely desire the impossible, such as possessing a round
square). However, in the case of conative episodes, there is no equivalent
to the possibility of a quasi-epistemic link between sensory and intellectual
imaginings | not the least, presumably, because there are no conative mental
projects. Correspondingly, our judgements about what we long for make a
claim about our state of mind, not about any situation or world distinct from
our mind.
Similar considerations can be put forward in support of the claim that
imaginative thoughts, too, involve a commitment concerning how the imagined
world is like. For intellectual imaginings could not be responsive to quasi-
epistemic reasons (i.e., to reasons for imaginative endorsement), if they were
not non-neutral towards the imagined situation. Hence, they are non-neutral,
minimally, to the extent to which they are reason-sensitive in this specic
way.48 The respective commitment is of course also imaginative in nature.
That is, it pertains to the presentation of objects as belonging to an imagined
world, rather than the real one. Furthermore, the presentation of material
features involved in imaginative thoughts is fully sensitive to quasi-epistemic
reasons. In contrast, sensory imaginative presentations of material features
are, at least to some extent, resistant to such rational impact (though they
are, as instances of mental agency, certainly open to the inuence of practical
considerations). For example, theoretical rationality does not demand of us to
avoid visualising a person as blonde if we also suppose, as part of the same
imaginative project, that her hair is dark. If there is any such rational pressure,
it will be concerned with the reconsideration of what we intellectually imagine
48Velleman may have had something similar in mind when proposing that intellectual
imaginings share with judgemental thoughts the attitude of regarding propositions as true
(cf. Velleman (2000): 248.). One problem with his proposal is, however, that he does not
further specify what it means for an episode to regard a proposition as true, apart from
noting that it does not amount to the stronger commitment of taking reality to be a certain
way. And another diculty is that he uses this idea also to speciy the direction of t of
judgemental and imaginative thoughts | which appears to force him to accept that merely
thinking something involves some form of non-neutrality as well. Besides, my proposal
is weaker than Velleman's in that it does not put forward a claim about all instances of
intellectual imaginings. Instead, it leaves room for non-neutral imaginative thoughts. For
instance, if it is true that a thought is already imaginative if it is formed in direct response to
the intention to produce a mental presentation of certain objects and features, then simple
imaginative thoughts need not be commital (cf. Dorsch (2011b)). The underlying idea is
that intellectual imaginings come with an imaginative commitment or `attitude' only if they
are embedded in a wider mental project | precisely because they acquire a sensitivity to
quasi-epistemic reasons only in the context of such a project.
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| requiring us, for instance, to give up the assumption that the person is
dark-haired, or alternatively to imagine in addition that the visual image is
part if an illusory experience within the imagined world.
It is true that the manifestation of the rational sensitivity of our imaginative
thoughts requires mental agency on our behalf, while it is not clear whether
our revision of our judgements is similarly active (cf. Harman (1986), and
chapter 5). And it is also true that we do not always care, as part of a
certain imaginative project, about the consistency or coherence of what we
are imagining; and that this need not even be a sign of irrationality. But
both observations are compatible with imaginative thoughts being sensitive to
quasi-epistemic reasons. For the latter does not require that they do always
change in response to such reasons, but only that this may happen and does
happen under suitable conditions. In the case of judgemental thoughts, the
latter comprise perhaps not much more than sucient theoretical rationality.
But in the case of imaginative thoughts, they may also include the absence of
overriding practical concerns, given that the existence and eectiveness of the
latter need not render the resulting thoughts to be irrational in any sense |
contrary to what would be the case in judging. Consider again the example
of visualising a person as being blonde, while also supposing her to have dark
hair. Within the project of imagining how a friend of this imagined person
sees her, we will come under rational pressure to revise or supplement our
imaginative thought. But within the project of imagining dierent possible
directions in which the life of the imagined person might develop, no such
pressure arises | perhaps because what we end up imagining are two distinct
and independent worlds.
If we now read the characterisations of the three categories of phenomenal
aspects in terms of theoretical reasons, rather than merely epistemic ones, we
get an improvement on the simple account of the sensory introduced above.
The modied proposal is that a presentational aspect is sensory just in case
it is insensitive to theoretical reasons and contributes to the determination of
what the respective episode is non-neutral about. Accordingly, the sensory
aspects of phenomenal character are identical with the phenomenal aspects of
kind (i). And presentational episodes are sensory just in case they involve such
sensory aspects | possibly in addition to reason-insensitive aspects of kind (ii).
The requirement of non-neutrality towards the material properties of objects
rules out mere or spontaneous thoughts and conative presentations. Adding
the partial or full reason-insensitivity of the presentation of such properties
enables us then to exclude judgemental and imaginative thoughts as well.
Does this imply that sensoriness is constituted by non-neutrality and rea-
son-insensitivity? Perhaps not, for there is still the possibility that one or
several more fundamental features are constitute of sensoriness and responsi-
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ble for the non-neutrality and unresponsiveness of theoretical reasons. Initially
plausible candidate for such features are the common transparency or perspec-
tivalness of perceptions, episodic memories and sensory imaginings (cf. Martin
(2002b)), or the determination by objects rather than reasons (cf. the Kantian
notion of receptivity or object-provision). But a discussion of this issue has to
wait for another occasion.
Another question that remains to be addressed is whether all non-sensory
phenomenal aspects are intellectual (or conceptual) in nature. The aspects
of kind (ii) | that is, the reason-sensitive presentations of material features
| clearly pertain to our understanding and should therefore be treated as
intellectual. But the situation is less obvious with respect to the phenome-
nal aspects of kind (iii) | that is, the presentations of objects as particular,
existing mind-independent, and so on. These aspects may be labelled ratio-
nal phenomenal aspects in so far as they are central to the occurrence of an
experience of rational role. Moreover, their presence is a precondition for the
non-neutral and reality-concerned presentation of objects and their material
features. For it is the aspects of kind (iii) that establish the non-neutrality
and concern for reality in question. In this function, they resemble very much
the Kantian categories which, ideally, should have included all the concepts
corresponding to the relevant aspects in my list in the rst section of this
chapter. So there is some plausibility to taking the latter to be intellectual as
well. But there are also some reasons speaking against this conclusion. Most
importantly, they are not responsive to theoretical reasons when occurring as
part of the character of sensory episodes. Perhaps part of this | namely their
insensitivity to empirical evidence | may be explained by reference to their
status as preconditions for the presentation of material (or empirical) features.
But this solution can still not account for the fact that, say, what subjectively
seems to be a perception does not change or disappear once we come to believe
with respect to it that there is really no perceived object. This ts well with
the observation already made above that perceptual judgements and beliefs
involve only the ascription of material features, but not that of the more ba-
sic ontological properties under discussion here. And it is also related to the
further idea that the perception of real objects may not require the possession
or employment of the respective ontological concepts. Besides, the underly-
ing Kantian picture, that has motivated the characterisation of the aspects of
kind (iii) as intellectual, is too radical in that it takes the presentation of ex-
istence, mind-independence, and so on, as a precondition for the presentation
of objects in general, and not merely for the presentation of real objects. This
raises the challenge to account for the apparent fact that sensory imaginings
present us with objects. It is particularly pressing with respect to unbidden
non-perceptual and non-mnemonic images, where it is not possible to point
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to an act of imagining or make-believe as the source of the impression of the
provision of an object.49 Hence, the non-sensory and rational phenomenal as-
pects of kind (iii) are perhaps better not taken to be intellectual in the same
sense as the aspects of kind (ii).
To sum up, there are three dierent kinds of presentational phenomenal
aspects, as the example of perceptions illustrates. First, the character of the
latter involves sensory elements of kind (i). A perception of a blue book takes
the latter to be blue; and that the book appears to be blue both contributes
to the character of the perception and is insensitive to, say, evidence that it in
fact has a dierent colour. Second, the phenomenal character of perceptions
may also involve intellectual elements of kind (ii). The perception of the blue
book may take the latter to be a book; and that the book appears to be a
book may both contribute to the character of the perception and be sensi-
tive to, say, new evidence that it is in fact just a fake book. And third, the
character of perceptions involves rational aspects of the kind (iii) | namely
presentational aspects that are concerned with the more fundamental ontolog-
ical properties of the objects, as well as with the resulting epistemic features of
our perceptions. What is signicant to note with respect to the debate about
non-sensory phenomenal aspects is that aspects of the last kind are much more
dicult to deny than intellectual elements concerned with the presentation of
material features. It may be plausible to argue that properties like being a
book or being a man are, strictly speaking, not really perceivable. But that
perceptions present us with objects which appear to be concrete, in existence,
particular, mind-independent or present, say, is very dicult to ignore. Of
course, some of these aspects might be more controversial than others. But
it is very hard to plausibly reject all of them. Part of the explanation of this
diculty is surely their centrality to conscious experience: they do not only
render subjectively salient the type of the episodes concerned, but also reect
the latter's rational roles in our mental lives.





Judging and the Scope of Mental
Agency
I. Divisions in the Mind
Try to conjure up a visual image of a sunny forest, or to suppose that Goethe
once visited Stoos in the centre of Switzerland. Presumably, you will be able
to comply immediately and easily, without having to do something else rst,
and without having to invest too much eort. But then, try to conjure up a
visual perception of a sunny forest, or to form the judgement that Goethe once
visited Stoos, just like that - that is, without resorting to additional actions,
such as travelling outside of the city, consulting a biography of Goethe, or
taking a perception-or judgement-inducing drug. Presumably, you will fail.
What these examples suggest is that there is a fundamental | though
perhaps not necessarily strict | divide among the phenomena making up our
mental lives. On the one side, there are our deliberate and straightforward
mental actions and the mental episodes which they produce (and sustain).
Conjuring up an image or supposing that something is the case should count
| if anything should | as paradigm instances of deliberate mental agency,
namely as instances of the activity of imagining something.1 Very roughly, they
are examples of agency because they rationally respond to and are guided and
possibly justied by certain practical reasons (i.e., those provided to us by our
desires or intentions to picture or suppose something); they constitute mental
actions because they are aimed at the production of some mental phenom-
ena (i.e., an image or a supposition), and because their performance does not
involve bodily movements, but occurs exclusively within the mind; they are
deliberate because they are done in full, attentive consciousness of the means,
ends and intended results involved; and they are straightforward | or `light-
ngered' (O'Shaughnessy, 2008, 21f.) | in that they are not done by perform-
1I defend the view that imagining is indeed a special form of deliberate and straightfor-
ward mental agency in Dorsch (2011b).
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ing another action which deliberately exploits certain passive eects (such as
those of emotional dispositions, hypnosis, or judgement-inducing drugs). In-
deed, our ability to imagine seems to reveal the extreme freedom which we
may enjoy in our conscious mental lives. It is dicult to think of a domain of
our agency with fewer restrictions or obstacles.
On the other side of the divide, there are the more passive mental phenom-
ena, notably those of our mental episodes, the formation (and sustainment) of
which is either not at all inuenced by our mental agency, or only in a mediated
| though usually still deliberate | way. Many episodes occur and disappear
without any active involvement on our behalf. We are often overcome by
feelings or sensations, surprised or annoyed by perceived smells or sounds, or
nd ourselves suddenly confronted with images, memories or thoughts. Other
mental episodes, however, are located in between deliberately formed images
or suppositions and passively occurring feelings or perceptions in that their
occurrence or nature is somehow inuenced by deliberate activity, but in a less
straightforward or encompassing way than in the typical case of imagining.
You may intentionally calm down yourself or improve your mood by actively
imagining something relaxing or cheerful, such as walking through a quiet and
sunny forest and attending to the pleasant and soothing sounds and smells of
the environment. Or you may be able to decide when to judge an issue or to
remember an appearance, and which issue to judge or whose appearance to
remember. But despite the intended impact of mental or bodily agency on
such episodes, they do not seem to allow for the straightforward control that
we often, if not always, enjoy over what we imagine. In this respect, they are
closer to episodes which occur completely passively.
My primary interest in this chapter is to get clearer about how, and where,
best to draw the line between the straightforwardly active and the more passive
aspects of our conscious minds. My main focus will thereby be on the question
of whether judging can be as active as imagining: that is, whether we can form
judgements in a deliberate and straightforward manner, or (as I will also say)
voluntarily, or at will. The example above suggests that the answer should
be negative, and that we cannot freely decide which particular proposition to
endorse in a judgement concerning a certain issue.
Indeed, this opinion has been widely endorsed.2 But it has not often been
explicitly argued for. And if it has, the arguments have typically made use of
the controversial idea that judgements (or beliefs) are intrinsically and norma-
2See, e.g., Williams (1973), Winters (1979), O'Shaughnessy (2008), Bennett (1990), No-
ordhof (2001), Engel (2002), Owens (2000), and Shah and Velleman (2005). Even thinkers,
who are more sympathetic to the idea of voluntary formations of judgements or belief, often
defend this possibility without accepting (or at least arguing for) the possibility of judge-
ments or beliefs formed directly in response to the intention to do so (cf. Weatherson (2008)'s
discussion, and especially his contrast between voluntary and volitional agency).
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tively linked to truth. I am very sympathetic to the view that there is no real
need to take up, but good reason to try to avoid, any commitment to such a
norm for judgements (cf. Papineau (1999) and Dretske (2000a). And I will
in addition illustrate, though only briey, that the normative approach to the
involuntariness of judgements faces a serious and not always noted problem.
As an alternative, I will present an argument which refers to the ways in
which we consciously experience judgements and instances of deliberate mental
agency. What is important about this argument for the involuntariness of
judgements is not so much its perhaps uncontroversial conclusion, but rather
the particular way in which it tries to support it. For it highlights the impact
which conscious experience has on | as well as what this form of awareness can
tell us about | the formation of judgements and the scope of deliberate mental
agency. The resulting account is thus meant to be a promising competitor
for theories which account for judgements and mental agency primarily in
normative or functionalist terms.
The issue of whether we can form judgements at will can, as already sug-
gested, be framed in terms of the question of whether the deliberate formation
of a judgement can sometimes be as active as the conjuring up of an image
or the making of a supposition, or whether instead it belongs always to the
group of less active mental phenomena, which includes not only the passive
cases of perceiving, sensing or feeling something, but also the somewhat active
cases of changing one's mood or bringing about the occurrence of an episodic
memory. What distinguishes in particular the two ways, in which we can de-
liberately inuence the occurrence or nature of some of our mental episodes,
is that one is (as I have called it) more straightforward, or less mediated, than
the other. Before I discuss both the normative and the experiential approach
to the involuntariness of our judgements, it is perhaps helpful to say a bit more
about what judgements are, and what characterizes straightforward deliberate
agency.
Judgements | including occurrent beliefs | are mental episodes. As such,
they are part of the stream of consciousness and of the same general kind of
mental state as feelings, thoughts, sensations, perceptions, and so on.3 More
specically, judgements consist in the conscious taking of a propositional and
conceptual content to be true, which means that they do not | like suppo-
sitions - merely represent things as being a certain way, but also make the
claim that this is how things are.4 This is one important respect in which
3What I label `mental episodes', Wollheim calls `mental states' (Wollheim, 1984, 33f.).
And I will use the latter expression to cover not only mental episodes or events, but also
dispositional or standing states, such as beliefs, desires, and so on. Accordingly, my talk of
`states' is not intended here as involving any commitment to a certain ontological category
| such as to their being states of aairs, rather than events, activities, or processes.
4This does not suce to distinguish judgements from guesses. What is needed in addition
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judgements dier from the events which constitute their formation (e.g., acts
of judging): only the former, but not the latter, are instances of episodic and
committal thought. Another is that, while events of forming a judgement
are often, or perhaps even always, instantaneous, the formed judgements may
remain in continuous existence for a considerable amount of time. Our judge-
ment that the person opposite of us is very attractive, for example, may stay
in the background of our conscious mind during our evening-long conversation
and constantly inuence what we say to, and how we treat, her or him.5 And
the same is true of many of our judgemental endorsements of the propositions
which we use as premisses in more complex instances of reasoning.
The contrast between straightforward and mediated deliberate agency, on
the other hand, is best drawn | at least for the current purposes | in terms
of the fact that, while the latter involves the instrumental reliance on certain
epistemic or merely causal processes and their passive eects, the former does
not. The relevant processes are thereby characterized by the fact that, once
they are triggered by us and progress normally, they lead by themselves |
that is, without further help or involvement of agency or other factors external
to them - to the desired or intended outcome. And to instrumentally rely
on such processes means here to employ them as means in relation to their
suciency, once triggered and progressing normally, to bring about the desired
or intended outcome. What this involves, more specically, is that we take the
respective processes to be instrumental in achieving our goal; that we take
them to be so partly by recognizing their capacity to lead by themselves to the
is that it is constitutive of a guess, but not of a judgement, that it originates in the conscious
practical or arbitrary choice of one or another from a certain range of propositions, none of
which are suciently supported or forced upon us by the evidence available to us, but which
may none the less be among the acceptable options of choice only because they all enjoy at
least some evidential backing. Consequently, we may still rationally endorse a proposition in
a guess | but presumably not in a judgement | even when the proposition lacks sucient
epistemic support (cf. Owens (2003)).
The oered characterization of judgements is also meant to focus the current discussion
exclusively on kinds of judgement which are truth-apt and to be formed and assessed in
relation to epistemic reasons. Whether this includes normative judgements (e.g., about
what one ought to do, how things ought to be, or what is good) or judgements linked to
or identied with intentions (e.g., about what one will do) depends on whether the correct
account of these judgements will understand them as truth-apt and epistemic, or rather as
expressive or as practical. However, my hope is that our experience of them as being formed
in response to reasons | whether these are epistemic or practical | is also incompatible
with any experience of them as being formed in a straightforward manner; and that this
provides us again with an argument for their involuntariness. See Pink (1996) for an excellent
discussion of, as well as a slightly dierent argument for, the involuntariness of decisions,
desires and normative judgements which are formed | or at least meant to be formed | in
response to practical reasons.
5Thanks to Kevin Mulligan for suggesting this example.
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desired outcome; and that we try to act on our relevant desires or intentions by
means of trying to trigger the processes in question. Accordingly, an instance
of deliberate agency aiming at the production of a mental phenomenon is
mediated | and not straightforward | just in case the agent attempts to
achieve this aim by trying to employ an epistemic or merely causal process
as a sucient means for bringing about the desired mental phenomenon. Any
other involvement of epistemic or merely causal factors is compatible with both
kinds of deliberate mental agency.
For example, when we deliberately attempt to recall the appearance of a
certain person, we thereby set in motion certain epistemic mechanisms because
we expect them to force a specic image onto us that is likely to be accurate.
If we lacked this expectation, we would probably often not bother engaging
our memory, but instead opt for our ability to imagine appearances. And
something very similar happens when we decide to judge an issue on the basis
of the evidence available to us: we thereby assume that the proposition, which
the evidence will compel us to endorse due to some underlying epistemic pro-
cesses, will probably be true.6 Similarly, we can reasonably decide and try to
cause a change in our mood by imagining a certain scenario only if we believe
that performing the latter action is likely to be instrumental in bringing about
the desired alteration of how we feel. Otherwise, there would be no reason for
us to engage in the imaginative activity in response to our wish to alter our
mood. And when we deliberately take a drug in order to cause in us certain
hallucinations, we do this precisely because of our reasonable expectation that
the respective causal mechanisms, thereby triggered by us, are very likely to
lead to the occurrence of such hallucinations. In the absence of this expec-
tation, we normally would not take the drug, or at least not with the aim of
hallucinating.
Imagining something, in contrast, does not involve similar instrumental
6What happens in these cases is perhaps that our sole reason to rely on epistemic pro-
cesses is that we are interested in producing true representations, and that we take epistemic
processes (and nothing else) to be truth-conducive. But instead, it might also be a fact that
basic cases of reliance on epistemic mechanisms within mediated mental agency do not ac-
tually involve the instrumental understanding and employment of the respective epistemic
mechanisms. When we, say, begin to act on our decision to recall the appearance of a friend,
we perhaps might not have to possess or use the instrumental belief that a good way of achiev-
ing this goal is to actively trigger the respective underlying mnemonic mechanisms. If this
should turn out to be true, the characterization of the dierence between straightforward
and mediated agency would have to be rened accordingly | for instance, by weakening
the respective condition to the eect that only the possibility, but not the actuality, of in-
strumental employment of the processes is to be taken into account; or by supplementing it
with the condition that, if epistemic factors are concerned, it is alone decisive whether these
are in fact triggered by our active engagement and furthermore by themselves sucient to
bring about the desired outcome, once started and progressing normally.
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beliefs about and exploitations of epistemic or merely causal mechanisms. Al-
though straightforward agency may allow for the inuence of, or even conscious
reliance on, epistemic factors, this kind of inuence appears never to be medi-
ated by an epistemic process which is - or, at least, which we instrumentally
believe to be | sucient on its own to lead to the occurrence of whichever
mental phenomenon has been wished for. Our successful attempt at visualiz-
ing a sunny forest, say, may very well be informed by our knowledge of how
sunny forests look like, or of what it would be like to see a sunny forest. But
the inuence of this kind of knowledge on the resulting visual image is not
mediated by (an instrumental belief about) a rational process pertaining to
epistemic rationality which, once actively triggered, is alone responsible for
the occurrence of the image. In particular, we do not form the visual image in
response to our current recognition of some epistemic reasons (as in the case
of the formation of judgements on perceptual or inferential grounds). And the
occurrence of the visual image is not the direct result of a mechanism meant
to preserve a rational link to epistemic reasons recognized in the past (as in
the case of episodic memories based on past perceptions).
Similarly, it may be true that, when we successfully visualize a sunny forest,
our employment of our capacity to visualize sunny forests is causally respon-
sible for the occurrence of the respective visual image. And this again may
involve, or be grounded in, more fundamental causal chains. But in order to
successfully act on our intention to visualize a sunny forest, we need not, and
do not, conceive of the causal processes concerned as sucient means. We may
take the employment of our capacity to visualize sunny forests to be a neces-
sary part of visualizing a sunny forest, and we may even understand what we
are then doing as the action of visualizing a sunny forest by means of actively
making use of the respective capacity. But we do not thereby think of the
link between our employment of this capacity (or similar capacities, such as
the capacity to visualize trees) and the occurrence of the visual image in both
causal and instrumental terms (if we think of the link or its potential causal
nature at all). In particular, we do not form the intention to use our capacity
to visualize sunny forests in rational response to our intention to visualize a
sunny forest and an instrumental belief that making active use of this capacity
is likely to cause the occurrence of the desired visual image. In fact, we would
not know what it would mean to act on the intention to use our capacity to
visualize sunny forests, if not to act on the intention to visualize one or more
sunny forests.7
7Note also that the case of visualizing someone by means of visualizing a portrait of
this person still counts as an instance of straightforward agency, given that visualizing the
portrait is neither epistemic, nor merely causal in nature, but instead itself a straightforward
action. As a result, not all instances of straightforward agency need to be basis in the sense
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II. The Normative Approach
In the light of the preceding considerations, the main task in the formulation
of an argument for the claim that judgements can be formed at will is the iden-
tication of a constraint on all possible judgements, which puts them beyond
our deliberate and straightforward control: that is, which prevents them from
being consciously formed by us in direct response to our desire or intention to
form them, without any instrumental exploitation of passive processes. If the
constraint would not apply to all possible judgements, it could not completely
account for the fact (assuming that it is one) that none of them can be formed
by us at will, including the unconstrained ones. Furthermore, the constraint
has to concern the ways in which judgements can be actively formed: it has to
limit these ways in such a manner as to rule out the possibility of a deliberate
and straightforward formation of judgements.
The most prominent strategy has been to derive such a constraint from the
assumed fact that judgements are normatively linked to, or aim at, truth in
such a way that they are subject to the following truth norm:8
(TN) Judgements ought always to be true, and to be formed only if they are
true.
This truth norm is usually introduced for very dierent purposes, such as to
capture the essence of judgements (or beliefs), or to account for their represen-
tationality and their link to truth (cf. Papineau (1999) and Dretske (2000a)
for a detailed discussion). That it may also gure in an account of the invol-
untariness of judgements is often only noted as an aside | if it is noted at
all. But the truth norm is none the less predestined for playing this particular
role because, when formulated in terms of (TN), it purports to achieve two
things: to govern all possible judgements; and to put a restriction on the ways
in which we can deliberately form them.
But not just any understanding of the truth norm and its impact on judge-
ments can help in explaining the involuntariness of judgements. In particular,
it does not suce to identify the constraint on judgements and their delib-
erate formation, as it arises out of their assumed subjection to (TN), with
of not being performed by doing something else.
8See, for instance, Williams (1973) and Shah and Velleman (2005) for defences of this
strategy and the kind of normativity involved, and Winters (1979), Bennett (1990) and
Engel (2002) for critical discussions. See also Burge's writings, Peacocke (2003b), Wedgwood
(2002) and Shah (2003) for endorsements or explications of the idea that beliefs are subject
to a truth norm, and that conformity to this norm requires us to believe something only if
it is true. It is not unlikely that they will be sympathetic with the normative approach to
the involuntariness of judgements.
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the demand that, when deliberately forming a judgement (in contrast to an-
other kind of mental episode), we should act on the aim to form the respective
mental episode only if it is true. According to this demand, it is better or
more appropriate to pursue truth as one's goal when deliberately forming a
judgement. But it is not necessary, given that the possibility of violating the
demand is not ruled out. Although one would be somehow at fault or irra-
tional when ignoring or not following the demand, whether one satises it has
no inuence on whether one counts as deliberately forming a judgement. As a
consequence, the demand does not really limit the ways in which judgements
may be deliberately formed, it puts a restriction solely on when such an inten-
tional formation may count as proper. It is, accordingly, not strong enough to
prevent the occurrence of judgements which are formed entirely at will.
Therefore, the constraint on judgements derived from (TN) has to be under-
stood in stronger terms. The most natural way of strengthening the condition
on how we can deliberately form judgements seems to be to modify it in such
a way that its satisfaction becomes constitutive of the deliberate formation of
a judgement, instead of merely rendering examples of it appropriate.9 The
result will be something like the following requirement:
(C) Deliberately forming a judgement necessarily requires acting on the aim
to form it only if it is true.
Thus, if we do not have this goal in mind and do not actively and consciously
try to achieve it, we cannot be engaged in the deliberate formation of a judge-
ment | although we still might be engaged in the intentional or active for-
mation of a mental episode of another kind (e.g., a supposition), or experience
the passive occurrence of a judgement.
Understanding the constraint in this way does indeed promise to establish
its incompatibility with any potential straightforward voluntariness of judge-
ments. It seems plausible to say that deliberately acting on the aim to form a
mental episode only if it is true requires making use of truth-conducive means.
And, it may be further argued, reliance on truth-conducive means renders the
respective mental agency mediated in the sense specied above. The idea is
that only the reliance on epistemic reasons is likely to result in the forma-
tion of a true mental state. For, the assumption goes, there do not appear
to be truth-conducive means other than epistemic considerations. Hence, the
requirement (C) comes down to the demand that the deliberate formation of
judgements has to happen by means of passive | namely epistemic | pro-
cesses: judgements have to be deliberately formed on the basis of epistemic
reasons (if they are to be deliberately formed at all). It follows from this that
9Williams (1973) can plausibly be read as adopting this strategy (cf. also Winters (1979)).
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we cannot deliberately form judgements in a straightforward manner.10
But the constraint (C) does not apply to all possible or even all actual
judgements. Paradigm examples of judgements, which are successfully formed
in deliberate response to the desire or intention to form them, but without the
aim in mind to form them only if they are true, are manipulative or induced
judgements. Manipulated judgements are based on evidence, the collection
of which involves ignoring evidence of a certain kind, or unproportionally or
exclusively seeking evidence of another kind. Here are some good examples:11
Consider people who aim deliberatively to mislead themselves. Suppose
an elderly man realises that he is likely to be upset if he learns about
the real probability of his developing cancer, and so arranges to avoid
any evidence that might undermine his sanguine belief that this proba-
bility is low. Or suppose an adolescent youth learns that people with an
inated view of their own worth are generally happier and more success-
ful, and so deliberately seeks out evidence which will make him think
overly well of himself. Of course, there are familiar psychological di-
culties about deliberately arranging to have false beliefs, but examples
like this suggest they are not insuperable. (Papineau, 1999, 24)
There are probably many other, and possibly more radical, ways in which
we can manipulate our evidence, other than by being unduly selective. For
instance, we may ignore the lack of quality of some pieces of evidence (e.g.,
by relying on untrustworthy sources), or may invent or misread some of them
(e.g., by misinterpreting emotional feelings as evidence). By contrast, induced
judgements are formed in much simpler ways: they are not evidentially based,
but instead occur as the product of some causal process which is intentionally
triggered by some action of the subject in question. Examples of induced
judgements would be those which would occur as the eect of the intake of
a suitable drug, or of the visit to a hypnotist. They have in common with
manipulated judgements that, often, they are deliberately formed without the
aim of truth in mind. And although they may, as a consequence, end up being
epistemically inappropriate, this does not undermine their possibility.
10This argument is very similar to one of the arguments for the same conclusion in Williams
(1973), only transposed from the conceptual level to the level of constitution (cf. my dis-
cussion in the last section). Proust (2008) presents a slightly dierent argument, the central
idea of which seems to be that the aim of truth does not allow for the freedom of choice
essential to deliberate agency.
11See O'Shaughnessy (2008), Owens (2000), Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005)
for further examples of manipulated judgements, or `wishful thinking'. Wedgwood (2002)
also mentions the possibility of acting on one's intention to cease or avoid having a cer-
tain belief. As O'Shaughnessy and Papineau observe, the intentional manipulation of one's
judgements may require a certain amount of self-deception.
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One might wish to insist that cases of manipulated or induced judgements
do not really constitute counter-examples to (C), either because the mental
episodes involved are not really judgements, or because they are not really
actively or deliberately formed, so that their formation does not have to meet
the necessary condition on the deliberate formation of judgements established
by the constraint.12 But it seems entirely ad hoc to claim that the examples
do not concern judgements, given that the mental episodes in question endorse
a proposition as true and are phenomenologically indistinguishable from more
typically formed judgements (cf. Winters (1979) and Engel (2002)). And the
view that manipulated or induced judgements are not formed in an active
and deliberate manner appears equally implausible. It is true that the agency
involved leads to the occurrence of the judgement only in a mediated way. But
something very similar is true of many other cases which we are normally happy
to classify as deliberate actions. If bringing about the occurrence of a specic
judgement by intentionally taking a drug in the full knowledge and reasonable
expectation that this intake is likely to lead to the desired occurrence of the
judgement is indeed not taken to constitute an action, then bringing about the
death of a person by pulling a trigger or bringing about the arrival of a letter
by posting it should not count as deliberate actions either.
Of course, the occurrence of the judgement is itself not an action. But
neither is the occurrence of the death of the person, nor the arrival of the
letter (at least not regarding the person who has sent it). Instead, what is
actively done by the subject in question is the intended and expected bringing
about of the occurrence of these passive events. And the subject performs
this complex action | which may reasonably be described as the forming of a
judgement, the killing of a person or the sending of a letter | by performing a
much simpler action, namely the taking of the drug, the pulling of the trigger
or the posting of the letter. It might still be attempted to maintain that, in
general, there are no complex, but only simple actions; and that the latter
do not allow for individuation and description in terms of their intended and
expected causal consequences. But then, the formation of the judgement, the
killing of the person and the sending of the letter would still be on a par, since
they all would equally not count as actions. And this result would fatally clash
with our ordinary treatment of events of shooting someone or sending a letter
| and not only of events of pulling a trigger or posting a letter | as instances
12In personal conversation, Shah mentioned that he is inclined to the view that the for-
mation of manipulated or induced judgement should not count as an instance of (deliberate)
agency. Indeed, he and Velleman seem to have to adopt this line of response, since they
acknowledge the possibility of these types of judgements, but also believe that judgements
cannot be formed at will because of their special normative nature described by (TN) (cf.
Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman 2005).
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of agency.13
The only signicant dierence between the two kinds of cases is that the
occurrence of the judgement, but presumably not the occurrence of the death or
the arrival of the letter, presents itself phenomenally to the agent as passive.14
However, this is not the result of the judgement perhaps being brought about
non-intentionally, or less actively than the two external events, but instead
due to the fact that the judgement is part of the conscious mind of the subject
and thus accessible to him in a dierent way than the external events. If he
were able to become aware of the latter in the same way, he probably would
experience them as passive as well. Moreover, the fact that the judgement
is part of the subject's own mind, and not of another's, seems irrelevant for
whether knowingly and expectantly bringing about of a judgement by, say,
the administering of a drug should count as an action. None the less, this
dierence in how we are aware of judgements and external events may still
ultimately explain why we may have the intuition that murdering a person or
sending a letter have more right to count as actions than forming a judgement
in one of the mediated ways mentioned.
It is conceivable that the truth-related normativity of judgements may give
rise to requirements other than (C). But it is doubtful that any of them can be
both weak enough to apply to all possible judgements, and strong enough to be
incompatible with the deliberate and straightforward formation of judgements.
In addition, the strategy of taking some constraint like (C) to be responsible
for the involuntariness of judgements faces other diculties, some of which I
want to briey mention.
A rst challenge is to provide independent support for the claim that judge-
ments are normative in the sense described. Critics of this idea have pointed
out that it suces for a satisfactory account of judgements (or beliefs) | which
can explain, for instance, what dierentiates judgements from other mental
episodes, or how they represent the world | to assume that they have certain
13Even proponents of the view, that only tryings are actions, often enough permit that
action descriptions can apply to complex events consisting in tryings and their causal results,
as long as there is a suitable or non-deviant causal link between the two (cf. Hornsby (1980,
122f.); cf. also O'Shaughnessy (2008)).
14Another dierence | though probably cutting across the cases | is that we do not
always have established action terms available to directly pick out the more complex actions.
We call the action of deliberately bringing about the death of a person by doing something
simply a `killing'. But there is no such action term for the action of deliberately bringing
about the sleep of a person (e.g., oneself) by administering a drug to her. And the expression
`forming a judgement', as used for the action of deliberately bringing about the occurrence of
a judgement by taking a respective drug, is probably not commonly understood as an action
term. Note, however, that the last term, as well as the related expression `the formation of
the judgement', is meant here to pick out the event of doing something in order to cause the
occurrence of a certain judgement, and not merely the event of this judgement occurring.
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(evolutionary evolved) functions, notably the function to be true. This picture
treats truth as a value for judgements, but as a value among many, which may
be outweighed or undermined by the other values and thus need not always
bind judges. That is, the latter need not always, when deliberately forming a
judgement, be under the obligation to form it only if it is true. Accordingly, if
the formation of a judgement is subject to such a truth-related obligation, this
cannot be due to the general, intrinsic nature of judgements, but has to derive
from something else, such as the wider practical purposes which are linked to
the occurrence of the particular judgements in question, and which may dier
greatly from case to case (cf. Dretske (2000a) and Papineau (1999)). Another
diculty for the normative approach is to show how the requirement (C) can
actually be derived from the truth norm (TN) | and if this fails, how it might
be established on other grounds. And a third challenge is to demonstrate that
intentionally grounding judgements in epistemic reasons is indeed a | and,
moreover, the only | truth-conducive means available to us. In fact, it has
been be doubted that deliberate reliance on epistemic reasons can function as
an instrumental means to truth | at least, if the latter is to be understood as
one of our purposes among many others (cf. Owens (2003)).
III. The Experiential Approach
That the normative approach arguably fails in its attempt to establish a con-
straint on our deliberate formation of judgements, which prevents it from being
straightforward in all possible cases, provides a good reason to look for an alter-
native account. But the search for such an account is also, and independently,
motivated by the reasonable expectation and hope that theories, which deny
(TN) on other grounds, should be able to account for the involuntariness of
judgements as well as their norm-orientated competitors. My aim is therefore
to pave the way for an argument showing why we cannot form judgements at
will, which refers to the phenomenal character of judgements instead of their
normativity.
This argument can be summarized as follows. Its starting-point is the
idea that we consciously experience our judgements always as epistemically
motivated, while we consciously experience the straightforward results of our
deliberate mental agency always as practically motivated. But, the reasoning
continues, experiencing a mental episode as practically motivated rules out
experiencing it as epistemically motivated | at least, if the episode concerned
has been formed in a deliberate and straightforward manner. For experiencing
such an episode as practically motivated means in fact experiencing it as imme-
diately responding to the practical motives in question. And the phenomenal
aspect reecting this immediacy is incompatible with another potential aspect
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of experience, namely that aspect which reects epistemic motivation. Hence,
our judgements cannot result in a straightforward manner from our deliberate
mental agency | which means that we cannot form them at will.
It will become much clearer in due course, I hope, how precisely each of the
premisses involved in this argument should be understood, and also how they
may be defended. But the core idea of this argument is that we experience
certain conscious mental phenomena | such as judgements or mental actions
| as rationally motivated. This means, rst of all, that these phenomena
possess a phenomenal or experiential character: they present themselves in
phenomenal consciousness, or are experienced by us, in a specic way; or, as
I will also say, they are phenomenally marked or revealed as being a certain
way.15 The core idea implies furthermore that the phenomenal characters of
the phenomena in question are of a particular kind: they involve a rational
dimension or aspect which reects their rational nature. More specically, the
conscious mental phenomena concerned are phenomenally marked as standing
in a certain kind of rational relation: we experience them as motivated by |
that is, as rationally based on and occurring (or having occurred) in response
to | reasons.16
In what follows, I will simply assume that judgements, mental actions and
the mental episodes, which are the straightforward results of the latter, are phe-
15My use of the term `experience' is perhaps unusual in that it refers to phenomenal
consciousness rather than sensory experience. But it is akin to the German `Erlebnis' or
`erleben' (especially as used by phenomenologists, such as Husserl) and will much simplify
the presentation of the experiential approach. Other attempts at the notoriously dicult
task of describing phenomenal consciousness have characterized it in terms of how it is or
feels like to undergo, or be in, the respective events or states. Besides, I will leave it open
whether the phenomenal character of episodes can remain unnoticed, or whether phenomenal
consciousness always involves or requires some form of attention. This is unproblematic
because forming a judgement deliberately, or `in full consciousness' (cf. Williams (1973)),
will include attending to the judgement and the agency involved (cf. Peacocke (2003b) and
O'Brien (2003) for a discussion of this kind of attention).
16As I understand motivation here, it is equivalent to actual responsiveness to reasons,
in the sense that a mental episode or event is rationally motivated if it is initiated, guided
or otherwise rationally determined by certain reasons. By contrast, in many meta-ethical
discussions, the notion of `motivation' is used in a more narrow and perhaps more technical
sense, being limited to what I call `practical motivation'. Furthermore, I am not concerned
with `motivation' in the sense of having a certain desire or intention which has not (yet) be-
come motivationally eective. And I also take it that there are important and phenomenally
salient dierences between epistemic and practical motivation | if only due to important
dierences between the respective kinds of reasons or rationality. One such dierence is, for
instance, that while practical ends may often be achieved in many dierent ways, reaching
epistemic ends (i.e., truth or epistemic appropriateness) seems to always require the reliance
on evidence. And while our various practical ends interact with each other (e.g., by out-
weighing or supporting each other), the epistemic ends appear to be completely independent
and isolated from them (cf. Owens (2003)).
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nomenally conscious, or part of the stream of consciousness, and thus possess
an experiential character. I will have to leave the defence of this assumption
for another occasion.17 Here, I will merely try to soften related doubts by
making clear that assuming the experiential form of awareness at issue is less
demanding than might be thought.
First, enjoying this kind of awareness need not require any specic con-
ceptual capacities, even if describing it in terms of experiencing an episode as
being a certain way might be taken to suggest just this. Saying that we expe-
rience certain mental episodes as responding to reasons does not mean more
than saying that their phenomenal character shows a specic aspect, that the
phenomenal character of other episodes lacks this aspect, and that this phe-
nomenal dierence somehow reects the corresponding dierence in origin and
determination. In a similar way, we experience red-perceptions as representing
a dierent colour than green-perceptions, or certain feelings as more pleasant
than others. And although it should usually be possible for us to conceptual-
ize such phenomenal dierences in introspective higher-order judgements, such
a conceptualization does not necessarily already happen on the phenomenal
level.
Second, the form of awareness in question is minimal in the sense that
we can experience a mental episode or event as rationally motivated without
being aware of, or otherwise able to identify, the respective reasons. For in-
stance, when asked what the capital of Ecuador is, we may form and rely on
the judgement that it is Quito | say, as a manifestation of some previously
acquired belief | without being able to remember when or how we learnt this
fact (e.g., whether from listening to a teacher, from reading a book, or from
looking at a map; cf. Wedgwood (2002, 20)). And it commonly happens to
us that we perform an action, such as entering a certain room, and recognize
it as been done deliberately by us, although we have forgotten why we did it.
Moreover, even when we are aware of the motivationally eective reasons and
their specic nature, this awareness need not be experiential.
Third, experiential awareness may be fallible in at least two respects. In
both cases, the phenomenal character of the episode or event concerned fails to
adequately reect its nature. But the reasons for this are dierent. On the one
hand, this failure may be due to the fact that the episode or event in question
does not live up to how instances of the mental type, to which it belongs,
phenomenally purport to be. We may, for example, experience a judgement as
a judgement and, hence, as responding to epistemic reasons, although it has
17The assumption has been doubted, in particular, with respect to judgements. But most
of the related debate has concentrated on whether judgements possess a distinctive phenom-
enal character, or whether dierences in conceptual contents are phenomenally salient (cf.
the discussions in Siewert (1998) andCarruthers (2000)), neither of which I assume here (cf.
below) | though I defend, together with Gianfranco Soldati, both claims in chapter 12.
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been purely causally induced (e.g., by a drug, or by an emotion). On the other
hand, the failure may stem from the fact that we erroneously experience an
episode or event, not as an instance of the mental type to which it belongs, but
as an instance of another type. We may, for example, experience a judgement
as being a supposition | that is, we may experientially mistake a judgement
for a supposition | and thus fail to experience the judgement as epistemically
motivated.18
Correctly speaking, my main claim should therefore rather be that, if we
experience a judgement as a judgement, or an instance or product of straight-
forward and deliberate mental agency as such an instance or product, then we
always experience it as purporting to be rationally motivated. In other words,
it is essential to how we experience episodes as being judgements, or alter-
natively as being part of straightforward and deliberate mental agency, that
they present themselves phenomenally as occurring in response to reasons.
But out of simplicity, I will continue to say that we always experience judge-
ments, deliberate mental actions and their straightforward results as rationally
motivated.
And fourth, the conscious phenomena in question need not possess distinc-
tive phenomenal characters, in terms of which they can be individuated and
dierentiated from other phenomena. Judgements, for example, need not phe-
nomenally dier from other mental episodes which may also be experienced
as epistemically motivated (e.g., perhaps, episodic memories); and they need
not phenomenally dier among themselves, even if they dier, say, in content,
origin, or motivation. All that is claimed is that judgements are experienced
as supported by epistemic reasons. And similar considerations apply to our
experience of deliberate mental actions and the mental episodes which they
produce.
18The many examples of mainly pathological dissociations between our agency and our
awareness of it (e.g., those mentioned in Wegner (2004) and discussed in his book) will also
fall into one or the other category. The latter possibility of error would probably require,
however, that episodes could be recognized and identied as judgements by reference to
features other than their being actually experience by us in a certain way | for instance,
in terms of their role in the acquisition of relevant beliefs or the performance of certain
actions. And this might very well mean again that it is not essential to judgements that our
actual experience of them shows some specic and distinctive aspects (though it may still
be essential to them that they are consciously experienced in some way or another). More
on the fallibility of experience and its relevance for the issue of involuntary judgements can
be found at the end of section VI.
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IV. Our Experience of Judgements
What I want to try to defend rst is the idea that the experiential character of
our judgements always possesses a certain epistemic dimension: we experience
our judgements as occurring in response to epistemic reasons. My defence
makes essential use of an argument for the further claim that we experience
judgements as epistemically reasonable, that is, as suciently supported by
epistemic reasons.19 This round-about strategy is possible because the two
aspects of the experiential character of judgements concerned correspond to
two intimately connected aspects of the epistemic status of judgements. Being
reasonable is, for a judgement, partly a matter of being motivated by reasons,
given that only (or at least primarily) motivating reasons contribute to the
rational standing of a judgement. If I judge that something is coloured on the
basis of my unjustied belief that it is green, my judgement will not be justied
either, even if there is a motivationally ineective, but good reason for forming
this judgement available to me (e.g., the object may indeed be green, and I
may generally be in the position to recall one of my correct past perceptions of
it or simply to look at it again). Hence, if judgements turn out to be marked
in phenomenal consciousness as reasonable, it is to be expected that they will
also be phenomenally marked as rationally motivated. If it therefore can be
made plausible that we are, in some way or another, aware of judgements as
reasonable, this should provide substantial support for the claim that we are,
in the same way, aware of them as being motivated by reasons. In particular,
experiencing a judgement as rationally motivated would seem to be part of
experiencing it as reasonable.
My argument begins with the observation that we take our judgements to
be epistemically reasonable, at least as long as we are not aware of defeaters or
do not otherwise begin to doubt the epistemic standing of the judgements in
question. If we would not take our judgements to enjoy such reasonableness, we
probably would not rely on them as a provider of reasons for belief or action, in
the sense that we would not let them rationally contribute to our acquisition of
the corresponding non-occurrent beliefs or, by means of further theoretical or
practical deliberation, to our acquisition or revision of other judgements, beliefs
or intentions. Instead, we would be inclined to revise them or give them up, or
indeed would have refrained from forming them in the rst place. That we |
at least initially | take our judgements to be reasonable becomes also apparent
in cases in which we come to doubt the epistemic reasonableness of one of our
already existing judgements | say, because we begin to question the quality
19In fact, these two phenomenal aspects seem to be part of an even richer epistemic di-
mension of the experiential character of judgements, consisting in our phenomenal awareness
of them as providing reasons for belief or action.
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of the supporting evidence, recognize some fault in the cognitive processes
originally involved, or simply encounter an opposing view. The occurrence
of such a doubt presupposes that we are already aware of an initial claim to
reasonableness, which then becomes the subject of the doubt. In particular,
doubting a judgement on the grounds, say, that the perceptual conditions are
inadequate requires being aware of the fact that the judgement in question
has enjoyed rational support by a perception had under those inappropriate
conditions.
The observation that we take our judgements to be reasonable and, as
part of this, to be rationally motivated ts well with two other observations,
namely that we take our judgements to have occurred passively, and that we
take them to amount to knowledge (or at least to purport to do so) and treat
them accordingly | for instance, when we rely on them in the acquisition of
beliefs or the formation of intentions | even if they do not constitute knowl-
edge (cf. Williamson (2000), Wedgwood (2002) and Hornsby (2007). It seems
that we are aware of our judgements as passive precisely because of | and
perhaps even by | being aware of them as based on epistemic reasons, that is,
as determined by passive epistemic processes. And assuming that knowledge
requires both truth and epistemic appropriateness, taking our judgements to
be instances of knowledge appears to involve taking them to be both true and
reasonable. Indeed, if it is furthermore accepted that the fact, that judgements
endorse a proposition as true and thus make a claim about how things are, is
phenomenally salient and distinguishes them experientially from, say, supposi-
tions (cf. Dorsch (2011b)), it seems very plausible that the other aspect of the
epistemic status of judgements | that is, their reasonableness | should also
be perspicuous in this way. The idea is that, by presenting themselves in phe-
nomenal consciousness as instances of knowledge (independently of whether
they in fact amount to knowledge), judgements make two salient and inter-
related claims to rationality: that they represent adequately how things are;
and that they are thereby suciently rationally supported.
But a sceptic concerning the experiential awareness of the prima facie rea-
sonableness of judgements is probably also a sceptic concerning the experiential
awareness of their claim to truth and knowledge. Therefore, I would like to put
forward another line of reasoning, according to which our primary awareness
of the reasonableness of our judgements should be best understood as a form
of experiential awareness, given that all plausible alternatives appear to be un-
tenable. There seem to be two plausible competitors to this view: the inference
model and the prompting model.20 Both these models have in common that
20Other candidates seem to be even less attractive (cf. O'Brien (2003)), in particular
the idea that the awareness in question is a matter of some internal form of perception or
observation (cf. Shoemaker (1994b), Burge (1996) and Martin (1997b)).
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they take the awareness at issue to be the higher-order judgement that the
respective lower-order judgement is epistemically reasonable. But they dier
in their account of how we come to form that judgement.
The inference model maintains that the higher-order judgement under dis-
cussion is the result of a complex cognitive process. More specically, it states
that we infer the prima facie reasonableness of our judgements. For instance,
we may believe that our judgements are generally reasonable as long as there
are no relevant defeaters or doubts, and we may introspectively recognize that
the mental episode in question is a judgement and that we have not been
aware of any relevant defeaters previous to our doubts. Or, alternatively, we
may remember how we have formed a judgement on the basis of certain pieces
of evidence, and we may recognize that we have taken this formation to be
epistemically appropriate, or at least have remained unaware of any inappro-
priateness, at the time of its occurrence. In both cases, we can then conclude
that the judgement concerned has some claim to reasonableness.
However, that our primary awareness of the reasonableness of judgements
is often not the result of such inferences is illustrated by cases in which we are
ignorant about the general reasonableness of judgements, or about the partic-
ular epistemic origin of the judgement at issue. The view that our judgements
are generally reasonable, as long as there are no defeating factors or circum-
stances present, seems to be suciently complex and non-obvious for many
subjects (such as children) to lack it - in particular, since it requires a substan-
tial amount of theorizing (assuming that it is not based on how we consciously
experience judgements) and the possession of certain more technical concepts
(such that of a defeater). But this does not seem to prevent those subjects from
taking their individual judgements to be reasonable and to rely on them as
providers of reasons for belief or action. Similarly, as already illustrated above,
we may not remember what has ultimately provided support for our judge-
ments and the beliefs which they may manifest. But we may still take them to
be reasonable and trust them in our reasoning. And nally, our awareness of
the reasonableness of our judgements often occurs too immediately to involve,
or be preceded by, inferences of the kind described | for instance, when we
enjoy such an awareness as part of coming to doubt the epistemic standing of
a given judgement in direct reaction to, say, hearing a contradicting opinion
or realizing that circumstances have been rather non-standard.
The prompting model, in contrast, claims that the higher-order judgement
at issue (or a corresponding intuitive seeming21) occurs spontaneously, once we
21The prompting model invites characterization in terms of intuitions. Depending on
one's understanding of them, either the higher-order judgement itself, or some spontaneously
occurring rational seeming, on which the higher-order judgement is directly based, may be
said to be intuitive (cf. the essays in Bodrozic (2004)). In the latter case, my arguments
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begin to wonder whether the lower-order judgement is reasonable. According
to this view, the higher-order judgement is neither based on some inference
or observation, nor simply the manifestation of a prior belief. Moreover, it is
not based on the conscious experience of the reasonableness of the lower-order
judgement. Otherwise, the experience would enjoy primacy over the higher-
order judgement, and we would have the experience, rather than the prompt-
ing, model. Instead, the higher-order judgement is automatically prompted
by our wondering about the epistemic status of the lower-order judgement in
virtue of some reliable internal mechanism.
This internal mechanism cannot plausibly be due to some constitutive link
between the lower- and the higher-order state. It does not seem to be true,
for instance, that | assuming that we are rational and possess the required
concepts | the presence of the lower-order judgement entails (and is perhaps
entailed by) the possession of the higher-order belief that it is epistemically
reasonable, or at least the willingness to form the corresponding higher-order
judgement when considering the issue. The two mental phenomena in question
seem to be of such kinds as to be much more distinct than that. We can be
rational, have a well-functioning mind and possess the concept of reasonable-
ness (or even prima facie reasonableness); but, when asking which epistemic
standing one of our judgements enjoys, still fail to apply the concept to the
judgement. In particular, no aspect of this concept, or of our possession of it,
tells us that it correctly applies to at least certain judgements. Recognizing
that they enjoy such reasonableness amounts to a more substantial piece of
knowledge.22
Hence, the lower-order judgement, together with our consideration of its
epistemic status, is perhaps better taken to reliably give rise to the higher-order
judgement via some contingent and merely causal or informational relation.23
against the prompting model will concern the spontaneously occurring seemings, rather than
the higher-order judgements grounded in them.
22The assumption of a constitutive link is perhaps plausible with respect to higher-order
ascriptions of propositional contents or attitudes (cf. Shoemaker (1994b), Burge (1996)
and Wright (1998)). But judgements about the reasonableness of other judgements are
clearly of neither kind. And see Peacocke (2003b), Martin (2000b) and O'Brien (2003)
for more general objections to the constitutive account and its central claim that higher-
and lower-order states are not distinct entities. One particular worry is, for instance, that
the postulated constitutive link between the lower- and higher-order states does not seem
to provide the resources to explain how the latter can be epistemically grounded on, and
constitute genuine instances of knowledge of, the former.
23Peacocke's account of self-knowledge seems to open up a third possibility: to take the link
to be rational, but non-constitutive. However, the considerations presented above against
the applicability of constitutivist accounts also rule out the applicability of Peacocke's view,
given that the latter, too, implies that the occurrence of the conscious lower-order states,
together with our conceptual capacities and a rational and well-functioning mind, ensures
that we are willing to form the higher-order judgements in the relevant circumstances (cf.
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But apart from the general diculties linked to causal reliabilism or infor-
mationalist semantics, this view faces the challenge to satisfactorily motivate
the postulation of the respective internal mechanism. This mechanism would
seem very odd and dicult to explain if such higher-order judgements sponta-
neously occurred solely in response to wondering about the epistemic standing
of lower-order judgements, and not in response to wondering about some other
feature or some other mental episode. But to widen the scope of the prompting
model to other kinds of higher-order judgements seems to be plausible only
in the context of endorsing an account of introspection, or self-knowledge, in
terms of contingently, but reliably prompted higher-order judgements. And
such an account seems to be highly implausible, especially if applied to the
kind of awareness under discussion.24 One specic problem is that the rea-
sonableness of judgements seems to be among their features to which we can
have direct introspective access only if they are indeed marked in phenomenal
consciousness. The epistemic standing of judgements is at least in most cases
a matter of their rational relations to reason-providing states or facts extrinsic
to them. Therefore, if it is not reected by an introspectible aspect of the
experiential character of judgements, it can be recognized only by means of a
cognitive process which encompasses more than the mere introspection of the
judgement and its intrinsic features | a cognitive process which, for instance,
combines introspection with inference and perhaps memory, as described above
during the discussion of the inferential model.25
However, if our primary awareness of the reasonableness of judgements is
in at least many cases neither based on inferences, nor a matter of causally
prompted higher-order judgements, then it should be taken to be experiential.
No other plausible alternative suggests itself. Hence, taking our judgements
to be epistemically appropriate should be best understood as experiencing
Peacocke (1996)). Besides, it is also interesting to note that Peacocke's account goes beyond
the prompting model, and has some anities to the experiential model, in that it assigns to
consciousness an essential function in the epistemology of self-knowledge (cf. n. 28 below).
24Among the more general objections to this account of introspection | which is endorsed,
for instance, by Armstrong (1993) and Lycan (1996) | are: that it has to assume some form
of causal reliabilism (cf. O'Brien (2003)); that it cannot capture the transparency of mental
content (cf. Dretske (1999)); or that it does not link the lower- and higher-order states
intimately enough to be able to account for the immediate rational impact of the latter on
our revision of the former, for our related epistemic responsibility, and for the impossibility
of brute error (i.e., error not due to the irrationality or malfunctioning of the subject) in
the acquisition of self-knowledge (cf. Burge (1996); cf. also Shoemaker (1994b) and Siewert
(1998)).
25The same problem need not arise with respect to the introspection of externally deter-
mined contents, given that the contents of the higher-order states may embed the contents of
the lower-order states and thus can inform us about them without having to tell us something
about their extrinsic relations (cf. Burge (1996) 1996 and Peacocke (1996, 2003b)).
144
Chapter 5 Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency
them as enjoying the support of epistemic reasons | which again involves
experiencing the judgements as being motivated by such reasons. Our higher-
order judgements about the reasonableness of our lower-judgements may then
be the result of introspecting this epistemic aspect of the phenomenal character
of the latter.
As I have already mentioned, that judgements are always marked in phe-
nomenal consciousness as occurring in response to reasons is compatible with
the possibility that they are actually not so motivated, and that correspond-
ingly our experiential awareness has failed us. We presumably react to such
cases of error by taking ourselves to have forgotten about the specic rational
origins of the judgements in question, or by coming to identify or construct new
ones (e.g., by interpreting the mental causes of the judgements | say, certain
desires or emotions | as their grounds). But our phenomenal awareness of
judgements as rationally motivated is also compatible with the possibility of
self-justifying judgements (if they are indeed a possibility). Such judgements
provide epistemic support for themselves in virtue of some feature which they
possess (e.g., their necessity, infallibility, certainty, etc.). And when we ex-
perience them as rationally motivated, we are aware of this rational relation
in which they stand to themselves (e.g., by experiencing them as certain or
self-evident). Nothing in what has been said so far suggests or even requires
that we experience judgements as motivated by epistemic reasons distinct from
themselves.
Much more problematic would be if some class of our judgements would
allow for epistemic appropriateness despite not permitting any support by
epistemic reasons, whether provided by the judgements themselves or by other
states or facts. However, none of our judgements seem to be of such a kind.26
From an epistemic point of view, such states would be much more similar
to perceptions than to normal judgements. Maybe intuitions, or intellectual
seemings, may be of this type. Just like perceptions, they can perhaps be
reliable or otherwise epistemically appropriate, without standing in rational
relations supporting them. And just like perceptions, they are perhaps also
immune to any rational inuence of reasons. But judgements seem to be very
dierent. Their epistemic appropriateness appears to be partly a matter of how
well they cohere with our already existing beliefs (as well as other judgements).
And this seems to mean, among other things, that the latter may provide us
with (access to) reasons for, or against, the formation or revision of judgements.
Moreover, our judgements appear to be sensitive to such reasons and react
accordingly - say, by disappearing when they are in too great a tension with
26I take it that even perceptual judgements are not of this type, given that they are
normally rationally supported by perceptions. See, e.g., Martin (1992) and Pollock and
Cruz (1999) for defences of this view.
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what else we believe.
V. Our Experience of Agency
What is left to be shown is how their feature of being experienced as epis-
temically motivated prevents judgements from being formed at will. In the
remaining sections, I will argue for this incompatibility in three steps. First, I
will try to make plausible that deliberate and straightforward mental agency (if
successful) results in mental episodes which are always experienced by us as ac-
tively formed. Second, I will argue that this actually means that the respective
episodes present themselves as occurring in immediate response to practical
reasons. And third, I will show that no mental episode can be experienced by
us both as being epistemically motivated and as being immediately practically
motivated. From this incompatibility between the two ways in which we may
consciously experience mental episodes, it follows that our conscious judge-
ments cannot result in a straightforward manner from our deliberate mental
agency: for us, there cannot be any judgements formed at will.
I take it that our instances of deliberate mental agency (and presumably
of deliberate agency in general) normally involve at least three elements (cf.,
e.g., Pink (1996)). First of all, there are certain practical reasons which are
potential motives for action, and which we are put in contact with by some of
our mental states | say, intentions, desires, or other states with the capac-
ity to move us to act. Then, there are the mental actions themselves which
occur when we begin to act on some of the provided reasons. Examples are
the straightforward acts of conjuring up an image or of making an explicit
assumption. The mental actions may thereby be partly or wholly successful
in bringing about the respective mental phenomena; or they may amount to
something like mere attempts or tryings. And nally, there is the motivational
link between the two other elements. The mental actions come into being once
our practical reasons actually begin to move us. And these reasons continue
to guide as throughout our performance of the resulting actions (cf. O'Brien
(2003)). According to this picture, practical motivation is | just like epis-
temic motivation - a rational (and presumably causal) relation; and it obtains
precisely as long as the practical reasons stay eective in initiating and guiding
the mental actions concerned.
Often, however, our mental actions involve, or at least give rise, to a fourth
element: they bring about certain desired or intended mental phenomena as
their results. Trying to conjure up an image of a sunny forest may actually
produce such an image; while attempting to improve one's mood by conjuring
up such an image may result in one's becoming happier. Furthermore, some
of these results may be due to deliberate and straightforward mental agency.
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The representational episodes produced by, or as part of, acts of successful
visualizing or supposing | such as the image of the sunny forest | are good
examples.
Now, we typically can tell whether one of our mental episodes has been the
result of our mental agency | at least, if it has been produced in a deliberate
and straightforward way. When you pictured to yourself the sunny forest, or
supposed that Goethe went to Stoos, you were presumably aware of the fact
that you actively formed the respective representational episodes. And your
awareness of them would presumably dier in this respect from the awareness
you would have when perceiving a sunny forest, or judging that Goethe visited
Stoos, or being confronted with the spontaneous and unbidden occurrence of
an image or thought with a corresponding content. The main issue with which
I will be concerned in the remainder of this section is how we can come to
acquire this kind of awareness. And the plausible options seem to be the same
as in the case of our awareness of the epistemic reasonableness of judgements:
the inference, the prompting and the experience model.27
As above, the inference model maintains that we inferentially arrive at our
knowledge of the active origin of the respective mental episodes on the basis of
introspection, and perhaps also memory or other forms of knowledge. A person
successfully visualizing a sunny forest may, for instance, be introspectively
aware of her intention | or of her attempt to act on her intention | to
picture such a scenery, as well as of the occurrence of the resulting image.
Moreover, she may notice that these phenomena are temporally ordered, and
that there is a match between the content of the intention or attempt at action
and the nature of the subsequent visual episode. And she may possess general
knowledge of the fact that such a combination of agreement and temporal
order, which furthermore involves an intention or attempt to do something,
is usually not accidental, but rather the consequence of the rational forces
involved in practical motivation. Hence, the person may be able to draw the
conclusion that the image of the forest has occurred, not spontaneously, but
as the result of her own deliberate mental agency initiated by her intention.
However, the demands put by the inference model on the knowing subject
are again too high. In order to come to know that some, but not others, of our
mental episodes have been actively formed, we do not seem to have to possess
knowledge of the non-accidental character and origin of the temporal order and
match of the mental phenomena involved in mental agency. Nor do we seem
to have to possess some of the concepts needed to entertain such knowledge or
27An observational model can again be ruled out straight away (cf. O'Brien (2003)).
Although it has been argued that our primary knowledge of our own bodily actions is
mediated by proprioception (cf. Dokic (2003)), this idea obviously cannot be applied to
mental agency. For the same reason, outer perception could not play a role.
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draw the inferences required (e.g., the concept of the kind of match described).
In addition, our acquisition of the knowledge about the origin of our mental
episodes appears, from a subjective point of view, to be more immediate than
described by the inference model. It may be true that we infer the active
or passive origin of a given episode in very special circumstances (e.g., when
we are unsure about whether our primary way of acquiring this knowledge is
working properly). But it seems that we typically do not need to engage in
such elaborate reasoning in order to tell whether an episode is due to our own
mental agency (cf. Peacocke (2003b) and O'Brien (2003)).
According to the prompting model, the higher-order judgements about the
active or passive origin of our mental episodes are not based on observation,
inference or experience, but instead reliably prompted by simply paying at-
tention to the issue, or asking oneself the question, of how a certain present
mental episode has been formed. Their occurrence is thus the product of some
underlying causal or informational mechanism, which is set in motion by con-
sciously addressing the topic of the origin of a given mental episode. And they
reliably track the presence, or absence, of the special link obtaining between
successful mental actions and the mental episodes which they have produced
in a straightforward manner.
But this application of the prompting model is not very appealing, and
mainly for the same reason as above, namely its diculty in motivating the
acceptance of the postulated internal mechanism. Again, it seems to make
sense to speak of reliably prompted higher-order judgements only if they are
taken to be introspective, or instances of self-knowledge. This idea is maybe
more plausible this time, given that the straightforward results of our successful
mental actions are perhaps constitutive parts of these actions (cf. Audi (1993)),
and introspecting the results and their active nature may therefore happen
as part of introspecting the respective mental actions and their active nature.
But it still seems valid that theories of introspection in line with the prompting
model are much more plausible if they take the link between the lower- and
the higher-order states to be constitutive rather than causal or informational
(cf. n. 24 above). However, the possibility of a constitutive account does not
arise, since we can satisfy all the relevant conditions concerning rationality,
possession of concepts, and so on, without being inclined to judge a given
lower-order mental episode to be actively or passively formed when asking
ourselves the respective question.28
28See O'Brien (2003) for more general criticism of the constitutivist approach to our self-
knowledge of our conscious actions. Her own account of such self-knowledge is formulated
along the lines of Peacocke's account of our self-knowledge of conscious states. Accordingly,
it assumes a rational, but non-constitutive link between our actions and our self-knowledge
of them, as well as an essential role for the way in which we are conscious of our own actions,
namely by means of a `[conscious] sense of guiding our action, ... a sense of control' (ibid.
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Peacocke's own view on our self-knowledge of (bodily) agency also assigns
an essential epistemic role to our non-observational conscious experience (or
`awareness from the inside') in the formation of the higher-order judgement
or belief that we are, or have been, successfully trying to do something, at
least in the case of basic or straightforward agency. Moreover, he takes the
respective experience to be an awareness of successfully trying (cf. Peacocke
(2003a, 103 and 105) and Peacocke (2009)). Hence, the awareness may very
well extend (as proposed by the experiential model) to that mental episode,
the occurrence of which renders the respective attempt at mental action suc-
cessful. It is, however, unclear whether what he has in mind here is the way we
phenomenally experience actions { i.e., a phenomenal property of the episodes
of acting themselves; or instead independent and non-judgemental conscious
states representing our mental actions (cf. Peacocke (2009)).
What remains also to be claried is which justicatory role experiential
awareness plays for self-knowledge (if any). Although I have sympathies with
the idea that our phenomenal awareness of the lower-order states provides us
with prima facie reason for forming the corresponding higher-order judgements,
I need not commit myself to this view here. The justication of the higher-
order judgements about reasonableness or active origin may also be a matter
of entitlement (e.g., of the kind proposed in Peacocke (2003a)), or perhaps also
of coherence and other factors.
The experiential model seems, again, to be the best remaining alternative.
It claims that we become aware of the active or passive origin of our mental
episodes simply by having and experiencing them. In particular, we experience
the mental episodes resulting straightforwardly from our deliberate mental
agency as actively formed; while we presumably experience most or all other
mental episodes as having occurred in a passive manner. This is one reason
why we experience a deliberately formed image of a sunny forest dierently
from a perception or a spontaneous or remembered image of such a scene.
This picture ts very well with (but does not entail) the view that our
primary awareness of the active character of our deliberate mental actions is
experiential, too. And the truth of this further view would suggest (but, again,
not imply) that the straightforward results of our deliberate mental actions,
given that they are experienced in the same way as the mental actions itself,
are constitutive parts of the latter. The fact that we experience certain men-
tal phenomenon as active may thus perhaps serve as a guide to agency: if
we experience something as active, then it normally is an instance of agency.
However, the opposite does not seem to be true: we do not appear to expe-
378). The latter aspect of her theory seems to be very close to my idea that we experience
our mental actions as motivated and guided by practical reasons and renders her view more
akin to the experiential than to the prompting model.
149
Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency Chapter 5
rience all instances or parts of action as active. Most, if not all, examples
of non-deliberate agency seem to lack the kind of attentive conscious aware-
ness of activity characteristic of deliberate agency (cf. O'Shaughnessy (2008)
and Pink (1996)). And when we intentionally improve our mood by imag-
ining something cheerful, we do not seem to experience the resulting change
in mood as actively produced, but only the images and thoughts involved in
bringing about that change. Given that the deliberate improvement of one's
mood is none the less an instance of mediated agency, this suggests that our
experience of passivity does not always reveal all aspects of the origin of the
respective mental episodes. It discloses the direct passive origination in, say,
some epistemic or merely causal processes. But it does not also reveal the
prior deliberate mental activity which has started these processes. Therefore,
this ultimately suggests that our experience of activity is solely or primarily a
guide to deliberate and straightforward agency.
VI. The Incompatibility of the Two Kinds of Experience
This leads directly to the question of what it means to experience a mental
phenomenon as active. My answer to this question is that the respective
experience reveals at least two aspects of the mental agency concerned: that it
is practically motivated; and that it is so motivated in an immediate manner.
This may explain, among other things, why our experience of activity may
very well be a guide to straightforward agency, assuming that, normally, the
phenomenal character of our conscious mental states and events adequately
reects their nature.
It appears very natural to say that our mental phenomena, which are
marked in phenomenal consciousness as active, present themselves thereby
as practically motivated. Experiencing some action or episode as practically
motivated means experiencing it as rationally responding to certain practical
reasons. And our deliberate mental actions (including our not entirely unsuc-
cessful attempts at them) are indeed sensitive to reasons in this way: they
are initiated and guided throughout their performance by practical reasons
provided to us by our desires, intentions, or similar states. In fact, if our
experience of our deliberate mental actions did not reect this sensitivity to
reasons, it would not make much sense to call it an experience of activity at all:
practical motivation seems to be at the heart of agency. Not surprisingly, when
theorists talk about how actions present themselves to us in phenomenal con-
sciousness, they often resort to characterizations very similar to mine.29 And
29In addition to O'Brien (cf. n. 28 above), Audi speaks of a `phenomenal sense of acting in
response' to some reason (Audi, 1993, 154), Wegner of a `feeling of voluntariness or doing a
thing on purpose' or of an `experience of consciously willing an action' (Wegner, 2004, 650),
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of course, our experiential awareness of practical motivation is | just like our
experience of epistemic motivation - possibly non-conceptual, minimal, fallible
and non-distinctive in the senses specied above.
However, my claim has been not only that we experience the results of our
deliberate and straightforward mental agency as practically motivated; but
also that we experience the straightforwardness of their motivation, meaning
that we experience them as immediately responding to the respective practi-
cal reasons. To understand and support this thesis, it is helpful to consider
rst what it could mean to experience some mental episode as responding to
practical reasons in a mediated way.
As already mentioned, mediated mental agency is characterized by the fact
that it | often deliberately | relies on certain passive processes in order to
bring about certain mental phenomena. For instance, when we act on the
intention to nally force a conclusion on a certain matter in the light of the
epistemic reasons already available to us, we usually do so with the expec-
tation that the respective epistemic processes or mechanisms triggered by us
are likely to compel us to endorse the proposition which best reects our epis-
temic reasons. Now, our experience of successfully forming a judgement in this
way shows two aspects, which correspond to two elements involved in such a
formation. First, our initial attempt to come to a conclusion by setting in
motion certain epistemic processes presents itself in phenomenal consciousness
as active: we are aware of it as a rational response to our underlying desire
or intention to force the issue. But second, the subsequently occurring im-
pact of the triggered epistemic mechanisms presents itself to us as passive: we
are aware of the compelling force of the epistemic reasons on our formation
of the judgement and, more precisely, on our actually drawing one particular
conclusion, rather than another. Accordingly, our complex experience of inten-
tionally forming a judgement on the basis of evidence has a double character:
it involves both an experience of the support provided by practical reasons and
an experience of the inuence of the epistemic mechanisms. And something
similar will be true for other examples of mediated mental agency, whether
they rely on epistemic processes (as when we deliberately try to remember
something) or on merely causal ones (as when we deliberately try to inuence
our mood by imagining something).
Because the eects of the passive processes deliberately triggered by us
occur often almost immediately after we have begun (and nished) to per-
form the respective action, it might seem as if we experience a single mental
phenomenon as both active and passive. But cases in which we fail to form
a judgement despite all our attempts | say, because our evidence does not
and Siegel of a `special sense or experience of carrying out an intentional action' (Siegel,
2005).
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favour one conclusion over another and thus lets the epistemic mechanisms run
idle | indicate that there are in fact two distinct phenomena with two distinct
experiential characters. The mental action of setting in motion the epistemic
processes (i.e., the attempt to judge the issue) is experienced as active, while
the subsequent output of those processes (i.e., the judgement) is experienced
as passive. Other cases, in which there is much more delay between the trigger
and the product of the passive processes involved, or in which the triggering ac-
tion is bodily, make this even clearer (cf. the example of inducing a judgement
by deliberately taking a slow-acting drug).
Our experience of successfully forming a mental episode in a more straight-
forward way, on the other hand, does not show such a double character. De-
liberately conjuring up an image will involve the awareness of the impact of
practical motivation on the resulting image, but not the awareness of the im-
pact of some epistemic or causal processes. Of course, we may sometimes
become aware of some obstacles beyond our inuence when attempting to per-
form a certain straightforward mental action. And we may experience their
impact on us in a very similar way to how we experience the force of the epis-
temic or causal processes in the examples of deliberate mediated agency. For
instance, when trying to visualize an object with twenty equal sides, we may
realize that we cannot do this, and our attempt and recognition of failure may
be accompanied by a strong feeling of the imposition of respective limits on our
capacities involved. But if we succeed in forming the image, no such awareness
of an obstacle or an external force will occur. Similarly, our choice of what
to visualize may be inuenced by epistemic considerations, and we may be
consciously aware of this fact (e.g., when we decide to visualize a sunny forest
partly because of concluding that this will calm us down). But this awareness
of an epistemic impact will be part of our formation of the respective desire or
intention to visualize. And it will therefore precede our straightforward agency
of visualizing, as well as our experience of our engagement in this activity.30
These considerations about the various ways, in which we can deliberately
inuence what happens in our minds, illustrate that our experiential awareness
of mental agency seems indeed to be restricted to deliberate and straightfor-
30The case of guessing is equally unproblematic, but slightly more complicated, given that
any potential impact of the evidence available to us need not precede our active choice of
which proposition to accept, but instead may restrict it during our active engagement with
it (cf. the experience of external objects as restricting our active bodily movement). In the
light of what has been said above (cf. esp. n. 4 above), the agency constitutive of guessing
counts as straightforward, despite the potential involvement of epistemic factors. For what
we guess (in contrast to what we judge) is ultimately a matter of our choice. Moreover, the
related experience of straightforward agency is compatible with the potential simultaneous
awareness of epistemic inuence and limitation, given that the latter is never experienced
as fully determining what is guessed (in contrast to what is judged), but as leaving room
for the experience of the immediate impact of the practical reasons concerned.
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ward agency and its mental products. But they equally link up to the observa-
tion that this kind of experience reects especially the straightforwardness of
the kind of agency concerned. For we experience the (not necessarily temporal)
immediacy of determination, with which the direct results of deliberate mental
agency occur in response to the respective practical reasons. The idea is that
we experience the mental episodes, which we intentionally produce without ex-
ploiting certain passive processes, as directly determined by and owing from
our motives and our attempts to act on them. And it is an essential part of
this experience of immediacy that we are not aware of any determining factors
other than practical motivation. In other words, we experience the immediacy
of the practical motivation partly by not being conscious of any other deter-
mining factors as intervening between our desire or intention and the formed
images, apart from our mental agency. When we visualize a sunny forest, we
experience the resulting visual image as a direct response to our attempt to
visualize a sunny forest and, given that this attempt ows immediately from
our respective desire or intention, also as a direct response to the latter.
By contrast, the mental episodes produced in a mediated way by our de-
liberate mental activity do not present themselves as immediately responding
to our practical motives, given that they are experienced as determined by
epistemic or causal processes. When we intentionally form a judgement on the
basis of the evidence available to us, we are aware of the compelling impact of
the epistemic considerations determining which particular proposition we end
up endorsing. And this aspect of our experience of the judgement is respon-
sible for the fact that it cannot count as an experience of immediate practical
motivation, given that this experience of immediacy requires the absence of
any awareness of determining elements other than practical motives. This is
precisely the reason why the phenomenal character of our judgements is in-
compatible with the phenomenal character of mental episodes resulting from
our deliberate mental agency in a straightforward way. For independently of
whether our judgements are actually motivated by epistemic reasons, they al-
ways phenomenally present themselves to us as such. And this experiential
awareness of an epistemic rational inuence would undermine | for the rea-
son just mentioned | any awareness of an immediate motivational impact of
practical reasons. But such an awareness of immediacy is always part of how
we experience straightforwardly formed episodes. Hence, none of our mental
episodes can be phenomenally marked for us both as a judgement and as a
product of deliberate and straightforward mental agency. And this explains
why we cannot form judgements at will: we would have to consciously experi-
ence the resulting episodes in a way which is not open to us.
The fact that our experience of the immediacy of the practical motivation of
a given mental episode is incompatible with our simultaneous experience of the
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same episode as occurring in response to epistemic motivation is perhaps more
fundamentally due to the fact that the respective two phenomenal aspects
reect incompatible features of our episodes. Since no episode can be both
epistemically and straightforwardly practically motivated, it seems that, if one
aspect of the experiential character of one of our episodes adequately reects
its epistemic motivation, another aspect cannot simultaneously adequately re-
ect the straightforward practical motivation of the episode. Similarly, that we
cannot properly experience a perception both as representing red and as rep-
resenting green is maybe primarily due, not to how such perceptions actually
present themselves to us in phenomenal consciousness, but to the underlying
fact that a red-perception cannot simultaneously (and with respect to the same
part of an object) be a green-perception. Consequently, the incompatibility
at issue may be located only derivatively in how we experience the respective
mental episodes, and ultimately in which role these experiences play in our
mental lives, namely to reveal the nature of the episodes concerned.31
Given that | as already noted before | our experiential awareness is
fallible, it might however still be possible that we can actively form a judgement
in direct and conscious response to some of our desires or intentions, as long
as we do not experience the resulting judgement as a judgement, that is, as
epistemically motivated.32 But such a case would not count as an instance
of deliberately forming a judgement in a straightforward manner. We might
have performed the described action on the basis of a desire or intention to
form a supposition; and a mistake might then have led to the occurrence of a
31The preceding considerations apply equally well to the many mental phenomena, which
mix imaginative or otherwise straightforwardly active elements with more passive | and
often cognitive | elements. Deliberately trying to visualize a particular friend as sitting
in the chair opposite to me will involve seeing the chair, actively recalling his appearance
and imaginatively combining and manipulating the `sensory material' thereby provided to
conjure up the image of him sitting in the chair. And while the perceptual element occurs
in a purely passive way, both the mnemonic and the imaginative element involve conscious
agency, albeit the former in a mediated and the latter in a straightforward manner. What
we thereby experience as active is precisely what we do straightforwardly: namely, whatever
needs to be done to trigger the respective mnemonic process, as well as our conjuring up
the image by using the provided `sensory material'. And the same seems true of other more
complex forms of mental agency. Calculating a sum in one's head, for instance, consists in
actively triggering a series of epistemic processes (e.g., those providing us with the result
of adding or multiplying two numbers). But although the impact of these processes is
experienced as passive, we actively trigger them in a mediated way by means of performing a
more basic straightforward action, coming with the respective experience of agency. And last
examples are cases of visualizing where some of the details of the resulting image are passively
`lled in' by the mind (e.g., due to our knowledge or memory of generic appearances) and
experienced as such, although the other aspects of the image are experienced as immediately
determined by our imaginative agency.
32Thanks to Lucy O'Brien for pointing out this possibility.
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judgement experienced as a supposition. But then, we would have tried to form
a supposition, and not a judgement. Alternatively, we might have intentionally
set out to form a judgement in such a way that it is not experienced by us as
a judgement. But then, we would have had to exploit some passive processes
bringing about this phenomenal illusion and, hence, would not have formed the
judgement in a straightforward manner. There is perhaps also the possibility
that we might come up with and might act on the intention to form a judgement
at will in such a way as to fail to experience it as the straightforward product
of mental agency (i.e., as immediately practically motivated). But our action
could not be successful, given that the satisfaction of the two intended goals
| the straightforward formation of the judgement and the creation of the
phenomenal illusion | dictates incompatible means. Since we cannot bring
about phenomenal illusions at will, the achievement of the second goal requires
the reliance on certain causal processes. But it is precisely such a form of
mediated agency which is ruled out by the successful straightforward formation
of the judgement.
It has also been argued that our phenomenal experience is systematically
misleading with respect to the nature of our minds: either because there are no
instances of judging, imagining or deliberate mental agency, despite it seem-
ing to us that way; or because there are such instances, but they are not as
they seem to us to be (cf. the eliminativist approaches to phenomenal con-
sciousness). Here is not the place to assess the respective arguments, but let
me briey note the consequences their soundness would have for the experi-
ential approach to the involuntariness of judgements. If none of the mental
phenomena at issue existed, the question of whether we can form judgements
at will would not arise, but instead only the question of why it none the less
seems to us as if there is a dierence between judging and imagining in respect
to (what merely appears to us to be) deliberateness and straightforwardness.
The normative approach could not hope to answer this question about our
phenomenology: if there were no judgements, then there would also be no
norms for judgements. The experiential approach, on the other hand, would
still have something to say about the dierence between judging and imagining
and would also have good chances to be compatible with the | presumably
causal and subpersonal | account of why things erroneously seem to us a cer-
tain way in the rst place. On the other hand, that our phenomenal experience
might turn out to generally misrepresent certain aspects of the nature of our
mental phenomena would not pose any problem for the experiential approach,
as long as the latter remains true of how we actually do experience judge-
ments and mental actions. If the phenomenal illusion concerned the seeming
rational motivation of judgements or deliberate mental actions, this would in
fact mean, again, that there are no judgements or deliberate mental actions,
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given that it is essential to these mental phenomena that they are rational
and normally rationally motivated. And if the phenomenal illusion concerned
some other aspect of the nature of judgements or deliberate mental actions,
this error would be irrelevant for the question of whether judgements can be
formed at will. For instance, it might indeed be the case that our actions are
caused by certain sub-personal factors in our minds, although we experience
them as originating in our tryings or volitions, or in us as conscious agents (cf.
Wegner (2004)). But our awareness of deliberate and straightforward activity
would still be correlated to the respective instances of mental agency; and it
would still be incompatible with our awareness of judgements.
VII. Conclusion and Outlook
What I have been trying to show is that the experiential approach succeeds in
establishing two things: the psychological and non-normative constraint on all
our possible judgements that they are always experienced by us as epistemically
motivated; and the incompatibility of this constraint with their deliberate and
straightforward formation and, in particular, with experiencing them as formed
in such a way. My main conclusion is therefore indeed that, for us, judging
cannot be active and deliberate in the same straightforward way in which
imagining can be active and deliberate. But the preceding considerations have
also further substantiated the idea that our conscious experience of agency
is a guide to | and only to | deliberate and straightforward agency, at
least if mental activity is concerned. If something mental is experienced as
active, it is normally part of deliberate mental agency. Our awareness of
mental passivity, on the other hand, seems less revelatory, given that it is
still compatible with more mediated forms of deliberate agency, such as in
the example of intentionally changing one's mood and, indeed, in cases of
deliberately forming judgements on the basis of evidence.
The experiential approach is compatible with the idea that it is possible
to conceive of judgements as being formed at will, and to desire or intend to
form a particular judgement in this way. All it claims is that we are bound to
fail if we consciously try to act on such a desire or intention. In this respect,
it is likely to contradict the version of the normative approach which assumes
that the truth norm (TN), and presumably also something like the constraint
(C), are part of our concept of judgements, and that we have to employ this
concept when aiming to form a judgement or classifying a mental episode as
a judgement. Given the presupposition of certain further conceptual links
(e.g., between truth and evidence), this assumption may be said - following
an argument similar to the one presented during the discussion of (C) | to
entail that we cannot conceive of judgements as formed at will. And this again
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seems to imply that we cannot deliberately produce them in a straightforward
manner: either because we cannot form the required desires or intentions in
the rst place; or because our necessary failure to conceive of judgements as
judgements after their deliberate and straightforward formation would prevent
us from acquiring the knowledge that we can perform this kind of action, while
such knowledge appears to be necessary for deliberate agency.33 But apart
from the fact, that the objections against the normative approach mentioned
above also apply to this more complex version of it, the latter faces its own
specic diculties. Notably, it seems very doubtful that it can establish all the
conceptual truths required; or, indeed, the claim that we (including children)
have to possess and employ such a rich concept of judgements in order, say,
to decide to make up our minds about a certain issue, or to desire forming
a particular judgement (e.g., by some manipulative means) because it would
make us happier if we did.
But the experiential approach has other advantages over the normative ap-
proach, in all its facets. Not only can it easily accommodate the deliberate
formation of manipulated or induced judgements, it also promises to be extend-
able to non-normative involuntary mental episodes. The normative approach
has nothing to say about why we cannot form, say, perceptions, sensations
or feelings at will, given that these phenomena are not subject to norms or
requirements similar to (TN) or (C). By contrast, all kinds of involuntary men-
tal episodes are phenomenally conscious and thus permit, at least in principle,
the application of an argument which concentrates on this feature of them.
It may be argued, for instance, that the causal determination of perceptions
or sensations by those aspects of the world or our bodies, which they inform
us about, becomes salient in their phenomenal character; and that this as-
pect of how we experience them is, again, incompatible with experiencing the
immediacy involved in deliberate and straightforward mental agency. The ex-
periential approach may therefore allow for a much more unied account of the
involuntariness to be found in our conscious mental lives than the normative
approach.
If the experiential approach indeed turns out to be the right one, then the
involuntariness of our judgements is a matter of our psychology, and not of
our concepts: it depends rst of all on how we, as a matter of fact, experience
judgements and mental actions. This leaves room for the possibility that the
involuntariness of our judgements is merely contingent, and that there might
be other creatures who experience these mental phenomena in very dierent
ways and, hence, may still be able to form judgements at will. So far, the
experiential approach has said nothing about this possibility. But it might
33This seems to come very close to the rst argument against voluntary beliefs to be found
in Williams (1973).
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perhaps be supplemented in such a way as to rule it out and thus to ensure
the necessity of our inability to form judgements at will. The idea would be
that the rational aspect of the actual phenomenal character of our judgements
and mental actions is essential not only to how we in fact experience these con-
scious mental phenomena, but also to how any potential being having them
would experience them. And this might perhaps be traced back to the idea
that the underlying rational nature of the respective phenomena can be phe-
nomenally revealed to subjects experiencing them solely in the way in which
it is actually disclosed to us | say, because how we experience these phenom-
ena is constitutive of, or constituted by, or otherwise inseparably linked to,
how they really are. This would still allow for experiential dierences among
subjects both of the same and of distinct species, as long as they do not con-
cern the phenomenal disclosure of their rational nature (or of the respective
aspects thereof). But the latter would necessarily be salient to all subjects in
the same way and, hence, give rise to the same phenomenal incompatibilities.
This would explain why we experience judgements and mental actions the way
we experience them: as of necessity, to experience some mental phenomenon
as a judgement or as a mental action would just mean, partly, to experience
it as occurring in response to reasons. However, it would perhaps also imply
that our experiential awareness of the rational aspects of our conscious minds
is not primitive, and that a more fundamental account of it and of why we
cannot form judgements at will can be formulated | namely in terms of those
of their features, which are constitutively linked to their phenomenal character
and ultimately make up their nature.34
34Various versions of this chapter have been presented at a one-day conference on mental
agency in Senate House, London, the research colloquium at the University of Fribourg, the
SOPHAmeeting 2006 in Aix-en-Provence, and a conference on the phenomenology of agency,
again at the University of Fribourg. For very helpful comments on these occasions, I would
like to thank Julien Deonna, Julien Dutant, Pascal Engel, Guy Longworth, Martine Nida-
Rumelin, Chris Peacocke, Joelle Proust, Nishi Shah, Joel Smith, Gianfranco Soldati, Juan
Suarez, Fabrice Terroni, Stephen White, and Ann Whittle. For reading previous drafts and
providing extensive comments, I am extremely grateful to Davor Bodrozic, Adrian Haddock,
Lucy O'Brien, Matthew Soteriou, Gian-Andri Toendury, and an anonymous referee. I would








1. Emotions can possibly stand in two kinds of rational relations: they can
be supported by reasons, such as judgements or facts concerned with the non-
evaluative nature of objects; and they can themselves provide reasons, for
instance for belief or action. My main concern in this essay is with a cer-
tain aspect of the latter, namely the capacity (or lack thereof) of emotions
or sentiments to epistemically justify aesthetic evaluations, that is, ascriptions
of aesthetic values to objects. That is, I will be concerned with epistemolog-
ical issues concerning the idea of emotion-based aesthetic evaluations. Only
in passing will I say also something about the rational underpinning of our
emotional responses themselves.
The view that certain of our emotional responses indeed possess the capac-
ity to justify aesthetic evaluations, and that our aesthetic assessments are pri-
marily, if not always, epistemically based on or constituted by these responses,
has become almost orthodoxy in aesthetics, or at least the predominant ap-
proach to the epistemology of aesthetic evaluations.1 Moreover, this view is
very often combined with the further view that all our aesthetic evaluations
are intersubjective, in the rough sense that at least neither their truth-values,
1Cf., for instance, the sentimentalist theories put forward in Hume (2008), Kant (2009,
sections 1.), Budd (1996, 11. and 38f.), Goldman (1995, 22), and the semi-sentimentalist
view proposed in Levinson (1996). One notable exception is Bender (1995) who construes
aesthetic evaluations instead as inferentially based. As it has been suggested to me by an
anonymous referee, adopting a sentimentalist outlook may perhaps be plausible only with
respect to certain kinds of aesthetic value (e.g., concerning the funny, or the disgusting).
If so, my discussion may have to be similarly restricted in its scope (and my notion of an
`overall aesthetic merit' of a work to be understood as denoting the most comprehensive and
non-descriptive aesthetic value said to be accessible by means of emotions).
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nor the exemplications of the ascribed values are relativised to specic human
subjects or groups.2 I will label the rst of these two views about aesthetic
evaluations sentimentalism, and the second intersubjectivism.3
Contrary to the still strong and inuential tendency in aesthetics to com-
bine sentimentalism and intersubjectivism, I aim to show that the two views
should not be endorsed simultaneously. That is, in my view, sentimentalism
should be upheld only if intersubjectivism is rejected; and intersubjectivism
should be upheld only if sentimentalism is rejected. Given that I furthermore
take the denial of intersubjectivism to be highly implausible (although I do not
intend to argue for this here4), I believe that, ultimately, it is sentimentalism
concerning aesthetic evaluations which should give way.5
Here is how I will proceed. First of all, I will spell out the main ele-
ments of the sentimentalist and the intersubjectivist approaches to aesthetic
appreciation (cf. sections 2-7). Then, I will formulate a challenge to this
approach, which arises out of what is usually described as the seeming possi-
bility of faultless disagreement among our emotional responses and the related
aesthetic evaluations (cf. section 8). After this, I will discuss and reject the
various strategies which a sentimentalist may adopt in order to be able to ac-
cept and accommodate this possibility (cf. sections 9-17). And nally, I will
try to undermine any plausible sentimentalist attempt to deny it (cf. sections
18-20). As a result, I will conclude that sentimentalism is forced to give up
intersubjectivism.
2Cf. Hume (2008), Kant (2009), McDowell (1983), Budd (1996, ch. 1), Budd (1999),
and presumably Levinson, who believes that `pleasure that testies to artistic value must go
beyond a single encounter, must be experiencable by others, and at other times' (Levinson
(1996, 13; see also 16)).
3Of course, both notions may be understood in many other ways. In particular, a wider
notion of sentimentalism may be used to characterize the dependence of our evaluations
or evaluative concepts on our emotional capacities in more general terms (cf. D'Arms and
Jacobson (2003, 127f.)); while a narrower notion may be limited to the view that aesthetic
judgements are about or express sentiments, rather than facts, and are not (genuinely)
cognitive or truth-apt (cf. Zangwill (2001, 149.)). By contrast, my notion focusses on the
epistemic link between emotions and evaluations (i.e., on the idea that the former can justify
the latter by either grounding or constituting them) and is meant to include also positions
which take aesthetic judgements to be truth-apt despite their being epistemically based on
emotional responses.
4Cf. e.g., Hume (2008), Kant (2009) andWollheim (1980, essay IV) for powerful criticisms
of more subjectivist approaches to aesthetic epistemology.
5Despite my exclusive focus on the aesthetic case, I hope that the following considerations
on the possible epistemic relationship between emotions and evaluations do not depend on
idiosyncrasies of the aesthetic debate or its subject matter and are therefore also applicable to
other kinds of value. In particular, I hope that the arguments presented here put pressure on
the views of the few moral epistemologists | Wiggins (1987) and Doring (2007) prominently
among them | who take emotions or sentiments to be justifying grounds or constituents of
evaluations.
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Sentimentalism
2. Sentimentalism, as understood here, is the epistemological view that cer-
tain of our sentiments or emotional responses can | and, indeed, often do |
justify our aesthetic evaluations. The underlying idea is that our aesthetic as-
sessments are typically based on, or constituted by, the relevant emotions, and
that the appropriateness of the latter transfers to the former. This implies
that there are strict correspondances between (sets of) emotional responses
and aesthetic values (or ascriptions thereof), which means at least that each
kind of aesthetic value is uniquely linked to a certain type of emotional re-
sponse. For instance, the particular aesthetic merit of being exciting may be
said to correspond to feelings of excitement; or, more generally, the value of
being aesthetically good to feelings of pleasure. But it may also mean that
dierences in degree among the values parallel dierences in intensity among
the emotional responses. Sentimentalism is compatible with a wide variety of
more concrete views about the nature of aesthetic appreciation. For instance,
sentimentalist may take aesthetic evaluations to consist in, or to express, emo-
tional responses.6 But they may equally take them to be based on emotions
in a similar way, in which perceptual judgements are based on perceptions, or
introspective judgements on the respective rst-order states.7
3. Among the main motivations for sentimentalism is the observation that our
respective emotional responses are rationally sensitive to evidence for aesthetic
(or other kinds of) worth. When we try to explain why we value certain art-
works, or try to convince someone else of our appraisal, we usually point to
certain non-evaluative facts about the object | for instance, how it looks or
sounds, which story it tells, and how, who created it, and when, and so on (cf.
Goldman (1995, 12.) and Zangwill (2001, 20. and 37.)). But these and
similar facts are also among those which are relevant for the occurrence and
nature of our emotional responses. When we hear that the painting, which we
took to be rather original for the Romantic period in its dispassionate objec-
tiveness stems in fact from the late Nineteenth Century, our excitement about
it will wane. And our admiration for a piece of music may well be heightened
by the recognition of its intricate and original structure. The impact of the
respective non-evaluative facts on our emotional responses is thereby evidently
6Examples are Goldman (1995, e.g., 22), and the aesthetic theories | such as those
discussed by Hopkins (2001) and Todd (2004) | which are in the spirit of Blackburn's or
Gibbard's versions of moral expressivism. The account put forward by Hume (2008), and
perhaps also that of Kant (2009), appear to involve similar ideas.
7The theory defended by McDowell (1983, 1998d), as well as aesthetic positions in the
wake of the moral accounts of Wiggins (1987) and Wright (1988), are of this kind. Note
that also Kant stresses that aesthetic judgements are primarily about the subject's own
emotions, and only then about the experienced objects (Kant, 2009, 3f.).
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rational in nature. For both the occurrence and the adequacy of our emotions
is at least partly a matter of the contents of our mental representations of these
facts (cf. Goldie (2004)). For example, feeling awed when confronted with a
certain poem, despite taking it to be unoriginal, bland, uninteresting in its
content and stylistically awed in many ways, would not be the right kind of
emotional response to that piece of writing, at least not within the context of an
aesthetic experience of the poem. This provides support for the sentimentalist
view that emotions mediate rationally between our non-evaluative experiences
of objects and our aesthetic evaluations of them. For it can elucidate why and
how our assessments are responsive to and based on relevant reasons, that is,
on relevant non-evaluative facts about the objects to be evaluated.8
The Idea of Reection
4. Sentimentalism is often combined with two other ideas: that (some of) our
aesthetic evaluations (as well as any corresponding emotional responses) have
the capacity to reect the aesthetic worth of objects; and that our aesthetic
evaluations are either appropriate or inappropriate, and possibly in more than
one way.
An evaluation reects a certain value of an object just in case the object
exemplies the value which the evaluation ascribes to him. Perhaps all our aes-
thetic evaluations reect actual instances of aesthetic value; or perhaps only
those which are appropriate or tting (as I will say). The idea of reection
is not very strong and should be uncontroversial. It is rather weak because
8Other important motivations for sentimentalism are: (i): the particularist insight that
aesthetic assessment is typically not the matter of deductive inference on the basis of judge-
ments about non-aesthetic features (cf. Kant 1985, section 56, Sibley (2001a), Budd (1999),
Goldman (1995, 132.), and Bender (1995)); (ii) the fact that sentimentalism promises to
explain certain aspects of the central role and importance of emotions in aesthetic evalua-
tion, such as the intimate link between aesthetic values and emotional terms (e.g., `exciting',
`wonderful', `stimulating', `awesome', `moving', `disgusting', `appalling' or `outrageous'; cf.
Williams (1993, 218f.) and McNaughton (1988, 8)), or the function of the emotional re-
sponses to draw our attention to reasons for aesthetic assessment; and (iii) perhaps also the
seeming subjectivity of our aesthetic assessments.
However, none of these points compel one to accept sentimentalism. Although they may
provide considerable support for this approach to aesthetic appreciation, there is still room
for alternative theories tting or explaining the noted facts as well as sentimentalism. In
particular, a more rationalist view can hope to be on equal standing with sentimentalism with
respect to the considerations commonly put forward in favour of the latter. According to
such a view, aesthetic assessment is a matter of true or false judgements about the aesthetic
merit of objects, made on the basis of inductive considerations and inferences to the best
explanation concerning the non-aesthetic features of those objects (cf. Bender (1995)). And
it can assign to emotional responses the role of merely drawing our attention to (already
independently recognized) reasons for aesthetic assessment, rather than that of grounding
or constituting such evaluations.
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the notion of having a value which it invokes is used in such a way as not
to entail any strong metaphysical or other commitments, apart from the pre-
supposition that talking of the values of objects is legitimate in some sense
or another. Indeed, it should be compatible even with eliminativist positions
or error theories which deny that there actually are any exemplications of
aesthetic values, but which nonetheless accept that it makes sense to speak of
the aesthetic worth of objects and provide a satisfactory theory of such talk.
Furthermore, the idea of reection is rather weak also because the notions
of reecting and, if applicable, of tting evaluations may likewise be under-
stood in a very non-committal way. While it may be proposed that aesthetic
responses reect instances of aesthetic worth by cognizing them, it may also
be proposed that they reect exemplications of aesthetic values simply by
projecting them onto their bearers. All that the idea of reection presupposes
is that objects have values, and that there is some kind of correspondance
between these values and those evaluations (and, perhaps, those emotional re-
sponses) which ascribe or assign them | again perhaps in a rather loose sense
which does not require, say, the involvement of respective concepts | to the
objects. It is therefore not very demanding or costly to endorse the idea of
reection. On the contrary, it would seem to be highly implausible to reject
it, given that this would mean having to to stop talking of objects as bearers
of values, and of evaluations as representing and potentially reecting these
values.
Epistemic Appropriateness and Fittingness
5. According to the idea of appropriateness, on the other hand, some evalua-
tions are better than others; and the former are to be preferred over the latter
| say, in respect to the issue of which we should endorse. For example, the
claim that Hamlet is a masterpiece is said to be more adequate than the claim
that it is a mediocre play. And we should thus hold on to the former and give
up the latter. Evaluations may be taken to be better or worse than others
in basically two ways: in relation to their epistemic standing, that is, their
justication; and in relation to their reecting the values of their objects. To
return to the example, the rst claim about Hamlet may be better than the
second because it has been made in the right way, or because it reects better
the actual worth of the play. To distinguish the two senses in which evalua-
tions may dier in appropriateness, I will dierentiate between the epistemic
appropriateness and the ttingness of assessments.
The idea of an epistemic appropriateness of aesthetic evaluations expresses
the view that such assessments are either justied or unjustied, namely in
the light of the relevant reasons available to us and, in particular, with respect
to the aim of getting access to the aesthetic values of objects. The idea is
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often linked to the postulation of suitable conditions which suce to ensure
such an adequacy in appreciation (cf. Hume (2008), Levinson (1996, 15), and
Goldman (1995, 21f.); cf. also, more generally, Wright (1988, 1994)). Which
conditions are suitable in this respect may perhaps dier from case to case, de-
pending on, say, the particular subjects, objects or aesthetic values concerned.
But the conditions will surely put certain demands on the evaluating subjects,
and perhaps also on the environmental circumstances. Accordingly, it is often
required that subjects are fully and correctly aware of all the relevant features
or acts concerning the object to be evaluated, which again presupposes that
they are suciently attentive, sensitive and experienced in these matters; and
that their further consideration of these features or facts happens in a rational
and impartial way, and with no cognitive fault involved (cf. Hume (2008),
Kant (2009, sections 2.), Goldman (1995, 21f.) and Zangwill (2001, 152.)).
And the satisfaction of such conditions may furthermore require, say, that the
right kinds of interaction with the object are possible or permitted, or that
the right kinds of observational conditions obtain. In the context of sentimen-
talism, any assumed epistemic justication of evaluations will be a matter of
the standing of the relevant emotional responses and of their relationship to
the assessments. Hence, if the emotional responses occur under suitable condi-
tions, they acquire the power to justify corresponding evaluations; and if they
then indeed lead to such assessments, they actually render them justied.
The idea of ttingness, on the other hand, becomes relevant for the iden-
tication of those evaluations which actually reect the aesthetic worth of
objects. Assuming that there is this form of appropriateness in aesthetic eval-
uation amounts to maintaining that not all assessments are equal in their
reection of aesthetic merit, and that, more precisely, only tting evaluations
correspond to instances of aesthetic values.9 Fittingness may then be spelled
out in terms of truth; but it may also be spelled out in terms of some other
kind of appropriateness, such as some form of emotional adequacy which does
not amount to truth, while perhaps being very similar to truth.10
6. Proponents of sentimentalism, who accept that our aesthetic evaluations
can be appropriate or inappropriate in one or more ways, may dier on how
they conceive of the relevant kinds of appropriateness (i.e., epistemic appro-
priateness and ttingness), as well as their relationship. But there is much
agreement on the idea that epistemic appropriateness is either conducive to or
constitutive of ttingness.
9D'Arms and Jacobson (2000) make a very similar use of the notion of ttingness with
respect to emotions and their accurate presentation of some of their target's evaluative
features.
10See the discussions in De Sousa (2002, 2007), and in Morton (2002); and see also the
notion of appropriate expressions in Gibbard (1990)).
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Many theories accept the truth-aptness of evaluations and, correspond-
ingly, understand ttingness in terms of truth. And although they may dier
in their interpretation of the nature of the truth involved and of its link to
epistemic appropriateness, they all assume that the latter is likely to, or even
does, ensure the former.11 Indeed, it would be highly implausible to endorse
an epistemological theory which takes truth and epistemic appropriateness to
be more independent of each other. On such a view, the acquisition of true
| rather than false | evaluations would be an arbitrary matter beyond our
control. Given that striving for justied assessments would not be more likely
to guarantee truth than striving for unjustied assessments, the respective
criteria for epistemic appropriateness (e.g., full information, unbiasedness, at-
tentiveness, etc.) could not guide us any more in the aim to discover the true
aesthetic values of objects. And the resulting cognitive irrelevance of these
criteria would raise the question of why we should care at all about epistemic
appropriateness and about the related justicatory potential of our respective
emotional responses.
However, there are also theories which deny the truth-aptness of aesthetic
verdicts and instead assume only a single kind of aesthetic appropriateness |
for instance, the emotional adequacy mentioned above | which fulls the role
of both epistemic appropriateness and ttingness by ensuring single-handedly
that the resulting assessments count as justied and as reecting the aesthetic
worth of the objects concerned.12 For such theories, epistemic appropriateness
11Some accounts of this kind assume that evaluations are (substantially) true when and
because they successfully track instances of values which are there, as genuine parts of the
world, to be recognized by us (cf. McDowell (1983, 1998d) and Wiggins (1987)). Other
accounts take evaluations to be (presumably less substantially) true when and because they
determine, rather than recognize, which objects have which values (cf. Wright (1988) and
Goldman (1995)). The idea is that it is our epistemically best opinions which reect the
aesthetic worth of objects and, hence, should count as true (cf. Wright (1988, 1994)).
Besides, both kinds of view may vary in whether they take our epistemically appropriate
evaluations to partly constitute the aesthetic values of the objects in question, or merely to
pick them | or the respective underlying features of the objects constituting them | out
(cf. McFarland and Miller (1998) for the dierence). McDowell, Wiggins and perhaps also
Wright seem to favour the constitutionist alternative, while Goldman may be read as opting
for the more reductionist view.
12The resulting non-truth-apt evaluations are probably best understood in expressivist
terms (cf. Gibbard (1990)). Some expressivists have tried to establish some (non-
substantial) notion of truth for evaluations (cf. Blackburn (1984) and Todd (2004)) and
hence align their accounts closer to the non-expressivist theories just mentioned which in-
volve a similar notion of truth. However, this project has come under criticism (cf. Hopkins
(2001)), in part because a notion of truth may not be so easily had (cf. McDowell (1998c)).
Expressivist accounts are often combined with the endorsement of some form of projectivism,
according to which values are not real aspects of the world, but merely gments of our minds
which we project onto the world (cf. Hume (2008), Blackburn (1984) and, presumably, Kant
(2009)). Besides, they may dier in respect to whether they accept that there are actually
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simply amounts to ttingness. Hence, combining sentimentalism with the idea
of appropriateness should involve the armation of the claim that epistemic
appropriateness is conducive to or constitutive of ttingness.
Intersubjectivism
7. As already noted, it is very common in aesthetics to combine sentimentalism
with intersubjectivism. As I understand intersubjectivism, it implies at least
two important ideas (although it may not simply reduce to them). First, it
entails that whether an object in fact exemplies a particular aesthetic value
or not is not relativised to certain subjects or groups of subjects among hu-
manity, but equal for all actual or possible human beings. This means that
objects are beautiful or disgusting for all humans (or none), but not, say,
beautiful-for-me and disgusting-for-you. And second, intersubjectivism entails
that whether aesthetic assessments reect the aesthetic merit of an object or
not is not relativised to certain subjects or groups of subjects among humanity,
but equal for all actual or possible human beings. This means | for instance,
if reection and ttingness are spelled out in terms of truth | that aesthetic
evaluations are true or false for all humans (or none), but not, say, true-for-me
and false-for-you. By contrast, intersubjectivism does not say anything about
non-human subjects | for instance, whether they have or know of aesthetic
values, and if so, whether they share ours.13 Similarly, intersubjectivism is
compatible with the idea that which aesthetic values objects exemplify is de-
termined by, or otherwise depends on, the responses of only certain humans
(e.g., experts, ideal judges, or subjects assessing objects under normal or opti-
mal conditions). And it permits that only particular humans may have access
to certain exemplications of aesthetic worth.
Intersubjectivism is attractive because it explains in an easy and straight-
forward way why we take diering evaluations to be in conict, ask ourselves
and others involved for reasons for our assessments, enter discussions with
them in order to come to agreement, either by trying to convince the others
of our opinion, or by revising our own verdict, and so on. We do not treat
our ascriptions of aesthetic values dierently in these respects than, say, our
ascriptions of shapes, wealth, talent in basketball, and other evaluative or or
exemplications of aesthetic values, or whether they prefer an eliminativist approach or
some form of error theory concerning these values.
13Cf. Budd (1996, 39f.). The choice of humanity as the hallmark of intersubjectivity
is to some extent arbitrary. Perhaps it would be better to understand intersubjectivity in
terms of (suciently large) cultures or communities | but only if these are specied in
terms of linguistic, geographical and similarly evaluatively neutral factors, and not in terms
of shared aesthetic sensitivities, tastes or emotional dispositions, given that this strategy
would otherwise lead to some form of relativisation. Similarly, if the relevant class of subjects
becomes too small, talk of `intersubjectivity' would have lost most of its signicance.
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non-evaluative properties. Hence, the denial of intersubjectivism appears to
imply admitting that there is some systematic error, or some misplaced de-
mand on others to agree with us, involved in our aesthetic assessments. Of
course, this is far from sucient to settle the debate between intersubjectivists
and their opponents. But what it illustrates is that giving up intersubjectivism
should not be more than a last resort.14 And in response to this fact, many
sentimentalists | not the least Hume and Kant | have tried to hold on to
the intersubjectivity of aesthetic evaluations, at least as much as possible.15
In what follows, I would like to consider whether they can hope to succeed in
this ambition.
The Challenge to Sentimentalism
8. As has often been observed (e.g., by Kant (2009, sections 36. and 56.),
and by Goldman (1995, 28f.)), a particular challenge which they are facing
is to show how it is possible to combine the idea of intersubjective aesthetic
evaluations with the possibility of faultless disagreement, all the while assum-
ing a sentimentalist approach to aesthetic appreciation. This challenge may
be developed in three steps.
The rst step is the observation that our emotional responses to artworks
and similar objects may dier | whether in quality or intensity, or whether
intra- or interpersonally | even under conditions held to be suitable for epis-
temically adequate aesthetic appreciation. In particular, critics may come up
with very dierent emotional reactions to objects, despite being of equally
highly attentive and sensitive to the relevant marks of aesthetic merit, of sim-
ilarly sucient impartiality, expertise and training, and so on. For example,
while one critic may feel excited by Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, another may
respond with uneasiness, or awe, or nothing of the sort. And it appears that
there need be no violation of any conditions on the epistemic appropriateness
pertaining to aesthetic evaluations16 and, hence, no epistemic fault in either
14Even sentimentalists, who, at least to some extent, give up intersubjectivism in the face
of the possibility of faultless disagreement, note how problematic this move is | for instance,
because it contradicts our common intersubjectivist intuitions (cf. Goldman (1995, 37f.)),
or because `it may not be possible to establish any sucient dierence in the `value-focus'
of those who appear to be in disagreement' (Wiggins, 1987, 209; see also 181) for his idea
to reject intersubjectivism in certain moral cases).
15For instance, although Hume and Budd seem to allow for relativisation in certain cases
| in Hume's case to age and culture, and in Budd's to ways of experiencing or understanding
artworks (or to the underlying sensitivities and dispositions) | they nonetheless hold on to
the idea that aesthetic evaluations are generally intersubjective (cf. Hume (2008) and Budd
(1996, 42)).
16I assume here that, if aesthetic evaluations are grounded on or constituted by emotional
responses, the appropriateness conditions for the former include the aesthetically relevant
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emotional response.17
According to the second step, the sentimentalist assumption that aesthetic
evaluations are grounded on or constituted by the emotional responses at issue
entails that, if these responses may dier in quality or intensity under the
conditions ensuring epistemic adequacy in aesthetic assessment, our aesthetic
evaluations may, too, dier under such conditions, whether in valence or in
degree. The idea is that, if there are two distinct emotional reactions to a
certain object under given circumstances, and if these responses lead to an
aesthetic appraisal of the object, there will, as a result, also be two distinct
aesthetic evaluations, one for each of the corresponding emotional responses.
And given that this applies, in particular, to cases in which the appropriateness
conditions for aesthetic assessments are satised, it follows also that there may
be diering, but equally epistemically appropriate aesthetic evaluations of one
and the same object.
The challenge arises now from adding the third step that such diering
evaluations may very well be in conict with each other. Two evaluations
stand in conict with each other just in case they assign incompatible values
to the same object (considered at a specic moment in time). And two values
are incompatible just in case a single object cannot exemplify both at the
same time. Accordingly, assuming that something cannot be both boring and
exciting at the same time, the two respective assessments are in conict with
each other.18 But as it seems, they may not have to dier in their epistemic
appropriateness. Similarly, in the example about Picasso's painting, it may be
appropriateness conditions for the latter. That is, according to sentimentalism, an evaluation
is adequate from an aesthetic point of view only if the respective emotional response is as
well. It thus is impossible to undermine the possibility of faultless emotions by introducing
(allegedly) aesthetically relevant suitable conditions for emotions which are not part of the
suitable conditions for aesthetic evaluations. Of course, the emotional responses involved
may still be subject to appropriateness conditions which are aesthetically irrelevant (e.g.,
because they are impractical). But their inadequacy in this respect could not undermine
the aesthetic appropriateness of the related evaluations.
17Once it is accepted that there can be dierent emotional reactions to the same artwork
(whether under the most suitable conditions or not), another important challenge arises.
For it is conceivable that the respective critics may come, after extensive discussion and
further scrutiny, to converge in their aesthetic opinions, without their diverging emotional
responses disappearing. For instance, the judges of Picasso's painting may very well end up
agreeing on its status as a masterpiece, despite continuing to emotionally react in dierent
ways | say, with feelings of excitement, awe or uneasiness | to their experience of the
work. Hence, it seems that there is a problem for sentimentalism not only with cases of
disagreement, but also with cases of agreement: convergence in aesthetic assessment does
not appear to be always due to convergence in emotional disposition or response. However,
the pursuit of this second challenge to sentimentalism has to await another occasion.
18Of course, there may be many other and independent ways in which evaluations or the
underlying emotions may be in conict (cf., e.g., De Sousa (2003, 2007).
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possible that the diverging emotional responses give rise to conicting aesthetic
assessments of the work. For instance, it seems plausible to maintain that awe
is linked to a dierent aesthetic value | if not in valence, at least in degree |
than uneasiness. And the absence of any relevant emotion in one of the critics
is presumably related to an altogether dierent value, or perhaps even to the
absence of any. The challenge to sentimentalism can then be formulated in
terms of the demand to show how it can satisfactorily handle the possibility
of such cases of faultless disagreement | that is, of such cases of conicting
aesthetic evaluations, none of which needs to be at fault from an epistemic
perspective.
If intersubjectivism is given up, this challenge can presumably be met with
ease | which is one reason why the denial of intersubjectivism may become
quite attractive for a sentimentalist (cf. Goldman (1995, 26.)). If objects
would really be of dierent aesthetic merit for dierent people | because,
say, the ttingness of aesthetic assessments, or the exemplication of aesthetic
values, would be relativised to distinct groups of human beings | then there
would cease to be any genuine conict among diering assessments, since there
would be no incompatibility any more between the aesthetic values ascribed by
the various critics (and at various times, and so on). One and the same work
could without a problem be boring-for-me and exciting-for-you, or graceful-for-
me and insipid-for-you, or a masterpiece-for-me and no masterpiece-for-you;
and one and the same aesthetic assessment (e.g., that a given work is beautiful)
could equally unproblematically be true-for-me and false-for-you (assuming
that it makes sense to speak of relativised values, exemplications or truth-
values). There might thus be no conict between aesthetic evaluations, once
intersubjectivism is given up.
But of course, the question remains whether sentimentalist can hold on
to intersubjectivism and still satisfactorily answer the raised challenge. I will
argue that they cannot; and I will do so by looking in turn at two dierent
strategies: to accept the possibility of faultless disagreement and to try to
show that it is harmless (cf. sections 9-17 below); or, alternatively, to argue
that there is no such possibility (cf. sections 18-20 below).19
19The denial of the idea of appropriateness would not help to answer the challenge to
sentimentalism. All evaluations would then equally reect the aesthetic merit of objects
(i.e., would, in some sense, be equally justied). And since many of them would stand
in conict with each other, giving up either intersubjectivism or sentimentalism would be
the only options available. Indeed, the only hope to rule out the possibility of faultless
disagreement is to hold on to the appropriateness of aesthetic evaluations and to try to
show that appropriate assessments converge (cf. the discussion below).
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Accepting the Possibility of Faultless Disagreement
9. While Hume, Kant and other sentimentalists have tried to rescue intersub-
jectivism by making plausible that our aesthetic evaluations and the related
emotional responses would | at least under suitable conditions | converge
(cf. the discussion below), it has recently become much more common to ac-
cept the possibility of faultless disagreement, both in conjunction with and
independent of sentimentalism, and regarding both aesthetic and other val-
ues. A sentimentalist (and, incidentally, also a denier of intersubjectivism) in
aesthetic matters, who endorses the possibility of conicting appropriate as-
sessments, is Alan Goldman. He claims that even the satisfaction of the most
ideal conditions for aesthetic appreciation cannot ensure sameness in evaluative
dispositions and opinions:
[One] cannot explain all disagreement as resulting from deviance from
ideal critics or from borderline areas of vague terms. Instead, some
disagreement reects the fact that dierences in taste persist through
training and exposure to various art forms. (By `taste' here I refer not
only to dierent preferences but also to dierent judgements of aesthetic
worth...). Even ideal critics will disagree in their ascription of evaluative
aesthetic properties... (Goldman, 1995, 36f.)
And assuming that non-evaluative features gure as supervenience bases for
aesthetic values, he continues to argue that dierent critics of equally high
standard may respond to the same set of non-evaluative features of an object
by ascribing dierent aesthetic values to the object:
A painting with gently curving lines may be graceful to one critic and
insipid to another. (Goldman, 1995, 138)
Likewise, Wiggins, who considers and seems to tentatively defend a version of
sentimentalism concerning moral | and presumably also aesthetic (cf. Wig-
gins (1987, 199)) | values, accepts the possibility of disagreements which
cannot be resolved on the grounds that all but one verdict are inappropriate
in some way or another:
In truth, whatever diculties there are in the possibility of irresoluble
substantive disagreement, no position in moral philosophy can render
itself simply immune from them. We should not tumble over ourselves
to assert that there is irresoluble substantive disagreement. We should
simply respect the possibility of such disagreement, I think, and in re-
specting it register the case for a measure of cognitive underdetermina-
tion. (Wiggins, 1987, 210)
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And nally, Hopkins argues that, if one accepts (as he seems to do himself)
a broadly sentimentalist approach to aesthetic evaluation, as well as that tes-
timony does not provide us with (much) reason to keep or change our own
aesthetic assessments, then one should also endorse a position which combines
the sentimentalist view with an embrace of the possibility of conict among
epistemically adequate evaluations. For, according to Hopkins, only such a
position can hope to explain the assumed fact about the relation between
testimony and aesthetic appreciation.20 Hence:
So we must abandon Kantian orthodoxy and allow that two subjects
can be warranted in holding dierent, but genuinely conicting, beliefs
about something's beauty. [...] This is made tolerable by the sepa-
rateness of the rational subjects in question. [...] The crucial notion, I
suggest, will be that of a sensibility, a set of dispositions determining
one's response, pleasure or otherwise, to the aesthetic object. Dierent
subjects may be equally warranted in their conicting judgements of a
thing's beauty because the pleasure of each is in part determined by her
sensibility, and sensibilities dier. (Hopkins, 2000, 233)
These dierent quotations all illustrate a recent tendency to acknowledge, or
at least to consider very seriously, the possibility of faultless disagreement in
aesthetic matters. And although they do not prove that this possibility really
obtains, they add at least to the initial plausibility of its assumption.
The Impact of the Possibility of Faultless Disagreement
10. But how should or could an intersubjectivist sentimentalist react if he
indeed accepts that faultless disagreement in aesthetic matters is | at least
sometimes | possible? Given that he wants to hold on to the intersubjectivity
of aesthetic evaluations, the most plausible option | as suggested by Budd
and others21 | is for him to accept that we should refrain from aesthetic
assessment if confronted with concrete cases of conict among epistemically
appropriate evaluations:
If there can be faultless dierences in taste, both of two opposed faultless
aesthetic judgements will be false | in which case someone who is aware
20But Hopkins is also inclined to hold on to the intersubjectivity of aesthetic evaluations.
Accordingly, his considerations about the view, which accepts the possibility of faultless
disagreement in aesthetic matters are not without doubts about its tenability. In particular,
he notes | but does not give up the hope of nally being able to avoid | the problem
that the acceptance of this possibility might lead to an account which is in tension with the
common assumption of the intersubjectivity of aesthetic evaluations (Hopkins (2000, 233
and 235f.)).
21Wiggins, for instance, suggests even `[giving] up on the predicate' in this case (Wiggins,
1987, 209).
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of the possibility of an opposed faultless response might be wise not
to express her own response in the corresponding aesthetic judgement.
(Budd, 1999, 308)
The underlying reasoning is the following. Two conicting evaluations assign
dierent values to the same object of which it can exemplify at best one (at the
particular time in question). Hence, at best one of the two evaluations can be
tting (e.g., true) in the sense of actually reecting the aesthetic worth which
the object has. Applying this result to epistemically adequate evaluations,
it follows that at least one of two epistemically appropriate, but conicting
evaluations has to be non-tting (e.g., false). Furthermore, we cannot tell
which of the two assessments is non-tting, and which tting (if not both are
non-tting). Their epistemic appropriateness cannot any more be our guide
to their ttingness, given that both are equally suciently appropriate from
an epistemic point of view. And there could not be some additional and so far
unnoticed evidence for the ttingness of one evaluation or the non-ttingness of
the other, for this would mean that neither assessment would be epistemically
adequate due to their violation of the requirement to take into account all
relevant evidence. Hence, we should refrain from forcing a conclusion about
which evaluation is tting, that is, reects the actual aesthetic merit of the
object in question and, therefore, endorse neither of the two assessments.
Of course, we might not be aware of the possibility of a faultlessly con-
icting evaluation with respect to one of our concrete actual assessments and,
hence, might fail to refrain from judgement in such a case. But we would
still be rationally required to do so. Besides, as Budd notes in the quote, the
mere possibility of an appropriate alternative verdict is already sucient to
undermine the epistemic standing of a given actual evaluation. No one needs
to actually come up with the conicting opinion for it to have an impact on
the epistemic appropriateness of the already existing assessment. That is, it
is the possibility of faultless disagreement, which functions as a defeater, and
not its actuality.
Wiggins proposes another strategy to deal with concrete instances of fault-
less disagreement, namely to `remain undeterred' and to `persevere as best
as we can in the familiar processes of reasoning, conversion, and criticism |
without guarantees of success, which are almost as needless as they are un-
obtainable' (Wiggins, 1987, 209f.). But it is not clear what this could mean,
apart from ignoring the problem and continuing in one's evaluative practices
as if there were no possibility of faultless disagreement. Success would not
only not be guaranteed, it would be impossible. For even if some of us were to
end up with tting assessments reecting the aesthetic values of the objects
concerned, we would not be able to know this, since we would still not be
able to identify the tting and the non-tting evaluations among all epistem-
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ically adequate ones. Also, Wiggins' hope cannot be that, in the end, there
will be agreement, given that he maintains | in the longer passage quoted
further above | that we should take the possibility of `irresoluble substantive
disagreement' serious. Wiggins' proposal might still amount to good practical
advice. But it does not tell us anything about how to theoretically handle
specic cases in which there is the possibility of two conicting appropriate
evaluations.
The Problem of the Ubiquity of Possible Faultless Disagreement
11. Now, if the possibility of faultless disagreement would be widespread (i.e.,
arises in many relevant cases) or even universal (i.e., arises in all relevant cases),
this would have serious consequences for the epistemic standing of both the
aesthetic evaluations and the emotional responses which ground or constitute
them.22 Hence, a intersubjectivist sentimentalist faces the dicult task to
limit this possibility only to a few cases, that is, to a few actual instances of
aesthetic merit.
If the possibility of faultless disagreement would turn out to be universal
| that is, if there is the possibility of the occurrence of a conicting adequate
opinion in the case of at least all actual occurrences of appropriate verdicts
(whether they occur in the past, present, or future) | then we should always
refrain from aesthetic judgement, given that we could not distinguish any more
the tting evaluations from the non-tting ones among the set of epistemically
appropriate responses. But this would have the (absurd) consequence that
we actually would not have any adequate or reliable access to instances of
intersubjective aesthetic values | presumably, either because there were none,
or because our emotional responses meant to ground or constitute our aesthetic
evaluations would not put us in proper contact with them. The rst would
mean that sentimentalism is pointless; the second, that it is false. Hence, the
intersubjectivist sentimentalist should deny that the possibility of a conict
among epistemically appropriate evaluations holds universally.
But he should also resist the assumption of a widespread possibility |
that is, of the possibility of a faultlessly disagreeing response with respect to
at least many of all the actual past, present or future occurrences of adequate
aesthetic assessments. As I have illustrated further above, it is common for
sentimentalists to maintain that, once our relevant emotional responses occur
under conditions ensuring the epistemically appropriate appreciation of ob-
jects, they do | or at least are likely to | ground or constitute aesthetic
evaluations which are tting, that is, indeed reect the aesthetic worth of
the object concerned. But if the possibility of faultless disagreement would be
22Cf. Hopkins (2000, 233 and 235) for similar, though less pessimistic worries.
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widespread, there would be many justied aesthetic assessments which are non-
tting, given that at best one of several conicting adequate evaluations could
be tting. And this would undermine the postulated link between epistemic
appropriateness and ttingness (e.g., the truth-conduciveness of the former):
if many emotional responses would give rise to non-tting aesthetic evalua-
tions, despite being epistemically adequate and thus possessing the required
justicatory potential, they would loose their general capacity to render aes-
thetic assessments (likely to be) tting | and, hence, their related capacity
to ground or constitute evaluations which potentially reect actual instances
of aesthetic worth. The intersubjectivist sentimentalist should therefore argue
also against the widespread possibility of faultless disagreement concerning
aesthetic merit | at least if he is assuming that epistemic appropriateness is
either constitutive of or conducive to ttingness.
However, such sentimentalists may still choose to accept the possibility of
a conicting justied opinion with regard to only some actual instances of
epistemically adequate aesthetic evaluations. Indeed, many intersubjectivist
sentimentalists have opted for this route (cf., e.g., Hume (2008) and Budd
(1999)). But, in order to avoid the problems outlined above, they should
then also reject the further thesis that, given that faultless disagreement in
aesthetic matters is possible in some actual cases of aesthetic assessment, it is
also possible in many or even all such cases. The sentimentalist in question
can try to resist this further thesis in two ways. First, he can claim | with
respect to the rst step of the challenge outlined above | that the possibility
of diverging emotional responses even under conditions suitable for epistemic
appropriateness is limited to only a few actual instances. And second, he can
claim | with respect to the third step | that the possibility of a conict
among diverging, but epistemically appropriate evaluations is limited to only
a few actual instances.23 I will discuss each option in turn (cf. sections 12-13
and sections 14-16, respectively).
23A third strategy would be to accept the widespread or universal possibility of faultless
disagreement relative to our actual aesthetic evaluations, but to discount its epistemic sig-
nicance for the latter | for instance, because this possibility is not `real' enough, that
is, is too remote from how things actually are and therefore seldomly or never actually
realized. However, the relevant possibility of a dierence in the intervening causal factors
concerns typically the personalities, moods or habits of the subjects in question (cf. section
12f. below) and should thus not count as too remote or `unrealistic'. And moreover, even if
the possibility would be only remote, there would presumably be the need to relativise the
exemplications of aesthetic values, or the truth-values of aesthetic assessments, at least in
the distant worlds involved. But relativisation is, if at all, an essential feature of the entities
concerned. Thus, if they would be relativised in some possible world, then they would be
relativised in all worlds, including the actual.
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The Ubiquity of Possible Faultless Divergence among Emotional Re-
sponses
12. The rst alternative turns out to be untenable, once a closer look is
taken at what is responsible for the possibility of a divergence among our
emotional responses to aesthetic objects. A diagnosis of this form is not of-
ten provided, even by sentimentalists who accept the possibility of diering
emotional responses under conditions which ensure the justication of the re-
lated evaluations. What is crucial here is the middle position with respect
to rational responsiveness and determination, which emotions and emotional
responses take up in relation to other mental episodes and states, at least if
fully rational subjects (which moreover are competent in their use of concepts,
and so on) are concerned. Sensations, perceptions and basic desires (such as
hunger), for instance, are not responsive to reasons at all, even in fully ra-
tional subjects. They occur and disappear merely due to causal mechanisms,
and independently of any reasons of which we may be aware. In contrast,
judgements, beliefs and instrumental desires are sensitive to reasons, at least
in fully rational subjects. More specically, in such subjects, they are formed
solely in response to reasons; and no merely causal factors are involved in the
determination of their occurrence and content.24
Emotional dispositions and responses seem to be located somewhere be-
tween these two extremes, some perhaps closer to perceptions and the like,
and others maybe closer to judgements or beliefs and the like. As I have
already discussed, our emotional responses are often responding to rational
forces. We become aware of the danger of walking near the edge of a cli and
start to feel frightened; and we discover that (certain) dogs are agressive and
dangerous and begin to develop the disposition to fear them.25 But our emo-
tional responses are in many cases only partly determined by reasons. Merely
causal factors are also often involved, both in the acquisition of emotional dis-
positions and in their manifestation in the form of occurrences of emotional
24I assume here that it is part of being a rational person that one forms a judgement,
belief or desire just in case one has reason to do so, and no undercutting or overriding
contrary reasons. The intimate links between the formation of judgements, beliefs or desires
in rational subjects and their reasons for forming them have been noted and described by
Peacocke (1992) and Smith 1994, among others. Of course, we may still come to form
judgements, beliefs or desires in irrational ways | for instance, when forming them partly
or entirely due to causal factors (e.g., certain feelings, moods, or drugs). And similarly, fully
rational subjects may still dier in their judgements, beliefs or desires, despite being aware
of the same reasons. Such dierences may concern the degree of credence, the intensity
of longing, the threshold of when reasons become compelling, and so on. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.
25I assume here that the sentimentalist will accept that the facts providing us with reasons
for emotional responses provide us at the same time with reasons for the corresponding
evaluations (cf. Goldie (2004, 2007)).
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responses | and even, as it seems, in fully rational people. For instance, char-
acter traits seem to be important. A generally timid person is more likely to
develop a disposition to fear dogs than a nervy one. Habits may also become
relevant. Having to regularly work at great heights may decrease one's ten-
dency to become frightened, even though one still believes it to be dangerous
each time one goes up. Similarly, other factors | such as associations, moods
or other emotions (cf. Goldie (2000, 75f.)) | may have such a merely causal
impact on our emotional disposition and responses. But due to its non-rational
nature, such an impact is compatible with the emotions in question satisfy-
ing the constraints on their rationality. Hence, the many emotions, which are
only partially responsive to reasons, may count as rational even if they are
inuenced by non-rational factors.
Wiggins seems to make a very similar point with respect to the possibility
of two diering and conicting moral verdicts, with which we may come up
despite being `not distinguishable in any of the relevant respects such as the
capacities, obligations, commitments, etc., that deliberation can treat as xed'
(Wiggins, 1987, 181, n. 43), and which can survive `scrutiny of everything in
the circumstances and scrutiny of all other deliberatively admissible facts'
(ibid., 181). As he suggests, even if some (say, causal) dierence between the
two cases is assumed (as seems plausible), these underlying (causal) factors
need not have any rational impact on our diverging verdicts:
Surely there must be something about case C1 that made that turn out
the other way and dierently from C2. Perhaps. Let me not quarrel
here with this well-worn dogma. But that which explains the dierence
in outcome [...] need not impinge upon our grounds for endorsing one
verdict in C1 and the other verdict in C2. (Wiggins, 1987, 181f.)
In short, the epistemic appropriateness of our evaluations is a matter of rea-
sons alone, but our relevant emotional responses are often not. In many cases,
the reasons underdetermine the emotional responses. And in these cases, even
if there is no dierence in rational impact and hence in epistemic standing,
non-rational factors can | and are perhaps even likely to | lead to diverging
emotional responses.
13. The sentimentalist might still insist that cases of emotional responses,
which involve some non-rational inuence, should count as inappropriate, at
least according to the requirements for justication in aesthetic assessment.
The idea would be that epistemic appropriateness excludes such non-rational
forces and, hence, ensures | as in the case of judgements, beliefs or instru-
mental desires | convergence in rational response.
However, it is doubtful that all possible kinds of merely causal inuences
on our relevant emotional responses should count as undermining the justica-
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tion of the related aesthetic assessments. In the example of Picasso's painting,
the dierence between the various emotional responses is due to a dierence
in such non-rational forces. But it seems equally appropriate, from an aes-
thetic point of view, to react to this particular artwork with excitement, awe,
or uneasiness.26 Similarly, we do not take all non-aesthetic emotions to be
inadequate solely on the ground that they have been inuenced by our per-
sonalities, habits, and so on. It seems that the sentimentalist rejoinder would
simply render too many emotional responses and corresponding evaluations |
whether in aesthetic or other matters | to be inappropriate.
Then, it is doubtful that non-rational factors have any signicant bearing
on aesthetic appropriateness in the rst place. As it seems, the epistemic ap-
propriateness of aesthetic evaluations is | just like the epistemic standing of
judgements, beliefs or instrumental desires, but unlike the epistemic adequacy
of sensations, perceptions or basic desires | exclusively rational in nature,
that is, solely a matter of reasons and rational considerations. This strict fo-
cus on reasons is reected in the fact that, when asked to justify our aesthetic
verdicts, we exclusively refer to features of the objects concerned which are
(or which we take to be) aesthetically relevant reasons. And it is also illus-
trated by the fact that the conditions ensuring the epistemic appropriateness
of aesthetic evaluations are traditionally unconcerned with the exclusion of
non-rational inuences, and instead merely demand the correct assessment of
all aesthetically relevant reasons, as well as the disregard of all other kinds of
reasons (e.g., purely sentimental ones).27 However, if the epistemic appropri-
ateness of aesthetic assessments is solely a matter of reasons, the presence of
merely causal factors cannot undermine it, as long as it is true that all the
rational requirements are fullled.
A nal diculty arises out of the phenomenon of the relative cognitive
impenetrability of our emotional responses (cf. Goldie (2000)). Emotional
responses are relatively cognitively impenetrable (or inert) in the sense that
they often tend to resist the immediate pressures of rational considerations.
Although our emotional responses are in general responsive to reasons, this
responsiveness is not always eective, or at least not directly. Belief in the
irrationality of a certain emotional responses may cause it to vanish straight
away. But it is more often the case that emotional responses remain existent
and manifest, at least for a while, even if one is aware of there being no good
reason for their manifestation. For instance, that my lover has succeeded in
26This seems to be an instance of the more general problem | as it has been noted by
Levinson (2002) with respect to Hume's account | to justify, from an aesthetic point of
view, the selection of a particular set of conditions (and not another one) as those which
ensure epistemic appropriateness in aesthetic appreciation.
27This is true even of impartiality requirements, such as Kant's disinterestedness (cf. Kant
1985, sections 2.)).
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convincing me of the fact that she is not having an aair may well have no
(immediate) inuence on my feeling jealous of the suspected competitor. Or
my knowledge of the harmlessness of spiders need not prevent me from feeling
fear when I am confronted with one. Again, this appears to place emotional
responses between perceptions, sensations or basic desires, on the one hand,
and judgements, beliefs or instrumental desires, on the other.
The relative cognitive impenetrability of emotional responses raises two
particular problems for the sentimentalist reply under discussion. The rst is
to explain why it is possible, and common, with respect to emotions (and im-
possible or at least very rare with respect to judgements, beliefs or instrumental
desires, even in subjects who are not fully rational). The best explanation of
this fact seems to be that there can | and often do | exist non-rational forces,
which compete with and overcome the rational ones at work. When we know
that something is not dangerous and still fear it, what happens is that the ra-
tional force of our knowledge is trumped by some causal factors which sustain
or continue to bring about our feeling of fear. The second problem is to make
plausible that all occurrences of cognitive impenetrability are inappropriate or
irrational, at least from an aesthetic perspective. For if they are not, such
occurrences will constitute further cases of faultlessly disagreeing emotional
responses. Consider the cognitive impenetrability of perceptions. If we experi-
ence the Mller-Lyer illusion, but are aware of the underlying mechanisms and
of the fact that the lines are nonetheless of the same length, it would be odd
to describe us as irrational. Of course, our perceptual experience is mistaken.
But this mistake is not of a rational sort. Likewise, if we are afraid of some-
thing that we know to be completely harmless, and if we perhaps also know
why our fear persists, our response does not seem to be irrational either.28
In particular, even our best attempts at education or training need not lead
to the desired responsiveness (cf. Goldie (2000, 110)). Hence, it still needs
to be motivated that emotional cases of cognitive impenetrability are always
inappropriate | and, in the relevant cases, especially from an aesthetic point
of view.
The conclusion should therefore be that the conditions on the justication
of aesthetic evaluations cannot guarantee a sameness in emotional responses or
dispositions. There is always the possibility of diering responses, given that
there is a great variety of causal factors which may become eective in the
establishment of emotional dispositions or in their manifestation in concrete
cases. Hence, in the context of adequate aesthetic assessment, there is likewise
28At least, we appear to be far less in the wrong than in the case in which we fear something
harmless while taking it to be dangerous, or in the case in which we fear something harmless
without being aware of our tendency to fear things of this kind despite their harmlessness
(cf. Goldie (2000, 75f.)).
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always, or at least in many cases, the possibility of a divergence among our
emotional responses.
The Ubiquity of Possible Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetic Ap-
preciation
14. But, as I mentioned above, there is a second option of resisting the further
thesis that the possibility of faultless disagreement in some actual cases of aes-
thetic assessment implies its widespread or even universal possibility. The aim
is now to limit this possibility on the level of aesthetic evaluations, rather than
on the level of emotional responses. The idea is that, even if it is accepted
that for many or even all actual and epistemically appropriate aesthetic as-
sessments of an object there can be diverging evaluations, and also that for
some of these cases there is the possibility of a genuine conict in assessment,
it does not automatically follow that there can be conicts in more than a few
of the cases of divergence. And simply assuming the ubiquitous possibility of
conict among epistemically adequate evaluations seems to beg the question
with respect to the sentimentalist.29 As Budd puts it:
[One can] make the exceptionally strong claim that with respect to any
object and any aesthetic property ideal critics might faultlessly disagree,
or merely that, for each aesthetic property, it is possible for there to be
cases in which there is no consensus among ideal critics as to whether a
certain object possesses that property. This weaker claim might well be
true. But to establish in the case of a particular [aesthetic value] that
it is possible for there to be a set of nonevaluative properties suitable
to be the basis of that [value] which is such that there can be faultless
disagreements of taste among ideal critics, it would be necessary to show
that the constraints imposed on the base properties by the nature of the
aesthetic [value] and the criteria for qualifying as an ideal critic do not
guarantee a consensus in aesthetic judgements. (Budd, 1999, 307)
29Indeed, as has been pointed out to me by an anonymous referee, a sentimentalist might
more generally object that what we are concerned with here is establishing merely the
epistemic possibility of faultless disagreement, but that, for all that we know, convergence
under optimal conditions seems as epistemically possible as divergence. But even if the rst
half of this objection is true, the burden of proof lies still with the sentimentalists, and for
two reasons. First, they aim at positively establishing the claim that emotions can justify
evaluations. And, as I try to argue in this essay, they can achieve this aim only if they either
accommodate or positively rule out the metaphysical possibility of faultless disagreement,
and not by merely casting some doubt on it. And second, in the light of our actual evidence
about how emotions get inuenced by very diering causal factors and, as a result, actually
dier a lot, it seems much more likely that they will diverge than converge, even under the
most optimal conditions. For the criteria for optimality concern primarily, or even solely,
rational factors, and not causal ones (cf. section 13 above).
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Budd's point applies even if the proponent of the ubiquity of possible conicts
among justied assessments of aesthetic merit limits his claim merely to the
widespread possibility of faultlessly disagreeing opinions with respect to actual
evaluations. Accordingly, the defender of the challenge to sentimentalism has
to demonstrate, or at least to render very plausible, that a conict among
diering appropriate assessments is possible in more than a few cases. And
this can indeed be achieved. If the diverging evaluations are concerned with
the overall aesthetic merit of the object in question (e.g., its being, or not
being, a masterpiece), they have to be in conict, simply because an object
can possess only a single intersubjective overall aesthetic value at a given time.
An object cannot truly and simultaneously be both a masterpiece and no mas-
terpiece. At best, it can simultaneously be both a masterpiece-for-me and no
masterpiece-for-you, or its possession of the property of being a masterpiece
may be true-for-me and false-for-you. Accordingly, intersubjective aesthetic
assessments | in fact, whether they are justied or not | are in conict with
each other whenever they ascribe dierent overall values to the same object.
15. The intersubjectivist sentimentalist can therefore claim merely that the
possibility of a conict among diering, but justied evaluative responses oc-
curs on more specic levels of aesthetic appreciation (and even there only
rarely, for that matter). These levels are concerned with the recognition of
(often partially descriptive) aesthetic values which, although they contribute
to the overall merit of their bearers, are either local by pertaining solely to
certain parts of the objects (e.g., the beautiful left panel), or aspectual by con-
cerning only certain aspects of the worth of the objects (e.g., the elegance or
inventiveness of its drawing).30 But due to this limitation of the acceptance of
possible cases of faultless disagreement, sentimentalism runs into some serious
diculties.
First, the challenge to sentimentalism still undermines the epistemic stand-
ing of our aesthetic evaluations and related emotional responses if these are
concerned with the overall assessment of objects. Given that many, if not all,
of our respective responses occurring under epistemically faultless conditions
permit diering reactions, and given that diverging overall evaluations have
to be in conict, there is indeed the widespread or even universal possibility
of conicting, but adequate assessments of overall aesthetic merit. Hence, the
sentimentalist view at issue has the untenable consequence that we should
refrain from making overall aesthetic assessments.
30Perhaps the more specic values dier from the overall ones also in that the former, but
not the latter, are merely prima facie and open to be overridden or undermined by other
more specic values of their bearer (cf. Goldie (2007) for a very similar distinction).
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Second, the number of cases, in which faultless disagreement about the
overall worth of an object is possible, is presumably large enough to threaten
to undermine also the epistemic standing of our aesthetic evaluations and emo-
tional responses in general, that is, independent of the specicity of value in-
volved. This presupposes that we do not distinguish between overall and more
specic assessments when we consider the epistemic status of our evaluations.
That is, if we should refrain from making the one kind, we should also refrain
from making the other kind of assessment. Any disjunctive approach to this
problem, on the other hand, would call into question our epistemic practice of
deriving overall values from more specic ones, possibly rendering the former
unknowable. And it would cast doubt on the classication of both as values
of broadly the same kind (i.e., as aesthetic).
Third, the claim that most diverging (appropriate) aesthetic assessments
on a more specic level are not in conict seems implausible. Considering
again Goldman's example, the aesthetic values of being graceful and insipid
do not merely seem to dier, but also to be incompatible with each other (if
only in the descriptive aspects of these evaluative properties). As it appears,
a painting | or some part of it | cannot be graceful and insipid at the same
time. And many other more specic aesthetic values | such as being gaudy
and calm, or balanced and unsteady | seem to stand in similar conicts with
each other. Hence, it appears likely that many (adequate) aesthetic evaluations
are incompatible, despite not concerning the overall merit of an object.
And fourth, the sentimentalist would still have to provide an account of
the fact that we so often take our evaluations to be in conict with each other,
even at the level of local or aspectual values. We do think that many of our
respective assessments are in conict, and that there is a genuine need to settle
the dispute. For instance, if someone takes a painting to be insipid which we
take to be graceful, we tend to answer back and try to convince him of our
opinion, or at least to bring him to disclose the reasons for his assessment. And
if we cannot nd any fault with any of the diverging responses, even after long
and detailed scrutiny and discussion, and therefore eventually stop arguing,
this happens usually simply because we do not know what to say any more,
and not because we cease to think that there is something to argue about.
16. One interesting reply to this, as well as to the more general issue of how to
deal with the seemingly possible conicts among justied aesthetic evaluations,
is to maintain that all what the possibility of diering evaluative responses
shows is that we may not all have the same access to aesthetic values. The
lack of intersubjectivity would thus turn out to be merely epistemological. This
might perhaps be how Hume understands the seemingly subjective elements
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which he (perhaps a bit surprisingly) introduces into in his account:31
A young man, whose passions are warm, will be more sensibly touched
with amorous and tender images, than a man more advanced in years,
who takes pleasure in wise, philosophical reections concerning the con-
duct of life and moderation of the passions. At twenty, Ovid may be the
favourite author; Horace at forty; and perhaps Tacitus at fty. Vainly
would we, in such cases, endeavour to enter into the sentiments of oth-
ers, and divest ourselves of those propensities, which are natural to us.
(Hume, 2008, 150)
Perhaps there are indeed certain limits on which aesthetic value we can recog-
nize at various stages of our life or development; and perhaps these limits are
connected to the fact that our emotional dispositions are partly determined by
factors, which uniquely pertain to each of those stages, and which inevitably
change over time in conjunction with the related dispositions. This would
mean that we would not always have, nor could acquire, the emotional dis-
positions required for the recognition of the overall aesthetic merit of certain
objects, or of the more specic values contributing to this overall worth. For
instance, the young may yet not be able to appreciate Tacitus, because the
latter's writings leave him generally cold, or because he cannot grasp all the
relevant specic merits of these writings.
But this epistemological approach to the divergence among our evaluative
responses faces at least two serious problems. The rst diculty is that it does
not seem to apply easily to cases in which there are two competing responses,
rather than one response and an absence of one. What if the young is not left
indierent by reading Tacitus, but is bored by him, or even annoyed? If this
would mean that he has access to a dierent overall aesthetic value than the
old who enjoys the writings, then one of the two would have to be in the wrong,
given that the works can posses only a single overall value. But there would
be no epistemic reason to prefer one response over the other. If, on the other
hand, the young's assessment would concern merely a dierent more specic
value than that of the old, at least one of the two | presumably the young |
would not have access to the overall value of Tacitus' writings. For he would
31Thanks to Mike Martin for making me aware of this way of understanding Hume. Ac-
cording to a dierent reading, suggested to me by an anonymous referee, Hume may not
intend to say here that dierences in age and culture inuence the aesthetic values of works
(or our responses which determine these values), but instead that they inuence only our |
presumably more personal practical | subjective preferences among the works with high
aesthetic merit (e.g., whether we prefer masterpieces of romantic or of didactic poetry). If
this alternative interpretation is right, Hume's position does not involve any kind of rela-
tivisation to age or culture, but still faces the challenge to sentimentalism outlined in this
essay.
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not have access to the more specic values which are only seen by the old, but
which nonetheless contribute to the overall merit. And we would perhaps be
happy to say that the young gets the overall value of Tacitus' works wrong;
but not that he cannot even assess it. The second problem is that, to cover
all cases of possible faultless disagreement, it would presumably have to be
assumed that there are many aesthetic values (whether more specic or not)
to which we do not have access at a given time in our life or development. But
this would again, and again absurdly, mean that we would not have access to
the overall merit of many works.
17. Besides, there is a further and independent problem for any sentimentalist
position which assumes the possibility of faultless disagreement in certain,
but not all cases: namely to answer the dicult question of which feature
of us, or of the respective situations, or of the aesthetic values involved, is
responsible for this restriction to certain cases. As it stands, it seems arbitrary
that the possibility of faultless disagreement arises in certain cases | in which
we should then refrain from aesthetic judgement | but not in others. As long
as no satisfactory explanation of this postulated fact is provided, it seems more
appropriate to allow for this possibility in all cases, if in any at all.
As a consequence, a sentimentalist should admit that, if faultless disagree-
ment is possible in some actual cases of aesthetic assessments, than it is also
possible in many or even all actual cases. Hence, to avoid the ubiquity of the
need to refrain from aesthetic assessment, he should either give up intersub-
jectivism, or deny the possibility of faultless disagreement altogether.
Denying the Possibility of Faultless Disagreement
18. Sentimentalist can deny the possibility of faultless disagreement and
thereby reject the raised challenge as misguided in various ways. The tra-
ditional approach has been to undermine the rst step of this challenge by
arguing that there is no emotional divergence under suitable conditions. This
postulated sameness in response may again be defended and explained in sev-
eral ways.
The Kantian strategy (cf. Kant (1990): sections 20. and 36.) is to
maintain that we all possess | presumably from birth on and as part of our
common human nature | the same aective dispositions to react with pleasure
or displeasure, at least with respect to those responses which are relevant for
aesthetic appreciation (i.e., we all possess the same `taste').32 Indeed, this
32Kant distinguishes the aesthetically relevant `feelings' of pleasure or displeasure (i.e.,
`Gefuhle') from an `emotional' condition (i.e., `Ruhrung') which should have no impact on
our aesthetic assessments (cf. Kant (1990): 43). For this reason, I speak of `aective' rather
than `emotional' dispositions, although the respective feelings of pleasure or displeasure are
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means that we can never dier in our aesthetic assessments: our aesthetic
responses will always be the same. This idea is often supplemented with the
claim that our shared aective dispositions can and do become manifest only
under suitable conditions. That is, we can have aesthetic responses to objects
only under special circumstances (even if it may seem to us that we have
aesthetic responses also under other circumstances). If these conditions do not
obtain, other aective dispositions not related to aesthetic appreciation come
into play and bring about non-aesthetic aective responses | notably those
linked to merely personal preferences or likings (i.e., to what is `agreeable'; cf.
Kant (1990): 7.).
The Humean strategy (cf. Hume (1998)), on the other hand, is to maintain
that we may and usually do possess dierent relevant emotional dispositions,
but that, under suitable conditions, the same dispositions will develop in and
become eective for all of us. The idea (or hope) is that raising the stan-
dards for the appropriateness of aesthetic evaluations will lead to a convergence
among those emotional responses and verdicts living up to these standards. If
critics improve themselves and become sophisticated enough | say, by expos-
ing themselves to many artworks, by fully and correctly informing themselves
about the relevant features of these objects, by learning how to ignore or over-
turn their own prejudices, and so on | they will ultimately end up in emotional
and evaluative agreement with each other. Hence, while Hume allows for dif-
ferences in the emotional dispositions underlying our aesthetic evaluations and
demands of us to continually improve and change our own dispositions in or-
der to acquire one of the limited number of appropriate ones, Kant argues for
the existence of a single and unchanging emotional disposition which alone is
capable of grounding aesthetic appreciation and which we all possess and just
have to learn to make proper use of.
clearly very similar to emotional feelings. In addition, Kant's notion of `taste' | and his
understanding of it as a `common sense' | seems to comprise two dierent abilities which
are both necessary for the formation of genuine aesthetic judgements, that is, `judgements of
taste' (cf. Kant (1990): footnote on page 4): (i) the ability to respond with a disinterested
and universal (or universally communicable) feeling of pleasure or displeasure to the form
of objects (Kant (1990): 16 and 60f.); and (ii) the ability to recognize instances of pleasure
or displeasure as disinterested and universal (or universally communicable) and to form the
respective aesthetic judgements (ibid.: 160f.) | which are thus really more about our own
states of mind than about the objects in question (Kant (1990): 4 and 18). The latter ability
seems to be of special importance for Kant since, for him, the aective responses involved
in aesthetic appreciation do not appear to dier phenomenologically from those involved in
our responses to the good or the agreeable (at least not in the relevant aspects). Instead,
Kant seems to take the three kinds of pleasure or displeasure to be distinct mainly in their
origin and in their related (lack of) disinterestedness and universality (Kant (1990): 4 and
14f.).
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19. However, both approaches are bound to fail, as seems nowadays widely
accepted (cf., e.g., Budd (1995): ch. 1, Levinson (2002) or Zangwill (2001,
ch. 9)). Although here is not the space to properly present and assess either
position, a short discussion of their main weaknesses may perhaps suce to
render them implausible.
Kant argued, very roughly, that we all share and can make use of the same
relevant aective dispositions because of our specic nature as cognizing and
rational human beings and, in particular, because of our common cognitive
faculties and our ability to use them in such a way as to succeed in acquiring
knowledge about objects. But this argument has been often, and convincingly,
critized (cf. especially Budd (1995): 26.). For instance, it appears simply im-
plausible to deduce, solely on the basis of the assumption that we possess the
sensory (or imaginative) and intellectual capacities required for the cognition
of non-evaluative aspects of the world, that we also possess certain aective
capacities capable of grounding or constituting evaluative responses. And it
seems even more dicult to infer, from the same assumption, that we all pos-
sess only a single, and one and the same, set of aective dispositions pertaining
to aesthetic matters.
Hume's strategy is not much more promising, although it avoids Kant's
futile and counter-intuitive attempt to nd a common core in all the emotional
or aective dispositions possibly relevant for aesthetic appreciation. One of the
main diculties for Hume is that no addition or strengthening of conditions
on epistemic appropriateness could hope to render impossible cases of faultless
disagreement. Even if critics of art would become more and more receptive
to evidence for aesthetic merit and indeed would end up with noticing all
relevant facts about a given, and even if they would have most thoroughly
studied all of art history and all existing artworks and compared them with
each other and the object under their scrutiny, and even if they would assess
the relevant evidence with the utmost care and unprejudiced rationality, there
would still be no guarantee, and probably not even the likelihood, that they
would react emotionally in the same way to the artwork in question (cf., for
instance, Goldman (1995): 26.). Besides, there is the deep issue of how to
justify, from an aesthetic point of view, the specic choice of these particular
conditions on epistemic appropriateness, and not of others (cf. Levinson (2002)
and Zangwill (2001, ch. 9)). In fact, this might be a more general problem
for all sentimentalist positions, given that we do not have a clear idea of when
emotional responses should count as epistemically adequate in the sense of
being able to justify the corresponding evaluations.
Both the Kantian and the Humean approach seem to be misguided in a
similar manner, namely by focussing primarily on the level of our emotional
responses and trying to show that they cannot diverge under suitable condi-
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tions. And their failure is, again, due to the fact that our emotional responses
are partly beyond rational inuence, while the epistemic standards governing
our aesthetic assessments do not concern non-rational, that is, merely causal
factors (cf. the discussion above in section 13).
20. A dierent and more recent attempt to deny the possibility of faultless
disagreement has been to question the second step of the challenge to sen-
timentalism by denying that the possibility of diverging emotional responses
even under conditions suitable for epistemic appropriateness transfers to the
related evaluations.33 This amounts in fact to a denial of the possibility of dif-
fering aesthetic evaluations under those conditions. Budd suggests two ways
in which this may be achieved. He describes the rst in the following manner,
treating evaluative properties here as dispositional:
If [...] crediting an object with the dispositional property only if it is
such as to elicit the response from all the qualied viewers, [...] the
absence of uniformity of response will imply that the object does not
possess the aesthetic property in question.(Budd, 1999, 306)
The central idea is to add a further condition necessary for epistemic appro-
priateness, in addition to the more substantial requirements already noted
(i.e., the demands for full information, attentiveness, sensitivity, impartiality,
experience, and so on). And this further condition states that an aesthetic
evaluation is appropriate only if there is | or, alternatively, can be | no
diering assessment when the more substantial conditions are satised. Budd
seems to prefer the reading according to which only the actual occurrence of a
second and faultlessly disagreeing evaluation would undermine the justication
of the originally given assessment. But this does not help to undermine the
possibility of faultless disagreement in cases in which a given adequate opin-
ion is not actually confronted with a faultlessly conicting verdict. For the
fact that the latter does not actually occur does not undermine its possibil-
ity. Hence, in this reading, the additional condition, together with the initial,
more substantial set, does not suce to rule out the possibility of faultless
disagreement. But the other reading, according to which already the possible
occurrence of another faultless, but conicting evaluation would undermine
33If the emotional responses are taken to be constituents, and the sole constituents, of the
evaluations, the second approach becomes very similar to the rst. Besides, another way
of undermining the possibility of faultless conict among various aesthetic evaluations is to
reject the third step of the challenge to sentimentalism by denying that such assessments
are ever in conict with each other. But for the reasons already rehearsed in sections 14-16
above, this strategy is bound to fail with respect to ascriptions of both overall aesthetic
values and more specic ones. See also footnote 27 for the discussion of a fourth way of
trying to undermine the possibility of faultless disagreement.
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the epistemic standing of the original assessment, does not fare better. For it
would lead to a needlessly sceptical view on our ability to gain justied access
to instances of aesthetic values, unless the possibility of faultless disagreement
under the initial, more substantial conditions (without the newly added one)
can be limited to a few cases. For if this possibility would be widespread, the
additional condition would classify all the respective (and otherwise possibly
adequate) aesthetic assessments as unjustied.
21. Now, Budd presents a second way in which the possibility of faultless
disagreement among aesthetic assessments can be denied:
The second is to understand a judgement that ascribes [an aesthetic
value] to a work as making no reference to ideal viewers but rather as
claiming that the work uniquely merits a certain response, so that the
response is the right response. [...] In fact, the second of the two strate-
gies would appear to be more plausible. [...] Accordingly, a response-
dependent account of judgements that ascribe [aesthetic values] should
represent the content of such a judgement as being that the item to
which the property is ascribed is such that the evaluative response inte-
gral to the property is the appropriate response to the item, the judge-
ment being true if and only if any competing response is indicative of
a defect in a person who responds to the item in that manner or an
inadequacy in the person's engagement with the item. (Budd, 1999,
307f.)
What Budd proposes is that certain evaluative responses are appropriate, but
others not, because only the former are rendered adequate by the actual values
of the objects concerned. And aesthetic values render appropriate precisely
those evaluations which stand in a correspondance relation to them | where
the correspondance presumably consists in the fact that the values have to be
elucidated in terms of the responses in question, and that the responses assign
these values to the objects at which they are directed. This suggests that
evaluative responses are appropriate only if their objects actually exemplify
the corresponding values, and that what is at issue is therefore the ttingness
of aesthetic assessments. Hence, the actual presence of the value is a condition
on ttingness, but not necessarily on epistemic appropriateness. On the other
hand, Budd's proposal involves also the claim that the exemplied values merit
or justify the corresponding evaluative responses. And this suggests that what
is at issue is the epistemic appropriateness of aesthetic assessments. This
duality in the proposal remains unproblematic only if an account of aesthetic
appreciation is endorsed which claims that epistemic appropriateness coincides
with ttingness. Hence, Budd probably has (or should have) such a position
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in mind.34
But in any case, his second proposal turns out to be very similar to the rst
in that it likewise involves the key claim that the satisfaction of the conditions
on epistemic appropriateness by more than one conicting evaluation renders
all of them unjustied. The dierence between the two proposals concerns the
issue of which factors are relevant for epistemic adequacy | the satisfaction
of the original, more substantial conditions in the rst case, or the presence
of a justifying link between the exemplied value and the response in the
second. But this means also that the second proposal faces, basically, the
same diculties as the rst.
Conclusion
22. What the preceding considerations have been intended to illustrate is that
intersubjectivist sentimentalists can neither hope to be able to accommodate
the possibility of faultless disagreement, nor hope to be able to undermine this
possibility. The conclusion is that sentimentalists, in response to the challenge
to their position, should simply reject intersubjectivism (and thereby reject the
second step of this challenge). However, in the light of the potential unattrac-
tiveness of giving up intersubjectivism, it is perhaps better to understand this
conclusion as a motivation to reject the view that sentimentalism may provide
a satisfactory account of the epistemology of aesthetic appreciation, and to
34Budd's second proposal has also some anities to accounts which do not take epistemic
appropriateness to be always sucient for ttingness. The proposal appears to replace the
verdicts of ideal judges (i.e., our epistemically best opinions) with the actually exemplied
values as determinants of the standard for the appropriateness of aesthetic evaluations. This
suggests a shift from projected values to ones which are cognizable as proper parts of reality.
Indeed, Budd may seem to have adopted the talk of `objects meriting responses' straight from
defenders of a substantial notion of truth which is not reducible to epistemic appropriateness
(cf. McDowell (1983, 1998d) and Wiggins (1987)). But perhaps this ambiguity in how to
understand Budd's second proposal just illustrates that both it and McDowell's and Wiggins'
positions resist the usual classications | or, more pessimistically and uncharitably, involve
an unavoidable incoherence.
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begin to search for a more promising alternative.3536
35One possibility is that such a theory may take evaluative judgements to be perceptual
or intuitive. Goldie (2007), for instance, argues that we can literally perceive instances of
(moral) merit, even if only with respect to partly descriptive, and thus more specic, values.
However, most of what Goldie says while elucidating and defending his view seems entirely
compatible with an intuitionist approach | as appears to be true of much of McDowell's
writings (cf. the talk of `perception' in his 1983 and 1985), which have partly inspired
Goldie's work. In my view, it seems more plausible to take genuine intersubjective evalu-
ations | in contrast to merely subjective preferences | to be the result of reasoning (cf.
Bender (1995)). But, as Goldie (2007) suggests, the two outlooks may perhaps be combined:
it may be the case that, while the justication of intersubjective assessments is primarily a
matter of reasons, these evaluations can nonetheless be psychologically based on | or `moti-
vated' by | perceptions or intuitions alone. It seems to me, however, that this makes sense
only if it is in addition assumed that reasoning is still not only epistemologically, but also
psychologically prior to perception or intuition | notably in that we can ultimately acquire
the ability to see or intuit instantiations of value only on the basis of a prior recognition and
assessment of reasons for evaluation (cf. the case of a chess-player who, by reasoning about
positions of a certain kind, learns how to immediately tell which move is best in positions
of that type; cf. Goldie (2007) for this example and related discussion).
36Part of this paper has been presented at the Emotions and Rationality in Practical
Philosophy conference at the Universities of Neuchatel and Bern, as well as at a workshop
at the University of Fribourg. I would like to thank the respective audiences for their
helpful comments, especially Davor Bodrozic, Julien Deonna, Peter Goldie, Kevin Mulligan,
Gianfranco Soldati, and Ronnie de Sousa. For extended discussions of the issues raised
in, or detailed comments on previous drafts of, this essay I am very grateful to Malcolm
Budd, Mike Martin, Elisabeth Schellekens, Nick Zangwill, the editors of this volume and
of dialectica, and their anonymous referees. I would also like to thank the Swiss National






1. Much of our knowledge of the features of objects is based on perception.
This is true not only of the basic shapes, sizes, distances, weights or colours
of objects, but also of many of their more complex properties that depend on
their more basic ones. Good examples for such higher-level features are the
sadness or intelligence of a friend, the kindness of an action, the elegance of a
gait, the climbability of a wall, the fragility of a glass, the quality of a proof
or of a move in chess, the content of a painting, the bikehood of a bike, or the
cathood of a cat. We notice that a friend is sad, for instance, in response to
perceiving the tone of his voice or the dynamics his gestures; and we notice
that a chess move is bad on the basis of perceiving the specic distribution
of the pieces on the board. Our awareness of these and similar higher-level
features involves or is grounded in the { typically perceptual { recognition of
relevant lower-level features that contribute to the realisation or determination
of the higher-level features in question.
Some of our recognitions of such higher-level features have two important
aspects in common. First, they are phenomenologically (or psychologically)
immediate. We need not engage in a conscious inference or another form of
reasoning in order to notice that someone is sad, or that a certain chess move
is bad. Second, we have an intelligible and reasonable practice of backing up
our ascriptions of the higher-level features by highlighting the respective lower-
level properties which realise them, and the perception of which helped us to
recognise them. When someone challenges our judgement that our friend is
sad, or the move bad, we support our opinion by referring to the tone of his
voice, or the concrete situation on the board. Indeed, being able to provide
this kind of support is something that is required from us. If we fail to satisfy
this demand, the standing of our judgements { and possibly also our status as
judges { will suer.
Now, there is a certain tension between these two aspects, which becomes
191
Non-Inferentialism about Aesthetic Judgement Chapter 7
apparent once we consider their relation to the justication of our judgements
and beliefs about higher-order properties. For it is a dicult task for any
account of this justication to accommodate the fact that our recognition of
higher-level features is both phenomenologically immediate and open to sup-
port through additional considerations. If we take our ascriptions of the fea-
tures to be justied inferentially (as, say, in deductive or inductive reasoning),
we owe an explanation of how our recognition can still be phenomenologically
immediate { perhaps in terms of habituation or internalisation, or some sub-
personal or implicit inferences. But if, on the other hand, we assume that our
justication is non-inferential (as, say, in the case of perception or intuition),
the availability of { and need for { additional backing in the shape of reference
to relevant lower-level features becomes problematic. When we judge some-
thing to be red on the basis of our visual perception of it, it is unreasonable to
demand from us to support our judgement by pointing to some lower-level fea-
tures of the object, such as its surface reectances or other physical properties.
In fact, no reason may be available to us for our colour judgements other than
the fact that the object concerned perceptually strikes us as having a certain
colour (and perhaps also the fact that nothing is unusual or wrong with our
mind or the environment during our experience of the object). By contrast,
it is normally appropriate to ask us to support our ascriptions of higher-level
features by reference to some relevant lower-level features.
2. In this essay, I aim to explore and question the prospects of the non-
inferential strategy. This approach has no diculties to capture the phe-
nomenological immediacy of our ascriptions of higher-order properties: we
simply form our judgements or beliefs in a non-inferential way. But, as I
aim to highlight, it has problems to accommodate our practice of pointing to
lower-level features in support of our opinions. Its best strategy seems to be
to interpret this support in non-evidential terms. However, important aspects
of this practice { notably the limits of our aesthetic curiosity { resist this in-
terpretation. My contention is therefore that the second noted aspect of our
recognition of higher-level features { that it may be backed up by picking out
suitable lower-level properties { cannot be properly explained if our justica-
tion in such matters is understood as being non-inferential in nature. Whether,
and how, phenomenological immediacy can be squared with inferential justi-
cation is another issue, and to be addressed elsewhere.
Although my focus in what follows is exclusively on aesthetic qualities, I
surmise that much of what I have to say applies equally to the epistemology
of other kinds of higher-level features, such as moral or other values, aor-
dances, natural or artical kinds, dispositions, meanings, or moods and char-
acter traits. The idea that the justication of our opinions about them is
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non-inferential should, too, be problematic to the extent to which we are in
need to nd a satisfactory interpretation of our practice to point to lower-level
features in support of our respective judgements and beliefs. Now, one of the
most sophisticated and inuential defenders of non-inferentialism with respect
to aesthetic qualities has been Frank Sibley. Because of this, and because
of the comprehensiveness and detailedness of his defense which exhausts the
main options available to a proponent of non-inferential justication, I let my
discussion be largely guided by his writings. But my concern is none the less
with the prospects of non-inferentialism about aesthetic judgements in general,
and not only with Sibley's particular version of it.
In the rst section of this essay, I spell out in a bit more detail what the
commitments of the non-inferentialist strategy are and contrast experientially
based judgements with testimonially and inferentially based ones. The second
section discusses the tension between non-inferentialism and an evidential un-
derstanding of the support for our ascriptions of aesthetic qualities provided
by our reference to the underlying lower-level features. It also introduces four
dierent suggestions { made by Sibley { of how to understand this element
of support instead in non-evidential terms. The third section contains the
two main arguments of this paper. First of all, I argue that none of Sib-
ley's four proposals can account for the supportive and normative character
of our practice of backing up our aesthetic judgements in terms of the ob-
jects' lower-level features. In addition, I introduce a further objection against
non-inferentialism, according to which this view cannot explain why our cu-
riosity in aesthetic matters is limited to certain metaphysical facts about the
aesthetic qualities of the objects concerned. In the nal section, I discuss
a more recent attempt to improve on Sibley's four proposals by taking the
reference to lower-level features to support aesthetic experiences, rather than
aesthetic judgements. As I aim to show, this view { put forward by Elisabeth
Schellekens { tries, but fails to combine non-inferentialism with an epistemic
understanding of our supportive practice. My conclusion is that inferentialism
can explain neither the limitations to our aesthetic curiosity, nor the expec-
tation to be able to bolster our aesthetic judgements by pointing to certain
lower-level features of artworks or similar objects. By contrast, an evidential
understanding of the supportive practice at issue has the resources to account
for both aspects of aesthetic appreciation.
I.
3. One important element of non-inferentialism about aesthetic judgements is
the claim that what Sibley has called aesthetic perception is essential to our
aesthetic engagement with artworks and other aesthetic objects. In particular,
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it is maintained that { with some possible exceptions (see further below) {
this aesthetic kind of experience is central to the formation and justication
of judgements or beliefs about the aesthetic qualities of objects. Our opinions
about aesthetic qualities are thus the result of experience, rather than the result
of reasoning. Here is how Sibley characterises this aspect of non-inferentialism:
`It is of importance to note rst that, broadly speaking, aesthetics
deals with a kind of perception. People have to see the grace or
unity of a work, hear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music,
notice the gaudiness of colour scheme, feel the power of a novel,
its mood, or its uncertainty of tone.' [...] To suppose indeed that
one can make aesthetic judgements without aesthetic perception,
say, by following rules of some kind, is to misunderstand aesthetic
judgement.' (Sibley (2001a): 34)
`[...] [A]esthetic perception [...] is essential to aesthetic judgement;
one could not therefore be brought to make an aesthetic judge-
ment simply as the outcome of considering reasons, however good.'
(Sibley (2001a): 40)
`[...] [U]nless [people] do perceive [aesthetic qualities] for them-
selves, aesthetic enjoyment, appreciation, and judgement are be-
yond them.' (Sibley (2001a): 34)
Indeed, as the last sentence of the quote illustrates, Sibley assumes aesthetic
perception to be essential to the occurrence not only of the judgemental, but
also of the emotional and evaluative elements involved in aesthetic apprecia-
tion. This is a direct consequence of the fact that all aesthetic appreciation
seems to start with the recognition of aesthetic qualities, before it can then
develop into some richer form of aesthetic engagement.
Sibley takes aesthetic perception to be a kind of experiential awareness of
the aesthetic qualities of objects, which provides us with non-inferential jus-
tication for aesthetic judgement. But he rightly does not assume aesthetic
perception to be an instance of ordinary perception and is very clear on the
fact that our ability to recognise aesthetic qualities goes beyond our normal
perceptual and recognitional capacities (cf. Sibley (2001a): 135.). What is
instead central to, and distinctive of, aesthetic perception is that it involves the
exercise of `aesthetic sensitivity, perceptiveness, or taste' (Sibley (2001a): 135).
Sibley does not really say anything more about this special kind of sensitivity
(cf. Budd (1999)). But it seems fair to assume that he understands aesthetic
sensitivity as a largely acquired ability that is open to further training and edu-
cation { perhaps, again, in contrast to our basic perceptual capacities. In fact,
it may very well be questioned whether aesthetic perception in Sibley's sense
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is really closer to ordinary perception than, say, to what others have identied
as intellectual feelings or seemings (cf. Mulligan (2010) and Bodrozic (2004)).
4. Endorsing non-inferentialism by treating our recognition of aesthetic quali-
ties as experiential has the advantage of providing us with a simple explanation
of the phenomenological immediacy of our aesthetic judgements. As already
suggested, it does not seem to require any conscious reasoning on our side
to recognise the elegance of a gait, or the expression of sadness in a piece of
music. We do not start o with certain premisses about the gait or the music
and infer from there that they are elegant or expressive of sadness. Instead,
we just form the respective judgement in direct response to our experience of
the movement or the piece of music. Assuming that our access to elegance
or expressed sadness is experiential is capable of explaining this psychological
immediacy in judgement.
But it is important to keep in mind that there may be alternative ways
of accounting for it, notably in terms of implicit or internalised reasoning.
Consider the example of a good chess-player or mathematician. She may
be able to immediately spot the quality of a move, or how to proceed in a
proof. But she had to engage in extensive reasoning in order to acquire and
develop this skill. She had to get used to make the right rational connections
within her eld between a certain type of position or problem and the best
response to it. She may now be able to form some of her judgements without
the reliance on any explicit inferences. But she was not able to do so in
the past; and some other of her current judgements about which steps to
pursue in a game of chess or a mathematical proof are still likely to require
extensive conscious calculation. However, what is important to note is that
her immediate judgements are not just mere causal responses, like a feeling of
pain or hunger. They are still rational responses to the situation before her,
and to be justied by reference to an argument which may be rehearsed by
her in an explicit way. That is, they are grounded in some implicit line of
reasoning, which is the result of some process of internalisation or habituation
during her conscious engagement in similar inferences in the past.
Despite their common phenomenological immediacy, judgements grounded
in implicit inferences dier from experientially grounded judgements in at least
two respects. First, our capacity to form them depends on our past engagement
in explicit inferences of a closely related kind. By contrast, we do not learn
to experientially recognise something through the internalisation of patterns
of inferential reasoning. Second, the justication of implicitly inferred judge-
ments is, of course, inferential: it stays the same independently of whether
the inferences involved are rendered explicit or not. By contrast, experience
provides us with non-inferential justication, which cannot be stated by refer-
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ence to some inferential pattern (cf., e.g., Martin (1992)). Inferentialism and
non-inferentialism about some type of judgements therefore typically dier not
only in whether they take the judgements' justication to be non-inferential,
but also in whether acquiring the capacity to form them requires engagement
in some related form of explicit reasoning.
Now, can non-inferentialism accept that an experientially grounded judge-
ment may also be open to inferential justication? The answer { at least in
the case of basic perceptual judgements { should be both yes and no. It should
be yes in so far as we can form legitimate perceptual judgements on the basis
of reasoning. But it should be no in so far as the justication involved is,
ultimately, non-inferential in nature. We can infer that something is red, for
instance, once we know the wavelength spectrum of the light emitted by its
surface in broad daylight (cf. Dorsch (2009): ch. 2.6). Hence, if challenged, we
can support our perceptually based colour judgement in an inferential man-
ner, namely by pointing to the underlying reectance properties of the red
object. But this presupposes that we have knowledge of the correlation be-
tween colours { or, more directly, colour experiences { and wavelength spectra.
And discovering the correlation requires, ultimately, consciously experiencing
colours and matching them up with reectance properties (cf. Dorsch (2009,
ch. 4) and chapter 1). What this illustrates is that the justication of a colour
judgement by reference to the light reected by the object concerned is, in the
end, non-inferential. So, while colour judgements may to some extent be in-
ferentially justied, the inferential justication involved has to derive its force
from some prior non-inferential justication. This is part of what it means
that perceptual experience is our canonical access to colours: any other form
of access depends on it.
The situation does not seem to be dierent in the case of aesthetic qualities,
assuming that they are open to experiential access in the rst place. Sibley has
convincingly argued that we cannot deduce, or infer by means of aesthetic prin-
ciples, the presence of aesthetic qualities on the basis of knowledge about the
object's lower-level features, even though the former metaphysically depend
in one way or another on the latter (cf. Sibley (2001b)). There is only one
general exception to his conclusion: if we have full knowledge of the most de-
terminate non-aesthetic properties and all the aesthetic qualities of an object,
we can reason that the same qualities are present in another object simply on
the basis of learning that it possesses exactly the same lower-level properties.1
Any more specic knowledge { say, just of the less determinate non-aesthetic
1Sibley acknowledges also the existence of particular exceptions, namely (quasi-)aesthetic
properties the presence of which we infer rather than experience. For instance, we may reason
from the bright colours of a painting to its gayness, or conclude that a painting in reddish
and yellowish tones is warm (cf. Sibley (2001b): n. 6). Budd also mentions the direct
inference from symmetry to balance (cf. Budd (1999): 302).
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properties, or of the fact that only some of the most determinate non-aesthetic
properties are responsible for the realisation of a particular aesthetic quality
{ does not allow for a similar kind of inference. For non-aesthetic properties
matter for the instantiation of aesthetic qualities on the level of their highest
specity, and relative to their wider context. A slight change in the shape of a
vase, or the addition of a certain pattern of colours, may undermine its initially
elegant appearance (cf. Budd (1999): 301f.). Now, for a non-inferentialist like
Sibley, the inference from the non-aesthetic to the aesthetic features of an ob-
ject is justied only to the extent to which it is based on a prior experience of
the object's aesthetic qualities, combined with the recognition that they occur
in correlation with the object's non-aesthetic properties. That is, any infer-
ential support for experientially grounded aesthetic judgements is, ultimately,
dependent on some prior experience. We rst have to discover experientially
which lower-level properties are responsible for which aesthetic qualities before
we can infer the presence of the latter by recognising the presence of the former.
5. That non-inferentialism about aesthetic judgements takes experience to be
our canonical way of recognising aesthetic qualities, on which all other forms of
access ultimately depend, becomes also manifest in its treatment of testimony
as not being on a par with experience in aesthetic matters. Sibley, for example,
acknowledges (cf. Sibley (2001a): 34, 40) that we sometimes ascribe aesthetic
qualities to objects just on the basis of testimony. But he also stresses that
such ascriptions have to rely on the experiences of others.
`Thus, rather as a colour-blind man may infer that something is
green without seeing that it is, and rather as a man, without seeing
a joke himself, may say that something is funny because others
laugh, so someone may attribute balance or gaudiness to a painting,
or say that it is too pale, without himself having judged it so.'
(Sibley (2001a): 35)
In this comparison, Sibley highlights { even if only somewhat implicitly {
the dierence between people possessing the required sensitivity or expertise
to recognise certain properties at rst hand and people lacking this capacity.
The blind are not acquainted with colours, and the humourless not with fun-
niness. Instead, they have to rely on testimony to come to know about the
presence of these features. If no one could see the colour of an object, the
blind would be unable to come to know about it. Similarly, if no one could
experience the funniness of a joke, the humourless would not be able to recog-
nise it either. Now, non-inferentialism assumes that something very similar is
true of aesthetic qualities. It maintains that experience is our canonical access
to such qualities; and that other forms of access { such as testimony or infer-
ence { are dependent on it. People, who ascribe aesthetic qualities without
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having experienced their instantiation themselves, have ultimately to rely on
the experiences of others. Indeed, Sibley makes the even stronger claim that
only experientially grounded judgements or beliefs can lead to a genuine and
valuable aesthetic engagement with artworks and similar objects.
`[...] [U]nless [people] do perceive [aesthetic qualities] for them-
selves, aesthetic enjoyment, appreciation, and judgement are be-
yond them. Merely to learn from others, on good authority, that
the music is serene, the play moving, or the picture unbalanced is
of little aesthetic value; the crucial thing is to see, hear, or feel.'
(Sibley (2001a): 34)
But this raises the question of which feature of experience may distinguish it
from testimony and be responsible for the dierence in canonical status and
impact on aesthetic emotion and evaluation. Both experience and testimony
may lead to knowledge. Sibley is right in that we can `learn from others'
and, moreover, `on good authority' (Sibley (2001a): 34) which objects possess
which aesthetic qualities. If you tell me about a smooth and relaxed piece of
music, and if also I know that you are trustworthy in such matters, then there
is no good reason to deny that my resulting belief concerning those aesthetic
qualities may count as justied and, possibly, also as constituting knowledge.2
Moreover, both experience and testimony may provide us with non-inferential
justication { at least if the latter directly communicates to us the experience
of someone else. If we judge that something is red because someone else, who
is looking at the object, tells us that it is red, our judgement is ultimately
justied in an experiential and, hence, non-inferential way.
So, the non-inferentialist needs to identify another dierence between ex-
perience and testimony which can ensure that, while testimonially based as-
criptions of aesthetic qualities play no signicant role in aesthetic appreciation,
experientially grounded opinions are central to the latter. The most promising
suggestion is perhaps one made by Malcolm Budd (cf. Budd (2003)). His
proposal is that what matters for aesthetic appreciation is not merely that
we recognise which aesthetic qualities are realised in a given object, but also
how they are realised by the respective underlying features. What is interest-
ing about Hamlet is not so much that it is a masterpiece (we learn this very
quickly and early on), but the unique and complex way in which it acquires
this high status { and in which it diers, say, from Faust. Now, testimony may
inform us about the exemplication of aesthetic qualities and non-aesthetic
properties. But it cannot (or at least not normally) give us a sucient idea of
how the two sets of features are linked. In order to identify the particular way
2See Budd (2003) for further discussion of this issue and a defense of the possibility of
testimonial aesthetic knowledge.
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in which some aesthetic quality is realised in an object, we need to experience
the object and its various higher- and lower-level features; or so the line of
reasoning may go. The so-called Principle of Acquaintance { which requires
us to experience artworks and aesthetic objects ourselves, rather than to rely
on the experiences of others { is therefore perhaps best understood as speci-
fying a condition on full aesthetic assessment and enjoyment, rather than on
the acquisition of mere knowledge about aesthetic qualities.
II.
6. As already noted at the beginning, aesthetic qualities depend for their
instantiation on certain lower-level features of the objects concerned. This
means that the latter are responsible for the exemplication of the former and
determine which particular aesthetic qualities are instantiated.3 Moreover, we
should be able to supplement our aesthetic judgements by reference to these
lower-level features. It is an important aspect of our critical engagement with
bearers of aesthetic qualities that we can identify the relevant underlying prop-
erties and their signicance for the exemplication of the aesthetic qualities in
question (cf. Sibley (2001a): 37.). Here is how Sibley summarises this point:
`[...] we saw that there must be some (ultimately non-aesthetic) fea-
tures responsible for any aesthetic quality. Another way of putting
this is that there always is, and must be, some reason why a thing
has that quality. We also saw that critics largely occupy them-
selves in discovering the reasons why a work is, say, graceful or
unbalanced; that someone who has seen that it is graceful must
in some degree have noticed these responsible features; and that
a good critic should be able to point out these reasons.' (Sibley
(2001a): 41f.)
It is indeed dicult to deny that it is standard and legitimate to expect critics
to add to our aesthetic judgements by pointing to the underlying features
responsible for the ascribed aesthetic qualities. We do not simply tell others,
say, that we nd a given painting balanced or pale, but draw their attention to
the underlying symmetry of the design or the unsaturatedness of the colours
in support of our opinion. If we are unable to follow the request of others to
back up our judgements in this way, the quality of our judgements and, more
generally, our status as a judge of aesthetic matters are diminished. Again,
3See Sibley (2001a): 35f. There, he also notes two specic aspects of this determination
relation: the aesthetic qualities depend on a whole set of lower-level features (if not on all
lower-level features of the object in question); and some members of this set are `notably or
especially responsible' for the aesthetic quality in question.
199
Non-Inferentialism about Aesthetic Judgement Chapter 7
Budd's idea that what matters is not merely the presence of aesthetic qualities,
but also the particular way in which they are realised by the lower-level features
of the objects concerned can explain why it is important and required to be
able to identify the latter and their link to the aesthetic qualities.
This highlights an important dierence between aesthetic cognition (as well
as other forms of higher-level cognition) and our basic perception of colours,
smells, sounds, and so on. For it is unreasonable to demand of us to supplement
our colour or similar judgements by referring to more fundamental features of
the objects at issue. At best, we may be asked to elucidate why we take our
respective perceptual experiences to be in order. This dierence is perhaps
best explained by reference to the fact that colours and similar properties { in
contrast to aesthetic qualities { are not dependent on more basic perceivable
(or otherwise easily accessible) features of their bearers. Given that seeing
the redness of an object does not require noticing any of the unperceivable
features responsible for that instance of redness, it is unreasonable to demand
that the perceiver is able to identify those unperceivable features. By contrast
{ as Sibley has noted in the quoted passage above and elsewhere (cf. Sibley
(2001a): 38) { we recognise aesthetic qualities by recognising the accessible
underlying features on which they depend.
7. The question is now what kind of support { and therefore also what kind
of quality or value of aesthetic judgement { is at issue here. It may seem
natural to maintain that our awareness of the lower-level features provides
us with evidence for aesthetic judgements { that is, with epistemic reasons
for judging or believing that the object concerned possesses certain aesthetic
qualities.4 But it is unclear how a non-inferentialist could accommodate this
interpretation of our practice. In the last section, I noted cases in which an
experientially grounded judgement may actually receive further epistemic sup-
port. But, with respect to aesthetic cognition, these cases are rather rare and
exceptional, while our practice of providing further support for our opinions
applies to all instances of aesthetic judgement. So, the justicatory power of
recognising relevant lower-level features cannot derive from some prior experi-
ential engagement with objects very similar to the one at issue. Instead, the
4For the current purposes, it is not necessary to distinguish between epistemic reasons
and evidence; and I treat them here as if they were the same. It should be uncontroversial
that whether we have epistemic reasons to form a certain judgement or belief is at least
partly a function of the existence and strength of evidence indicating the truth or falsity of
the propositions at issue. But the presence or availability of epistemic reasons { for instance,
when evidence counts as epistemically sucient for rational belief, or when we have reason
to form a belief in response to evidence in the rst place { may also depend on pragmatic
factors (cf. Kolodny (2007): n. 10), so that perhaps not all pieces of evidence should count
as providing us with some epistemic reason.
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non-inferentialist has to assume the evidential force in question to be indepen-
dent of experience. But, now, the problem for the non-inferentialist is to avoid
the possibility of acquiring knowledge about the exemplication of aesthetic
qualities simply in response to the evidence provided by the recognition of
the lower-level features, and without any experience of the aesthetic qualities
in question. If the presence of some lower-level features speaks in favour of
the presence of some aesthetic quality, the recognition of the former should {
everything else being equal { be sucient for the recognition of the latter.5
Not surprisingly, Sibley maintains that reference to the underlying proper-
ties cannot supplement the epistemic justication of our aesthetic judgments.
Instead of treating the lower-level features as reasons for ascribing aesthetic
qualities, he proposes to identify them as reasons for why something possesses
certain aesthetic qualities:
`There is a familiar and important form of reason-giving, at least
for the aesthetic judgements under discussion, which does not con-
sist in citing properties of the work in propositions which logically
support { that is, make certain or likely { the truth of the critic's
judgement.' (Sibley (2001a): 44)
`[...] these are reasons why the work is graceful, and to be distin-
guished from reasons { good or bad, a critic's or anyone else's { for
concluding or inferring that the work is graceful.' (Sibley (2001a):
41f.)
`It is, then, a quite unwarranted assumption that, if a critic has
noticed or discovered the reasons why something has a certain aes-
thetic quality and in that sense can cite reasons which support his
judgement, he thereby has reasons the citing of which provide ra-
tional support for his judgement or show it to be reasonable.' A
may in fact be the reason why something is B, and yet the knowl-
edge that that thing has A may provide no reason or justication
for supposing that it has B.' (Sibley (2001a): 43)
The distinction appealed to in these passages is that between epistemic rea-
sons and what Sibley sometimes identies as explanatory reasons (cf. Sibley
(2001b): 12; and Sibley (2001a): 38). The rst are reasons for forming a
judgement or belief and are cited in the justication of the latter. The second,
by contrast, are reasons (or facts) that are responsible for something being a
certain way and thus may be used to explain why it is that way { in this case,
5Perhaps it is possible to treat the justicatory power of our awareness of the lower-level
features to be independent of experience, while denying that it is by itself sucient to justify
(or motivate) an aesthetic judgement. I return to this possibility in section IV.
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why something possesses certain aesthetic qualities, and possibly also why it
causes us to have certain responses.
Now, the non-inferentialist proposal is that pointing to the lower-level fea-
tures has no evidential, but just explanatory force: it helps us to understand
how the aesthetic qualities are realised in the object concerned, and perhaps
also what is causally responsible for our awareness of those qualities. It is
important to note that the explanation concerned is not of a rational { and
epistemic { nature: it does not answer the question of why { that is, for which
epistemic reasons { we have formed our judgement. Rather, he insists that it
is an answer to the question of why { that is, because of which features { the
object possesses the aesthetic qualities ascribed in the judgement (cf. Sibley
(2001a): 36, 43). What we are concerned with here are therefore metaphysical
explanations that single out the lower-level features responsible for the pres-
ence of aesthetic qualities, as well as possibly for our recognition of the latter.
To use some of Sibley's examples, the concentration of the blues and greys of
a painting gives rise to and determines its unity of tone; and the sombre or
indecisive character of a musical passage is due to a prominent change in key
(cf. Sibley (2001a): 36). Moreover, the lower-level features are part of what
causes us to recognise them and, subsequently, the aesthetic qualities which
they determine or realise. The corresponding explanations do not rationalise
our aesthetic responses, but instead highlight certain constitutional, causal or
otherwise metaphysical connections in the world. That is, they cite (what may
be called) metaphysical { instead of epistemic { explanatory reasons.6
6With this interpretation of Sibley's position, I seem to be in disagreement with Elisa-
beth Schellekens, who appears to read his distinction as being one between justifying and
rationalising epistemic reasons. For, according to her, recognising the lower-level features
`[explains] why one might think that some thing has a certain property' or `why one has
made the judgement' (Schellekens (2006): 174, 170); and the resulting `process of rational
reection about features of the object of appreciation plays a part in the process by which the
aesthetic judgements are held to be explained' (Schellekens (2006): 175). Only one passage
suggests that she may mean metaphysical explanation, rather than psychological rationali-
sation. There, she says that `[t]he features responsible for a thing's aesthetic character can
only be viewed as explaining reasons for the phenomenal impression produced' (Schellekens
(2006): 175). Assuming that `impression' stands in for `experience', what she takes to
be explained here is the { presumably non-rational { causal occurrence of our experiential
awareness of aesthetic qualities.
In any case, the quoted passages of Sibley's text should make it clear that his own contrast
is one between epistemic and metaphysical reasons, and not between two kinds of epistemic
reasons. For him, reference to the lower-level features does not provide any form of rational
support for aesthetic judgements, not even one that is capable of explaining the formation
of the latter { or rendering it reasonable { from the subject's perspective. Instead, Sibley
is concerned with the realisation of aesthetic qualities by some underlying non-aesthetic
properties: the latter are the reasons why the former are present { and possibly also the
reasons why the objects cause us to recognise the aesthetic qualities.
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8. The main task for the non-inferentialist is therefore to elucidate how ref-
erence to metaphysical connections or reasons really adds something to our
aesthetic judgements; and moreover does so in such a way that we can rea-
sonably demand such an addition from good critics. If the non-inferential ap-
proach fails to come up with a satisfactory answer, our practice of asking for
additional support in aesthetic matters would remain completely unexplained.
But how can highlighting metaphysical facts and formulating corresponding
metaphysical explanations be aesthetically relevant? Again, it is worthwhile
to pay closer attention to what Sibley has to say on this issue:
`Even when we have remarked the grace, unity, or ungainliness of
something, we may yet be unable to say why it has these qualities.
But a good critic should be able to point out what makes it so.
Such explanations satisfy an interest and curiosity we often have
about the aesthetic qualities of things (especially when the artist
has achieved new eects or achieved something in an unusual way).
But they may do more than this. When we see in detail how and
why the work has its character, we may nd our initial judge-
ment strengthened and trust it more condently. Moreover, as we
come to realize how boldly or subtly, with what skill, economy,
and exactness, the eect is achieved, how each detail is judged to a
nicety and all work together with a ne precision, our appreciation
is deepened and enriched and becomes more intelligent in being
articulate.' (Sibley (2001a): 37)
`The second [critical] activity I have in mind is less limited and more
important than that of providing explanations for the aesthetic
qualities one has already seen; it consists instead in helping people
to see and judge for themselves that things have those qualities.
[...] a major occupation of critics is the task of bringing people
to see things for what, aesthetically, they are, as well as why they
are.' (Sibley (2001a): 38)
In these passages, Sibley singles out four dierent ways in which the reference
to the realisation of aesthetic qualities by lower-level features may add some-
thing to our judgemental ascriptions of the former qualities in a non-evidential
manner: (i) it may enable or help us { and others { to actually experience the
aesthetic qualities; (ii) it may increase our condence { and the condence of
others { in our aesthetic judgements; (iii) it may enrich our aesthetic appreci-
ation and render it more intelligible; and (iv) it may satisfy a curiosity of ours
which is distinctive of our aesthetic engagement with objects. The challenge
for non-inferentialism is hence to make sense of how one (or more) of these four
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potential eects of noting the metaphysical connection between the two sets of
properties can count as supporting or supplementing aesthetic judgement in
a non-evidential manner. More concretely, the non-inferential approach needs
to elucidate the aesthetic relevance of these factors independently of any evi-
dential considerations. And it needs to account for the normative dimension
of the reference to the lower-level features { namely that good critics should
be able, when challenged, to identify these features and their impact on the
aesthetic qualities. Whether the non-inferentialist can satisfactorily address
these issues is the topic of the next section.
III.
9. Let me begin with (i), Sibley's observation that pointing out the relevant
lower-level features and their aesthetic signicance may help people to recog-
nise for themselves the aesthetic qualities realised by the former. As far as it
goes, this observation seems to be accurate. But it is compatible with a denial
of the experientiality of the recognition of aesthetic qualities, as well as with
the postulation of an inferential link between our awareness of the lower-level
features and our judgemental ascriptions of the aesthetic qualities. Indeed,
recognising the lower-level features and their contribution to the realisation
of the aesthetic qualities may help us to notice the latter precisely because it
provides us with further evidence for ascribing the latter.
Furthermore, the observation cannot elucidate why we take the identi-
cation of the features realising the aesthetic qualities to add something of
aesthetic relevance to the ascription of the latter. It has been explained how
this identication may lead to the formation of aesthetic judgements (namely
of others), but not how it may support or supplement them. In particular, our
demand of good critics to be able to back up their own judgements by point-
ing to the responsible lower-level features when challenged is distinct from our
expectation of good critics to be able to make other people recognise aesthetic
properties. The former concerns the task of convincing a sceptic about the
aesthetic qualities ascribed, while the latter concerns the task of educating
people and of improving their aesthetic sensibility.
It is true that one ecient way of convincing a sceptic is to get him to
recognise the disputed aesthetic quality for himself. But it is not the only way
and can neither be required, nor hoped for in response to a challenge to an
aesthetic judgement. This is reected by the fact that the educational func-
tion of the reference to the lower-level features is of no interest to someone
who is already able to recognise the aesthetic quality concerned. By contrast,
the explanatory and supportive function of that reference may still be very
important for that person. For instance, she may be unsure about her own
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aesthetic judgement and may therefore feel the need to supplement it further
by identifying the relevant lower-level features. Or she may disagree with the
other person about which such underlying features in fact realise the aesthetic
quality and support its ascription.
10. Perhaps Sibley's idea (ii) { that pointing to certain lower-level features
in order to explain the presence of a particular aesthetic quality may increase
our trust or condence in our corresponding aesthetic judgement { can bet-
ter account for this supportive role. The situation envisaged is like this: we
experience, and judge, a passage of music to have a sombre character; we in-
dependently notice a change in key in the passage and link its presence to the
presence of the sombre character; and noticing this link leads us { as well as
others { to feel more condent about our judgement, and perhaps also more
inclined to rely on our experience. But why does our recognition of the lower-
level features and their contribution to the realisation of the aesthetic qualities
render our aesthetic judgement more trustworthy in our own eyes and the eyes
of others?
One possible answer is to maintain that the increase in condence does not
consist in a strengthening of epistemic trust, but rather in something like a
merely causal inuence on some non-rational feeling of condence or certainty,
or some non-rational disposition to rely on our aesthetic experience and judge-
ment. Accordingly, the increase in trust reects no positive contribution from
an epistemic point of view. To the contrary, it is actually in danger of render-
ing our aesthetic judgements epistemically inadequate. For it may decrease its
epistemic standing (e.g., its likelihood of being true) by making us less critical
and less responsive to opposing reasons. That is, we run the risk to hold on to
our judgement for non-epistemic causes, namely an increased feeling of con-
dence or a strengthened disposition to trust. Although the gain of condence
need not necessarily have these negative consequences, it also has no positive
eects because of which it could count as adding something valuable to our
aesthetic judgements.
So, perhaps the kind of condence involved amounts rather to some kind of
epistemic credence or trust. But, as noted above, the non-inferentialist wants
to deny that our knowledge of the metaphysical underpinnings of aesthetic
qualities supplies us with evidence for believing in the exemplication of the
latter. Hence, the non-inferentialist should rather say that what we are con-
cerned with here is not the evidential justication of the aesthetic judgements,
but but instead our trustworthiness as critics in aesthetic matters. In other
words, the suggestion should be that our manifestation of the ability to recog-
nise the lower-level features and their realisation of the aesthetic qualities is
an indicator of the quality of our aesthetic sensitivity { at least on this partic-
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ular occasion. It reveals that we are good judges of aesthetic qualities and, in
this sense, adds further support to our aesthetic judgements. Similarly, if we
discover that someone is very good in visually dierentiating and identifying
objects far away, we may trust his respective judgements more than those of
less discerning people.
But this proposal is awed. Part of the reason for this is that the compari-
son with visual discrimination actually reveals a signicant dierence. We nd
out whether someone is good at recognising objects in the distance by looking
at whether his past discriminations and judgements have been accurate. That
is, we trust him because, in the past, he was mostly right about the distinctness
and identity of distant objects. The parallel suggestion in the aesthetic case
would be that we have condence in someone (who may actually be identical
with ourselves) because, in the past, he was mostly successful in recognising
aesthetic qualities. The proposal at hand, however, locates the reason for the
increase in trust, not in the quality of (past) recognitions of aesthetic qualities,
but instead in the quality of (present) recognitions of the underling realisators
of such qualities. Accordingly, the suggestion is that we should trust someone's
aesthetic judgements because he has shown himself to be able to identify the
lower-level features and their contribution to the aesthetic qualities.
Now, this proposal can be made to work only if it is true that someone,
who is good at the identication of aesthetically relevant lower-level features,
is also good at recognising aesthetic qualities. This would be the case if the
awareness of the lower-level features would actually enable or help him to dis-
cover the relevant aesthetic qualities { either along the lines of proposal (i), or
because this awareness would provide him with evidence for the ascription of
the qualities. But both options are not open to the non-inferentialist: the rst
for the reasons outlined at the beginning of this section; and the second due
to the view's commitment to the non-evidential character of the support pro-
vided by our awareness of the lower-level features. However, if proposal (i) fails
and the abilitity to recognise lower-level properties as realisators of aesthetic
qualities does not reveal a sensitivity to epistemic reasons for aesthetic judge-
ments, then it becomes mysterious why the possession of this ability should
have any bearing on the epistemic standing of someone as a judge in aesthetic
matters. There is no reason to assume that someone, who possesses knowl-
edge of how aesthetic qualities are realised, should count as a better judge of
aesthetic qualities than someone, who lacks that kind of knowledge.7 A blind
person may know everything about how colours are realised by their bearers.
7If it is indeed true to say that aesthetic sensitivity is concerned both with aesthetic
qualities and with what realises them, the present challenge for the non-inferentialist is to
show how these two aspects of discernment are linked to each other { if they are not linked
by means of an evidential connection between the lower-level features and the aesthetic
qualities.
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But this does not render him good at experientially (rather than inferentially)
recognising the colours of objects.
11. As already noted in section I, understanding how aesthetic qualities are
realised by the lower-level features of specic objects may very well add some-
thing to our aesthetic experience of those objects. More specically, it may
enrich the latter by enabling us to fully appreciate the aesthetic value of the
objects or to respond with adequate aesthetic emotions to them { thus oer-
ing the possibility of accepting Sibley's proposal (iii). However, as important
as this enrichment might be, it does not aect the standing of our aesthetic
judgements. At best, it bestows some value on our related, but independently
acquired knowledge of the realisation of the aesthetic qualities by the lower-
level features. For, as outlined in section I, it is this kind of knowledge { rather
than the mere ascription of aesthetic qualities { which is crucial for the occur-
rence of aesthetic evaluations and emotions. So, there is no obvious sense in
which the possible enrichment of aesthetic appreciation that comes with aes-
thetic perception adds something positive to the status of any experientially
based aesthetic judgements involved in the same instance of appreciation.
12. This leaves us with element (iv) in Sibley's account of the impact of
metaphysical reasons on aesthetic judgements: the satisfaction of a distinc-
tively aesthetic kind of curiosity. Sibley's idea appears to be that we have
a specically aesthetic interest in coming to know which lower-level features
are responsible for the aesthetic qualities of an object, and how the former
contribute to the determination of the latter. Satisfying this kind of curiosity
is then taken to support or supplement our aesthetic judgement, albeit not by
adding to the latter's evidential justication.
It seems undeniable that our desire to understand artworks and similar
objects includes that we care about knowing how aesthetic qualities are realised
by relevant lower-level features { and not seldomly more than about knowing
that the aesthetic qualities are instantiated in the rst place. When considering
artworks with a high degree of originality, say, our critical activity typically
focusses less on the relatively unspecic and obvious fact that they are original,
and more on the precise and partially hidden ways in which they manage to
be so. Correspondingly, there is likely to be much more disagreement about
the latter than about the former.
Once we compare this aesthetic type of curiosity with its scientic counter-
part, however, the proposal turns out to be problematic. The main diculty
is to delineate the kind of interest distinctively linked to aesthetic judgement
and appreciation, and to get clear in which sense its satisfaction might add
something to our aesthetic judgements.
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When we engage with artworks on our own or talk about them with others,
we may refer to the lower-level features of the works for various reasons, not
all of which are concerned with the appreciation of their aesthetic value, or
with the explanation of why they possess their aesthetic qualities. Painters
may be curious about the kind of paint used because they are impressed by
its durability and want to try it out for themselves. Historians may be inter-
ested in the type of wood of a painting's frame in order to get clearer about
why people at that time used dierent kinds of wood for dierent purposes.
Biologists may have a similar interest in the wood because they study the dis-
tribution of types of tree in the region where the painting was made. However,
these are not cases of aesthetic curiosity, but rather examples of a practical,
historical or similar form of interest. Even when we are aiming to understand
the metaphysically explanatory link between lower-level features and aesthetic
properties, this need not happen because of any aesthetic interest in the ob-
ject in question. A metaphysician worrying about the ontological status of
aesthetic properties or artworks may concern himself with the relation of de-
termination holding between the non-aesthetic and the aesthetic in the hope
that this will shed light on some of his philosophical problems.
But even if our interest in an object and its features is clearly aesthetic
in nature, we do not care about all possible metaphysical explanations of the
presence of aesthetic qualities. When we notice that the harmony of a paint-
ing is partly due to the fact that the gestures and postures of the depicted
characters are roughly mirrored in the spatial orientation of elements of the
landscape, such as trees or roads, we do not care about how much the respec-
tive lines in fact diverge from being straight lines or true parallels. Or when
we recognise that the dramatic nature of a piece of music is partly a matter
of a continuous and rhythmic low pitch sound, we are not really captivated by
the additional knowledge of the specic length of the sound waves, or of the
precise intervals of the rhythm specied in milliseconds. None the less, these
latter facts about the piece of music, just as the actual angle between the lines
on the painting, may very well be used, from a metaphysical perspective, to
account for the harmonious or dramatic characters of the works. To take an
even more radical example, the harmony of the painting { and most of its
other aesthetic qualities { depends on the specic nature and distribution of
the molecules making up the paint on the canvas. But we do not pay attention
to that molecular structure while experiencing and appreciating the painting.
It is true that, when we are aiming to fully appreciate a painting, we may
be interested in physical facts about the wooden panel or the paint used, which
tell us something about the age of the work; or in the results of an X-ray inves-
tigation, which reveal something about the development of the artist's ideas
during the process of painting. But we normally do not care about the precise
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length of the light waves reected by the coloured canvas, or about the molec-
ular structure of the oil used in mixing the paint. The respective facts strike
us as aesthetically irrelevant, as not in any way enriching our understanding
of the work. Similarly, there may be future artworks, the recognition of the
aesthetic properties of which requires us to study the reectance properties
of their surfaces, or their atomic composition. But even then, there will be
metaphysical facts { for instance, about the subatomic particles { which we
do not care about from an aesthetic perspective.
A scientist or metaphysician, on the other hand, has any interest to keep
on investigating, given that his goal is to fully comprehend the nature and
origin of the objects concerned. It is here that we nd a central dierence
between aesthetic and scientic curiosity. The latter is not restricted to certain
metaphysical truths and explanations. From a scientic point of view, it is
interesting to nd out as much as possible about the constitution and causal
powers of things. In contrast, our aesthetic curiosity is rather limited, once
it comes to metaphysical matters. This fact is in need of explanation: why
are we aesthetically curious only about some facts about the realisation of
aesthetic qualities, and not others? However, when we address this question,
the problematic status of Sibley's fourth proposal { and indeed of the non-
inferential approach as a whole { becomes apparent: they simply do not have
the resources to provide a satisfactory explanation of the limits of our aesthetic
interest.
As a rst possible answer, the non-inferentialist might suggest that our
aesthetic curiosity stops at the level of perceivability: that we do not care
about explanations which trace aesthetic qualities back to imperceivable lower-
level features. This may be true in some cases, but not in all. Many aesthetic
qualities depend directly on imperceivable features of their bearers, and we are
aesthetically interested in the respective metaphysical knowledge. We do care,
for instance, about the usually imperceivable age of a painting because it tells
us something about its originality. In addition, many aesthetic qualities of
novels depend on non-aesthetic features { such as the meaning of its words, or
the elements of its story-line { which we cannot experience and have to grasp
intellectually.
Similarly, it is imaginable that there may be forms of art which we are
supposed to appreciate by means of oscillographs which render otherwise im-
perceivable sound or light waves accessible in the shape of changing curves
on the screen. But it is not clear whether this kind of access to the waves {
in contrast to our access to the marks on the screen { should still count as
perceptual. One simple way of dealing with these last cases might be to treat
the mentioned tools and their eects literally as part of the artwork. Thus,
the perceivable parts of the piece would be the images of the waves produced
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on the screens. But this might be in tension with the artist's intentions, or the
curatorial conventions, which do not take the oscillographs to be part of the
work. It is also doubtful whether we could establish a satisfactory theory of
which elements belong to certain artworks of certain types, that could rule out
the possibility of artworks which are accessible only via oscillographs and the
like, but do not contain the latter or their perceivable eects as their parts.
Most importantly, however, noting that our aesthetic interest is, in certain
cases, restricted to perceivable lower-level features and their contribution to
aesthetic qualities would not amount to a very illuminating characterisation of
the limitation of aesthetic curiosity. For it would still be in need of explanation
why our interest does in fact not extend to imperceivable lower-level features.
For the same reason, the limitation of aesthetic curiosity cannot be accounted
for in terms of the idea that it is concerned merely with what enables and
enriches more complex and emotional aesthetic experiences. For, again, this
would just shift the explanatory burden since we would then need to say why
this limited concern might be in place, without simply falling back on option
(iii) discussed above.
A second possible non-inferentialist answer is that we are interested only
in those metaphysical facts which we actually manage to explanatorily link up
with the aesthetic qualities. Knowing the precise angles of the nearly parallel
lines or the molecular structure of the paint may not mean much to us because
we do not recognise their contribution to the harmonious or garish character
of the painting. And learning something about the wavelengths and temporal
intervals may remain aesthetically uninteresting for us if it does not help us to
make sense of the dramatic nature of the music.
But the problem with this proposal is that the acquisition of the missing
understanding normally does not undermine our impression that reference to
features like the molecular structure is aesthetically beside the point. Coming
to know the exact angles of the lines in the painting may tell us why they are
approximately parallel. And, from a purely scientic point of view, this addi-
tional information is interesting and illuminating, at least to some extent. But
it does not add anything to our aesthetic understanding of why the painting
is harmonious. Knowing that the lines are approximately parallel suces here
already. Similarly, that the garishness of the painting is ultimately due to the
molecules of paint on its surface is aesthetically irrelevant, even if we know
how the latter contribute to the brightness and purity of the colours responsi-
ble for the former. Importantly, the limitation of aesthetic curiosity concerns
not merely our (rather trivial) knowledge that the precise angles of the lines
or the molecular structure of the paint determine the aesthetic qualities of the
painting, but also our (very substantial) knowledge of how the former realise
the latter { or at least how they realise the approximate parallelity of the lines
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or the brightness and purity of the colours, which again realise the latter.
A third and nal option for the non-inferentialist is to maintain that our
aesthetic curiosity is limited to those lower-level features, noticing which helps
us to recognise the respective aesthetic qualities { of course without providing
us with further evidence for our aesthetic judgements. However, this would
mean that we would loose or fail to develop this interest in the underlying
properties, if we came or were already able to recognise the aesthetic quali-
ties in question. For instance, once we got the other party to recognise the
aesthetic qualities at issue by pointing them to suitable lower-level features,
the latter would stop being of any help for us and would therefore cease to be
relevant for our aesthetic experiences. But this is obviously not the case in real
aesthetic disputes. Even if there is agreement on the presence of a certain aes-
thetic quality, we may still refer to some lower-level features in support of our
aesthetic judgement { in fact, we may still disagree about reference to which
lower-level features is of justicatory importance. The problem is thus that
the proposal under consideration treats our curiosity as purely pragmatic. In
particular, it ignores the fact that there is a link between the aesthetic qualities
and the underlying lower-level features, and that this link is of signicance for
why identifying the latter may provide support for ascribing the former.
13. So the current challenge for the adherent of the non-inferential view {
namely to provide us with a satisfactory specication of our distinctively aes-
thetic interest in certain, but not all, of the lower-level features which help to
realise aesthetic qualities { is still unanswered. As a result, non-inferentialism
is subject to two serious objections, and not only one. First, it cannot make
sense of how identifying the metaphysical connection between the two sets of
properties can provide some form of non-evidential support for our aesthetic
judgements. That is, it cannot make sense of why it is expected of good critics
that they can point to lower-level features in support of their aesthetic judge-
ments. At least, none of Sibley's four proposals has been resourceful enough
to resolve this issue; and it is not clear whether there are any other, more
promising options available to the non-inferentialist. Second, as just argued,
non-inferentialism cannot account for the limitation of our aesthetic curiosity.
In the light of both objections, non-inferentialism in the form advocated by
Sibley is better to be given up.
IV.
14. There is, of course, a relatively simple solution to the two problems men-
tioned at the end of last section. It consists in adopting an evidential un-
derstanding of the support provided by the recognition of the lower-level fea-
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tures. The rst problem disappears immediately: pointing to relevant evidence
clearly bolsters our aesthetic judgements. But also the second problem can be
dealt with in a straightforward manner. The key idea is to say that, when
referring to the lower-level features in aesthetic debates, we are interested in
proper justication { namely in the evidential impact of our recognition of the
lower-level features on the occurrence and epistemic standing of our aesthetic
judgements. This interpretation of our practice of demanding and providing
support for our aesthetic judgements in terms of lower-level features explains
the limits of our aesthetic curiosity in terms of the fact that only those lower-
level features matter for us, the awareness of which provides us with evidence
for (or against) our ascription of the aesthetic qualities concerned. We are
aesthetically interested in these { but not other { lower-level features precisely
because identifying them may help us to improve and solidify our aesthetic
judgements and, as a consequence, also to advance the emotional, evaluative
and other elements of aesthetic appreciation. But this, of course, requires giv-
ing up non-inferentialism and endorsing inferentialism. Once we reject the idea
that we experience (or feel, intuit, etc.) aesthetic qualities, the two problems
raised can be resolved.
The inferential account, however, faces its own diculties. One has already
been mentioned, namely the problem of accounting for the phenomenological
immediacy of our aesthetic judgements. Especially the idea of implicit in-
ferences needs further elucidation and support. Another problem is how to
accommodate Sibley's convincing arguments against the existence of aesthetic
principles. The best idea seems to be to understand aesthetic reasoning as a
special form of abduction or informed guessing, which does not require to be
guided by principles. But much more needs to be said to make proper sense
of this idea.
15. These and similar diculties may motivate one to hold on to the idea that
aesthetic judgements are non-inferentially grounded in experience, but to com-
bine it with the idea that our awareness of suitable lower-level features may
give us some extra epistemic { and possibly evidential { support for our expe-
rientially based recognitions of aesthetic qualities. In a recent essay, Elisabeth
Schellekens has argued that this is indeed how we should conceive of our access
to aesthetic qualities and interpret our practice of providing further support
for our resulting aesthetic judgements. According to her hybrid account, our
aesthetic judgements are responses not only to experiences of aesthetic qual-
ities, but also to considerations about the relevant lower-level features which
realise or determine those qualities.
`Whereas our perception of [a] building's elegance seems unmedi-
ated or instantaneous rather like the perception of redness { we
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`see' the elegance { our judgement to the eect that the building
is indeed elegant may be understood to follow from the perception
that it is so and also from our reection on various salient features
of that building.' (Schellekens (2006):175f.)
`Such an account relies on the possibility of appealing to an ob-
ject's salient features in order to check [...] whether our aesthetic
judgement is well founded. [...] The idea of such a justication play-
ing a more prominent part in our account of aesthetic epistemology,
then, is not intended to suggest that aesthetic perception should be
discarded, but merely that a reasonable objectivism for aesthetic
judgements stands little chance of getting o the ground if the per-
ceptual model is taken as our chief and only guide.' (Schellekens
(2006): 177)
This raises, however, the question of the nature of the specic epistemic sup-
port that the recognition of the lower-level features and their metaphysical con-
nections to the aesthetic qualities is meant to provide. Schellekens is adamant
that it is not inferential, at least not to such an extent that noting the pres-
ence of the lower-level features is already sucient to infer the presence of
the aesthetic qualities. For she follows Sibley in insisting on experience as our
canonical access to aesthetic qualities and, relatedly, in rejecting the idea of the
possibility of an independent inferential justication of aesthetic judgements
(cf. Schellekens (2006): 176).
`I may form the judgement `x is graceful', and my judgement may
involve my scrutinizing x in an attempt to isolate some explaining
reasons, but that is not to say that the presence of the features
serving that role are in themselves sucient for me to infer that x
is indeed graceful now or at any other time. This is so because the
aesthetic perception prompting the judgement forms a necessary
part of its grounding. And for the reason that this perception still
retains its non-inferential and purely aesthetic character, there is
no genuine inference from non-aesthetic to aesthetic to be found.'
(Schellekens (2006): 176)
`To use Sibley's scheme whereby `A' refers to a non-aesthetic fea-
ture and `B' an aesthetic quality, it is not because we know A that
we perceive B; but we can say that because we perceive B and
know, or come to know A, we can judge that `x is B'.' (Schellekens
(2006): 176)
Accordingly, what puts us into the position to acquire knowledge about aes-
thetic qualities are both our experiences of these qualities and our awareness
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of the relevant underlying features. It would be a misreading of Schellekens'
proposal to interpret it as meaning that our aesthetic judgements are the result
of a more complex kind of inference { namely an inference, not just from our
recognition of the lower-level features alone, but from both this recognition
and our experience of the aesthetic qualities together. Schellekens is right in
not promoting such an interpretation of her view. For it would lead to the
problematic treatment of experiential evidence in aesthetic matters as insu-
cient for the rational motivation and justication of corresponding judgements
and, hence, as in need of supplementation by some further epistemic consid-
erations. There is no reason to assume that aesthetic experience should dier
from normal perception in not providing us with sucient evidence for judge-
ment (everything else being equal). But if experiencing an aesthetic quality
is already enough for us to be moved and entitled to ascribe it to the object
concerned, it becomes unclear why there is any need to substitute it with a
richer form of reasoning. Schellekens conception of the epistemic role of the
reference to the lower-level features is, accordingly, dierent:
`Perhaps, then, it would be better to understand an aesthetic per-
ception as that which provides the experiential grounding of an
aesthetic judgement, and an aesthetic judgement as that which re-
ports on a perception. Thus a judgement may be allowed to involve
a set of reections { reections most probably prompted by the per-
ception but not, strictly speaking, part of that aesthetic perception
itself { concerning features of the object of aesthetic appreciation.
Some of those features may be considered relevant to the thing's
aesthetic character, and can thus lead us to conrm our perception
in the form of a judgement.' (Schellekens (2006): 175f.)
`Such an account relies on the possibility of appealing to an object's
salient features in order to check whether our aesthetic perception
is well grounded [...].' (Schellekens (2006): 177)
So the formation of aesthetic judgements may be a process with three stages.
First, we experience a certain aesthetic quality. Second, this experience gets
conrmed by the recognition of suitable lower-level features that explain the
presence of that aesthetic quality. Third, we report on our conrmed expe-
rience in the shape of an aesthetic judgement. Schellekens does not seem to
take the second step to be necessary for the ascription of aesthetic qualities {
in contrast to the other two steps without which we would not end up with a
justied, experientially based aesthetic judgement. Moreover, she insists that
the second step has to happen epistemically { if not also temporally { after
the rst one and, in some sense, as a response to the experience involved in
the rst step. For otherwise, some kind of inference { such as the one central
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to the rich inferential model just sketched above { would, after all, enter the
picture.
`[...] the account I am exploring need not involve picking up on
a handful of non-aesthetic features, and from there inferring the
presence of an aesthetic one. The direction of this exercise is rather
the reverse, namely one of going from the aesthetic to the non-
aesthetic.' (Schellekens (2006): 176)
`The account would have to ensure that the distinctively aesthetic
element always comes into play before we look for any salient
non-aesthetic features. That way, Sibley's keenly felt and entirely
proper worry about inference may be avoided without giving up
the possibility of some kind of rational justication.' (Schellekens
(2006): 177)
To summarise, four aspects of the assumed kind of conrmation are of partic-
ular importance for Schellekens: (a) it provides epistemic support for experi-
ences of aesthetic qualities; (b) it does not on its own { and independently of
experience { suce to ground aesthetic judgements; (c) it is not needed for the
formation of justied aesthetic judgements; but (d) it still provides some epis-
temic support for aesthetic judgements { namely by conrming the aesthetic
experiences on which the judgements are based. What is perhaps most striking
{ and most puzzling { about this view is the idea that the identication of the
relevant lower-level features has the primary purpose to support the experience
of the aesthetic qualities { and not their judgemental ascription. But it is like-
wise problematic to assume that something can provide epistemic support for
experientially based judgements by bolstering the underlying experiences, but
not by supporting the judgements in a more direct manner. Each idea gives
rise to a serious worry.
16. The rst is that it is doubtful whether experience is at all open to epistemic
support and criticism in the proposed way. When the perception of colours
and shapes is concerned, our practice of challenging and defending an instance
of it may focus on two dierent kinds of factors. On the one hand, it may be
concerned with the general suitability of the viewing conditions or the viewing
subjects (e.g., whether their minds work properly or whether they possess
the required concepts). The corresponding considerations do not point to the
lower-level features of the experienced object and can therefore be ignored
here.8 On the other hand, what may be at the centre of the debate is the
comparison of dierent agreeing or opposing opinions about one and the same
8See also the similar point made in response to Sibley's proposal (ii) in section III.
215
Non-Inferentialism about Aesthetic Judgement Chapter 7
object and its colour or shape properties. For example, we may question
or bolster the standing of a given perceptual experience by considering the
perceptual experiences of other subjects, or of the same subject at dierent
times. But again, this has no bearing on the current discussion, since reference
to the lower-level features still plays no role.
This is dierent in cases where the comparative colour or shape judge-
ments are formed inferentially, and not in response to experiences (or feelings,
intuitions, etc.) of the specic property instances under consideration. As
already noted, we may, for instance, know that the presence of certain surface
reectance properties or certain geometrical features is generally a good indi-
cator for the presence of certain colours or shapes. And this piece of knowledge
may enable us to infer the colour or shape of the object in question on the
basis of recognising that it possesses the corresponding lower-level features.
Moreover, in cases where we lack such connecting knowledge, reference to the
reectance or geometrical properties remains entirely irrelevant for the assess-
ment of the epistemic status of our colour or shape experience. If we perceive
something as being red, saying that it also shows a certain reectance property
does not tell us anything about the standing of our red experience and the re-
sulting judgement, unless we know whether this particular reectance property
is linked to the colour red or to some other colour. This indicates that any
conrmation of our respective experiences in terms of the lower-level features
presupposes that we can infer the presence of the experienced properties from
the presence of the underlying features.
But, according to the view under discussion, this is not the case in the
recognition of aesthetic qualities, given that the possibility of such an infer-
ence is rejected by Schellekens (as well as Sibley). Consequently, the proposed
kind of conrmation cannot be modelled upon any of the various forms of con-
rmation present in the case of the perception of colours, shapes and similar
properties. This should already suce to cast serious doubt on the conrma-
tion's availability in the case of aesthetic experience, given that it is unclear
on what it could be modelled instead, or whether we have any independent
reason to assume the existence of such a special and unusual kind of conrma-
tion. But the preceding considerations highlight another strange fact about
the kind of epistemic support put forward by Schellekens: while we can acquire
inferential knowledge about the colour or shape of a given object, we are said
to be unable to do the same with respect to aesthetic qualities. However, if at
all, it should be the other way round. Colours and shapes are among the most
basic perceivable properties, both in the sense that we do not perceive them
by perceiving some other features, and in the sense that backing them up by
reference to lower-level features is a highly unusual practice. Normally, point-
ing to the fact that we ascribe a certain colour or shape to an object because of
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how we perceptually experience it suces to answer the demands of reasonable
challenges. By contrast, aesthetic qualities are not basic in these two senses. In
particular, it is normally not enough to silence a challenge simply by claiming
to have experienced the aesthetic quality in question. This dierence suggests
that the inferential model applies more naturally to aesthetic qualities than to
colours and shapes.
17. The second worry is that no awareness of lower-level features, that is insuf-
cient to ground certain judgements by itself, can provide epistemic support for
experiences which are themselves capable of grounding those judgements. Non-
inferentialism maintains that experiences are sucient to justify the relevant
judgements. But this suciency may be questioned in particular situations.
The identication of the respective lower-level features is meant to counter
such doubts and conrm the suciency of the experiences to justify the judge-
ments. Indeed, it is dicult to see how the conrmation of the experiences
could otherwise extend its support to the experientially based judgements, if
not by rearming the suciency of the experiential support in question. How-
ever, if something is able to conrm that a given experience is enough to justify
a certain judgement, then it should also be able to justify the judgement on
its own.
Another way of making the same point is to highlight the fact that the
kind of epistemic support for experiences in question should be understood in
evidential terms. There is no way in which a reference to lower-level features
could conrm the suitability of the viewing conditions, or the quality of the
discriminatory capacities of the experiencing subject (see the discussion in sec-
tion III). Instead, such a reference should be taken to speak in favour of the
experiential presentation of the specic higher-level qualities concerned. But
if it is able to ensure the well-groundedness of experiences, then it should also
ensure the well-groundedness of judgemental endorsements of such experiences
(everything else being equal). The judgemental element does not add anything
to the experience, which would be beyond the evidential support provided by
the identication of the relevant lower-level features. In particular, both ex-
periential and judgemental presentations of higher-level qualities involve the
same kind of commitment towards the actual instantiation of those qualities
(in contrast, say, to sensory or intellectual imaginings). In other words, it
does not matter for evidential support whether the non-neutral presentation
concerned is experiential or judgemental in nature.
In addition, there are two further problems with Schelleken's proposal. First,
it threatens to undermine the rational dierence at the heart of the contrast
between experiences and judgements. What is distinctive of the two kinds of
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mental episode is that the latter are responsive to epistemic reasons and thus
open to rational revision, while the former are not. But if both are indeed
subject to the same kind of epistemic { and, presumably, evidential { support,
we need an account of how this shared support is compatible with the dierence
in rational responsiveness. It seems that this would be possible only if the link
between evidence and epistemic reasons would be cut.
Second, it is also left unexplained why the { limited or partial { justicatory
power of the recognition of the lower-level features cannot be supplemented
by some further epistemic considerations or pieces of evidence, such that it
becomes possible to form justied judgements about higher-level qualities on
these grounds. Schellekens' view is incompatible with this possibility. As
noted above, adding the experience of an aesthetic quality { or any other kind
of awareness or thought { to the recognition of the relevant lower-level fea-
tures does not lead to a sucient inference base for a judgemental ascription
of the quality. Similarly, no additional experience can turn the recognition
of the lower-level features into an experiential ground for an aesthetic judge-
ment. The only plausible candidate would be an experience of the aesthetic
quality at issue; and this experience would suce on its own to ground the
judgement. But, given this incompatibility, we are still in need of a satisfac-
tory explanation of it: that is, ow what is what is so special about the limited
or partial epistemic support provided by the identication of the lower-level
features that it cannot be rendered sucient for aesthetic judgements by some
extra elements.
18. To conclude, Schellekens' non-inferentialist view does not seem to be bet-
ter equipped than Sibley's to avoid the tension between the claim about the
experiencability of higher-level aesthetic qualities and the idea of supporting
the corresponding judgements in terms of relevant lower-level features. It is
also not easy to see how some other non-inferential theory of our canonical
access to aesthetic or other higher-level properties could do better than the
two discussed in this essay. Perhaps we should therefore start to look for an
alternative account of the phenomenological immediacy of our ascriptions of
higher-level features to experienced objects { possibly in terms of some induc-
tive and non-principled form of reasoning.9
9This paper has been presented at one of the eidos meetings at the University of Geneva,
as well as at the University of Fribourg and at University College London. I would like to
thank all participants at those occasions for their comments, notably Philipp Keller, Vincent
Lam, Stephan Leuenberger, Mike Martin, Andrew McGonigal, Kevin Mulligan, Gianfranco
Soldati, Gian-Andri Toendury, Jonathan Wol and Christian Wuthrich. Special thanks go
to Malcolm Budd for his detailed and very instructive comments on an earlier version. I
am also grateful for the nancial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation who
funded the research for this paper as part of a project on `Properties and Relations' at the
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Transparency and Imagining Seeing
One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of
disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F.
Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of
this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly
inconsistent:1
(i) As reection on the phenomenal character of visualising an external
thing reveals, it is not neutral about the presence of the visualised
thing in the imagined situation.
(ii) At least in some cases, visualising an external thing consists in imag-
ining a visual perception of it.
(iii) But imagining a visual perception of an external thing is neutral about
the latter's presence in the imagined situation.
Given that visualising cannot be non-neutral and identical with a neutral form
of imagining at the same time, one of the three claims has to go. Martin
presents detailed arguments in favour of (i) and (ii) and concludes that we
should give up (iii). Intentionalists, on the other hand, typically attack (i) or
(ii), while holding on to (iii). In this paper, I would like to suggest that the
intentionalist response gets its target wrong: instead of trying to undermine
one of the rst two claims, it should instead raise doubts about the last. In
particular, I argue that intentionalism has the resources to ensure and explain
the non-neutrality involved in imagining perceiving something.
Much of the paper will be concerned with a reconstruction of Martin's
1See especially Martin (2002b): 417.. McDowell (1998a) and Fish (2009) defend versions
of disjunctivism which in many relevant respects come close to that defended by Martin and
discussed here.
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complex argument. Intentionalists have been misunderstanding key steps in
his line of reasoning, so that it is worthwhile to explore where they went wrong,
and why the challenge raised by Martin is real. The resulting formulation of the
argument against intentionalism may very well be more mine than Martin's.
My goal is not to provide a scholarly introduction to Martin's writings, but
instead to make his case against intentionalism as strong as possible. Having a
detailed look at the problems which visualising poses for theories of perceptual
experience makes it possible to nd a satisfactory response on the behalf of
intentionalism. Indeed, it will turn out that some aspects of visualising thereby
discovered actually favour intentionalism over disjunctivism.
The version of intentionalism to be defended here diers signicantly from
those currently en vogue | most notably in linking intentionality essentially to
consciousness, and in assuming a self-presentational (i.e., experiential and self-
reexive) element as part of perceptual (and other kinds of) intentionality.2 It
may therefore be aptly labelled experiential intentionalism. Much of the paper
will be devoted to showing that, while many current versions of intentionalism
cannot provide a satisfactory answer to Martin's challenge, experiential inten-
tionalism can do so. Experiential intentionalism is thus to be preferred, not
only over disjunctivism, but also over other versions of intentionalism.
In the rst section, I introduce the intentionalist and the disjunctivist ap-
proaches to perceptual experience and contrast their distinct accounts of the
transparency and non-neutrality of perceptions.3 The next three sections elab-
orate on why we should accept the claims (i) and (ii), respectively, and why
intentionalists have been misguided in rejecting them. In particular, the nature
of experiential imagination | that is, imagining an experience | and that of
imaginative projects involving the former are considered in detail. The fth
section is intended to illustrate why current forms of intentionalism cannot
avoid the challenge posed by Martin's argument for thesis (iii). It also aims
to illustrate how both disjunctivism and experiential intentionalism can do
better, especially with respect to an explanation of the transparency and non-
neutrality of visualising. In the nal section, I use the previous discussions
about what it means to imagine having a perceptual experience in order to
2See chapters 11 and 13 for more detailed discussions of these dierences. Among the
current proponents of intentionalism, which have written explicitly on visualising and expe-
riential imagination, are Hopkins (1998), Noordhof (2002), Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)
and Burge (2005). Others are Dretske (1995), Tye (1995) and Speaks (2009).
3I use the term `experience' to denote not only sense experiences, but all instances of
conscious object awareness, including episodes of visualising and of experiential imagination.
The expression `perceptual experience' is meant to cover both (veridical) perceptions and
hallucinations, and I distinguish between the latter two independently of whether they dier
in nature or not. Besides, when I speak of `hallucinations', I mean to refer, if not stated
otherwise, to perception-like hallucinations | that is, hallucinations which are subjectively
indistinguishable from perceptions (cf. chapter 13).
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formulate an objection against disjunctivism. I conclude with some remarks
about the fact that experiential imagination seems to involve two dierent
objects of awareness, namely the imagined experience and the latter's own
object.
I.
Intentionalism and disjunctivism disagree about the nature of perceptual ex-
perience. That is, they put forward dierent accounts of the rst-personal side
of our perceptual awareness of external things and their features. But they
do so before a background of common assumptions and observations. One
is that perceptual awareness diers from propositional thought in showing us
objects, rather than describing, naming or indexing them. This contrast is
not restricted to the realm of the mental. It also characterises the dierence
between, say, pictures and sentences. Another, closely related shared observa-
tion is that perceptions are not merely about objects, but take them to be a
certain way: they are non-neutral about how things are. This aspect distin-
guishes perceptions, for instance, from desires which may also be directed at
objects, but do not involve a claim about how they are.4 And nally, both par-
ties agree that perceptions are immediate in that they present their objects as
part of our actual environment. That is, their non-neutrality concerns the ac-
tual presence of things before our senses. This perceptual commitment about
how things actually are is reected in the fact that perceptions enjoy epis-
temic authority over our beliefs about our actual environment. Furthermore,
the non-neutrality of perceptions is salient from the rst-person perspective, as
part of their transparency. Perceptions are transparent in so far as introspec-
tive attention to them reveals the external things and features of which they
make us aware, and no other canidate objects of awareness (such as sense-data
or mental pictures). The positive element of this aspect of the phenomenal
character of perceptions | of what perceptions are like for the subject |
consists in their non-neutrality: when attending to our perceptions, we nd
objects that are given to us as part of our actual environment.
However, intentionalism and disjunctivism provide dierent theories of how
perceptions relate us to external things, and of why they are non-neutral and
immediate. Intentionalism about perceptual experiences does not distinguish
between perceptions and hallucinations when adressing these issues. It main-
tains that perceptual experiences | whether they are veridical or not | make
us intentionally aware of those entities. Accordingly, they are understood as
presenting us with external objects without requiring their existence. They are
4See Martin's distinction between the semantic and the stative conception of representa-
tion in Martin (2002b).
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non-relational appearances of things which do not involve the latter as their
constituents. Moreover, intentionalism characterises the form of intentionality
common to both perceptions and hallucinations as distinctively perceptual.
This means that they involve a specic intentional attitude towards their ob-
jects which takes the latter to be actually present before us. This explains
why they are committal to aspects of our actual environment, and why they
have authority over our respective beliefs.5 Given that perceptions and hal-
lucinations are said not to dier in respect of how they make us subjectively
aware of things, intentionalism concludes that they share the same phenomenal
character and are therefore of the same fundamental kind of experience.6
By contrast, disjunctivism about perceptual experiences (as it is defended
by Martin) maintains that there is an essential dierence between the character
of perceptions and the character of hallucinations, to the eect that they belong
to dierent fundamental kinds of experience. The dierence in question is
that, while perceptions make us relationally aware of objects, hallucinations
do not.7 That perceptual awareness is relational means that the character
of perceptions | and thus the perceptions themselves | are constituted by
the external objects of which they make us aware. This explains why we nd
those objects when reecting on our perceptions, and also why the latter are
non-neutral about the presence of the former in the situation before our senses.
Intentionalism and disjunctivism, so dened, are incompatible with each
other. They provide rival accounts of how perceptual experiences make us
aware of objects and which character(s) they show. And they give dierent
5The resulting characterisation of intentionalism is meant to be neutral between its vari-
ous versions, including both naturalistic and non-naturalistic conceptions of its nature. That
is, the rst-personal presentational and attitudinal aspects of perceptions may | but need
not be | further elucidated in terms of mental representation and functional role. In chap-
ter 11, I argue that at least reference to representation is not very helpful, since it ignores
the essential connection between intentionality and consciousness or subjectivity. A similar
issue with functional role is whether it is the same as rational role, or whether it is non-
normative in nature. If the latter, I again contend that intentionality cannot be separated
from normativity.
6This conclusion is not necessitated, since perceptions and hallucinations might possibly
dier in aspects of character that are not linked to how they make us aware of objects and
features. But it is not clear what aspects that could be, or why it should be plausible to
assume their existence.
7This dierence is sometimes also spelled out in terms of perceptions `acquaintaining' us
with things, or making them `manifest' to us (though intentionalists can presumably adopt
at least the rst manner of talking). Besides, it can be ignored here what disjunctivists do, or
should, say about hallucinations and their subjective indistinguishability from perceptions.
It is perhaps defensible to argue that they still make us intentionally aware of objects (cf.
the respective discussion in Smith (2002)). But it seems more natural for disjunctivism to
conclude that hallucinations do not make us aware of objects at all | they just seem to do
so.
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answers to the question of whether perceptions and hallucinations belong to the
same fundamental kind of experience. None the less, it will become important
in the last two sections that intentionalism can endorse | if not in fact, then
at least in spirit | some of the central ideas of disjunctivism, such as the
priority of perceptions over hallucinations.
In particular, it may be argued that perceptual experiences do not only
have a rst-personal side to them, but also a third-personal side. The disjunc-
tivist position considered so far has been concerned with how to conceive of
perceptual object awareness | that is, of how it is for the conscious mind to
be presented with objects. But when we are perceiving something, we also
stand in interesting causal or similar relations to the world, which are missing
in the case of hallucination and which can be investigated from the perspec-
tive of the natural and cognitive sciences. It is surely not uncontroversial
whether these third-personally accessible, structural features of our cognition
of objects should really gure in an account of the nature of our predominantly
rst-personal experience of objects. But the two phenomena are clearly related
(e.g., we can inuence our perceptual awareness of things by inuencing our
structural relation to the world). In particular, if there is indeed a dierence in
character between perceptions and hallucinations, it is very likely to be due to
some structural dierence between cases in which we perceive something and
cases in which we hallucinate something. That is, it should be expected that
any constitutional dierence between the two kinds of perceptual experience
is accompanied by | and perhaps also partly derivable from | a dierence
in some causal or similar element.
This leaves room for a version of intentionalism which, despite claiming
that perceptions and hallucinations possess the same character, accepts that
the two dier structurally | perhaps even essentially so. In this way, inten-
tionalism can accommodate the (fairly) uncontroversial idea that, while some
intentional experiences (i.e., perceptions) relate us to the world, others (i.e.,
hallucinations) do not. It just takes the relation in question to be, not a rela-
tion of awareness, but some other kind of relation that is accessible to empirical
investigation. If we label the view that perceptions and hallucinations dier
also in character phenomenal (or naive realist) disjunctivism, and the view
that they dier merely in structure structural disjunctivism, then we can say
that intentionalism is compatible with the structural variant of disjunctivism,
but not with the phenomenal one. Intentionalism can accordingly even as-
sume that perceptions and hallucinations dier in nature | namely in their
third-personal side. However, if not stated otherwise, my focus in what follows
will be on the phenomenal version of disjunctivism. And I will understand in-
tentionalism as being neutral on the issue of whether the structural dierence
between perceptions and hallucinations amounts to a dierence in nature.
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II.
Perceptual awareness is not the only form of object awareness which is trans-
parent and commital. Imaginative experiences | and, notably, visualising
| possess both features as well (cf. Martin (2002b): 413.).8 Most of all,
episodes of visualising, too, enjoy some kind of epistemic authority over our
beliefs | this time only over our beliefs about what is part of the imagined sit-
uations. It makes sense to ask which entities are part of the possible situation
that we are visualising at a given moment. And our answer should be inu-
enced by what we are visualising, given that the latter typically determines
what is contained in the imagined world. Other things equal, if it is a green
tree that we are visualising, then there is a green tree in the situation that
we are imagining. Hence, picking up on what we are visualising should guide
us in forming beliefs about what is part of the respective imagined situation.
This authority of visualising over our beliefs about the imagined world may
be countered, or perhaps need not always be present. For instance, we may
visualise a green tree simply as part of imagining having a hallucination of a
green tree, in which case we should not believe that there is a `hallucinated'
green tree in the imagined world, but at best that there is a hallucinatory
experience as of such a tree.
The epistemic dimension of visualising becomes important in cases where
we are using visualising to acquire knowledge | say, about possibilities or
conditional truths.9 In his most recent book, Timothy Williamson argues that
visualising is one of the many empirical capacities that we may employ in
order to acquire modal knowledge | or, in his concrete example, knowledge of
some conditional, which forms the rst step to modal knowledge. Considering
a situation in the mountains, he describes the largely non-inferential process
involved in coming to know that a certain rock would have landed in a lake, if
its path had not been blocked by a bush:
`You notice one rock slide into a bush. You wonder where it would
have ended if the bush had not been there. A natural way to
answer the question is by visualizing the rock sliding without the
bush there, then bouncing down the slope. You thereby come to
8Indeed, it may very well be that the transparency at issue is, in fact, inseparably linked
to the presentation of objects, rather than the entertainment of propositions. When in-
trospecting experiences, the external things that we nd are shown to us; and no internal
objects are given to us in this way. The issue of whether a given thought is transparent in
this sense does not arise then, since thinking is not an instance of object awareness.
9Martin (2002b): 37 and 39, mentions the example of mentally rotating a piece of fur-
niture in a shop in order to see whether it is possible to get it through one's front door at
home.
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know this counterfactual: [...] If the bush had not been there, the
rock would have ended in the lake.' (Williamson (2008): 142)
Acquiring knowledge in this way is possible only if, by visualising the rock, the
slope and the lake, we take them all to be part of the same possible situation.
And this requires that our episode of imagining is commited to their existence
in that situation. Two things need to be noted about this commitment. The
rst has already been hinted at: it is not trivial to claim that the visualised
object is part of the imagined situation. The example of a desire for something
(e.g., an ice-cream) shows that there can be mental states which are object-
directed, but do not take a stance on how things are in a certain world.10
The second point to consider is that the non-neutrality linked to visualising
cannot be external to it, that is, derive from its further intellectual context
rather than from the basic episode of visualising itself. The distinction between
the episode and its context is not meant to deny that simple instances of
visualising | or `images', if one prefers | may include intellectual or other
non-sensory elements (e.g., the presentation of objects as mind-dependent or -
independent). An episode of visualising diers from the additional thoughts in
two other respects, namely that the former is an instance of object awareness,
and that it may occur without the latter | although it may also form a more
complex imaginative project with them. Now, that we end up being committed
to the presence of what is visualised in the imagined situation is due to the
fact that visualising itself is commital in this way. That visualising presents us
with, say, a green tree is not neutral on whether there is such a green tree in
the imagined world (rather than, say, a yellow ower, or no such object at all).
We may cancel out this commitment by adding the thought that, within the
imagined world, the green tree is merely hallucinated and therefore not really
part of that world. But, as a default, visualising takes the visualised object to
be part of the imagined situation.
If it were instead neutral on this issue, the commitment would have to
come from some additional thought specifying that the imagined situation
indeed contains whatever is visualised. The green tree would become part of
the imagined world, not by being visualised, but instead by being thought to
be part of that world. This is in fact, roughly, the view suggested by Burge
as an alternative to the disjunctivist's take on visual experience. For him,
the commitment to the presence of the visualised object | or, in the case of
visualising an external thing by imagining a perception of it, the veridicality
of the latter | in the imagined world comes not with the basic episode of
visualising, but instead with a suppositional thought accompanying the rst.
10The claim may become trivial, if it can be established that object awareness is, by its
very presentational nature, transparent and commital (cf. footnote 8). But to establish this
is not a trivial task.
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Note, however, that Burge uses the term `visualizing' to denote the complex
and commital imaginative project which contains not only the simple visual
presentation or image, but also the additional supposition:
`[One begins] with the supposition of veridicality. One simply takes
the content of the imagined experience to be veridical. [...] I hold
that the imagery does not by itself guarantee the presence of the
imagined scene [...]. What gives us the imagined scene is the fact
that we are visualizing the scene. [...] The imagined veridicality is
not derivative from the imagery itself. Visualizing something with
a given imagery has do to with how the imagery is used.' (Burge
(2005): 65f.)
But this alternative picture would not be able to pay justice to the character
of visualising (cf. Martin (2002b): 416.). To get clearer about this, consider
the issue of what a neutral visual presentation of an object would have to
be like. When we are looking from a distance at a perfect wax replica of a
friend of ours and are completely in the grip of its illusionary eect, it seems
to us as if there really is our friend before us. That is, our visual experience is
commited to the presence of our friend in our environment, and we are bound
to form the respective belief. However, when we move closer to the gure and
come to recognise it as being just a wax replica, how things appear to us alters
substantially. Now, it seems to us as if there is a wax gure in front of us,
and our experience commits us to accept its actual existence before our eyes.
Relatedly, although we continue to enjoy some kind of awareness of our friend,
our experience has stopped being non-neutral about his presence. So here we
have a case of visual object awareness, which in some sense is still about a
particular object, but which does not commit us to its presence in our actual
environment. This neutrality, however, has been gained by a change in the
object of awareness. We are now presented with a three-dimensional depiction
of our friend, rather than with our friend himself. Indeed, when introspecting
our experience, we nd the wax gure and its pictorial properties, but no
human being. This explains why we are commital with respect to the former,
but not with respect to the latter.
In line with these considerations, if visualising were neutral about the pres-
ence of the visualised object in the imagined situation, we should expect not
to nd that object, but instead some substitute | such as an internal picture
| when reecting on our imaginative experience. But this does not seem to
be the case. When we introspect an episode of visualising, what is revealed
to us is the visualised object, and no other candidate object of awareness. In
other words, visualising is transparent, just like seeing is. The two kinds of
visual experience dier in their immediacy: while an episode of seeing presents
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its object as actually being there before us, visualising does not do this, but
instead locates the object in the imagined situation. There is, hence, good
reason to accept the rst claim in the triad introduced at the beginning. As
part of its transparent nature, visualising an external thing is by default com-
mited to the latter's presence in the imagined situation. And this commitment
remains intact, as long as it is not cancelled out by some additional intellectual
stipulations about what is in fact imagined.
III.
The second claim of the triad maintains that some instances of visualising an
external thing amount to instances of imagining a perception of such a thing.
It is a special case of Martin's Dependency Thesis :11
`[T]o imagine sensorily a ' is to imagine experiencing a '[.]' (Mar-
tin (2002b): 404)
Imagining a perception | or, more generally, experiential imagination | is
a case of object awareness, just as much as seeing or visualising an external
thing is. What we are aware of when imagining an experience is just that,
some experience. More specically, we are aware of the rst-personal side of an
experience, that is, of its phenomenal character. We imagine some experience
by imagining some instantiation of its character. Its third-personal side (if
experiences have any) is, so to speak, `invisible' to object-directed imagining.
Of course, we can have additional thoughts about it. But it is not presented as
part of a case of imagining with an experience as its object. The reason for this
is that this form of imagining is experiential, in the same sense in which seeing
and visualising are visual. Just as the latter are limited to the presentation
of visible entities, experiential imagining is restricted to the presentation of
phenomenal aspects of mental episodes. The latter's structural features lack
an `experiential appearance', so to speak. Again, experiential awareness does
not dier in this respect from, say, visual awareness. When we see or visualise
a lemon, we see or visualise its visual appearance, but not its biological nature,
for example.
Intentionalists typically select the Dependency Thesis | and therefore also
claim (ii) | as the main target of their criticism of Martin's argument against
intentionalism. Indeed, if imaginative experience is to be understood in the
same intentional terms as perceptual experience, it is dicult to understand
why, say, seeing and visualising should not make us aware of the same objects,
11Note that Martin uses `experience' here as short for `sense experience', such as perception
or bodily sensation. As already mentioned, my own use is less narrow in also including, say,
visualising or other imaginative instances of object awareness.
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namely external things. If perception does not involve an awareness of an
experience, why should imagination do so, if both are assumed to involve the
same kind of object awareness? This doubt should be taken serious | not
the least because it simply conrms that there is in fact a tension between
the intentionalist thesis and the claim (ii). While Martin draws the conclusion
that the former should be given up, it is also very plausible to question the
latter.
Some of the intentionalist objections, however, seem to have misunderstood
the intended scope or nature of the claim at issue.12 A rst point to be noted
is that that thesis (ii) need not have universal application for the argument
against intentionalism to go through. For this purpose, it is meant to be the
claim that some cases are instances of experiential imagining | and not the
claim that this is true of all. More is not required for the argument against
intentionalism under consideration issue here. And more is also not intended
by Martin, or supported by his line of reasoning in favour of (ii).13
Another important issue is that this argument concentrates on, and exploits
the special features of, cases in which our episodes of visualising involve cer-
tain subjective properties. Subjective properties are characterised by the fact
that they are experience-dependent: their instantiation is dependent on the
occurrence of a specic experience.Martin's focus is on cases in which instances
of visualising involve a certain kind of perspectivalness; and thesis (ii) should
be understood as being restricted to those cases (or to similar cases, such as
imaginative experiences involving aspects of painfulness or itchiness).14 What
(ii) therefore claims is that visualising is identical with imagining perceiving
when it involves the subjective perspectival element at issue.
By perceiving an object, we may acquire knowledge about the latter's spe-
cic spatial location. But our perception does not thereby place the object in
objective space. When we look at a building that is located roughly to the
South-East of the bench on which we are currently sitting, we do not see it
12A further possible locus of misunderstanding is perhaps that (ii) understands both
visualising and imagining a perception as instances of object awareness, given that some
intentionalists tend to construe visual experience in terms of thought-like contents (cf., e.g.,
Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995).
13See Martin (2002b): 404f.. It is true, though, that others | such as Peacocke (1985)
and O'Shaughnessy (2003) | have put forward stronger versions of the claim, extending
even to all kinds of sensory imagining. And Martin is clearly sympathetic with this more
general conclusion, as can be witnessed in Martin (2002b): 404f., and Martin (2001).
14See Martin (2002b): section 3, which is mostly occupied with the development of his
argument in favour of thesis (ii), the restricted version of the Dependency Thesis. In what
follows, I draw heavily on this section of Martin's paper. I am also very grateful to the
challenging questions about this section raised by one of the referees, which helped me
greatly to get clearer about certain deatails of Martin's argument, as well as about my own
addition to it at the end of this section.
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as being to the South-East of that bench. In particular, we do not perceive
objects as being orientated in accordance with the cardinal directions. Instead,
we see them as being orientated towards ourselves | for instance, we see the
building as being to our left. What this means is that we perceive objects as
part of egocentric space, and not as part of objective (or `absolute') space.15
One manifestation of this fact is that our perception of the building inclines
and entitles us to judge that it is to our actual left, but not that it is to the
South-East of the bench. Coming to know the latter requires additional infor-
mation | notably about our own location and orientation in objective space
(cf. Campbell (1995)).
None the less, our perceptions of egocentric locations are still as much con-
cerned with actual space as is our knowledge of objective locations. We see
the building as being to our actual left, as part of our actual environment. If
this were not so, our experience would not be able to provide us with all the
information necessary to properly interact with what we see | for example,
to succeed in walking over to the actual building. But that perception does
provide us with this information is illustrated by the fact that such interac-
tion does not require inferring the presence of the building to our actual left
from perceiving it as being to our left and believing that such experiences are
(typically) concerned with the actual world. The issue of which world our per-
ceptions are concerned with simply does not arise | it is our world, the world
in which we perceive. Something similar is true of the temporal relevance of
our perceptions: they concern our present environment. We see the building
as presently being to our left, and not as having been there in the past, or as
going to be there in the future.16
Part of our perception of the building as being to our actual left is implicit,
however. We do not explicitly experience ourselves and our spatial relation
to the building when perceiving the latter. We are not among the entities
presented to us by our experience. Of course, we can see other perceivers |
and even ourselves, say, by utilising a mirror or some similar apparatus which
turns us into the object of our own perceptions. But normally, when we are
15It does not really matter for Martin's main argument whether we are concerned here
with two dierent sets of spatial properties of objects (e.g., one objective, and the other
subjective), or instead with two modes of presentation of one and the same set. What is
relevant here is primarily the fact that our perceptual access to spatially located objects
is perspectival and, in particular, presents them as orientated towards us, rather than in
more objective terms. But many of the points involved in the argument can be described
more easily by reference to egocentric properties. Besides, the postulation of subjective
orientations is not much dierent from the postulation of subjective modes of presentation
(cf. the similar issue raised below with respect to the aspect of leftishness and similar
phenomenal aspects).
16In what follows, I concentrate on the fact that perceptions present objects in actual
space and mention the temporal dimension only when it becomes relevant.
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simply subjects of perception and perceive the orientation of objects relative
to us, we do not see us, but only the objects. Our own perspective is only
implicitly reected in our perceptual experiences, namely as the point of view
orientated to which objects are presented to us. As a consequence, what gures
explicitly in our experience is not the relational property of being to the left
of us, but the monadic quality of being leftish.
It seems that such a quality can gure in perception in two dierent ways.
The perceptual experience may instantiate the quality; or it may instead
present an external object as having that quality. In both cases, this has
consequences for the phenomenal character of the experience concerned. In
the rst case, the quality constitutes one of the non-presentational aspects of
that character. In the second case, it is a constituent of one of the character's
presentational aspects.17 That the quality of leftishness gures in our per-
ception of the building therefore means that the latter instantiates a certain
character aspect | either a non-presentational aspect, or the presentational
aspect of presenting the building as being the monadic property of being to
the left.18
Which view is to be preferred in the end does not matter here. Indeed, it
is not so clear whether they actually dier in any substantial way | which
might explain why Martin appears to switch between both views in some of his
formulations (e.g., when talking about the quality of itchiness). The step from
acknowledging the presence of a non-presentational aspect of the character of a
perception to projecting this aspect onto the perceived object is indeed small
| as discussions about blur or similar phenomena illustrate (cf. Peacocke
(1983) and chapter 13). Moreover, any presentation of something as being
leftish would lack the status and force of the presentation of it as being to our
actual and present left. In particular, we do not see the building as having the
monadic property of being to the left; and we are not inclined or entitled to
believe it to genuinely instantiate this property. Of course, we may say `the
building is to the left'. But when prompted, we will happily clarify that what
we really meant was that it is to the left of us.
In any case, that the character of our perception of the building include
this phenomenal aspect | let us call it the aspect of leftishness | should not
be doubted. We can attend to it; and we can exploit it when drawing a picture
of how the building looks like when seen from our current point of view. That
17It should become clear very shortly that there is a third possibility: the experience may
represent another experience as instantiating or presenting the quality.
18Using the expression `being to the left' to denote a monadic property is not ideal, since
this expression clearly has some connotations of relationality. But it is not easy to come
up with another formulation, without altogether loosing the connection to the perceived
property of being to our actual left. I am grateful to one of the referees for making me
aware of this issue.
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is, we can depict an object as being to our actual left by drawing it on the
left side of the canvas | instead of, say, by drawing both ourselves and the
object.19
But how is the instantiation of the aspect of leftishness linked to the per-
ception of the property of something as being at some specic location to our
actual left? More generally, how does the perspectivalness of an experience
relate to the determination of what is experienced? Martin's insightful obser-
vation is that the former suces for the latter (cf. Martin (2002b): 410). If
an experience of an object exemplies leftishness | that is, shows a respective
non-presentational phenomenal aspect or, alternatively, presents the object as
being to the left | then it is an experience of the object as being to our actual
left. More specically, the presence of the perspectival aspect of leftishness
is sucient to ensure, rst, that the experience concerned is an experience of
something as being to our left (rather than to our right) and, second, that it is
an experience of something as being to our actual left (rather than to our left
in a merely possible situation). Indeed, Martin claims even more, namely that
it also suces for having a perceptual experience of something as being to our
actual left. This makes sense since the other two kinds of visual experience,
which may involve the aspect of leftishness, are not | or at least not in their
simplest forms | concerned with our current environment. Episodes of visual-
ising present objects as part of imagined situations (cf. below), while episodes
of visual memory present objects as part of past situations. I return below to
the issue of how important this additional claim is for Martin's argument.
That the instantiation of the aspect of leftishness turns the respective expe-
rience into an experience of something to our actual left is a direct consequence
of the implicitness involved in our perception of the spatial relations that ob-
jects bear to us in egocentric space. As noted above, we see objects as being to
our actual left (and not, say, as being at an egocentric location in some merely
possible space). But this relational property is typically not explicitly given
to us. Instead, what gures in our experience is solely the monadic quality
of leftishness. Hence, we perceive the instantiation of the property of being
to our actual left simply by being aware of the quality of leftishness. When
we see the building as being to our actual left, no aspect of our perception
but its aspect of leftishness plays a role in determining that we experience
19Very similar issues arise, for instance, with respect to the status of the quality of ovalness
| another perspectival aspect of perception | which gures in our experience when we are
looking at objects from an angle and perceive them as round. Again, we typically draw round
objects by tracing elliptical shapes on the canvas. But it is debatable whether our experiences
present round objects as elliptical in addition to presenting them as round (cf., for instance,
Peacocke's discussion of what he calls sensational properties in Peacocke (1983)). One
signicant dierence from egocentric orientation is, however, that, while roundness is an
objective property, being to the left of us is not.
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the building at that specic location in our actual environment. If the aspect
of leftishness is taken to be presentational, this thought becomes even more
straightforward: our perception presents the building as being to our actual
left just by presenting it as being to the left; no other presentational element
is needed or involved. What we are confronted with here is the particular sub-
jectivity of the aspect of leftishness. Its actual instantiation is both necessary
and sucient for the experience of something as being to our actual left.20
However, as Martin notes, these considerations about perception give rise to
a puzzle in the case of visualising (cf. Martin (2002b): 410). On the one hand,
our episodes of visualising involve the same kind of perspectivalness as our
episodes of seeing (cf. also Hopkins (1998): chapter 7). We visualise buildings
as being to the left of certain subjective points of view. And we normally do
so without explicitly presenting those points of view or any subjects occupying
them. What gures in our respective imaginative experiences is therefore,
again, the monadic quality of leftishness, and not the relational property of
being to the left of some subject in the subject's environment. But this means
that our episodes of visualising may involve the same phenomenal aspect of
leftishness as our episodes of seeing. Indeed, this is partly due to the relative
simplicity of our visual presentation of the egocentric orientations of objects.
It is devoid of any explicit reference to the subject of experience and, therefore,
allows us to visualise something as being to the left without thereby visualising
it as being to the left of any particular subject.
On the other hand, when visualising buildings as being to the left of sub-
jective points of views, we need not | and typically do not | imagine them
as being to our actual left. At least in the simplest cases, our episodes of vi-
sualising do not locate their objects in our actual environment, but instead in
some imagined space.21 Of course, we can project our image onto our actual
environment by taking what we imagine to be part of actual space. But even
then, there is no real competition between what we see and what we visualise.
For example, when looking at a certain picture on our kitchen wall, we may
visualise with open eyes how things would look if there were a dierent picture
at the same spot on the wall. But such a complex and mixed presentation does
20Of course, Martin cannot assume in his argument that an experience's instantiation of
the aspect of leftishness is also sucient for the existence of something to our actual left.
This would follow only if the experience is a perception, and if perceptions are always factive
| something that intentionalists deny.
21See Sartre (2004): 8., and Wittgenstein (1984c): 622 and 628. There is also the issue of
whether visualising always locates objects relative to us, rather than to some imagined sub-
ject. The default case seems to be that we visualise objects as orientated towards ourselves,
and that imaginative projects involving subjects dierent from us require the additional
identication of our imagined point of view with that of those other subjects (cf. Wollheim
(1984), and Martin (2002b): 411).
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not amount to a presentation of the impossible state of aairs of two pictures
occupying the same part of space.
So, episodes of visualising may involve the aspect of leftishness without
presenting something as being to our actual left. But due to the subjectivity
of the aspect of leftishness noted above, its instantiation is inseparably linked to
the presentation of something as possessing the relational property of being to
our actual left. Hence, the instances of visualising concerned cannot exemplify
the aspect of leftishness. This raises the question of how it is involved in
visualising instead. Martin's proposal is that, in visualising, we imagine an
experience as instantiating the aspect of leftishness | that is, we imagine
a perspectival experience of something as being to the left in the imagined
situation. When we visualise a building as being to the left, our imaginative
episode does not instantiate the aspect of leftishness. But it still involves the
latter by representing another experience as instantiating it.
The proposal captures the specic subjectivity of the aspect of leftishness.
For it takes the instantiation of that aspect in a certain world to be sucient
for the occurrence of an experience of something as being located to the expe-
riencing subject's left in that very same world. Actual perspectival experiences
concern actual space, while imagined perspectival experiences concern imag-
ined space. Moreover, what needs to be imagined is a perceptual experience.
As noted above, other perspectival experiences are not concerned with the
current state of the world in which they themselves occur. Instead, they are
concerned with the past of that world (as in the case of visual recall), or with
an entirely dierent possible world (as in the case of visualising). Hence, nei-
ther episodic memories, nor imaginative episodes can instantiate the subjective
aspect of leftishness. If we want to imagine an experience with that aspect,
we therefore have to imagine a perspectival perception. This conclusion can
also be inferred more directly from Martin's additional claim mentioned above,
namely that the presence of leftishness suces for the presence of perception.
Indeed, the reasoning put forward in support of that claim has been very sim-
ilar to the one rehearsed in the second half of this paragraph. But, strictly
speaking, the additional claim does not seem to be necessary for Martin's
argument.
Martin further illustrates this argument by comparing the subjective per-
spectivalness of perceptions to the subjective aspects involved in some bodily
sensations. His example are experiences of itchiness; but experiences of pain
are equally good candidates. Experiences of pain instantiate the phenomenal
aspect of painfulness: they are feelings of pain. Moreover, having a feeling of
pain is sucient for there actually being a pain and, hence, for experiencing
an actual pain. If we feel pain in a certain part of our leg, then that part of
our lef does indeed hurt - independently of whether its skin tissue is damaged,
237
Transparency and Imagining Seeing Chapter 8
say.22 By contrast, merely imagining our leg as hurting does not involve the
presentation of an actual pain in our leg. But this raises, again, the question
of how imagining a pain can still involve the aspect of painfulness | which
it clearly does, albeit possibly to a lesser degree of intensity and determinacy
than real feelings of pain. As above, the solution is to understand imagining
a pain as imagining a sensation of pain | that is, as imagining an experience
which instantiates the phenomenal aspect of painfulness.
This concludes what are, in essence, Martin's considerations in favour of
thesis (ii). However, the analogy with pain suggests in fact a second route to
the conclusion that visualising the orientation of objects in egocentric space
requires imagining perceiving that orientation. Feeling a pain is not only suf-
cient for the existence of pain, it is also necessary for the latter. Our leg does
not really hurt if we do not feel pain. Of course, other things may distract us
so that we do not always notice the pain. But if we do not feel any pain in
our leg, despite being suciently attentive to the latter, it does not seem true
to say that our leg in fact hurt. In particular, by-standers cannot insist that
we are in pain by pointing to some bodily damage to our leg. Such evidence
cannot trump our failure to feel pain. Accordingly, the instantiation of pain
requires an experience of that pain | and, presumably, as part of the same
world. Hence, imagining a pain has to involve imagining feeling that pain.
Now, egocentric orientational properties seem to be similarly subjective
| opening up the possibility of formulating a similar argument in favour of
the Dependency Thesis. Martin does not discuss this second route to the
conclusion; and it is not clear whether he would accept the subjectivity of
egocentric orientations, or the argument exploiting it. But even if not, it is
still worthwhile to discuss both. When we see a building as being to our
left, it does not possess this orientation independently of being perceived by
us as having it. Certainly, the objective location of the building comes with
the disposition of giving rise to a perception of leftishness when viewed from a
position to its North-West by a normal human being with a normal orientation
in objective space (e.g., standing on his feet, etc.) who faces South. But
its perceived property of being to our left cannot simply be reduced to this
objective disposition. Instead, the instantiation of this egocentric orientation
seems to depend on our actual perceptual awareness of it.
For one thing, which dispositional property is correlated to the property of
being to the left of us varies with changes in our location in objective space.
Once we being to move or turn around, the building may very well cease to be
22The possibility of experiencing a phantom limbs as hurting is no exception. The only
dierence is that, in this case, the existence of the hurting body part is subjective as well.
But, in any case, nothing here depends on whether the presented view on pains and pain
experiences is correct. The analogy is merely meant to further illustrate Martin's treatment
of the involvement of subjective elements in imaginative experience.
238
Chapter 8 Transparency and Imagining Seeing
to our left | though it may also begin to be to the left of another person who
steps in and takes our previous spot. The disposition may therefore constitute
the property of being to the left of whoever occupies the objectively specied
location to its North-West with the respective objectively specied orientation.
But it does not amount to the property of being to the left of us (understood in
rst-personal terms). This is reected in the more general fact that egocentric
space cannot be fully specied in objective terms | which is why the two are
to be distinguished in the rst place. In particular, what we describe with the
expression `to our left' is not a cardinal direction in objective space.23
Without this lack of strict correlation between egocentric and objective
spatial features, it would also seem impossible to exlain why we cannot suer
an illusion with respect to perceiving something as being to our actual left. Of
course, when facing South, we may perceive a building as being to our actual
left while, in fact, it is located to the South-West of our current location
in objective space. But, as the previous considerations have indicated, the
objective orientational properties of the building are neither sucient, nor
necessary for its instantiation of any subjective orientational property. What
happens in cases like this is just that we fail to track the former by perceiving
the latter | an error which is due to some breakdown in our relation to our
environment.24
But the subjectivity of egocentric orientations has consequences for our
attempts to visualise objects as having them. Objects can possess these sub-
jective features only when they are perceived as having them. Furthermore,
this is true as much of imagined or other possible situations, as it is true of
actual ones | assuming that they all contain the same ontological kind of ob-
jects and properties. Finally, the dependence in question does not range over
dierent possible worlds, but is conned to a single one: the perceived object
and the perception are always part of the same world. Hence, visualising an
object as having such an experience-dependent property requires imagining a
suitable perception of that object. Visualising a building as being to the left,
for instance, has to involve imagining a perception of a building as being to
the left.
23See Campbell (1995), and also the famous example of two incongruent hands with
dierent orientations in Kant (1992).
24The property of being to our left shares both discussed aspects with the property of
being here if ascribed to ourselves. The latter, too, cannot be specied in purely objective
terms. And we cannot go wrong in being aware of ourselves as being here. One dierence
between our awareness of us as being here and our awareness of other objects as being to our
left is, however, that the latter may concern hallucinated objects. But, as already suggested
in note 22, this does not necessarily undermine the claim that the kind of property concerned
is subjective.
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IV.
It should now be easier to understand why some of the objections raised against
Martin's considerations in support of thesis (ii) have in fact been missing their
target. In many cases, this is due to the fact that the critics have overlooked or
underappreciated the importance of subjectivity in Martin's line of thought. A
good example for this is Tyler Burge's discussion of Martin's argument for (ii).
Burge seems to have no problem to accept that visualising an object as being
to the left requires the presence of a respective point of view in the imagined
situation. But he rejects the claim that there also has to be a perception which
occupies this location.
`[Martin] begins by rightly noting that visualizing an object in-
volves taking an imagined visual perspective on the object | for
example, visualizing it from a perspective according to which the
object is to the left. [...] Martin assumes that since the perspective
is from some position in the imagined scene, it must be the per-
spective of an imagined experience in the imagined scene, or of an
experience imagined to be in the imagined scene. This seems tanta-
mount to begging the question in an argument for the Dependency
Thesis.' (Burge (2005): 63f.)
But it is not clear whether Burge's charge really is one of begging the ques-
tion. For he still seems to briey discuss | and dismiss | Martin's argument
involving the subjective perspectivalness of our presentation of orientational
features. Here is how the rst part of the passage just quoted continues:
`It is quite true that one could have such a perspective on the object
only if one were to have an experience of the object. It does not
follow that if one imagines something from a perspective that one
could have only if such and such were the case (only if one were
experiencing the object from that perspective), then in imagining
something from that perspective one must imagine such and such
to be the case.' (Burge (2005): 63)
One problem with this passage is to understand the dierence between `having
a perspective on an object' and `imagining something from that perspective'.
That Burge takes the two to be dierent becomes evident in his claim that only
the rst requires having a perceptual experience of the object. So what does
`having such a perspective on an object' mean? If what is meant is simply
visually presenting an object as being to the left, without further specify-
ing whether this presentation is perceptual or imaginative, then the intended
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contrast collapses. For visualising an object to the left involves such a presen-
tation, too. Furthermore, since Burge wants to deny that visualising requires
imagining a perception, his claim that `having such a perspective' requires hav-
ing a perceptual experience turns out to be false. So this cannot be the right
interpretation of his words. If, on the other hand, what is meant by `having
such a perspective' is visually perceiving an object as being to the left, then
we get the desired contrast, given that visualising something does not involve
perceiving it. But then, the noted dependence claim becomes trivial and has
nothing to do with subjectivity. Perceiving an object as being to the left ob-
viously requires having a perception of it. And it does so independently of the
subjective status of the perspectivalness or the perceived properties involved.
So, if this reading is correct, Burge does not really engage with Martin's focus
on the subjective element in our perceptions of egocentric orientations.
Something similar seems to happen in Paul Noordhof's direct reply to Mar-
tin's paper.25 For example, he acknowledges that the Dependency Thesis is
plausible | if not true | in the case of subjective properties. But he does not
recognise that this is how the egocentric properties guring in Martin's exam-
ples should probably be understood. Moreover, he does not properly address
the fact that what really matters in Martin's main argument is not the onto-
logical status of the perceived properties, but instead that of our perspective
onto them.
This has, for instance, the result that he underestimates the resources of
proponents of the universal truth of the Dependency Thesis (among whom he
seems to count Martin) for explaining the apparent fact that we nd this thesis
more plausible in some cases than in others:
`As I have already noted, the Dependency Thesis varies in plausi-
bility depending upon the sensory modality we consider. It is more
plausible when we consider what is involved in imagining the feel
of somebody's skin or the taste of bacon. Our capacity to imagine
these things seems to rest upon our capacity to imagine our expe-
riences of these things. The proponent of the Dependency Thesis
needs to explain why it is more plausible in these cases given that
the Dependency Thesis holds across the board. My guess is that
the proponent of the Dependency Thesis might try to argue that
the variation in plausibility depends upon contingent psychological
facts about what we nd easier to consider independent of expe-
rience. The issue is whether we should search for an explanation
there rather than in the objects and properties imagined. If the feel
25Currie and Ravenscroft also do not address the issue of subjectivity when they briey
sketch Martin's motivation for endorsing thesis (ii) (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003): 28).
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of someone's skin or the taste of bacon imply the existence of cor-
responding perceptual experiences in contrast with other objects
of imagination, then the Dependency Thesis cannot be true for all
sensory imaginings.' (Noordhof (2002): 446)
Here, Noordhof insists that the perceived dierence in plausibility should be
explained in terms of a dierence in the objects and properties imagined. His
suggestion is that we nd it plausible with respect to certain things, but not
others, to conceive of imagining them as an instance of experiential imagi-
nation because we understand that they, but not the other things, involve
some experience-dependent element. So Noordhof, too, proposes a limitation
of the Dependency Thesis to cases pertaining to subjectivity. But he fails
to acknowledge that this is exactly Martin's non-universalist take on the is-
sue. Besides, Martin can explain the dierence between instances of imagining
which require experiential imagination and instances which do not without
having to refer to contingent facts about what we nd easy to conceive of as
being experience-independent. For he can simply refer to the involvement of
subjective aspects of character | such as the perspectivalness involved in the
perception of egocentric orientation.
A very similar oversight becomes apparent in Noordhof's discussion of the
factors which determine what is imagined when we are visualising something.
Although he does not draw this connection, it will be helpful to briey consider
the elements involved in xing what is part of the situation depicted by a
painting. The marks on the surface (plus perhaps our general recognitional
abilities) determine whether the painting depicts a blonde man or a brunette
woman. But assuming that it is a blonde man, extra-pictorial factors | such
as the stipulation of a title or the exploitation of iconographic conventions |
decide whether it is a portrait of, say, Saint John or Hercules. The pictorial
element puts certain constraints on the extra-pictorial take on the nature of
the depicted entities, which cannot be overridden by the latter. An artist may
turn his painting of a man into a portrait of Jean of Arc by labelling it as such.
But it will then be a painting of Jean of Arc in the disguise of a man.
Noordhof's observation is that very similar factors are responsible for de-
termining the nature of the objects of visualising. On the one hand, there is
the basic visual presentation and, on the other hand, the accompanying in-
tentions or suppositions which put a certain conceptual gloss on that visual
presentation. To take an example from Peacocke (1985), when we are visu-
alising a suitcase, we may think of it as a suitcase with a cat hidden behind
it, or as a suitcase which is merely hallucinated by some brain in a vat. The
visual presentation is limited to the presentation of the suitcase, while the
wider imaginative project concerns also other aspects of the imagined situa-
tion. And again, how we conceive of the visualisied entities as part of such a
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project is constrained by how these entities are visually given to us. We may
use the visual presentation of the suitcase in order to imagine a car, but only
by imagining a car with the visual appearance of a suitcase.26
According to Noordhof, this constraint on what is imagined as part of the
wider imaginative project is problematic for a proponent of the Dependency
Thesis. His starting point is the idea that it is possible to pursue the project
of imagining a certain object, and nothing else. The subject engaged in this
project conceives of it in terms of the object, but not in terms of any expe-
rience of that object. Hence, if the project is also taken to involve imagining
an experience of the object, this cannot be due to any of the accompanying
intentions or suppositions of the subject. So a proponent of the Dependency
Thesis has to assume that the imagining of the experience is part of the vi-
sual presentation of the object. But this seems to violate the constraint of
the visual presentation on the extra-visual interpretation of it. For we cannot
pursue the project of imagining nothing but an object by means of an episode
of visualising which involves imagining more than that object. The only way
out appears to be to consider the extra-visual gloss on the visual presentation
to be irrelevant or, even worse, misleading:
`When we consider what characterises an imaginative project, it is
clear that there are cases where the project is to imagine merely
an F. Proponents of the Dependency Thesis don't have to resist
this but, if they don't, they must insist that certain facts about
the mental image override a subject's own characterisation of his
or her imaginative project so that, in fact, what is imagined is a
perceptual experience of an F. This is quite a strong claim to have
to establish.' (Noordhof (2002): 430)
The questionable assumption in Noordhof's line of reasoning, however, is that
imagining an object as having a certain feature is always distinct from, and
more basic than, imagining perceiving such an object. For this is not true
if that feature is the egocentric orientation of an object. Visualising such an
orientation requires the involvement, but not the instantiation, of a perception-
dependent phenomenal aspect (e.g., that of leftishness); and what is thereby
visualised is, presumably, a subjective state of aairs. Imagining the instan-
tiation of an egocentric orientation therefore involves imagining a perception
of that instantiation. As a consequence, it is a misconception to think that
it is possible to imagine `merely' such a feature, if this is meant to exclude
imagining an experience of it. Notably, when we describe an episode of ours
simply as one of imagining an object as being to the left, our characterisation
26See also the discussion of Wittgenstein's example of King's College on re in Peacocke
(1985).
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is at best incomplete. It may refer to the episode of imagining a perception
of an object as being to the left. Or it may denote the episode of imagining
an object as being to the left of a specic perceiver | which has to include
explicitly imagining that perceiving subject in addition to the object. But
contrary to what Noordhof suggests, there is no simpler episode of imagining
to be picked out by that description. Much the same response should be given
to Burge's insistence that it is natural and not incoherent to say that we can
visualise something without imagining experiencing it:27
`It seems to me that in a certain clear and natural sense, one can
visualize an object and not imagine visually experiencing the ob-
ject. One imagines the object from the perspective of a visual
experience, but no experiencing of the object (either by oneself or
by anyone else) is imagined to be included in the imagined scene.
[...] Prima facie, there seems to be nothing contradictory in this
claim, as there would be if (DT') [i.e., (ii)] were (constitutively)
true.' (Burge (2005): 63)
Again, the problems start once we focus on visualising orientational features
that locate objects in egocentric space. Their imagination requires the imag-
ination of a perceptual perspective onto them. That it is still natural for us
to say that what we are imagining is just the object and its orientation may
suggest that we either make use of an elliptical characterisation, or have no
full grasp of the nature of our episode of imagining and, in particular, of the
subjectivity involved in the perspectival presentation of egocentric orienta-
tions. Indeed, it is to be expected that not all of our conceptions of subjective
properties characterise them as subjective. For example, we can discover that
the phenomenal aspect of leftishness and the property of being to our actual
left are in fact experience-dependent. So we should be able to conceive of
those properties without conceiving of them as subjective. But this means
that we can engage in imagining without fully grasping what we are thereby
engaging in. In particular, we may imagine an instance of a specic egocentric
orientation without realising that we are thereby imagining a perception of it.
This helps to resolve another of Noordhof's worries. Granting his oppo-
nent, for the sake of argument, that imagining perceiving something constitutes
sometimes the most basic episode of imagining available to us, he still insists
that it has to involve an | explicit or implicit | thought which conceives of
what one is imagining in terms of an experience. But that visualising is there-
fore supposed to require the possession of the concept of an experience casts
27See also the similar point against the Dependency Thesis made by Currie and Raven-
scroft (2003): 27f..
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doubt on whether, say, children under the age of four can visualise something,
given that they may lack the notion of an experience.
`If the Dependency Thesis rests on the claim that imaginers, at
least tacitly, suppose that they are imagining a perceptual experi-
ence, then it links the capacity to imagine with possession of the
concept of perceptual experience. In which case, the attribution of
imaginings to the autistic, young children, and animals, becomes
as doubtful as their possession of the concept of perceptual expe-
rience.' (Noordhof (2002): 436)
While acknowledging that the evidence seems undecided on this last issue, No-
ordhof is right in pointing out that this connection to the empirical question
of when children acquire the concept of experience threatens to undermine the
Dependency Thesis. For not only does it seem empirically far less controversial
whether young children can visualise something than whether they can con-
ceive of perceptions. But the issue of when children become able to conceive
of experiences should not be expected to have such a strong bearing on the
issue addressed by the Dependency Thesis | namely the constitution (if not
the concept) of imaginative experience.
These problems related to an over-intellectualisation of visualising arise,
however, only if the Dependency Thesis indeed implies that imagining per-
ceiving something requires the possession or application of the concept of per-
ception. Noordhof assumes that it does. But the proponent of the Dependency
Thesis need not | and should not | follow him in this. As already noted,
we need not fully grasp the nature of our imagining when being engaged in
it. And this includes the fact that it may involve imagining an experience.
But, more importantly, this partial ignorance is possible because we imagine
an experience, not by thinking of it as part of the imagined situation, but by
experientially imagining the instantiation of its character. That is, imagining
an experience is a form of object awareness, and not of thinking. What the
Dependence Thesis | in the form of thesis (ii) | claims is that the visual pre-
sentation involved in relevant cases of visualising consists in the experiential
presentation of the character of a visual perception. And this kind of object
awareness does not involve the employment of the concept of a visual percep-
tion. At best, it relies on some discriminatory or recognitional capacities with
respect to experiences, as well as perhaps some basic demonstrative ways of
referring to the respective experiences as `this' or `that'. It is of course still
possible for us to add some additional thoughts to our episode of experiential
imagination. For instance, we can take the imagined experience to be a hal-
lucination, or one of the perceptions that Napoleon had when looking at the
battle of Jena. But the basic form of imagining a perception does not involve
such conceptualisations, but instead constrains them.
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The nal intentionalist criticism that I would like to address is the charge
that understanding visualising in terms of imagining perceiving raises more
questions than that it answers. It is worthwhile to note that, if this charge is
adequate, it poses a general diculty for all views, assuming that the argument
concerning the visualisation of egocentric orientations goes through. But it is
true that more needs to be said about the nature of experiential imagination
and, in particular, how it can accommodate certain important features of vi-
sualising | notably its involvement of a visual, perspectival and non-neutral
presentation of external things. Part of this explanatory challenge can be re-
stated by the distiction between the exemplication and the representation of
a subjective aspect of character. Episodes of seeing exemplify a perceptual
character, while episodes of visualising | if they amount to experiential imag-
ination | involve the imaginative representation of such a character. What
then needs explaining is how the proposed kind of representation can ensure
that the character of representing (i.e., that of visualising) is very similar to
the represented character (i.e., that of seeing) in the mentioned respects (i.e.,
visual presentation, perspectivalness and non-neutrality), without being iden-
tical to it.
`In addition to the problems just mentioned, there is obscurity in
the explanation provided by the Dependency Thesis. It rests upon
the idea that the experience is represented in imagination. But it
is unclear how to cash this out. [...] It is hard not to think that all
the explanatory work is being done by the nature of imagination
and the kind of representation which serves it.' (Noordhof (2002):
447)
Noordhof is absolutely right about the last point. But the proposed kind of
representation is perhaps less mysterious than it might seem to him and others.
Consider the reproduction of a painting | for instance, a postcard hanging
at your wall. This image does not itself amount to a painting and diers
substantially from one (e.g., it does not involve paint and has no perceivable
texture). But it none the less inherits important aspects of the reproduced
painting. Most of all, it depicts the same objects and features, and from the
same perspective, as the painting. Indeed, if the reproduction is done well, its
perspectivalness derives from that of the reproduced painting, and not from
the perspectivalness of the photographic process involved in the reproduction.
That is, the impact of the point of view occupied by the lens directed at the
painting is typically negligible in comparison to the impact of the point of
view inherent to the photographed depiction.28 Much more can surely be said
28The process of photo-copying, which does not involve any such perspective onto the
reproduced piece of paper, is perhaps an even better illustration of the kind of representation
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about how the reproduction does end up presenting the same situation from
the same perspective as the painting. But the absence of such further eluci-
dations does not render the kind of representation involved in photographic
reproduction mysterious or completely unilluminating. We accept that this
kind of representation exists. And the description given above gives us some
grasp of what it amounts to. In fact, we know at least that the reproduction
represents the painting partly by representing the visual perspective of the
painting; and that it represents the latter's perspective by presenting the same
objects and features as they are presented to the point of view of the painting.
Imagining a perception involves the same kind of representation. It repre-
sents a perception partly by representing the latter's perspective. And it does
this by presenting the same external objects and features as they are presented
to the point of view of such a perception. In imagining a perception, we thus
imagine a possible perceptual perspective onto the world.29 And, as in the case
of the reproduction of a painting, the resulting episode of visualising ends up
with a character very similar in its visual, perspectival and non-neutral charac-
ter to that of an episode of seeing. Besides, we also know that this imaginative
representation of a perceptual perspective constitutes an experiential form of
object awareness, which may be spelled out in intentional terms | an idea
which, incidentally, disjunctivists agree with. Although it leaves many issues
open, this characterisation of what experiential imagining amounts to, and
how it can inherit some of the features of the imagined experiences, should
be illuminating enough to rebut the charge of obscurity. The proposed kind
of representation is involved in other phenomena as well. And we have some
understanding of how it can explain the presence of the important features of
reproductions and episodes of visualising noted.
To illustrate that explanatory power, it is worthwhile to have a brief look
at how this account of experiential imagination can answer a challenge raised
by Currie and Ravenscroft.30 They ask for an account of why it is possible
that we may mistake an instance of seeing for an instance of visualising (e.g.,
as in Perky's experiments), and that we may recall something as seen that we
pertaining to experiential imagination (as proposed by Martin in a personal discussion about
how best to understand Hume's Copy Principle).
29This idea is not new: Hume's Copy Principle may be read as claiming pretty much the
same if applied to the case of imagining.
30See Currie and Ravenscroft (2003): 28. Reference to the kind of representation at
issue promises also to illuminate why episodes of visualising often possess a lesser degree of
repleteness, determinacy or intensity than episodes of seeing. Just as the reproduction of a
painting may lead to the loss of some of these qualities, imagining perceiving something may
have this eect. Martin's employment | in Martin (2001) | of the Dependency Thesis in
his account of the phenomenological dierences between seeing, visually remembering and
visualising provides another example of the explanatory force of treating at least some
instances of visualising as an instance of experiential imagination.
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have merely visualised in the past (e.g., as in the case of fabricated memories).
Their suspicion is that the defenders of the Dependency Thesis do not have
the resources to identify the underlying similarities, assuming that they have
to accept a dierence between what we see and what we visualise as part of
the respective experiences.
`How could we explain, on this hypothesis, why people are prone
to misrecall visualizing as seeing, and in some circumstances will
mistake perception for visualization? According to the hypothesis,
visualizing an F has the representational content, not F, but seeing
an F. Thus the seeing and visualizing have quite dierent contents.
Why would states with such dierent contents seem to us to be so
similar? Content is just one dimension of similarity; perhaps states
could dier in content and be similar in other ways. But the hy-
pothesis oers us no account of what these other similarities might
be and how they could, in the face of content-dissimilarity, sustain
the overall phenomenological similarity that seeing and visualizing
enjoy.' (Currie and Ravenscroft (2003): 28)
One part of the answer to this challenge is to stress that, for a proponent of
the Dependency Thesis, there is | contrary to what Currie and Ravenscroft
suggest | a substantial overlap in content between seeing and visualising. For
imagining a perception of an external object involves the visual presentation of
that object as part of the imagined situation | just as the reproduction depicts
whatever is depicted by the reproduced painting. In other words, experiential
imagination has two objects: the imagined experience and the external thing
presented by the latter. We have already seen how disjunctivism can accom-
modate this fact by taking the imagination of a perception to consist in the
imagination of the instantiation of a relational character with two relata. I will
address the issue of how experiential intentionalism can allow for more than
one object of experiential imagination at the end of the next and nal section of
this paper. The other part of the reply to Currie's and Ravenscroft's challenge
is that, as already illustrated by reference to the analogy with the reproduc-
tion of paintings, the presentation of external things involved in imaginatively
adopting the subjective perspective of a perception shares many important
aspects with the presentation of those things involved in perceiving them from
such a perspective. Accordingly, seeing and imagining seeing resemble each
other, not only in what they make us aware of, but also in how they present
it to us.
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V.
There are good reasons to accept the rst two members of the inconsistent
triad introduced at the beginning. So why should | and typically do |
intentionalists accept the third? What forces them to assume that imagining
a visual perception of an external thing is neutral about the latter's presence
in the imagined situation? To answer this question, it will actually be helpful
to have a look at why disjunctivists reject this thesis.
What we are concerned with are cases in which we visualise an external
object by imagining a perception of it. And we imagine a perception by experi-
entially imagining the instantiation of the character of a perception. According
to disjunctivism, the character of a perception | and therefore the perception
itself | is partly constituted by the perceived object. So what we are doing
when we are imagining a perception is that we are imagining a relational char-
acter. And this involves imagining the two relata: a subjective perspective
and the external things and features presented to that perspective.31 In other
words, by experientially imagining a perception, we imagine all its experiential
constituents | which include the perceived object, since the latter constitutes
part of the character of the perception. So, in some sense, such instances of
experiential imagination take two objects: the perception and the perceived
object. But since the former is relational in character by containing the latter,
we in fact imagine a single, but complex object, namely the perception.
This account can easily explain the transparency and non-neutrality of
visualising. Visualising consists, partly, in the representation of external things
and their features, given that it consists in the representation of a character
constituted by those entities. And in line with the intentionalist nature of
that representation, the character of visualising is partly determined by what it
represents. Hence, when we reect on the character of an episode of visualising,
we are bound to nd the represented objects and features as part of what is
visualised. Moreover, we do not nd any other candidate objects of awareness.
There are no internal pictures or similar entities involved in visualising. And
the subjective perspective, which constitutes the imagined perception as its
second relatum, is not given as an object of awareness, but rather as part of
the subject of awareness. This means, of course, that introspection reveals not
only what we are aware of, but also the way in which we are aware of it. So
a strong representationalist interpretation of transparency and the character
of visual experience (cf. Dretske (1995), Tye (1995) and Speaks (2009)) is
not compatible with the resulting picture. But strong representationalism is
31It is interesting to ask to which extent imagining a subjective perspective involves imag-
ining a subject. It seems that we need not be in any way specic about the identity of such
a subject when visualising | although we may also be very specic in the form of additional
suppositions (cf. Martin (2002b): 411).
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undermined, in any case, by the fact that seeing and visualising can have
the same external things and features as objects, so that their dierence in
character has to be due to some other element, namely the kind of object
awareness involved.
The intentionalist treatment of imagining perceiving diers from the one
just presented because intentionalism does not assume that the perceived ob-
ject constitutes the character of the perception. But, as Martin has noted, this
fact gives rise to a problem (cf. Martin (2002b): section 4). Both parties in the
debate agree that, when we are imagining an object, we are non-neutral about
the presence in the imagined situation of what we are imagining. Hence, in
imagining a perception, we are commited to the presence of a perception | or,
more specically, the instantiation of a perceptual character | in the imag-
ined world. However, according to intentionalism, the presence of a perception
does not entail the presence of a perceived object. For a perception is, from
an experiential point of view, an experience of exactly the same kind as a hal-
lucination: they both possess the same intentional character. But this means
that there is no dierence between imagining a perception and imagining a
hallucination. In both cases, we imagine the same perceptual character. And
since the instantiation of this character does not involve any external things,
we imagine it without imagining such things. However, if we do not imagine an
external thing as part of imagining a perception, there is no reason to assume
that the latter is non-neutral about the presence of an external thing in the
imagined situation. After all, this kind of non-neutrality comes with imagining
something and seems to extend just to what is imagined. This argument of
Martin's may be summarised as follows (cf. especially Martin (2002b): 415f.):
(iii.1) Imagining an object is non-neutral about the presence of that object
| including its constitutive parts | in the imagined situation; and
about no other object's presence.
(iii.2) The object of awareness in the case of imagining a perception of an
external thing is the perception.
(iii.3) Perceptions do not involve any external things as constituents.
(iii) Hence, imagining a perception of an external thing is neutral about
the latter's presence in the imagined situation.
The disjunctivist can block this argument by rejecting (iii.3), but it is far less
obvious how the intentionalist could avoid having to accept its conclusion.
The premisses (iii.1) and (iii.3) seem to be simply part of the intentionalist
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outlook on things. That perceiving is intentional just means that it does not
involve the perceived object as its element. And, more generally, intentional
presentations are committal in so far as they involve a respective attitude
towards the presented. Accordingly, the non-neutrality of imagining should
extend just to what is imagined. Premiss (iii.2), on the other hand, simply
states a denitional truth about part of what the imaginative object awareness
of a perception amounts to. However, if the intentionalists have to accept (iii),
they have to reject (i) or (ii). And, as the previous sections were meant to
show, neither is a feasible option. So what has to go, it seems, is intentionalism
itself | and at least (iii.3) with it.
It does not help to highlight the fact that, according to intentionalism,
imagining a perception involves imagining a commitment towards the presence
of an external thing in the imagined world. As described in the rst section,
intentionalists claim that perceptions involve an intentional attitude towards
their objects which takes the latter to be present in the situation before the
perceiving subject. In the case of an imagined perception, this non-neutrality
concerns of course the presence of the object in the imagined world, which
also contains that perception and the related imagined subjective perspective.
Imagining a perception therefore involves imagining taking an external thing
to be part of the respective situation. But imagining such a commitment
is compatible with actually staying neutral on the issue. Hence, this aspect
of experiential imagination does not suce to establish the non-neutrality of
actual instances of visualising (cf. Martin (2002b): 415).
Now, that intentionalists indeed endorse the problematic claim (iii), and
roughly for the reasons sketched, may be illustrated by reference to Burge's
discussion of Martin's paper. Once it is assumed that it is sometimes possible
(if not even necessary) to visualise an object by imagining perceiving it | an
assumption which he is happy to grant | Burge seems to have no problem
with any of the three premisses needed to derive thesis (iii).32 In particular,
he is clear about the fact that the intentionalist view takes perceptions not
to involve their objects (cf. (iii.3)). And he also assumes that imagining a
perception does not itself involve imagining an external thing to be present
in the imagined situation (cf. (iii.1) and its discussion in the second section).
Instead, this presence is merely supposed as part of a thought accompanying or
even preceding the imagining of the perceptual experience. Burge's complaint
is, in fact, that Martin is wrong in demanding that the commitment about the
presence of the visualised object in the imagined situation should be part of
the experiential imagination.
`The 'intentional theory' is not required to explain how by merely
32He does not explicitly comment on how to characterise experiential imagination. But
there is no reason to suspect that he would reject premiss (iii.2).
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imagining an experience with a certain representational content
one thereby supposes that the content is veridical. I deny that this
supposed explanandum is even true. In the imagined experience
which, according to the Dependency Thesis, is involved in visualiz-
ing, one does not take the representational content of the imagined
experience itself to involve or entail the presence of the visualized
object. Rather one has begun with the supposition of veridical-
ity. One simply takes the content of the imagined experience to be
veridical. The content itself might not have been veridical. That
is the position of the 'intentionalist theory'. Certainly, it is my
position.' (Burge (2005): 65)
As discussed in the second section, what Burge is rejecting here is thesis (i).
But he is happy, as an intentionalist, to embrace thesis (iii) | and thereby
opens up his position to Martin's criticism. For the non-neutrality involved
in visualising cannot simply be moved from the episode of visualising to the
additional supposition. The transparency and non-neutrality of visualising are
aspects of the kind of object awareness involved in visualising (cf. claim (i)).
And this kind of object awareness is, according to the Dependency Thesis,
identical with an instance of experientially imagining a perception (cf. (ii)).
Hence, it is already part of the experiential imagination that an external thing
is given as part of the imagined situation. And, together with thesis (iii), this
leads to an inconsistent position.
However, as I would like to suggest in the remainder of this paper, inten-
tionalism need not endorse thesis (iii) and thus may answer the challenge put
forward in Martin's paper. The key thought is that intentionalists need not
endorse premiss (iii.1) in its current form. They should agree that imagin-
ing something is non-neutral towards what is imagined. But they should also
point out that there are other ways in which imagining | or at least imagining
a perception | can be commital. A closer look at the intentionalist under-
standing of the commitment involved in visual experience will show how this
is possible.
According to intentionalism, the commitment to the presence of some vi-
sually perceived or imagined object in the respective situation is compatible
with there being no such object. For instance, when we hallucinate a green
tree, we are non-neutral about the existence of a green tree in our actual en-
vironment, despite there being no such tree there before us. The commital
aspect of perceptual experiences is therefore independent of the presence or
absence of a perceived object.33
33Again, this is false for disjunctivism, according to which perception-like hallucinations
are non-commital because of their lack of any presentational elements. This means, among
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The same is true of the non-neutrality involved in visualising. It is plau-
sible to maintain that, as the default case (i.e., in the absence of intentions
or suppositions to the opposite eect), visualising an object suces for the
presence of that object in the imagined world. After all, specic imagined
situations are populated by those possible (and perhaps impossible) entities
which we imagine to be part of them. But this is a fact about the nature of
imagined worlds, and not about the nature of imaginative commitment. The
principle at work here is something like that imagined worlds are such that
they contain whichever entities our imaginings are non-neutral about. This
principles assumes that imaginings are commital. But it does not exploit any
aspect of the nature of that commitment. That is, its truth does not depend
on what it means for imaginative experiences or thoughts to be non-neutral.
Hence, nothing speaks against this non-neutrality being independent of the
presence or absence of an imagined object.
This object-independence, however, leaves room for the possibility of an
imaginative commitment which is not due to the constitution of the imagined
perception by its object. But what else could be the source for such a com-
mitment? The answer can | perhaps a bit surprisingly | in fact be found in
the disjunctivist rejection of premiss (iii.3). One factor that is central in this
rebuttal is that disjunctivism distinguishes sharply between imagining a per-
ception and imagining a perception-like hallucination. They are two dierent
imaginative projects. Imagining a perception consists in imagining the instan-
tiation of a perceptual character. The problem with imagining a hallucination
is that, according to disjunctivism, we do not know anything positive about
the character of such an experience. We know merely that its character is
subjectively indistinguishable from that of a perception. Hence, the only way
for us to imagine a hallucination is to imagine the instantiation of a perceptual
character and then simply to stipulate that the resulting imagined experience
is a hallucination which only seems to exemplify a perceptual character, but in
fact exemplies a character which is indistinguishable from a perceptual one.
One thing that is very important to note about this is that the two imagina-
tive projects do not dier in which character is imagined as being instantiated.
They dier only in that one is the most basic | or default | case of imagining
a perceptual experience, while the other requires some additional suppositions.
The other thing not to be missed is that this already suces to ensure that
imagining a perception is non-neutral about the presence of an external thing
other things, that the intentionalist proposal of an object-independent non-neutrality of
perceptions cannot be used to argue against the disjunctivist view that the non-neutrality of
perceptions is due to their being constituted by their objects (and, indeed, vice versa). What
we have here are two rival accounts of perceptual commitment, which are so far diactically
on a par. The last section of the paper is meant to change the balance concerning this issue
in favour of intentionalism.
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in the imagined situation | reference to the constitution of perceptions is not
needed. That imagining a perception is the default case when we are trying
to imagine a perceptual experience means, among other things, that imagin-
ing a hallucination requires explicitly denouncing the perceptual status of the
imagined experience. But this is possible only if imagining a perception is
non-neutral about its being a perception (whatever that means for its consti-
tution). Hence, visualising an external thing | that is, imagining a perception
of such a thing | comes, by default, with a commitment to the presence of a
visual perception (rather than a hallucination) in the imagined situation. But
perceptions dier from hallucinations in being factive (again, independently of
the constitution of either). Accordingly, the presence of a perception implies
the presence of a perceived object. So the commitment involved in visualising
extends to the presence of an external thing in the imagined world. And its
double source is the factivity of perceptions and the default status of imagining
a perception.
What is crucial now is that an intentionalist can adopt more or less the same
account of the two dierent projects. The only dierence is that the character
to be imagined in both imaginative projects counts as perceptual for a dier-
ent reason. Disjunctivism maintains that this character is perceptual because
only perceptions, but not hallucinations, possess it. By contrast, intention-
alists accept that this character is shared by perceptions and perception-like
hallucinations. None the less, intentionalists can still count it as perceptual,
and not as hallucinatory, because it is characteristic of perceptions, and not
of hallucinations. This has the consequence that imagining the instantiation
of this character amounts, by default, to imagining a perception (rather than
a hallucination). Nothing more is needed, especially no intention or thought
concerning the perceptual status of the imagined experience. Imagining a hal-
lucination, on the other hand, involves not only the experiential imagination
of that character, but also a supposition to the eect that the imagined expe-
rience is hallucinatory, despite rst appearances. The rest of the intentionalist
story is the same as the disjunctivist one. That imagining a perception is the
default case means, partly, that imagining the character in question comes
with a commitment to the presence of a perception in the imagined situation.
And this non-neutrality extends again to the visualised external things and
features because of the factivity of perception.
It still has been left open, of course, why | and in which sense | the
character shared by perceptions and some hallucinations is characteristic of
the former, but not of the latter. One aspect of this is that being a perception
implies having this character, while being a hallucination does not. For not all
hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions and there-
fore do not share the same character (cf. chapter 2). But the more important
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(and related) element is that the character in question involves a self-reexive
form of intentionality which is concerned with the presentation of the respec-
tive experiences as perceptions (and not as hallucinations). As already noted
in the rst section, perceptions and rst-personally indistinguishable halluci-
nations dier in their third-personally accessible structure which may or may
not relate them to the world. The thought is now that it is part of their
common intentionality that perceptions and hallucinations present not only
the world, but also themselves as being a certain way. More specically, both
kinds of perceptual experience present themselves as relating us to external
things in the manner distinctive of perceptions. This presentational aspect
forms part of their shared character. But only perceptions do actually relate
us in the relevant way to external things and therefore present themselves ad-
equately. By contrast, hallucinations are not relational and thus mislead us
about their own third-personal structure (cf. chapters 11 and 13). The char-
acter of perceptual experiences is thus characteristic of perceptions, and not
hallucinations, because it subjectively marks both of them as perceptions, and
not hallucinations. Their shared character is characteristic of perceptions, and
not hallucinations, because it adequately reects the structure of the former,
but not of the latter.
The character of perceptual experiences is not unlike the appearance of
real and fake lemons. The latter two are (ideally) visually indistinguishable
because they share the same appearance. But this appearance is characteristic
of real lemons, and not of fake lemons. When we see an object with that ap-
pearance, we take it, by default, to be a real lemon. And visualising an object
with that appearance amounts, by default, to visualising a real lemon. In this
case, the priority of real lemons over fake lemons is, of course, grounded in very
dierent factors | such as their value for us, their natural or articial status or
perhaps even their sheer number. But the basic phenomenon is the same: we
have some form of object awareness (experiential vs. visual), and the respec-
tive presentational element or appearance is, by default, non-neutral about
what is presented. Besides, in both cases, the dierence between the default
experience and its non-default counterpart is that the latter involves an addi-
tional thought concerned with the further specication or re-characterisation
of what is presented. We do not, say, rst see an object with a lemon-like ap-
pearance and then judge it to be that of a real lemon, rather than a fake one;
we simply see a lemon. Similarly, imagining the instantiation of a character
characteristic of a perception suces to count as imagining a perception; no
additional stipulation that the imagined experience is a perception, and not a
hallucination, is needed.
The proposed version of intentionalism| experiential intentionalism |de-
parts signicantly from those which are currently more orthodox (cf. footnote
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2 for references). In particular, it diers from them in agreeing with disjunc-
tivism that the priority of perceptions over perceptual-like hallucinations is not
exhausted by the fact that both kinds of perceptual experience involve a per-
ceptual attitude, that is, take their objects to actually exist and to be as they
present them as being. It is also said to include the fact that hallucinations
possess a perceptual character and present themselves as perceptions; and not
vice versa. As a result, hallucinations and their features (e.g., their motiva-
tional and rational powers) have to be elucidated in terms of perceptions and
their characteristic character; while the latter can be discussed without any
reference to hallucinations.34 The claim that the self-presentational charac-
ter of perceptual experiences adequately reects the structure of perceptions
and therefore counts as characteristic of perceptions may perhaps require the
assumption that the underlying structural dierence between seeing and hallu-
cinating is one in nature. That is, experiential intentionalism should perhaps
be combined with structural disjunctivism (as dened in the rst section).
This would, for instance, more be in line with phenomenal disjunctivism in so
far as then both this view and experiential intentionalism would account for
the dierence between imagining a perception and imagining a hallucination
| which obtains despite both projects involving imagining the instantiation of
one and the same character | partly in terms of a dierence in nature in what
is imagined. But either way is ne: experiential intentionalism is compatible
with structural disjunctivism, but does not require it.35
VI.
There are independent reasons for preferring the intentionalism put forward
here over its intentionalist rivals | and, indeed, over disjunctivism. For in-
stance, the proposed view promises to be able to capture both externalist and
internalist epistemological ideas: it can identify the third-personal, relational
structure of perceptions as their knowledge-relevant and reason-giving features,
while also ensuring some rst-personal, experiential access to them which does
not suer the problem over-intellectualisation (cf. chapters 11 and 13). Here
is, however, not the space to elaborate on this and other advantages of the
view; or to discuss how it may respond to some of the other challenges di-
rected at intentionalism (e.g., those raised in Martin (2004)). Instead, I would
like, in closing, to formulate an objection to the disjunctivist account of the
transparency and non-neutrality of visualising.
34See Martin (2002b, 2004) and chapter 11. Similar ideas can be found in the intentionalist
views inspired by the phenomenological tradition, such as that put forward in Smith (2002).
35But see the end of chapter 11 for a line of reasoning which supports the supplementation
of experiential intentionalism with structural disjunctivism.
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Disjunctivism has objected to intentionalism that the latter cannot prop-
erly account for the commitment involved in experientially imagining a percep-
tion. In the preceding section, I have argued that this objection can be met by
intentionalism in the form of experiential intentionalism. My contention now
is that disjunctivism cannot properly account for the commitment involved in
experientially imagining a hallucination. Disjunctivism assumes that we expe-
rientially imagine a perception-like hallucination by experientially imagining
the instantiation of a perceptual character and by additionally supposing that
what is indeed is imagined is an experience which possesses a dierent, but
subjectively indistinguishable character.
`[W]hen one takes on the project of sensorily imagining visual hal-
lucination as opposed to visual perception, what one has to do is
imagine the situation as for the perceptual situation. One's ap-
preciation of its hallucinatory status will not come from some phe-
nomenologically distinctive element of what one has imagined, but
rather the further cognitive gloss one puts on it all. That is, when
one sensorily imagines a visual hallucination, one puts oneself in a
position where one takes the imagined situation to contain the ob-
jects presented, and then uses that image as the basis of imagining
a situation just like it in which it appears to one as if there is such
an object, although none is present.' (Martin (2002b): 417)
The main problem with this proposal is that the presence in the imagined
situation of an external thing, which is a consequence of the presence of the
imagined relational perception, cannot be properly cancelled out by the ad-
ditional supposition that there is no such thing present in the imagined situ-
ation, after all. As a result, it | wrongly | turns out to be impossible to
experientially imagine a perception-like hallucination. For the disjunctivist, a
perception and its character is constituted by its object; and imagining the
former involves imagining the latter. Hence, imagining a perceptual character
includes imagining a perceived object as part of the imagined world. Now,
once the suggested supposition is added, the question arises of whether this
basic episode of experiential imagination still suces for the presence of the
external object in the imagined situation. If the answer is yes | and assum-
ing that the presence of this object is a determinate matter | the opposing
supposition can, in this respect, have no impact on what the imagined world
contains. This means, however, that we continue to imagine a perception and
thus have not really succeeded in imagining a hallucination. But it is surely
possible for us to succeed in pursuing the latter project.
So the answer to the question has to be no: the experiential imagination
of the perception does not any more determine that the imagined situation
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contains an external thing. But this has the consequence that it also cannot
any more determine that this situation contains a perceptual experience. It
cannot posit a perception as part of the imagined world because this would,
after all, require positing an external thing. And it cannot posit a hallucina-
tion because this would require imagining the character of hallucination, and
not that of a perception. Hence, the experiential imagination stops altogether
to determine what the imagined world contains, once the supposition is added.
And the hallucination is therefore only intellectually imagined to be part of
the imagined situation, but not experientially. Again, we have failed in our
project, which was to experientially imagine a hallucination. In short, disjunc-
tivism entails the impossibility of experientially imagining a perception-like
hallucination. The underlying reason for this is, of course, that disjunctivists
should deny that we have any access to the positive nature of the character of
such a hallucination (cf. Martin (2004) and chapter 11). We merely know that
it is indistinguishable from the character of a perception. But this knowledge
does not suce to imagine the instantiation of the character of a perception-
like hallucination. The diculty with this is that we seem none the less to be
able to experientially imagine having such a hallucination. The disjunctivist
cannot account for this possibility.
Experiential intentionalism, as well as other versions of intentionalism, do
not face the same problem. The character of a perception-like hallucination is,
after all, identical with that of a perception. And we can experientially imagine
its instantiation because we have positive knowledge of its nature | especially
its intentional nature. The same is true of visualising fake lemons. We know
positively what they look like, namely that they have the same appearance as
real lemons. And we can therefore visualise them, even if this requires some
additional stipulation that we are not confronted with the default case. This
cancelling out is not problematic in the case of imagining a hallucination, since
the experiential imagination of the respective character can loose its power to
ensure the presence of an external thing, without loosing its power to ensure
the presence of a perceptual experience. For no constitutive link is assumed
to hold between the character of perceptions and their objects.
It seems therefore better to give up this constitutive claim | and thus dis-
junctivism | and to locate the source of the transparency and non-neutrality
of both seeing and visualising in the factivity of perceptions and their priority
over hallucinations. Does this mean that visualising an external thing | in
cases where it is identical with imagining a perception | does not really involve
visually imagining such a thing? Is the imagined perception the only object of
the experiential imagination potentially involved in visualising? The answer
should, of course, be no: visualising an external thing makes us visually aware
of it and is not neutral towards its presence in the imagined situation. This
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is possible because experiential imagination takes two objects. These objects
are of dierent kinds (experiences vs. external things). They are presented in
dierent ways (experientially or phenomenally vs. visually, auditorily, etc.).
And they may or may not be independent of each other (e.g., in the case of
an imagined pain, they are not). So what intentionalists should do is to add a
clause about the other object of experiential imagination to premiss (iii.2):
(iii.2*) The objects of awareness in the case of imagining a perception of
an external thing are the perception and the external thing.
That the two objects are given to us in a dierent way is also apparent in
the fact that we are aware of one of them (i.e., the external thing) solely by
being aware of the other (i.e., the perception of it). This is also exactly what
happens in the case of a reproduction of a painting: the former represents
what the latter depicts by representing the latter. And both in the case of
experiential imagination and the case of the reproduction of an artwork, what
is represented | the character of a perception and a painting, respectively |
are not relational, that is, not constituted by the objects that they themselves
present. This doubling of objects does not undermine the transparency of
visualising or, more generally, experiential imagination. For while the imag-
ined experiences are objects of awareness, they are not given to us as objects
of awareness. Instead, we are aware of them by imaginatively adopting the
subjective perspective inherent to them. None the less, they still count as
genuine objects of awareness because our episodes of experiential imagination
are non-neutral about their presence in the imagined world.36
36I would like to thank Malcolm Budd, Peter Goldie, Rob Hopkins, Mike Martin, Kevin
Mulligan, Matt Nudds, Gianfranco Soldati, Matt Soteriou, Juan Suarez and the members
of the philosophy research colloquium at the University of Fribourg for many benecial
discussions about intentionalism and disjunctivism. In addition, I am very grateful to two
anonymous referees and the editor of this symposium, Marcus Willaschek. My work on this
article was generously supported | in the form of a Fellowship for Advanced Researchers




The Humean Origins of the
Representational Account of Imagining
Two of the main contemporary approaches to the nature of episodes of imag-
ining { such as visualising an Arcadian landscape or imagining that the Earth
is at { are the Agency Account and the Representational Account. While the
former tries to understand imaginings as instances of a special kind of mental
agency, the latter attempts to characterise them as representations of episodes
of cognition, such as perceptions, episodic memories or judgemental thoughts.1
The various contemporary versions of the Representational Account dier both
in how they conceive of the kind of representation in question and in which
forms of imagining they restrict their claim to.2 But many of them have in
common that they have { more or less explicitly { been inspired and inuenced
by Hume's approach to imagining, as it can be found in his Treatise of Human
Nature.3
An assessment of Hume's view on imagining is therefore worthwhile not
only in its own rights, but also in respect of issues concerning the motivation
for, and the prospects of, endorsing the Representational Account. It is of
interest to ask how best to formulate this view on imaginings and what to
preserve from Hume's own position; and also to investigate to which extent
the views of more recent proponents of the Representational Account may be
understood as responses to or modications of Hume's original approach. In
this essay, I conne myself to a presentation and criticism of Hume's claims
about imagining (sections I and II), as well as to suggestions of how to improve
his view when aiming to formulate a promising version of the Representational
1See Dorsch (2011b) for a critical discussion of both views. Note, however, that I there
treat what I call here the `Representational Account' as a version of the `Epistemic Account'
of imagining { namely the one which describe the dependency (or `echoing' relation) of
imaginings on cognitions in representational terms.
2See (Dorsch, 2011b, chs. 5 and 6) for a detailed presentation of the main dierences.
3If not stated otherwise, all references in this chapter are to Hume (2007) and given in a
notation picking out the book, part, chapter and section of the respective passages.
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Account (section III).
I.
For Hume, episodes of imagining belong to the class of `ideas'. And as such,
they are taken to be dependent on the corresponding `impressions' in the sense
that they are `copies' of these impressions. To understand this claim, it is
necessary to take a closer look at some of the details of Hume's account of
the mind. He divides the class of mental episodes (or `perceptions' in his
terminology) into impressions and ideas { or, as he also says, into `feelings'
and `thoughts'. The former comprise `sensations, passions and emotions, as
they make their rst appearance in the soul' (1.1.1.1) { that is, perceptual
experiences, bodily sensations, and basic feelings of desire and emotion. By
contrast, the latter include `the faint images of [impressions] in thinking and
reasoning', such as imaginings and occurrent beliefs or judgemental thoughts.4
Hume characterises the dierence between both kinds of mental episode
in two dierent, though related ways. According to the rst, impressions and
ideas dier in vivacity: the former are said to be generally more vivid than
the latter. Vivacity comes in degrees, however. And some impressions and
ideas may be of almost equal vividness, so that we may sometimes be unable
to distinguish them.
`Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we
may name impressions [...]. [...] The common degrees of [impres-
sions and ideas] are easily distinguish'd; tho' it is not impossible
but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each
other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent
emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: As
on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are
so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas.
But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they
are in general so very dierent, that no one can make a scruple to
rank them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name
to mark the dierence.' (1.1.1.1)
The `near resemblance' of instances of the two types of mental episode and our
subsequent problems to tell them apart are still not meant to imply that some
ideas might be more vivid than some impressions { they only `approach' each
4See 1.1.1.1, and also some of the passages quoted further below. Memories are a special
case and will be discussed separately further below.
262
Chapter 9The Humean Origins of the Representational Account of Imagining
other very closely.5
Another point is that Hume takes the vivacity of our mental episodes to be
an aspect of their subjective characters which enables us to tell apart, from the
inside, instances of the various kinds of mental episode. For he acknowledges
that the vividness of mental episodes is part of how they appear to us in
consciousness and of what lets us distinguish them from our rst-personal
perspective. This becomes apparent in the passages where Hume describe the
subjectively accessible dierences among ideas of three kinds, namely those of
judgement, memory and imagination.
`For tho' it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the
original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination trans-
poses and changes them, as it pleases; yet this dierence is not
sucient to distinguish them in their operatio, or make us know
the one from the other; it being impossible to recal the past im-
pressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and
see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. Since therefore
the memory is known, neither by the order of its complex ideas,
nor the nature of its simple ones; it follows, that the dierence be-
twixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity.'
(1.3.5.3)
`An idea assented to feels dierent from a ctitious idea, that the
fancy alone presents to us: And this dierent feeling I endeavour
to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or
rmness, or steadiness. [...] [I]t is something felt by the mind,
which distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the ctions of
the imagination.' (1.3.7.7)
One may wonder whether the enumeration of dierent terms really already
helps to `explain' what vivacity amounts to. But Hume oers more, namely the
claim that a higher degree of vivacity comes with two other important aspects:
(i) an increased sense of presence or reality with respect to the objects and
features presented6 to us by the episodes at issue; and (ii) a higher motivational
5In 1.3.5.7, the focus is also on the eect a de- or increase in vivacity has on what we take
a given episode to be. Hume also notes there the possibility that an imaginative episode
may change into a cognitive one { that an often enough repeated idea of the imagination
may become an idea of judgement or memory. But again, this makes clear that a sucient
de- or increase in vivacity leads to a dierent kind of episode.
6My use of the term `presentation' is meant to be neutral enough to allow for both inten-
tional or relational forms of presentation of objects, as well as for the sensory or intellectual
presentations of objects that may be given as past, present, actual, non-actual, and so on.
The presentation of an object is, however, always taken to be a conscious presentation. The
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(or rational, as one would feel inclined to say today) impact on our beliefs,
emotions and actions.
`This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is in-
tended only to express that act of mind, which renders realities
more present to us than ctions, causes them to weigh more in the
thought, and gives them a superior inuence on the passions and
imagination.' (1.3.7.7)
In the case of judgemental thoughts, their high degree of vivacity also ensures
that they lead to the formation of a more stable and enduring belief.
`It gives them more force and inuence; makes them appear of
greater importance; inxes them in the mind; and renders them
the governing principles of all our actions.' (1.3.7.7)
Accordingly, the subjective vivacity of a mental episodes reects the closeness
of its connection to perception and its impact on belief { which is, of course,
in line with Hume's thought that perceptions are the most vivid episodes that
we enjoy, and that imaginings are characterised by the least degree of vivacity.
His second and less explicit characterisation of the dierence between im-
pressions and ideas introduces both the idea of a resemblance between the two
and the notion of a causal dependence of the latter on the former.
`Thus we nd, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each
other; and as the complex are form'd from them, we may arm
in general, that these two species of perception are exactly corre-
spondent. [...] Let us consider how they stand with regard to their
existence, and which of the impressions and ideas are causes, and
which eects.
The full examination of this question is the subject of the present
treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with estab-
lishing one general proposition, that all our simple ideas in their
rst appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are cor-
respondent to them, and which they exactly represent.' (1.1.1.6f.)
Since Hume describes this multi-faceted relationship between impressions and
ideas also in terms of the latter being `copies' of the former (cf., e.g., 1.1.1.5,
1.1.3.4, 1.3.7.5 and 1.3.14.15), it has come to be known as his copy princple.
expression 'representation', on the other hand, is intended to highlight the fact that the
represented perceptions or judgements are thereby not themselves present in the stream of
consciousness, but instead merely re-presented by the respective episodes.
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Simple `perceptions' are thereby understood as `perceptions' which cannot be
further divided or analysed into smaller `perceptions' (cf. 1.1.1.2). And since
complex ideas are composed of simple ones, the former inherit their resem-
blance with and dependence on simple impressions from the latter. Hume
thus maintains that we cannot think of, imagine or remember something, the
various parts and aspects of which (e.g., their colours, shapes, etc.) we have
not previously perceived. This does not require that complex ideas have to be
actually caused by corresponding complex impressions. It is sucient if they
are constructed out of simpler ideas which are causally dependent on precedent
simple impressions (cf. 1.1.1.4f.). This entails that complex ideas { despite
being possibly caused by corresponding complex impressions { causally depend
for their occurence only on the respective simple impressions.
Now, the causal derivation of ideas from impressions is not the only aspect
of their relationship highlighted by the copy principle. One further aspect
is that Hume also understands ideas as corresponding to the respective im-
pressions by resembling them in all respects but their degree of vivacity (cf.
1.1.1.3). In particular, they resemble each other in which objects and features
they present us with, albeit presenting them in dierently vivid manners (cf.
1.3.7.5). Moreover, there is a third aspect which, like the causal dependence
but unlike the resemblance, is asymmetric in nature: ideas are `images' or
`representations' of impressions (cf. 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.1.7).
That a given complex idea may be caused merely by several simple im-
pressions, rather than also by a corresponding complex one, raises the issue
of which impression(s) it is said to resemble. It seems plausible to maintain
that the complex idea resembles each of the simple impressions in so far as
it possesses parts (i.e., simple ideas) which resemble the latter. On the other
hand, and as already noted, the resemblance at issue here concerns primarily
the (non-mental) objects and features presented by the ideas and impressions
compared. And this similarity is unlikely to hold between complex ideas and
simple impressions, at least with respect to the presentation of objects and
of higher-level properties. For Hume understands simple impressions as pre-
sentations of basic features, such as colours, tastes or smells (cf. 1.1.1.2).
Hence, although complex ideas may resemble each of the respective simple
impressions, this is not the kind of similarity referred to in the copy principle.
Instead, what is meant is the resemblance of ideas on those impressions that
present the same objects and features as the former { in this case, the resem-
blance of complex ideas on similarly complex impressions. However, it remains
unclear which complex impression could be relevant in cases where a complex
idea is not preceded by any corresponding complex impression. It is true that
such ideas would resemble a complex combination of the relevant simple im-
pressions, if any would actually come into existence. But this is not the same
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as saying that the complex idea resembles an already given impression.
The same set of issues does not arise with respect to the proposed repre-
sentational link between ideas and impressions. On the one hand, in contrast
with resemblance, representation need not be genuinely relational in the sense
of requiring an actually given second relatum. And, on the other hand, a com-
plex idea represents not simply individual simple impressions, but also their
complex structure. Imagining a blue book on a brown table corresponds to
seeing a blue book on a brown table, and not to seeing a brown book on a
blue table, despite both complex impressions involving the same simple ones.
Accordingly, what complex ideas represent are complex impressions, though
not necessarily particular ones (e.g., the one I had yesterday when looking at
my friend's house).7
This suggests perhaps also some solution to the resemblance issue. The
key thought is that ideas present certain (non-mental) objects and features
precisely because they are representations of impressions which present those
objects and features. Hence, it is not surprising that ideas resemble the im-
pressions that they represent in so far as they present the same (non-mental)
objects and features as the latter (albeit in a less vivid way). For they repre-
sent an impression with a certain property and thereby acquire themselves this
property, or at least something very similar to it. A complex idea therefore
resembles the complex impression that it represents. And although the latter
need not enjoy actual existence in the past or present, it is clear which complex
impression is relevant. Moreover, we do not generally nd claims about the
resemblance between actual and merely represented entities problematic. We
may recognise similarities between friends of ours and characters in a lm; or
between a real person and our mental image of her which we have formed prior
to meeting her or knowing anything about her appearance.
These considerations allow now for a more precise reading of Hume's copy
principle. Since the symmetric resemblance between ideas and impressions is
probably best understood as a consequence of their asymmetric representa-
tional link, we need not any more mention the former separately.8 According
7The preceding considerations liken Hume's complex ideas to pictures, given that both
allow for the presentation of some kind of object, without the need to present a particular and
actual instance of that kind; and given that both may perhaps still give rise to an experience
of resemblance. A painting may depict a man with a certain appearance, without depicting
a particular man (e.g., Socrates or Napoleon); and it may perhaps still look like such a man
(see chapter 8). This analogy may provide further support for the suggested interpretation
of copies as reproductions similar to photocopies or photographs.
8At one point, Hume writes that `impressions and ideas [...] are exact copies of each other'
(1.1.1.5). This seems to equate the relation of copying with the relation of resembling. My
dierent usage follows instead that to be found in the contemporary literature on Hume, as
well as presumably in other passages in Hume's text (e.g., cf. 1.3.7.5). My aim is, in any
case, a reconstruction, not of Hume's use of the word `copy', but of his conception of the
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to the resulting interpretation, the principle maintains that particular ideas
are copies of particular impressions in that they (i) causally depend on the
later, and (ii) are representations of the latter in such a way as to end up
presenting the same (non-mental) objects and features. In the case of simple
ideas, both relations hold between them and simple impressions. And they
always represent a particular simple impression. Complex ideas, on the other
hand, causally depend on each member of a certain set of particular simple
impressions, while representing and resembling a complex impression { though
not necessarily a particular one.
Hume's conception of the relationship between simple ideas and simple im-
pressions seems thus to be that the former are causal reproductions of the latter
{ perhaps not dissimilar to photocopies or photographs.9 For such reproduc-
tions combine the same three elements of causal dependence, representation
and resemblance. It is constitutive of photocopies of sheets of paper that they
are causally dependent on the respective original sheets, and also that they
are photographic representations of the latter and resemble them in respect
of what is written or drawn on them. Complex ideas deriving from complex
impressions may equally count as causal reproductions of the latter { with the
exception that they are not causally dependent on them, given that they might
have come into existence without the involvement of the complex impressions.
For those cases, the analogy of a collage of photocopies seems more tting. If
we glue together several photocopies, the resulting collage of copies is causally
dependent on the initial sheets of paper, while representing and resembling a
corresponding potential collage of the originals, though no particular one.
Drawing the analogy with photocopies may perhaps also oer an explana-
tion of why ideas are less vivid than impressions { and therefore also of how
the two distinct characterisations of the dierence between the two types of
mental episode t together. In the case of photocopies, the contrast and satu-
ration of the marks on their surface tend to be less than those of the marks on
the original sheets of paper. Similarly, the vivacity of episodes might be un-
derstood as an aspect of their subjective character which is bound to decrease
when mentally reproduced. That is, this reproduction might be of such a na-
ture that it results not only in the episodes' inheritance of the presentation of
certain objects and features, but also in a diminishing of their sense of reality
or presence and of their impact on beliefs, emotions and actions.
We have nally reached the point where we are in a position to become
more concrete about Hume's account of imagining. Both his examples of imag-
ining and his discussion of the dierence between imagining and remembering
relationship between ideas and impressions.
9I follow here the interpretation of Mike Martin, presented in a research seminar on the
Treatise at University College London in the academic year 2002/03.
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something suggest that he takes imaginings to be complex ideas. Imagining
`the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies' (1.1.1.4), or
`winged horses, ery dragons, and monstrous giants' (1.1.3.4), means combin-
ing simpler ideas { whether the latter are still somewhat complex (such as the
ideas of horses, wings, and so on) or indeed among the simplest (such as the
ideas of colours, tastes, smells, and so on). Correspondingly, ideas of the imag-
ination dier from ideas of memory in whether they preserve the order in which
the relevant impressions occurred before (1.1.3.2).10 And this, again, presup-
poses that both are complex ideas possessing an internal structure. According
to the proposed reading of the copy principle, Hume therefore maintains that
it is constitutive of imaginings that they represent complex perceptions and
causally depend on the prior perceptual occurrence of the simple aspects of
those perceptions.11
II.
Hume's account faces many challenges, some of which concern his theory of
mental episodes in general. One of these has already been acknowledged by
Hume himself, namely that it seems possible to have simple ideas (e.g., the
one of `the missing shade of blue') without having had before the correspoding
simple impression (cf. 1.1.1.10). The universality of his copy principle becomes
therefore questionable, even in its restriction to simple ideas and impressions.
Another objection targets the fact that the dierences in vivacity { and
hence the resulting dierences between mental episodes { are taken by Hume
to be quantitative, and not qualitative. This contradicts the observation that
perceptions, judgements, memories, imaginings, and so on, dier in kind, and
not merely in degree. They dier, for instance, in whether they are sensory
or intellectual, in whether they involve a cognitive attitude (i.e., whether they
involve the claim that things are as they present them to be), or in whether
they provide us with reasons for belief, or are responsive to them (see (Dorsch,
2011b, ch. 3) and chapter 5). And these dierences are not only subjectively
salient (see chapters 2 and 4, but also distinguish the episodes concerned qual-
itatively, and not merely quantitatively.
10Note that this fact is not directly subjectively accessible (cf. the passage from 1.3.5.3
quoted above). It is interesting to ask whether the also postulated and subjectively salient
dierence in vivacity between memories and imaginings might be said to indirectly reect
this dierence of how the two kinds of episodes are taken to relate back to the original
perceptions.
11I assume here that our perceptions are simple { that is, for instance, of a single colour
and no other sensible quality { only in rare and articial circumstances. Perhaps there
may also be simple instances of imagining, in which case Hume's account would have to be
slightly modied as to allow for simple ideas of the imagination as well.
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Furthermore, it should be explained why some ideas (i.e., judgemental
thoughts and conscious memories) are more vivid than others (i.e., imaginings)
to such an extent that the former, but not the latter, have an impact on what
we believe about the world in a way very similar to that of impressions. Espe-
cially Hume's discussion of episodic memories reveals that he himself struggled
more or less explicitly with this problem. While generally assuming them to
be ideas (cf., e.g., 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.3.1), he then moves them sometimes closer
to impressions to account for the perception-like impact on belief. Thus, when
trying to distinguish them from imaginings, Hume locates memories 'betwixt
an impression and an idea', to reect the fact that their vivacity is in between
those of perceptions and imaginings (1.1.3.1). And when trying to specify why
memories have the same power as perceptions to give rise to beliefs, Hume
even speaks of them as `impression[s] of the memory' (1.3.5.1) { though not
without seemingly relativising this statement shortly afterwards by apparently
reintroducing the contrast between perceptions and memories:
`To believe is [...] to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or
a repetition of that impression in the memory.' (1.3.5.8)
If `repetition of an impression' is understood here as meaning the literal reoc-
currence of the original impression, the explanation of the memories' impact
on beliefs has the price of rendering them indistinguishable from perceptions.
But if it is instead taken to denote, in accordance to the copy principle, the less
vivid representation of a perception, the initial problem of accounting for the
memories' perception-like link to belief reoccurs. This illustrates that Hume
has diculties to accommodate the fact that memories are very similar to per-
ceptions in their epistemic role, while also holding on to their dierences in
vivacity and immediacy { that is, their dierences in how they present us with
objects.
And nally, the rst characterisation of the dierence between impressions
and ideas is in tension with the second one precisely because of this aspect
of Hume's conception of vivacity (and despite the explanatory link between
the two mentioned above). For treating ideas as copies of impressions in the
sense just specied means treating the two as being dierent in kind. Hence,
it clashes with the claim that the only dierence between the copies and what
they are copies of is one of vivacity (cf. 1.1.1.3). In fact, this inconsistency
seems already to be inherent to the copy principle itself, given that its second
clause postulates a resemblance in all repects except vivacity (i.e., a dierence
in degree), while the third clause puts forward the idea of a representational
link (i.e., a dierence in kind).
Now, Hume's account is subject not only to general challenges to his the-
ory of mental episodes. Some objections are also more specically related
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to the particular incorporation of imaginings in his overall view of the mind.
Hume claims that episodes of imagining are causal reproductions and therefore
representations of their cognitive counterparts. In addition to the diculties
already mentioned, this thesis is problematic for at least two reasons.
The rst is that it is unclear how to avoid the conclusion that all imaginings
(just like all thoughts or judgements) involve some sensory or aective element,
given that they are or include copies of perceptions with sensory or aective
qualities. This idea makes sense in the case of aectively imagining a pain or of
sensorily imagining something red: the character of the rst episode contains
some element of painfulness, and the second some quality of reddishness.12
But we can suppose (or, more generally, think) that an object is a certain way
without any sensory or aective element involved. The underlying problem is
that Hume's account cannot properly accommodate the distinction between
sensory, aective and intellectual episodes, especially given that this distinction
is one in kind.
The second motivation for being uneasy about the proposed claim about
imaginings is that it can at best play only a minor role in an account of
imagining. That imaginings are dependent on perceptions in the way described
is not distinctive of them within Hume's theory. For the same is said to be true
of episodes of memory, thought and judgement. This leads back to the worry
that, ultimately, reference to degrees in vivacity is his only means to establish
dierences among mental episodes, while the more fundamental or signicant
ones of these are in fact dierences in kind. In particular, a high degree of
vivacity is implausibly meant to be the sole feature which is distinctive of all
cognitive episodes (whether they are impressions or ideas) and distinguishes
them strictly from imaginings.
III.
Hume's account can be improved, however, without having to give up on the
general idea that imaginative episodes are representations of cognitive ones.
The two most important modications are, rst, the introduction of the
qualitative distinction between sensory and intellectual presentations; and sec-
ond, the substitution of the qualitative dierences in attitude and epistemic
role for the quantitative dierence in vivacity. Hume's contrast between im-
pressions and ideas is thus replaced by the opposition of cognitions and imag-
inings, as well as the orthogonal opposition between sensory and intellectual
episodes. As a result, not only perceptions, but also episodic memories and
12Though neither suces to qualiy the episode as a genuine experience of pain or redness,
given that they do not present these qualities as actually being instantiated (see chapters 2,
8 and 10).
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judgemental thoughts are taken to be episodes that do not represent others in
the relevant way, but instead can gure as the objects of such a representation.
And only imaginings { plus possibly memories (cf. below) and spontaneous
images { continue to count as representations of cognitions.
These two modifcations suce already to solve several of the diculties
facing Hume's theory of the mind. The resulting version of the Representa-
tional Account can accommodate the fact that the various kinds of cognition
and imagining dier in kind from each other, and along the dimensions out-
lined above. It also avoids any of the problems linked to the introduction of
vivacity as an important element in an account of imaginings. Intellectual
imaginings need not involve any sensory elements any more, since they can
now be construed as representations of intellectual cognitions, such as judge-
mental thoughts or occurrent beliefs. And the modied theory comes closer to
the identication of a distinctive feature of imaginings which separates them
strictly from cognitions and other non-imaginative mental episodes. For while
it is said to be constitutive of imaginings that they are representations of
cognitions, the same is not true of perceptions, judgemental thoughts, bodily
sensations. feelings of emotion or desire, and so on.
The application to episodic memories may remain problematic, however.
They still seem to fall in between perceptions and instances of sensory imag-
ining. While they share their cognitive attitude and epistemic role with the
former, they do not present their objects as being there before us in our en-
vironment and, in this respect at least, resemble the latter. This raises again
the issue of how they can actually share their attitude and impact on belief
with perceptions, despite their lack of the latter's direct connection to real-
ity. And it also generates the question of which set of features is distinctive
of imaginings, if it turns out that episodic memories, too, are best treated as
representations of perceptions.
But the Representational Account may have the resources to deal with
episodic memories (see Martin (2001)). If episodic memories are indeed repre-
sentations of past perceptions, they may inherit the particular content of the
latter. That is, they may also be presentation of the specic objects and fea-
tures then perceived and, moreover, present these objects and features as they
were once presented by one's past perception. In this way, episodic memories
may provide us with access to particular aspects of the past. And this fact
may very well explain why they involve a subjectively salient commitment to
how things actually were, and why they inuence our beliefs in roughly the
same way as the original or other perceptions. They would still dier from the
latter in that they do not present their objects as being there before us, but
locate them in the past.
The contrast with sensory imaginings may then be established by arguing
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that they { although representing some perceptions { do not represent par-
ticular perceptions, let alone with objects from the present or the past. This
would ensure that they do not bring us into contact with the actual world {
something which is reected by the fact that their objects are not given to us as
actual, and that they do not show the cognitive attitude and impact on belief
of cognitions. The Representational Account may therefore identify the repre-
sentation of non-particular cognitions as the distinctive feature of imaginings.
And this would not only suce to distinguish them from episodic memories
and other non-imaginative episodes, but would also promise an account of their
lack of epistemic features.
Now, another diculty for the modied view is that it is unclear whether
the distinction between sensory and intellectual episodes is already sucient
to render the Representational Account applicable to intellectual imaginings
(see (Dorsch, 2011b, ch. 7)). It is at least questionable whether all instances
of imagining that something is the case can or should be modelled on imag-
ining judging or imagining believing that it is the case. But if the answer to
this question is negative, the Representational Account cannot hope to pro-
vide a unied theory of imagining, which should include intellectual instances
as well. It may still be able to elucidate the nature of sensory imaginings {
but presumably only by giving up on the idea that sensory and intellectual in-
stances of imagining share a common nature. Properly answering the question
of whether the Representational Account is indeed bound to fail to accommo-
date intellectual imaginings, however, requires a more extensive and thorough
investigation than can be oered here.
In addition to the two modications already mentioned, proponents of the
Representational Account may also interpret the signicance of the causal de-
pendence of imaginings on cognitions in a slightly dierent way than Hume
and, as a result, separate it more from the idea that imaginings are repre-
sentations of cognitions. It may very well be true that we cannot visualise
something blue without having seen something blue, or that we cannot imag-
ine that water is blue without having formed judgements or beliefs about water
(rather than, say, twater). But it seems that the dependence in question is not
merely a causal one, it also { and primarily { concerns semantic aspects of the
respective kinds of episode.
The thought is, more specically, that our capacities to imagine something
depend on our perceptual and conceptual capacities. And since episodes of
imagining involve the employment of the former, while we acquire the latter
by cognitively interacting with aspects of the world (including, say, the abstrac-
tion from sensory input, or conceptual analysis and construction), it follows
that imaginings depend on our cognitions for their presentational power. And
it is also to be expected that this dependence is underwritten by some complex
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causal chain leading from the initial cognitions, by means of which we learned
to see and conceptualise certain things, to the nal imaginings. But what is
really of interest here is the semantic dependence. This is supported by the
fact that reference to the latter can explain why we are in many ways lim-
ited in what we can imagine { notably in that we can sensorily imagine only
perceivable items and features, and in that we can imaginatively refer to real
individuals or natural kinds only if we stand in the right cognitive relation to
them.13 Besides, it ts well with what has been said above about understand-
ing imaginings as complex presentations of objects and their features.
However, since presumably many more presentational mental episodes rely
in this or a similar way on our prior perceptual and conceptual capacities, the
claim that imaginings are correspondingly dependent on cognitions becomes
relatively uninteresting for a theory of the distinctive features of imaginings.
The thesis may still help to elucidate the presentational side of the nature
of imaginings, but it cannot contribute to an account of what distinguishes
imaginings from other kinds of mental episode.
As a result, the representational clause from Hume's original copy principle
becomes separated from its causal counterpart, and only the former remains
properly at the heart of the Representational Account of imagining. This sepa-
ration is reected in the fact that, while imaginings are semantically dependent
on relatively simple aspects of perception or conception, their representational
element is said to concern more complete or complex cognitions. And it also
highlights that the problem of the missing shade of blue is not a specic prob-
lem for the Representational Account. Imaginings may none the less continue
to count as causal reproductions or collages of reproductions, given that the
assumption of a causal dependence need not be rejected. So none of the ob-
jections to Hume's theory of imaginings provides a good reason to give up on
its key idea: namely that episodes of imagining are mental representations of
episodes of cognition.
Whether more recent versions of the Representational Account fare better
as accounts of imaginings than Hume's remains still to be seen, though. I
argue for the idea that visualising or emotionally imagining something means
representing corresponding experiences of seeing or feeling in chapters 8 and
10, respectively. But I also think that imaginings have this feature in com-
mon with other sensory or aective presentations, such as episodic memories
or spontaneous images. What is distinctive of the imaginative episodes and
distinguishes them from the non-imaginative ones is, in my opinion, that they
13See also the idea that people, who are blind, cannot visualise (e.g., (Scruton, 1974,
104)). But note also that there is some empirical evidence in favour of the idea that even
congenitally blind people enjoy mental imagery, or at least something very similar to it (see
Thomas (2010)).
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are instances of a special kind of mental agency aimed at the (partial) con-
trol of what is presented (see Dorsch (2011b) and chapter 5. Accordingly, I
endorse the Agency Account about imagining. While I think that the Rep-
resentational Account is right about the nature of the sensory presentation
involved in sensory forms of imagining, it is wrong about what renders them
imaginative.14
14I am very grateful to Mike Martin for comments on an early version of this chapter.
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Chapter 10
Emotional Imagining and Our
Responses to Fiction
Discussions about imagining normally concentrate on the imaginative counter-
parts of perception and judgemental thought (or occurrent belief). Other forms
of imagining | such as daydreaming, or the imaginative counterparts of bod-
ily sensations and episodes of emotion or desire | are less often considered.1
In this article, I aim to develop an account of emotional imagining as a specic
instance of object imagining and, more specically, experiential imagining.
According to this view, emotional imagining consists in non-propositionally
imagining the instantiation of the phenomenal character of an episode of emo-
tion. I motivate this account in response to the theories of Kendall Walton
and Richard Moran. Walton's view stays too unspecic about the nature of
emotional imagining when it matters; and my own account may be understood
as supplementing Walton's by rendering it more specic. Moran's theory, on
the other hand, is in conict with both my own view and that of Walton's;
and I argue that it should be given up in favour of the latter.
Both Walton and Moran discuss the connection between imagination and
emotion in the context of our responses to representational media. Both pic-
tures and texts, and possibly also pieces of music and other artefacts, por-
tray ctional or | in the case of didactic stories or thought experiments |
hypothetical worlds. One thing that is particularly interesting about our en-
gagement with such works is that it need not be concerned with real persons,
situations or events to help us to acquire knowledge about reality. Reading
about the adventures of a ctional character, being confronted with a poten-
tial dilemma or envisaging a new possibility may enable us to gain theoretical
or practical insights into the actual nature of ourselves and of aspects of the
world. In the aesthetic and the moral cases, these types of engagement with
representations of ctional or hypothetical worlds and the resulting instances
1White (1990), O'Shaughnessy (2003), McGinn (2004) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)
are recent examples of this kind of limited focus.
275
Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction Chapter 10
of knowledge acquisition are often accompanied or facilitated by emotional re-
sponses. Some of these responses constitute episodes of real emotion, while
others amount to instances of the aective imagination. The latter are there-
fore relevant for both aesthetics and ethics.2 Although the subsequent consid-
erations are focussed exclusively on our aesthetic engagement with represen-
tations of ctional worlds, they should equally apply to our moral assessment
of hypothetical situations.3
The central disagreement between Walton and Moran is about whether
instances of the aective imagination involve emotional elements as part of
their content or as part of their manner (or mode) of representation. I side
with Walton on this issue and argue that what is characteristic of emotional
imagining is that it consists in the imagination of an emotional feeling. The
main challenge to this view is that this does not obviously suce for the
respective imaginative episodes to count as aective (rather than, say, cognitive
or dispassionate).4 While Walton remains silent on this issue, I propose a way
of how it may be successfully adressed | whether as an integral part of his
view, or entirely independently of it.
The article is divided into ve sections. In the rst, I outline the puzzle of
ction, in response to which Walton and Moran have developed their views of
2The consideration of hypothetical scenarios is also central to science and theoretical
philosophy and, to some extent, also to theology and religion. We invent or use stories and
models, say, when attempting to make sense of the structure of atoms, or the nature of the
universe. In the case of faith, this is likely to involve emotional episodes as well; in the case
of scientic or metaphysical investigation, on the other hand, probably less so.
3Indeed, the aective imagination may be relevant for ethics in several respects. First,
as just described, we may come to determine what is morally required of us (or someone
else) to do in a given situation by imagining performing the dierent available actions and
considering our emotional responses to those instances of imagining | assuming here that
emotional responses provide some indication of the presence of values (but see chapter 6
for the restriction of this idea to subjective values). Second, in order to assess (or even
understand) the actions of another person, it may be necessary to empathise with them
which, again, may require imagining having some of their emotional feelings. Third, how we
and others are inclined to emotionally react | whether in reality or in the imagination | to
a given situation (including imagined ones) may reveal something about our character and,
especially, our moral character. And there are probably more scenarios in which imagination-
based emotions become morally relevant.
4Aective episodes comprise both feelings of genuine emotion and merely emotion-like
experiences. What both have in common is an aective phenomenal character. I assume
here that the dierence between aective and non-aective mental episodes (e.g., between
episodes of felt jealousy or joy and episodes of perception and belief) is subjectively salient;
but not necessarily that we have any detailed grasp of the nature of this dierence. It
does not seem implausible to describe the phenomenal character of emotional episodes by
reference to values and, in particular, the feature of having a valence (i.e., being either a
positive or a negative experience). But nothing in what follows depends on this or any other
specic claim about what it means for an episode to count as aective.
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the aective imagination. The second section is devoted to Walton's theory
of our emotional engagement with representational art, and to the already
noted challenge which this theory faces. In the third and the fourth section,
I critically discuss Moran's alternative view and, especially, his distinction of
emotional imagining from other forms of imagining in terms of an aective
manner of representation. The fth and last section presents my own account
of emotional imagining. I aim to show that it is capable of answering the
challenge raised by proposing that occurrences of emotional imagining count
as aective precisely because they are representations of emotions | namely
non-propositional and experiential representations of the aective character of
emotions.
I. The Puzzle of Fiction
It is an uncontroversial | and as such unproblematic | fact that, when we
watch movies or read novels, we often become emotionally involved. Part of
these emotional responses are centred on the works themselves. The latter
captivate, excite or bore us and thereby move us to continue or, alternatively,
stop our engagement with them. These reactions, which form part of our
aesthetic experience of the works concerned, are clearly genuine instance of
emotion.5 Moreover, they also occur in the case of non-representational art-
works or aesthetic objects in nature and are therefore not directly concerned
with the ctional story told by the movies or novels in question (though of
course the story still has an inuence on whether, and how, we enjoy the
artworks concerned). In particular, the question whether these responses are
directed at aspects of the ctional world portrayed does not arise: they are
clearly focussed on the artworks themselves. Hence, they are not of interest
for our current discussion.6
However, our emotional involvement with representational art may in addi-
tion involve elements that are more directly related to the fact that the works
are representational and present us with a specic ctional world. Indeed, we
do not nd it inadequate to describe aective experiences of this second kind
in terms of the ctional content of the artworks. For instance, we say that
we `rejoice or suer with the characters' or `hope or regret the occurrence of
5As I use the terms, if an emotion is `genuine' or `real', it is actually true of that it is an
emotion. By contrast, merely emotion-like experiences do not actually belong to the mental
kind of emotions | although this may still be ctionally the case.
6In chapter 6, I discuss in more detail the role of emotions in aesthetic evaluation, which
is one central aspect of aesthetic experience. My conclusion there is that they cannot justify
objective judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic value, but may none the less point us to the
presence of subjectively important values, which may very well include certain instances of
aesthetic worth.
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certain events' within the story. The debate about the nature of our emo-
tional responses to representational art focusses on these reactions and asks
whether they indeed amount to genuine emotions directed at ctional entities.
What is at issue is thus whether our descriptions of these responses are to
be understood literally true, or instead in a dierent manner | say, as state-
ments about what it is ctionally true about ourselves and our engagement
with the ctional worlds (cf. Walton (1990)). But both sides accept that
our appreciation of representational art involves emotional elements that are
concerned with | and cannot be understood without reference to particular
aspects that characterise the represented ctional worlds (cf. Walton (1990,
1997) and Moran (1994)).
This close connection to the representationality of art ensures that our
ction-directed aective responses dier in one or more crucial respects from
work-directed emotional responses. The most notable is perhaps that the
former | but not the latter | are imagination-based in the sense that they are
triggered by what we imagine about their objects. Our evaluative emotional
responses towards artworks are concerned with what we take to be actual facts
about those artworks, while our aective responses to ctional characters or
situations are concerned with what we take to be ctional about them | that
is, what we imagine about them. The two types of responses therefore have
dierent targets in that they deal with dierent worlds | the actual or real
world or a ctional one, respectively. And while we access the actual world by
means of perception, belief, and so on, we access ctional worlds by means of
the imagination.7 Our evaluations of representational artworks may, of course,
be `imagination-based' in a dierent, and weaker, sense: they are based on
our experience and understanding of the work which may very well involve
imagining the represented characters, locations, events, and so on. But this
does not count as imagination-based in the sense just introduced above, since
the instances of imagining concerned are not about the object of evaluation,
that is, the artwork itself. What we imagine to be imbalanced is Hamlet, the
ctional character | and not Hamlet, the piece written by Shakespeare.
One recurring theme in this essay is that this central dierence between the
two types of aective reponses gives rise to a second dierence: namely that
only our work-directed reactions are genuine instances of emotion, while our
ction-directed responses are instances of a dierent | though still emotion-
like | kind of mental phenomenon. Walton, for instance, insists on this dier-
ence in mental kind, while Moran argues that both types of responses belong to
the same kind (i.e., the kind of emotions). Their disagreement is related to the
issue of whether being a genuine emotion is compatible with being imagination-
based in the sense described. Accordingly, while both sides accept that our
7See Walton (1990) for a discussion of the link between imagination and ctionality.
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engagement with ction is imagination-based and involves aective responses,
they are at odds with respect to whether these imagination-based responses
constitute real emotions, or merely emotion-like experiences. Here is a nice
quote from Walton describing an example of the central element of the kind of
reaction at issue (denying, in the process, that it constitutes a genuine emotion
directed at ctional entities):
`Charles is watching a horror movie about a terrible green slime.
He cringes in his seat as the slime oozes slowly but relentlessly
over the earth, destroying everything in its path. Soon a greasy
head emerges from the undulating mass, and two beady eyes x on
the camera. The slime, picking up speed, oozes on a new course
straight toward the viewers. Charles emits a shriek and clutches
desperately at his chair. [...] Charles's condition is similar in cer-
tain obvious respects to that of a person frightened of a pending
real-world disaster. His muscles are tensed, he clutches his chair,
his pulse quickens, his adrenaline ows. Let us call this physiologi-
cal -psychological state quasi-fear. [...] Afterwards, still shaken, he
confesses that he was `terried' of the slime.' (Walton (1990): 196)
Quasi-emotions like these are real episodes in our mental lives. Moreover, they
are aective episodes which is reected in the fact that they resemble genuine
emotions (e.g., fear) in various signicant respects. First of all, they are simi-
lar to genuine emotions in their involvement of actual emotional feelings and
emotion-related physiological events. Charles's experience is, from his subjec-
tive point of view, very similar to an experience of genuine fear | notably
in that it involves a similar kind of unpleasantness and makes him aware of
similar bodily changes.8 But quasi-emotions resemble genuine emotions also
in being triggered by the same mechanisms. Both types of emotional response
are partly due to dispositions to react aectively and physiologically to certain
mental representations | whether they are perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, or
imaginings. Just as the recognition of the real danger presented by an ap-
proaching lion is crucial to the occurrence of genuine fear, the recognition of
the ctional danger presented by an approaching slime is crucial to the oc-
currence of a fear-like quasi-emotion. This explains why it matters for our
emotional responses to artworks whether they are representational and, if so,
what it prompts us to imagine to be part of the represented ctional world.
However, what is controversial is whether quasi-emotions (perhaps together
with the imaginings on which they are based) constitute genuine emotions, or
8Of course, his overall experience of the movie is pleasurable. Otherwise, he would stop
watching the movie in order to get rid of it. But his overall pleasure is compatible with |
and surely partly due to | the fact that there is something unpleasant and discomforting
about seeing the slime on the screen seemingly moving towards him.
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whether they are merely emotion-like experiences. There is a long tradition of
taking responses involving quasi-emotions to be puzzling. At the heart of the
respective discussions has been the so-called `paradox of ction' which can be
formulated in the form of a triad of jointly inconsistent claims:9
(a) We have real emotions towards what we take to be ctional characters
or situations.
(b) At least in some cases, real emotions are constitutionally dependent on
belief in the reality of the relevant entities.
(c) We do not believe in the reality of what we take to be ctional entities.
This paradox possesses considerable initial force. When watching a horror
movie or reading a tragedy, we undergo emotional experiences and physiolog-
ical changes which are very similar to those involved in real life cases of fear
or pity. Moreover, we are inclined to say that we `fear the monster' or `pity
the heroine'. So there seems to be good reason to take our statements literally
and ascribe to us emotions towards ctional characters, situations, events, and
so on. However, genuine fear or pity also appear to require us to believe that
the respective objects exist as part of reality. When we think that there is
really no lion in the room, it seems impossible for us to genuinely fear one.
But when we watch movies or read tragedies, we usually do not take the rep-
resented characters and events to be real (unless we are concerned with some
historical or biographical works). Hence, we typically lack the belief that they
exist as part of reality. And it therefore becomes puzzling why we none the less
seem to react with something like an emotion of fear or pity to these ctional
entities.
The described problem of emotions towards ction has been widely de-
bated, and many dierent solutions to it have been proposed. The claims (a),
9See the chapters in Hjort and Laver (1997), and especially Levinson (1997). Walton
allows for the possibility of emotions which do not presuppose any kind of belief, but still
stresses we cannot have emotions towards something that is merely imagined (cf. Walton
(1990): 245). The puzzle may also be formulated in terms of belief in certain relevant
propositions, or in terms of belief in the existence of the entities in question. The rst
condition is more specic than the other two (i.e., it implies, but is not implied, by the
latter) and is not required in all cases. Fearing something may presuppose believing it to be
dangerous, but hoping for something does not presuppose any belief (in particular, we may
be agnostic about whether the hoped-for state of aairs has already been realised). The
second condition can allow for emotions directed at the past or the future only if `existence'
is understood as denoting reality, that is, actuality. Besides, emotions may be said to be
dependent, not on what we believe to be real or existent, but what in fact is real or existent
(cf. externalism about thought contents).
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(b) and (c) are jointly inconsistent. Similarly, (c) should be accepted as a fact
about our normal psychology | if not even as a claim about our ordinary con-
ception of what ctional entities are. Of course, there may be cases of people
who believe in the reality of ctional entities and develop real emotional feel-
ings towards them (e.g., when they fall in love with a character of a telenovela).
But it is doubtful that they then conceive of the objects of their emotions as
ctional | and if they do, their response becomes even more problematic. In
any case, it suces for the presence of a paradox if (c) is true of our normal
engagement with ction.
This leaves two broad strategies of how to deal with the puzzle. The rst
is to deny (a). This means insisting that no genuine emotion involved in our
engagement with ction can be directed at ctional characters or events; and
that no response to the latter | including those involving quasi-emotions |
can constitute an emotion, even if it may resemble one in certain important
aspects. The main reason for such a view is to stress the cognitive element
present in emotion: they are concerned with how reality is like and therefore
require a specic take on the latter (cf., e.g., Walton (1990)). Perhaps propo-
nents of this answer are also prepared | or forced | to accept the additional
claim that we are in some sense wrong or irrational to treat our emotion-like
responses to ctional entities as if they were genuine emotions.
The second option is to reject (b). This may be done for several reasons.
For instance, it may be claimed that imagining the reality or existence of
objects | rather than believing in it | may already suce for having emotions
towards those objects (cf. Moran (1994)). Or it may be assumed that there
are two fundamentally dierent kinds of emotion, one exclusively directed at
real entities and the other exclusively at ctional ones; and that (b) applies
only to the rst, but not the second kind. Or, nally, it may be maintained
that (b) does not express a constitutional dependence, but merely a rational
requirement, so that it is still possible | albeit irrational | to have emotions
without belief (cf. Radford (1975)). Again, the denial of (b) may (have to) be
accompanied by the postulation of a systematic form of irrationality inherent
to our responses to ction, in this case concerning the fact that it is in some
sense unreasonable to feel emotions towards entities which we do not take to
be real. At least, to respond with fear seems to be more suitable when one
perceives or believes a lion to be in the room than when one merely visualises
or imagines it to be there | just as there is something irrational about fearing
real spiders which one takes to be completely harmless (cf. Goldie (2000) and
chapter 6).
This is not the place to settle the debate between the two approaches. Our
concern is with the nature of aective imagining, and not with the nature of
our emotional responses towards representational artworks and the ctional
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worlds that they portray. But since both Walton and Moran | the rst
of whom rejects (a), and the second (b) | develop their views on aective
imagining in the context of this debate, it is worthwhile to a look a bit closer
on their views on how we react emotionally to representational art.
II. Walton's Account of the Aective Imagination
Walton maintains that Charles's real and aective experience of quasi-fear
alone does not suce for genuine fear (cf. Walton (1990): 196). What is
missing, according to him, are the right kind of accompanying beliefs and
action tendencies.10 Charles does not believe in the existence or danger of
the slime, and he does not run away or shout for help. Instead, he merely
imagines the presence of the slime and desires to stay where he currently is.
Some of his more basic, instinctive inclinations (e.g., to freeze or to grab hold
of the person next to him) may still be the same as in a case of genuine fear.
But on the level of intentional agency, the two experiences involve with very
dierent motivational proles. Walton therefore concludes that Charles is not
really frightened by the ctional slime, given that his reaction lacks certain
characteristic aspects of such a fear.
This does not necessarily prevent quasi-emotions from sometimes constitute
real emotions, together with some respective beliefs and action tendencies.
For instance, when watching a battle scene in a war movie, our quasi-fear
may combine with | or even be partly brought about or intensied by |
our belief that a friend of us is actually in a very similar situation right now.
Our quasi-fear then becomes part of our real fear for our real friend. This
is possible because quasi-emotions are relatively unspecic. The feelings and
bodily events involved are compatible with many dierent emotions | whether
of the same kind or even of dierent kinds | and in need of determination by
the accompanying representations and motivations which specify, among other
things, the objects of the responses.
More importantly, however, if quasi-emotions are triggered by, and part
of, our imaginative experience of representational art, they may | and typ-
ically do | lead to aective imagining. According to Walton, our basic and
non-emotional engagement with representational art involves three distinct el-
ements (cf. Walton (1990, 1997)).
First, we experience the material qualities of the work. For instance, we
perceive the printed marks in a book, or the congurations of colours and
shapes on a canvas. These marks and congurations | together with genre-
related conventions | determine what the works represent and, hence, what is
10At least in this case; Walton allows that, in other cases, something else might be missing
(cf. Walton (1990): 245.
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true within the respective ctional world. One of the central ideas of Walton's
account of representational artworks is that the ctional truths related to such
works are not only concerned with the represented objects and their features,
but also with us and our access to those objects and features. The worlds of
paintings and novels include landscapes and battles. But they also include our
ctional perspectives on those landscapes and battles | for instance, our seeing
or thinking about them. According to Walton, this is part of our conventional
rules of engagement with representational art.
Second, and on the basis of the rst experience, we intellectually imagine
whatever is part of the represented ctional world. Indeed, the demand to
imagine the ctional truths created by a representational artwork in accor-
dance with the relevant conventions is an integral part of our engagement with
such art. Walton is adamant that, without this element, our experience would
not really amount to an experience of something as representational art. But
imagining the ctional truths in question requires that we recognise the repre-
sentational content of the work.11 We thereby exploit explicitly or implicitly
known principles or conventions which link the perceived material congura-
tions to the represented entities. This enables us to recognise words and their
meanings, or the three-dimensional arrangement of objects in a scenery, by
perceiving the specic nature of the marks on the respective surfaces.
And, third, we imagine, again on the basis of the preceding elements of our
engagement with the work, having a certain epistemic access | or standing in
a certain epistemic relation | to the imagined world of the work. For instance,
we may imagine seeing the landscape depicted by the painting before us, or
believing the propositions expressed by the sentences in the novel. Again,
this is an essential part of our imaginative engagement with representational
artworks and required by the ctional truths determined by the latter.
Since, for Walton, aective imagining works very similar to pictorial expe-
rience, it is worthwhile to dwell a bit longer on the latter (cf. Walton (1990)).
First of all, it is important to note that it is distinct from sensory imagination,
such as visualising or auditorily imagining it. Looking at a picture and imag-
ining seeing what it depicts does not involve visualising the depicted scenery
| at least not in the same sense in which we can visualise something with
closed eyes, say. None the less, imagining seeing that scenery | which is part
of our pictorial experience | is distinctively visual in character and cannot
be reduced to intellectual imagination. Walton's proposal is that imagining
seeing the depicted scenery amounts to imagining of our actual visual per-
11It is interesting to ask whether the recognition precedes the intellectual imagining, or
whether the latter is identical with | or, alternatively, part of | the former. What speaks
in favour of the distinctiness of the two phenomena is that imagination normally does not
play a role in knowledge acquisition, while the recognition of what a painting depicts or
what sentences mean is a form of knowledge.
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ception of the picture (i.e., the rst kind of experience) that it is a ctional
visual perception of what is depicted. If a painting depicts trees, we imagine
seeing those trees by imagining of our perception of the material qualities of
the painting (which is part of the actual world) that it is a perception of trees
(which is part of the ctional world depicted by the painting).
The kind of imagining at issue amounts to what Walton calls imagining
`from the inside', meaning that we imagine things from our rst-personal per-
spective | rather than imagining our point of view from a third-personal
perspective (e.g., when we imagine how we look like from the perspective of
our friend sitting opposite of us). In the case of pictorial experience, this
means that we imagine seeing the depicted scenery from the perspective of our
perception of the picture: we imagine an identity between our real and our
ctional point of view.12
The issue of whether pictorial experience really involves such a complex
kind of imagining, and whether this form of imagining is indeed visual, has been
subject of much debate (cf., e.g., Hopkins (1998) for a nice summary), but need
not be settled here. What is important to note is that the rst two elements
alone do not suce for becoming aware of a picture as a picture. Simply
perceiving its material properties and, in addition, intellectually imagining
that there is a landscape does not give rise to experiencing it as depicting such
a landscape. Perception and imagination have to be more intimately linked to
each other to constitute pictorial experience. Perhaps Walton is wrong about
the details of this close connection. But he is right that, if pictorial experience
is indeed partly imaginative, the imaginative element has to be integrated with
the perceptual one in a single visual experience.13 What matters here is the
twofoldness of pictorial experience. Seeing something as a picture of something
else involves two instances of object awareness: our awareness of the picture
and our awareness of what is depicted. And although they are distinct, they
are also inseparable from each other. We can, at least to some extent, shift
our attention from one object to the other. But we cannot stop being aware
of one of them without ceasing to have a pictorial experience. Moreover, we
are aware of both objects as part of a single and unied experience.14
According to Walton, our aective imaginative engagement with ction is
similar to pictorial experience in that it involves the same kind of elements as
the latter.
12It is in this sense that we | or, more precisely, our subjective perspectives | `enter' the
ctional world. This ts well with Walton's characterisation of imagining from the inside as
one (but not the only) form of imagining de se.
13See Hopkins (1998) and Dorsch (2011b). This also explains why O'Shaughnessy (2003)
talks about `imaginative perception' when describing pictorial experience and its relationship
to the imagination.
14See Hopkins (1998), following the writings by Richard Wollheim.
284
Chapter 10 Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction
First, we experience some quasi-emotion concerned with some aspects of
what the respective work represents. This real emotional reaction is thereby
triggered by our more basic non-emotional and imaginative engagement with
the work | for instance, our recognition of the portrayal of an approaching
slime or lion, and our imagination of the danger posed by the latter. For
Walton, the occurrence of quasi-emotions brought about in this way | in
conjunction with the conventions of our engagement with representational art
| makes it ctional that we feel the respective genuine emotion towards the
ctional entities concerned. The quasi-fear triggered by imagining a dangerous
lion approaching does not amount to real fear of the ctional lion. But it
determines that it is ctionally the case that we are frightened of that lion.
Second, in response to the general demand to imagine what is part of the
ctional world related to some representational artwork, we intellectually imag-
ine that we have a certain genuine emotion | namely that corresponding to
the quasi-emotion | towards the ctional entities in question. In our example,
we imagine that we fear the approaching lion.
And, third, we imagine some corresponding form of access to the ctional
world, this time an aective kind of access. More precisely, we imagine feeling
the genuine emotion towards the ctional entities at issue. We do so by imag-
ining of our quasi-emotion that it is a real emotional response towards what
is represented by the work. That is, we imagine being frightened by the lion
by imaginatively identifying our quasi-fear with an instance of genuine fear
of the lion. Again, the kind of imagining in question is imagining from the
inside: the imaginative identication in question involves an identication of
two subjective emotional perspectives, one real and the other ctional.
Our emotional responses towards ctional entities are not twofold: we
are not emotionally aware of two dierent objects. In particular, the quasi-
emotions concerned are not directed at the respective artworks. Indeed, they
do not have any (clear) object. They are triggered by the imagination of some
ctional entities or situations, but are not about them (at least according to
Walton). Hence, the problem of guaranteeing that our imaginative response
forms a unied experience is less pressing than in the case of pictorial expe-
rience. Feeling the quasi-emotion and imagining it to be a genuine emotion
towards ctional entities need not form a single and unied experience. In-
stead, the main reason for assuming the third element over and above the other
two seems to be that the intellectual imagination does not involve any aective
elements. Imagining that one is feeling an emotion does not suce for having
an aective reaction towards it. But just as our awareness of what is depicted
possesses a visual character, our response to ctional entities possesses an emo-
tional character. Assuming that we also imagine feeling an emotion promises
to introduce the required aective element into the experience.
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However, it is not clear how this supposed to work | how imagining feeling
an emotion can really possess an aective character. As Moran notes, the
problem arises because the emotion is assumed to be merely part of what
is imagined.15 In the case of intellectual imagining, this is precisely what
prevents the episode of imagining from being aective. So why should the
situation be dierent in the case of the kind of imagining Walton proposes?
He maintains that imagining, from the inside, having an emotion is more
aective in character than intellectual imagining and, hence, not an instance
of the latter (cf. Walton (1990): 247). But he does not say much to help us
to better understand imagining feeling an emotion, apart from the fact that it
is imagining experiencing an emotion from the rst-person perspective. What
still needs to be explained is why | or in which sense | this kind of imagining
should count as aective.
III. Moran on the Various Types of Imagining
Moran tries to provide an answer to this question of how we can have responses
towards ctional entities that count as genuinely emotional. His theory con-
sists mainly of two claims (cf. Moran (1994)). The rst is that the aective
character of our responses is due to their manner or attitude, and not their
content. Just representing having an emotion does not lead to an aective ex-
perience, since we can represent having an emotion in a dispassionate way |
for instance, when we suppose, for the sake of an argument, that we are angry.
Therefore, aective representations have to amount to representing something
in an aective manner | just as visual representations amount to represent-
ing something in a visual manner. The second claim central to Moran's view
is that the quasi-emotions triggered by our engagement with representational
art are in fact constituents of our emotional responses to ction | that is, for
Moran, of our experiences of imagining something in an emotional manner.
He combines these two claims with a third, namely that the resulting emo-
tional experiences towards ctional entities should count as genuine emotions.
Accordingly, he chooses the second strategy in dealing with the paradox of
ction. That is, he rejects (b) by insisting that imagining something is already
enough to give rise to full-blown emotions. Two elements have motivated his
15See Moran (1994). Note, however, that Moran seems to misunderstand Walton's posi-
tion by ascribing to him the view that what is central to aective imagining is intellectually
imagining that one has the emotion concerned. The reason for this misunderstanding ap-
pears to be the failure to see what is responsible, according for Walton, for the ctional truth
that we are feeling an emotion towards the ctional entities in question. Moran seems to
assume that this is due to intellectually imagining that proposition | hence the view which
he ascribe to Walton; while the latter insists that the occurrence of a relevant quasi-emotion
is the eective factor (cf. the discussion in Walton (1997)).
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choice: the observation that our engagement with ction involves real aec-
tive elements; and the hypothesis that, partly for this reason, our emotional
responses to ctional entities are very similar to, and as unproblematic as, our
more ordinary aective reactions to certain real objects, situations or events
| such as those which are in the past or the future, or which constitute unre-
alised, but `real' possibilities (e.g., missed opportunities or alternative courses
of action).
As discussed in the previous section, Walton rejects all three claims. He
thinks that emotional feelings are part of what we imagine, not of how we
imagine it. He also maintains that our imaginative emotional engagement with
ctional worlds is only prompted by, and about, the relevant quasi-emotions,
but does not include them as one of its constituents. And nally, neither the
quasi-emotions, nor our imagining feeling an emotion are, for him, instances
of emotion | which is reected by his acceptance of (b). Again, the aim here
is not to settle the debate about the third claim | that is, about how best to
reply to the seeming paradox of ction. But the rst two claims are relevant
for the nature of aective imagining. We have already considered Walton's
position. It it now time to look into the details of Moran's view.
Moran understands our aective responses to ction as instances of what
he calls `emotional imagining'. This label ts very well with the fact that
the form of imagining concerned is treated by Moran as being genuinely emo-
tional. Episodes of emotional imagining are taken by him to be instances of
real emotion and, hence, on a par in this respect with normal emotional feel-
ings, in the same way in which episodes of visual imagining are sometimes
taken to be instances of visual experience and, hence, on a par in this respect
with visual perceptions.16 In the course of his paper, Moran distinguishes
emotional imagining from three other imaginative phenomena: propositional
(or intellectual) imagining, dramatic imagining, and imaginativeness. While
propositional, emotional and dramatic imagining have in common that they
occur in the form of mental episodes or activities, imaginativeness constitutes
a mental ability or disposition. He does not explicitly talk about a fth form
imagining, namely sensory imagining. But there is no reason to assume that
he would not acknowledge its existence, which is why I have added it to the
list.
Propositional or hypothetical imagining amounts to the simple imaginative
entertaining of a proposition | for instance, when we imagine or suppose that
it rains, or that the Earth is at (perhaps as part of some daydream, thought
experiement or hypothetical reasoning; cf. Moran (1994): 104). Propositional
16I will follow Moran in reserving the expression `emotional imagining' for aective re-
sponses to ction which are genuinely emotional. The debate between Moran and Walton
is therefore about the possibility (or at least actual occurence) of such responses.
287
Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction Chapter 10
imaginings are thus instances of conceptual or intellectual thought and as
such dier from sensory forms of representation, such as visual perceptions
or memories, or bodily sensations. Moran leaves it open whether all non-
endorsing or non-judgemental entertainings of a proposition are imaginative,
or whether instead there is a dierence, say, between merely having the thought
that it rains and imagining or supposing the same proposition. But he is clear
about the fact that mere propositional imagining is dispassionate, that is,
does not involve any real emotional feelings or aective elements | though of
course it is possible to propositionally and dispassionately imagine that one
has certain emotional feelings (cf. Moran (1994): 89f.).
In contrast to propositional imagining, sensory imagining does not have
a propositional content and is therefore not an instance of thought. Instead,
what we sensorily imagine are objects or events and their perceivable features.
While thoughts merely describe or name objects or events, sensory episodes
(including perceptions or episodic memories) show them (cf. chapter 8). Ex-
amples of instances of the sensory imagination are visual, tactile or auditory
imaginings. Like propositional imagining, sensory imagining is dispassionate
and does not possess an aective character. But again, it is possible to sensorily
and dispassionately imagine someone having | or perhaps rather expressing
| specic emotions (e.g., when we visualise someone crying).
Emotional imagining | or imagining `with respect to emotional attitudes'
| consists in imagining something with feeling or emotion, in contrast to imag-
ining it dispassionately (cf. Moran (1994): 90 and 105). Moran concentrates
on propositions as candidates for what we can imagine with feeling. But just
as with the existence of sensory imaginings, it is fair to suppose that he would
also allow for the emotional imagining of objects or events. Moran's examples
for emotional imagining are imagining something with loathing, anticipation,
apprehension or regret (cf. Moran (1994): 86, 90 and 93). The aective aspect
of the imaginative episode consists thereby in a real | and not merely in an
imagined | feeling. Accordingly, imagining something with regret involves re-
ally having a feeling of regret. As a consequence, emotional imagining cannot
| or not exclusively | be a matter of propositional imagining. In particular,
imagining something with, say, sadness cannot be reduced to imagining that
one feels sad. While the former involves a real feeling of sadness, the latter
does not. Now, given that the aective aspect of emotional imagining is real,
and not merely imagined, it should | as Moran maintains | be located in
the manner (or mode), and not in the content, of the imagining (cf. Moran
(1994): 90 and 93). The statement that something is imagined with feeling
or emotion thus qualies how it is imagined, and not what is imagined. It is
therefore likened by Moran to the statement, say, that something is imagined
visually or auditorily (cf. Moran (1994): 93).
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Both propositional and emotional imagining occur in the form of single
mental episodes. By contrast, dramatic or empathetic imagining is typically
more complex by involving several distinct episodes (cf. Moran (1994): 104).
More specically, dramatic imagining consists in the imaginative adoption of,
and identication with, a certain point of view dierent from one's own. The
adopted perspectives in question are typically characterized partly by a set of
evaluative attitudes and the related emotional or conative dispositions. Thus,
imaginatively adopting such a point of view usually involves imagining having
the respective evaluative and aective responses to given situations, in addition
to more neutral propositional and sensory imaginings about those situations.
Moran's description of dramatic imagination renders it very similar to | if
not identical with | the phenomenon of empathy, or the closely related phe-
nomenon of imagining being in the place or shoes of someone else (cf. Goldie
(2000) for an extensive discussion of imaginative projects of this kind).
Moran does not always clearly distinguish between emotional imagining
and dramatic imagining. In fact, he notes certain close links between the two.
Empathetic identication with a certain point of view dierent from one's own
often involves the `dramatic rehearsal of emotions'; while emotional imagining
`may require such things as dramatic rehearsal', it `involves something ... like
a point of view, a total perspective on the situation' (Moran (1994): 105).
However, the two are none the less quite dierent phenomena. Not only is
dramatic imagining typically more complex than emotional imagining (i.e.,
results in extensive mental projects rather than in single mental episodes), but
the two phenomena are also independent from each other. On the one hand,
we can empathize with or enter the mind of another person without actually
having any real feelings, but instead only imagining them (cf. the proposal
put forward in the last section). And, on the other hand, we can respond
with fear to imagining the scenario of being pursued by a lion without thereby
imaginatively adopting a particular point of view dierent from one's own.17
Besides, Moran introduces the notion of imaginativeness which denotes for
him a complex ability covering, in particular: the ability to recognize and link
to each other the features of artworks which are responsible for their emotional
tone (i.e., their `expressive features'; the ability to emotionally and otherwise
respond to these features and their links; and the ability to empathize with
or put oneself in the place of someone else (cf. Moran (1994): 86f.). It thus
includes or combines both the capacity to imagine emotionally and the capacity
to imagine dramatically. But it also involves certain non-imaginative, cognitive
17This is true even if, say, what is involved is imagining having certain sensory and aective
experiences. For our act of imagining need not further specify the perspectivalness of the
imagined experiences, or assume by default that it is our own (cf. Martin (2002b) and
chapter 8).
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abilities, such as recognitional capacities or sensitivities.
IV. Moran's Account of the Aective Imagination
According to Moran's picture, what is central to the aective imagination
and, in particular, our emotional responses to ctional entities, is what he has
labelled emotional imagining. By contrast, dramatic imagining is linked to the
aective imagination only in so far as it may include what he calls emotional
imagining; and imaginativeness is linked to the aective imagination only in
so far as it includes the capacity to engage in emotional imagining (as well as
in dramatic imagining that includes emotional imagining).
What he calls emotional imagining ts Moran's two claims about the nature
of aective imagining. It involves both the imagining of certain aspects of the
ctional world in question (e.g., that a character suers unjust treatment)
and a really felt response towards these or related aspects (e.g., real feelings of
sympathy towards the character and of anger towards the unjust perpetrators).
In accordance with Moran's second claim, the latter is taken to consist in a
quasi-emotion triggered by the former. That is, imagining something with
feeling or emotion consists in imagining something with some quasi-emotion
directed at it. The resulting episode is, for Moran, an instance of genuine
emotion. In accordance with this, what is responsible for the aective character
of the resulting imaginative experience is not the imagined content, but instead
the really felt quasi-emotion | as Moran's rst claim maintains.
His main reason for taking emotional imagining to be central to aective
imagining | notably in the context of our experience of representational art
| is his claim that imagining having an emotion is no exception to the rule
that it is always possible to imagine something in a dispassionate way (just
as it is always possible to imagine it with feeling).18 We can imagine that we
feel sad or visualise ourselves as expressing our sadness through cyring, say,
without thereby being in any aective state. That is, both propositional and
sensory imagining can occur in a dispassionate manner, even if they have a felt
emotion as their object of imagining. As already indicated in the last section,
18Moran presents another motivation for assuming that our responses to ction and the in-
volved aective imaginings are really | and not merely imaginatively | emotional: namely
that we are often held responsible for having | or failing to have | them. He notes that we
may be praised or blamed (morally or otherwise) in relation to whether we react to ctional
situations, say, with laughter or lust; and that how we react often reveals something impor-
tant about our personality (cf. Moran (1994): 93f. and 105). Laughing at a racist joke, for
instance, may reveal racist tendencies or beliefs. However, as Walton has correctly pointed
out (cf. Walton (1997), what manifests our convictions and is subject to assessment can
equally well be our dispositions to imaginatively engage with ction in certain ways rather
than others.
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Moran's explanation of this fact is that having an emotion as part of its content
does not suce for a representation to be emotional. That is, real aectivity
cannot simply derive from imagining of an emotion. But if what we imagine
has no impact on the aective dimension of imagining, the thought continues,
it has to be due to how we imagine it. Hence, Moran concludes that aective
imagining consists in, or involves, emotional imagining.
This line of reasoning has three weaknesses, though. The rst is that Moran
has not done enough to establish the claim that what is imagined is always
neutral on emotionality of the imaginative episode concerned. This may be
true of intellectual and sensory imagining. But there are perhaps other ways of
imagining feeling an emotion which are, by their very nature, always aective
in character. I return to this possibility in the next | and last | section.
A second problematic aspect is that the passivity of the occurrence of
quasi-emotions casts serious doubts on the imaginativeness of any episodes in-
volving them as one of their constituents. The various forms of imagining may
perhaps allow for passive instances | such as spontaneously arising images
and thoughts in the case of sensory and intellectual imagining, or aimlessly
oating daydreams in the case of more complex imaginative projects.19 But
they all have still in common that they also allow for voluntary instances
and, moreover, permit us to take deliberate control of their passive instances.
We can actively sustain the eating spontaneous images and thoughts, and
we can decide to give our freely wandering daydreams direction (cf. Dorsch
(2011b) and chapter 2). But what Moran takes to be emotional imagining can
never be subject to our direct voluntary control, given that the occurrence of
quasi-emotions is not up to us. Of course, we may be able to bring about
quasi-emotions by exploiting our knowledge about our emotional dispositions
that representations of a certain kind give rise to those quasi-emotions (e.g.,
we can induce quasi-fear in us by imagining something that we know to scare
us). But this does not render quasi-emotions subject to our will | at least not
in the same direct way as imagining is (cf. chapter 5). Hence, the emotional
reactions that Moran focusses on and, in particular, the choice of represent-
ing whatever is imagined in an emotional manner (rather than, say, in a visual
manner) is never voluntary. So the challenge is to explain why we should count
them as instances of imagining in the rst place | assuming that imagining
is at least in principle always subject to the will.20
19See, for instance, the discussion of imaginings in O'Shaughnessy (2003). For the op-
posing view that all imagining is voluntary, see, for example, Scruton (1974) and McGinn
(2004). I discuss the dierent positions and considerations and side with the latter in Dorsch
(2011b).
20See Scruton (1974), McGinn (2004) and Dorsch (2011b). A similar argument may be
formulated against the idea that our awareness of what a picture represents is imaginative,
given that it is usually not up to us what we experience a picture as depicting (with the ex-
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The third weakness in Moran's proposal is that it is not clear how to make
sense of his idea of emotional imagining. His talk of `imagining with feeling'
invites a certain ambiguity. If this form of imagining is meant to consist just
in the complex of an episode of propositional or sensory imagining and an
additional episode of quasi-emotion triggered by the rst, then it is doubtful
that it constitutes an instance of aective imagining at all. Nothing ensures
that the two episodes are more closely linked to each other than by a causal
connection, given that the very same quasi-emotion can also occur in response
to perceiving or believing something. Hence, the overall complex is imaginative
only in so far its dispassionate component is imaginative; while it is aective
only in so far its non-imaginative element is emotional. The emotional and
imaginative elements in aective imagining should be expected to be more
unied. This suggests taking Moran's comparison of emotional imagining with
visual imagining more seriously. There is good reason to assume that the
content and the manner of representation are inseparable. Hence, if emotional
imagining literally involves an aective way of representing something | just
as visualising involves a visual way of representing something | then the unity
of the aective and the imaginative elements can be guaranteed. According
to this interpretation, emotional imagining is more than the mere conjunction
of some imaginative episode and some subsequent emotional response. Like in
the case of visualising, the content and the manner of emotional imagining are
understood as aspects of a single and unied experience.
However, the postulation of an imaginative episode with an emotional man-
ner is problematic for its own reasons. First of all, how something is represented
puts a characteristic restriction on what can be represented. At least, this is
the case with all the widely accepted ways of representing something. Visual
representations are limited to visible entities: we can see or visualise only ob-
jects and features which are visible. Something similar is true of other sensory
modes, such as representing something in an auditory or tactile manner. In-
tellectual representations come with conceptual restrictions: we can believe in
or suppose the truth of only those propositions, which we possess the required
concepts for (and, perhaps, also only those propositions that are not logically
inconsistent); and we can desire the realisation of only those states of aairs
that we can conceive of. Finally, representation in a conative or motivational
manner is limited to possible courses of action: all our intentions, strivings
and impulses are concerned with something to do.21 By contrast, there are
ception, perhaps, of ambiguous pictures), or whether we experience it as depicting something
in the rst place. None the less, Walton (1990) is not the only one who defends an account
of pictorial experience in terms of imagining (cf., e.g., Scruton (1974) and O'Shaughnessy
(2003)).
21Not all desires are conative. We may perhaps desire the occurrence of peace, or that it
will rain (in contrast to desiring to actively bring about peace or rain). But such desires are
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no distinctive restrictions on what we can imagine with emotion, or with spe-
cic emotional feelings. If at all, such imagining inherits its limitations from
the underlying dispassionate imagining, such as visualising or propositional
imagining.
Moreover, the traditionally assumed manners of representation exclude
each other. Thus, we cannot represent something, in a single instance of repre-
sentation, visual-auditorily, or tactile-propositionally. Of course, our episodes
can involve two distinct representational elements which involve dierent man-
ners of representation | for instance, when we see and hear a theatre produc-
tion, or have thoughts about what we feel. But each of the representational
elements is still conned to a single manner of representation. However, as
Moran acknowledges, it is possible to visualise or, indeed, propositionally imag-
ine something with feeling. Again, this provides a good reason to doubt that
there is an emotional mode of imagining, in addition to | and of the same
kind as | sensory and intellectual modes.
Moran therefore faces a dilemma in relation to his insistence on the ex-
istence of emotional imagining. If he conceives of the emotional element as
something in addition to sensory or intellectual imagining, he cannot ensure
that the two components are unied in a single instance of aective imagining.
But if he understands the emotional element as a substitute for the sensory or
intellectual component in other instances of imagining, he cannot accommo-
date the fact that the aective element behaves in a dierent way and, indeed,
combines well with sensory or intellectual elements. The conclusion should be
that what Moran calls emotional imagining | that is, imagining something
with emotion | does not constitute a distinctive form of imagining. At best,
it captures the fact that some of our imaginative representations give rise to
quasi-emotions.
V. Aective Imagining as Experiential Imagining
The discussion of Moran's proposal has shown that locating the emotionality
of aective imagining in the manner of representation is not a plausible option.
If there is such a thing as emotional imagining, its aectivity should be due
to what is imagined, and not how it is imagined. However, the challenge
for Walton has been precisely to say more about how it can be possible that
instances of imagining are aective episodes just in virtue of their content
| that is, more specically, just in virtue of being representations of having
an emotion. Moreover, the aective element of emotional imagining cannot
not motivational states. Whether they are like emotions or preferences, and whether they
involve a distinctive manner of representation, are interesting questions which, however,
need not concern us here.
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derive from any underlying quasi-emotions | as, again, the considerations
about Moran's view have illustrated. And there are no obvious candidates for
some other real emotional feelings that might be involved in instances of the
aective imagination, such as our emotional responses towards representational
art. Therefore, the challenge for Walton can be formulated in a more rened
way: how can emotional imagining possess an aective character in virtue of
representing an emotion, without actually including any real emotional feeling?
Moran has proposed two types of imagining concerned with emotion: pro-
positional imagining about emotions; and imagining someting with emotion.
The rst is characterized by the fact that the emotions form part of the propo-
sitional content of the imagining | for instance, when we imagine that we have
or feel fear directed at an imagined lion in the room. By contrast, Moran takes
the latter to be an episode of imagining something in an emotional manner.
Propositional imagining is dispassionate and therefore no good candidate for
aective imagining; while imagining something in an emotional manner can be
ruled out since there are good reasons to doubt the existence of such a mode
of representation. But independently of what one thinks about the plausibil-
ity of imagining something emotionally, there is at least a third alternative
in which emotions may enter imagination: they may be the direct objects of
non-propositional imagining.
Consider the case of imagining a pain (or a similarly subjective bodily
phenomenon). This imaginative episode diers subjectively from real instances
of pain. Most notably, we do not come to nd the former unbearable in the
same way as the latter | for instance, we do not cry or faint as a consequence
of experiencing it. In this respect, imagined and remembered pains are much
closer to each other than to really felt ones. Moreover, this dierence between
imagined (or remembered) and really felt pains is not simply a matter of degree
in determinancy or intensity. We sometimes have real pains which are not very
intense or determinate, but which we still experience as real pains, and not
merely as imagined ones. And we also can imagine having rather strong and
specic pains, without thereby beginning to really feel pain. None the less,
imagined (and remembered) pains still involve the quality of pain. This is
reected by the fact that we describe their subjective character in terms of
pain (e.g., that they feel similar to genuine pain) and group them, from our
rst-personal perspective, together with real feelings of pain, rather than with
thoughts about pain. In short, imagining a pain is an experience, but not a
real pain experience. That is, it involves the quality of painfulness, but does
not instantiate it.
The best explanation of this situation is to assume that imagining (and
perhaps also remembering) a pain is an instance of non-propositional object
awareness (or acquaintance) which takes the feeling of pain | rather than the
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felt pain | as its direct object.22 The idea is that, while a feeling of pain
involves painfulness by instantiating it, the imaginative (or mnemonic) aware-
ness of such a feeling involves painfulness by representing it as instantiated.
As a result, feeling pain and imagining it are subjectively similar in that both
their phenomenal characters involve the quality of painfulness. But they dier
from our rst-person perspective in that they involve this qualitative aspect
in dierent ways: the former is really an experience of pain, while the latter
is an episode of representing pain. The involvement of painfulness in the case
of imagining pain is thereby not a matter of the non-propositional manner of
representation. Rather, it is a matter of what is imagined, namely a feeling of
pain which instantiates the quality of painfulness.
The proposed treatment of imagining pain therefore satises all the con-
ditions on aective imagining: it is non-propositional; it does not involve an
emotional manner of imagining, but instead is a representation of emotion, and
its aectivity does not amount to the real thing, that is, to a genuine instance
of emotion. Emotional imagining may | and should | thus be understood as
an instance of experiential imagining, namely as imagining an episode with an
aective phenomenal character (i.e., an episode of emotion). This guarantees
that the aectivity of emotional imagining arises from what is imagined, and
not from how it is imagined. But it also ensures that there is an aective
element involved in emotional imagining, but no real emotional feeling, only a
represented one.
The proposed imaginative and non-propositional manner of representation
does not face the same problems as Moran's emotional manner. First of all,
it puts a restriction on what can be imagined, namely particulars and their
experienceable features | in this case, mental episodes and aspects of their
phenomenal characters. And then, it excludes other manners of representa-
tion. This is true independently of how the precise nature and role of the
non-propositional manner involved in emotional imagining is specied. There
are basically three options. First, it may be held that all instances of ob-
ject awareness involve the same basic non-propositional way of representing
something. Perception and imagination then dier in whether the represented
objects are external objects or mental episodes (i.e., representations of ex-
ternal objects). Second, it may be thought that, while perception does not
involve representation at all (but instead some relational form of awareness,
such as acquaintance), imaginative object awareness always consists in the
non-propositional representation of some episode with a sensory, aective or
similar character. This means taking visualising, say, to be the imaginative rep-
resentation of a visual perception. And third, it may simply be claimed that
22See the comparable claims about itchiness and perspectivalness in Martin (2002b), which
I also defend in chapter 8.
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the non-propositional manner of representation is distinctive to the (imagi-
native, mnemonic or otherwise) representation of mental episodes and their
phenomenal characters | we may call it an experiential manner of representa-
tion (cf. chapter 8). This option leaves it open whether visualising is directed
at external objects or perceptions of them, as well as whether perception is
representational or relational. But in all cases, the various manners of rep-
resentation | including that taken to be involved in emotional imagining |
remain mutually exclusive.
In addition to meeting the conditions on aective imagining which have
emerged during the discussion of Walton's and Moran's views, the account in
terms of the non-propositional representation of emotions ts well with Wal-
ton's approach to our engagement with representational art. The demand im-
posed on us by the occurrence of quasi-emotions may very well be understood
as involving the demand to imagine oneself as feeling the emotion concerned
(cf. the third element). For this imagining is not only non-propositional, it
also happens from the rst-person perspective: we imagine the instantiation of
the phenomenal character of an emotion, and this character is identical with
what the emotion is subjectively like (cf. chapter 8). This also claries the re-
lation to the underlying quasi-emotions: they are not constituents of aective
imagining, but indirectly give rise to the latter in so far as they establish the
ctional truth that we feel an emotion towards the ctional entities in question
and, hence, require us to engage in aective imagining as part our engagement
with the representational artwork in question.
This proposal may then be used to explain why the resulting aective states
do not motivate us in the same way as the real emotions, namely to interact
with the respective entities at which they are directed. The idea is that the
emotional aspect looses its motivational power, once it is experienced, not in
an immediate way, but instead only mediated by a non-propositional repre-
sentation of it. Thus, while the experience of fear felt towards a real lion has
the power to move us to run away, the imaginative representation of such an
experience of fear directed at a ctional lion does not possess this power any-
more. Similarly, the intensity and determinacy of the feeling usually decreases
when we move from a real experience to a represented one. Thus our imagina-
tions (and memories) of fear are typically | though not necessarily always |
less vivid than the comparable experiences of fear in real life situations. The
claim that our emotional responses towards ctional entities amount to the
non-propositional imagination of having emotions towards those entities may
thus help to explain some important characteristics of our engagement with
representational art.
Finally, the provided account of emotional imagining is compatible with the
idea that it is distinctive of imagining that it allows for voluntary control. The
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occurrence of quasi-emotions and the subsequent establishment of a ctional
truth to be imagined by us may be beyond the direct inuence of our will. But
whether we follow this demand and imagine feeling the respective emotion is
at least in principle up to us.23
23I would like to thank Malcolm Budd, Josep Corbi, Mike Martin, Richard Moran, Lucy
O'Brien,
Gianfranco Soldati, two anonymous referees and the audiences at the Senior Semi-
nar, University College London, and at the 16th Phronesis Inter-University Workshop on
Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Valencia, for their valuable comments on
former versions of this paper. I am also very grateful to the editors of this volume, Remei
Capdevila Werning and Gerard Vilar Roca, for their help and support. During the various






`If I stand here, I saw him.' (The Tragedy of Macbeth, Act III,
Scene 4)
I. The Epistemic Conception of Hallucinations
1. One of the main issues in the recent debates about the nature of perception
is whether it should be understood in relational or in intentional terms. While
relationalist positions are arguably more promising with respect to the eluci-
dation of the phenomenology of perceptions and their close links to knowledge
and demonstrative thought, intentionalist views are plausibly better equipped
to accommodate the contentfulness of perceptions and their rational force.
The two approaches compete with each other, however, only if they are con-
cerned with the same aspect of the nature of perceptions. And, contrary to the
received opinion, this need not necessarily be so. In particular, while the third-
personally accessible structure of perceptions may be taken to be relational,
their rst-personally accessible character may be thought of as intentional.
Such a view | which I aim to develop and defend here | can perhaps com-
bine the strengths of the two more austere alternatives, while avoiding the
weaknesses of either.1
2. There is a long and fruitful tradition in philosophy to try to get clearer
about the nature of perceptions by shifting one's attention to the nature of
hallucinations. In particular, the epistemic conception of hallucinations is
very helpful to understand better what is distinctive of perceptions and, more
generally, of perceptual experiences.2 Hallucinations dier from perceptions
1Schellenberg (2010) also puts forward a mixed position. But her conception of the in-
tentional element of perception is dierent from the one suggested here. While she promotes
a Fregean picture, my proposal is more Husserlian in spirit.
2I use the term `perceptions' exclusively to denote veridical perceptual experiences. The
expression `perceptual experiences' is intended to cover both perceptions and perception-like
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in that they do not put us into contact with the world in such a way as to
enable us to refer to mind-independent objects and acquire knowledge about
them. In addition, certain hallucinations are special in so far as they are, in
a signicant sense, subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions. According
to the epistemic conception of hallucinations, these two claims | one being
negative and metaphysical, the other positive and epistemic | capture all
that can, and need to, be said about what these perception-like hallucinations
have in common. In other words, the main tenet of this conception of such
hallucinations is that their common makeup | if they share any at all | can
be positively characterised only in epistemic, but not in metaphysical terms.
Proponents of the epistemic conception typically put forward an even stron-
ger claim, namely that there is nothing more to having a perception-like hal-
lucination than having an experience which is indistinguishable from that of
perceiving. That is, the positive characterisation of such hallucinations is
taken to be exhausted by reference to their indiscriminability from percep-
tions. This conclusion is stronger in that it concerns not only the issue of
what all perception-like hallucinations have in common, but also the issue of
whether there is something that dierentiates them. The claim that their com-
mon makeup cannot be positively characterised in non-epistemological terms
does not imply that their dierent individual makeups do not allow for such a
description. Objects, that share nothing but the feature of being perceptually
indiscriminable from lemons, without being lemons, can still dier greatly in
their natures. The epistemic conception (as introduced above) is compatible
with something similar being true of perception-like hallucinations: while they
do not share among each other anything but their subjective indiscriminability
from perceptions, they may still have distinct individual natures which can be
positively characterised in metaphysical terms (e.g., in terms of their causes
or neuronal bases). By contrast, an endorsement of the stronger claim rules
out this possibility: the hallucinatory experiences at issue do not possess any
other positively describable feature, over and above their subjective indistin-
guishability.3
3. The subjective (or rst-personal) indiscriminability referred to by the epis-
temic conception is understood as indiscriminability from the inside, that is,
indiscriminability relative to some form of access other than outer perception,
(or `perfect') hallucinations | but not hallucinations which are, from the inside, discrim-
inable from perceptions. The class of `experiences', nally, is meant to include not only
perceptual experiences, but also other sensory episodes, such as episodic memories, imagin-
ings and subjectively discriminable hallucinations.
3This strengthening of the epistemic conception of perception-like hallucinations has been
defended in Martin (2004, 2006) and Fish (2009), and criticised in Sturgeon (2000) and Siegel
(2008), among others.
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testimony, or inference on the basis of either. There is a dierent and wider
sense in which all kinds of access may be said to be `subjective', given that
they all involve a knowing subject with a particular perspective onto what is
known. But what matters for the distinction between perception-like and other
hallucinations is the narrower notion of subjective indistinguishability dened
in terms of non-perceptual and non-testimonial access. It becomes clear later
on that this includes not only introspection, but also experiential awareness
| the kind of awareness that comes with conscious mental episodes and their
possession of a subjective character.4
A closely related issue is which aspects of mental episodes are accessible
from the inside. The object of our knowledge from the inside is the subjective
(or phenomenal) character of mental episodes | that is, what the episodes
are like from our conscious perspective. So whichever aspects of episodes are
accessible from the inside, they have to be intimately linked to their character.
The closest link possible is that of constitution. If it is assumed, for instance,
that the character of perceptions is partly constituted by their relational con-
nection to objects in the world, it follows that we have access from the inside
to their relationality. But the same conclusion may be available even if the link
between character and relationality is understood as something weaker than
constitution | namely as an intentional connection. As I aim to illustrate in
this chapter (cf. especially section 47), an account along these lines can hold
on to the idea that the relationality of perceptions is accessible from the inside,
despite being a constituent of their third-personal structure (e.g., their causal
origin, representationality, functional role or reason-giving power), and not
their rst-personal character. The kind of access to their structure in question
counts as access from the inside in so far as the intentionality involved is not
perceptual or testimonial. But the accessed structure is still third-personal
in so far as our canonical access to it is from the outside (e.g., a matter of
empirical or metaphysical investigations).
4. These considerations have the consequence that the epistemic conception (in
the sense introduced above) may be understood in two ways. On the one hand,
it may be taken to maintain that we cannot positively characterise perception-
like hallucinations in terms of a common character which they share with
each other and possibly also with perceptions (cf. Martin (2004, 2006)). On
the other hand, it may instead be understood as claiming the impossibility of
positively describing perception-like hallucinations by reference to a structure
4Just like other proponents of the epistemic conception, I do not have much to say in
this chapter about hallucinations which are subjectively discriminable from perceptions. I
address the issue of what they have in common with perception-like hallucinations in chapter
2.
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common to all of them, as well as perhaps also to perceptions. The main
underlying issue is thereby whether the relationality of perceptions should be
understood as an aspect of their character or an aspect of their structure.5 My
conclusion towards the end of this chapter is that the second way of specifying
the epistemic conception of perception-like hallucinations is to be preferred
over the rst (cf. especially section VIII).
One important motivation for the epistemic conception of hallucinations
| independently of whether it is concerned with the character or the struc-
ture of perceptual experiences - is the observation that, while there is only one
way in which perception can go right, there are many ways in which it can go
wrong. Perception goes right just in case it relates us to the external world in
the way just mentioned. In all other cases, it goes wrong; and it may fail to
establish the required relation on dierent occasions for very dierent reasons.
This observation allows us to characterise perceptions | that is, those percep-
tual experiences involved in successful cognition | in positive metaphysical
terms. But it also suggests that we may be unable to provide more than a
merely negative metaphysical description of what unies defective perceptual
experiences, given that they may vary signicantly in why they fail to relate
us to the world. We may therefore be able to further categorise perception-like
hallucinations only by reference to the extent to which we can subjectively tell
them apart from perceptions and other mental episodes. Further below, I say a
bit more about the motivation to treat the subjective indiscriminability from
perceptions as the mark of being a perceptual experiences (cf. also Martin
(2006)). There is still the possibility of perceptions and hallucinations sharing
some other, non-epistemic feature | thus permitting a positive non-epistemic
characterisation of hallucinations, after all. But, as should become clearer later
on, it is not easy to support the postulation of such a feature.
5. Experiential disjunctivism about perceptual experiences endorses the epis-
temic conception of hallucinations and is traditionally linked to the latter.6
5There is one notable dierence between the two readings. If we cannot discriminate
the character of a given experience rst-personally, we cannot discriminate it at all. Even
reductionist physicalism has to assume that our canonical access to what is to be reduced
is rst-personal. Otherwise, it would be impossible to decide which brain states are to be
identied with pain, say, and which with pleasure. So, if the character of a given hallucination
is distinct from that of perceptions, but cannot subjectively be known to be distinct from
the latter, we cannot say anything positive about it at all. By contrast, the structure
of experiences is open to third-personal investigation. Indeed, identifying the subjectively
accessible aspects of the structure may be impossible without reliance on such a third-
personal access (cf., for instance, the external determination of content). Hence, even if we
cannot tell from the inside that a given hallucination diers structurally from perceptions,
the sciences or metaphysics can still reveal their structure (cf. chapter 2).
6See the writings of Martin, especially Martin (2004, 2006). In sections 13f. and 22 below,
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The core claim of this version of disjunctivism is that the essence of percep-
tions includes | and, presumably, is also exhausted by | their introspectible
property of bringing us into conscious contact with mind-independent enti-
ties. That is, perceptions are essentially instances of relational awareness or
acquaintance. As a consequence, the view maintains that perceptions and hal-
lucinations dier completely in their essences, given that the latter lack this
kind of relationality. It also claims that, although we have introspective ac-
cess to these dierent essences, we need not always be able to tell them apart
in introspection. Together with the above observation about the variety of
ways in which perceptual experience may go wrong, this leads naturally to a
merely epistemic characterisation of perception-like hallucinations: they are
introspectively indiscriminable from perceptions, while lacking the link to the
world which is distinctive of perceptions.
Many of the central elements of experiential disjunctivism have been well
argued for (cf., e.g., Martin (2000a), Martin (2002b), Nudds (2010) and chapter
8). Notably, the following three insights should not be readily given up: (i)
that perceptions, but not hallucinations, are essentially relational; (ii) that
the relationality of perceptions is accessible in introspection; and (iii) that
perception-like hallucinations may dier in their natures from each other and
need not have more than their subjective indiscriminability from perceptions
in common. Instead, my intention is to argue that experiential disjunctivism
is problematic for other reasons. In particular, it has diculties to account for
the nature of our error involved in taking our perception-like hallucinations to
be perceptions.
Moreover, I aim to show that there is an alternative account of percep-
tual experiences which can avoid the problems for experiential disjunctivism,
while still holding on to | or at least being compatible with | the three
central claims just identied. The view in question does not fall victim to
the problems because it takes perceptual experiences to be intentional. And,
as illustrated towards the end of this chapter, it can accommodate the three
insights by understanding the subjective indiscriminability of hallucinations
from perceptions primarily in terms of experiential, rather than introspec-
tive, awareness. Accordingly, what I aim to put forward and defend is an
intentionalist account of perceptual experiences, that combines well both with
(non-experiential) disjunctivism about these experiences and with the epis-
temic conception of hallucinations. My underlying suggestion is that the error
I characterise in more detail both this version of disjunctivism | which is sometimes also
called `nave realist disjunctivism' (cf. Martin (2002b) and Nudds (2010)) or `phenomenal
disjunctivism' (cf. Macpherson and Haddock (2008)) | and its understanding of subjective
indiscriminability in terms of introspection. The term `disjunctivism' and its counterpart
`conjunctivism' are, if taken literally, perhaps not particularly apt, but I follow the tradition
in using them for the positions at issue.
303
Experience and Introspection Chapter 11
in mistaking hallucinations for perceptions should be located already at the
level of experiential awareness.
6. Apart from the nature of the subjective indiscriminability of hallucinations
and the distinction between introspective and experiential awareness, two other
important themes | which have sometimes been neglected in the recent lit-
erature on the nature of perceptual experiences | gure prominently in what
follows. One is the idea that | following the phenomenological tradition in
which much of the talk of intentional phenomena originated | intentional-
ity should be understood as a normative aspect of consciousness (cf. chapter
13). The other central theme is the importance for any adequate account of
perceptual experiences of a satisfactory theory of our access from the inside
to our own mental episodes.7 Our subjective access is our canonical way of
becoming aware of, and acquiring knowledge about, our conscious experiences.
It informs our ordinary opinions about them. And it enables us to notice simi-
larities and dierences among their conscious characters. Given that conscious
experiences should | precisely because of their conscious status | be char-
acterised in terms of how they are given to us in consciousness, any theory of
them has to investigate our rst-personal access to them.
7. As already mentioned, the epistemic conception of hallucinations makes
reference to two important facts about hallucinations and their relationship
to perceptions. The rst is that the two types of experience dier from each
other in their relationship to the world: perceptions relate us in a certain
manner to some particular mind-independent objects and their features, while
hallucinations do not. Accordingly, there is a distinctively perceptual way of
being related to the world which is not realised when we are hallucinating. It
may not be easy to specify the precise nature of this perceptual link. But for
the current purposes, it suces to note that it exists, and that it dierenti-
ates perceptions from hallucinations. In particular, it explains the fact that
perceptions | but not hallucinations | inform us about, and enable us to
demonstratively refer to, objects in our environment. The second important
fact is that there can be hallucinations which are subjectively indiscriminable
from perceptions. In order to understand better what this amounts to, it is
perhaps helpful to say a bit more about the general idea of indiscriminability.8
7Martin (2004, 2006) and Nudds (2010) are notable exceptions, though they limit their
discussion to introspection.
8The following considerations draw heavily on Williamson (1990) and, to some extent,
also Martin (2006).
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II. The Subjective Indiscriminability of Hallucinations
8. Indiscriminability is an epistemic phenomenon. That two distinct entities |
whether they are objects, events, properties, and so on | are indiscriminable
means that they cannot be told apart, that is, known to be distinct. Claims
about indiscriminability dier in generality relative to the extent to which they
put limitations on relevant contextual features, such as the subjects, times and
sources of knowledge concerned. Inuits can tell apart more kinds of snow and
ice than most of us. We may be able to visually recognise dierences in shape
or colour if looking at the respective objects from a close range, but not if
looking at them from a great distance. We may better in discriminating certain
dierences in shape by vision than by touch (or vice versa). And sometimes,
we may able to discriminate two entities only by comparing each of them to a
third entity | for instance, in cases where discriminability turns out to fail to
be transitive.
In addition, there may be variations in the scope of indiscriminability
claims. Most basically, indiscriminability is a relation between two distinct
entities. And, at this basic level, it is also arguably symmetric: if one thing
is indiscriminable from another, the latter is also indiscriminable from the
former.9
But indiscriminability claims may concern more than two entities. They
may proclaim the indiscriminability of each possible pair of entities belonging
to a certain group (e.g., `all people from that country look the same to me').
Or they may assert that a certain entity is indiscriminable from each member
of a certain group (e.g., `I cannot tell from his looks whether he belongs to
that community'). In both cases, indiscriminability turns out to be a relation
between more than two entities. And in the latter case, it stops being sym-
metrical in any meaningful sense. For it is not necessary that any member of
9This should be obvious for cases in which both entities are accessible to us at the
same time and in the same way (e.g., when we can simultaneously see them). In other cases,
however, it is less clear whether indiscriminability is symmetric (e.g., when we see one entity,
while merely remembering the visual appearance of the other). Consider the example of my
coming across a certain twin earlier today and being unable to tell which of the two he is,
although I was able to recognise the identity of the other (or the same) twin when meeting
him yesterday. This case would not pose any problem for the symmetry claim if it were true
that, if I would have met today the other twin instead, I would not have been able to tell
him apart from his twin as well; or if it were true that a change in the identity of the twin
met earlier today would have led to a signicant change in the epistemic situation (e.g., if
I would have noticed a distinctive feature of the second twin | such as a mole | when
seeing him, which I did not notice when remembering his visual appearance; or if I would
not have remembered a distinctive feature of the rst twin, which I did see). However, it is
unclear whether the truth of the idea that the actually seen twin is indiscriminable for me
at the time of seeing him from the merely remembered twin requires that also at least one
of these counterfactuals is true.
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the comparison group is itself indiscriminable from anything other than the
entity originally compared with the group. In particular, the members of the
group need not be indiscriminable from each other.
9. It may help to consider a concrete example to get clearer about the possibil-
ity of hallucinations being indiscriminable from perceptions. It is normally |
and perhaps even always | possible to come to know that one is hallucinating,
and not perceiving. Macbeth, for example, need not have been so convinced
that the perceptual character of his vision of Banquo sitting at the table was
as obvious as his own presence in the room. He might just have listened
properly to what the other lords present at the banquet told him. He might
have inferred the hallucinatory character of his experience from his previously
acquired knowledge of the murder of Banquo. Or, in a more contemporary
setting, cognitive scientists might have informed him that they subjected him
to a treatment meant to induce guilt-related hallucinations.
However, if any such relevant evidence coming from the outside | that is,
delivered by outer perception, testimony, inference, or any combination thereof
| is lacking, it can be impossible for the subject concerned to notice the
hallucinatory character of a current experience. This is well illustrated by the
initial reaction of Macbeth, during which he seemed to be ignoring the lords'
assertions, and to have forgotten about the murder of Banquo. More clearly,
if he would have been uninformed about the absence or death of Banquo |
that is, if he would have had no perceptual, testimonial or related inferential
evidence available to him suggesting that he was hallucinating, rather than
perceiving | he might have been unable to tell that his experience was indeed
hallucinatory.
In addition, perhaps no other human being in his position would have been
able to come to know about the hallucinatory character of the experience. For
the fact that Macbeth might have been unable to discriminate his hallucina-
tion from comparable perceptions in the absence of perceptual or testimonial
evidence to their distinctness need not have been due to features which distin-
guish him from other actual or possible human beings | such as his general
cognitive or moral shortcomings, or his particular situation (e.g., the stressful
guilt and anxiety that he was suering, or the specic spatial point of view
which he occupied in the hall where the banquet was held).
Finally, what is at issue is not simply whether Macbeth could have dis-
tinguished his hallucination from one or more of his other actual experiences,
such as his particular perceptions of Banquo which he had had at some time
before the banquet, or underwent at the same time as his hallucinatory expe-
rience, or could have experienced at some time after the banquet (assuming
that Banquo would then still be alive). Macbeth could have had the very same
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hallucination, and been unable to identify it as such, even if he would have
never encountered and seen Banquo in his whole life. It would just have been
for him an experience of some unknown lord.
The indiscriminability under consideration is therefore not merely a relation
between the hallucination and one or more actual perceptions. What matter
as well are possible perceptions of Banquo. In particular, that Macbeth | or
anyone else in his position | could not have told apart his hallucination from a
perception implies that, from the inside, he could not have noticed a dierence
if he would have instead perceived Banquo. Similarly, it also implies that he
could not have noticed a dierence if he would have seen Banquo at some point
or another before starting to hallucinate him. That is, the indiscriminability
claim about Macbeth's hallucination compares it with the members of a larger
class of actual and possible perceptions of Banquo. And it is in this | and only
in this | sense that, for all that Macbeth knew from the inside, his experience
could have been a perception.
Not all possible perceptions are relevant, however. Macbeth would presum-
ably have been able to distinguish his hallucination from a possible perception
of his wife or, for that matter, from a possible perception of Banquo at a
dierent location, or under a dierent spatial perspective, or under dierent
lighting conditions. But this fact need not undermine the indiscriminability
claim about his hallucination. The reason for this is that Macbeth would still
have been able, from the inside, to tell apart these possible perceptions from
those other possible perceptions just mentioned, that he could not have distin-
guished from his hallucination. Hence, what should be said about Macbeth's
hallucination is, more precisely, that it is individually indiscriminable only
from each member of a certain class of possible perceptions, that are them-
selves mutually indiscriminable from each other.10
10. From these considerations about Macbeth's hallucination and its indis-
criminability from certain perceptions, we can glean a more precise character-
isation of the subjective indistinguishability from perceptions, the possibility
of which I took to be the second important fact about hallucinations. Let `us'
include all possible subjects which are just like human beings as they actually
are; and let a class of `corresponding' perceptions be a class of perceptions
which, from the inside, are mutually indiscriminable from each other. A given
10The relevant comparison class of perceptions might perhaps be demarcated more pre-
cisely by reference to a certain shared content of some sort | assuming that this would also
take into account parameters like spatial point of view, lighting conditions, and so on. One
diculty with this approach is that it might not be able to capture all factors which have
an inuence on whether perceptions are mutually indiscriminable from the inside or not.
And another problem is that it would not be compatible with views on perception that deny
their having a content of that kind (cf. Travis (2004)).
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hallucination is then subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions just in case
it satises the following condition:
(S) None of us could, from the inside, come to know it to be distinct from
each member of some class of possible corresponding perceptions.11
The subjective indiscriminability of hallucinations is sometimes spelled out in
terms of the fact that we cannot, from the inside, come to know that it does
not instantiate the property of being a perception (cf., e.g., Siegel (2008)). One
problem with this formulation is that it remains unclear what the relata of the
relation of indiscriminability are supposed to be. For instance, they cannot be
the general properties of being a hallucination and of being a perception, given
that even Macbeth can distinguish instances of the two. And referring instead
to the more concrete properties of being a perception or hallucination with
a certain content is problematic precisely because of the unclear and contro-
versial notion of a content of perceptual experiences. It therefore seems more
reasonable to take this ignorance about property instantiation to derive from
the more fundamental subjective indiscriminability, as it is specied by means
of (S). This also ts much better Martin's insistence to understand (S) as hav-
ing a plural form (cf. Martin (2006)). Besides, the formulation proposed here
stays neutral on which aspects of experiences can be introspected. It presup-
poses only that we can introspectively note similarities and dierences among
such episodes.
11. The second feature of hallucinations | their subjective indistinguishability
from perceptions | gives rise to a third important fact about them and their
relationship to perceptions: the priority of perceptions over hallucinations. In
general, when two of our mental episodes are subjectively indistinguishable,
we treat them in the same way. In particular, we take them to possess the
same features and to belong to the same mental kind; and we rely on the them
to the same extent when forming beliefs or intentions. This is precisely what
happens in the case of indistinguishable hallucinations and perceptions. We
take both to be perceptions and to relate us to the mind-independent world.
We endorse both in the shape of perceptual judgements and corresponding
actions. And, on the basis of introspection, we judge both to be perceptions.
In short, we treat both as if they were perceptions | and not, as if they were
hallucinations. It is in this sense that perceptions enjoy priority over their in-
distinguishable hallucinatory counterparts. And this fact becomes manifest in
the formal structure of the indiscriminability relation concerned: while some
particular hallucinations are subjectively indiscriminable from all members of
11Note that the thesis labelled '(S)' in Martin (1997a) is a completely dierent claim from
the one discussed here.
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a group of perception, no particular perception is subjectively indiscriminable
from each member of a class of hallucinations.
12. The priority of perceptions has the consequence that we end up being
doubly misled when hallucinating, namely not only about the world, but also
about the hallucinations themselves. When Macbeth is hallucinating Banquo
sitting at the table and does not suspect the hallucinatory character of his
experience, it is rational for him to come to believe that there is such a scene
before him. But the resulting belief is surely false: Macbeth is mislead about
how a certain part of the world is. Similarly, when he cannot tell apart his
hallucinatory experience from perceptions, it is rational for him to come to
believe that he is perceiving | and not, say, merely hallucinating or visual-
ising | Banquo at the table. And again, the resulting belief is false: this
time, Macbeth is misled about how a certain part of his mind is. Hence, those
hallucinations, which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions, may
lead us to form rational, but erroneous judgements or beliefs about their expe-
riential type. And this fact is due to the priority of the perceptions over such
hallucinations.
The rst kind of error has already been discussed in much detail in the
literature. The challenge is rather to identify the best account of the nature
and source of the second kind of error linked to hallucinating. What is clear so
far is that it becomes manifest in false self-ascriptions of the form `I am now
perceiving'. But what still needs to be determined is what kind of judgements
or beliefs give rise to these self-ascriptions, and at which stage in the epistemic
process of their formation the error occurs rst.
III. The Introspective Indiscriminability of Hallucinations
13. So far, our access from the inside to our perceptual experiences has been
characterised in purely negative terms, namely as a form of access dierent
from outer perception, testimony, inference based on either, or any combina-
tion thereof. A natural way of being more positive is to identify the kind of
access mentioned in (S) with introspective access. We can introspectively dis-
tinguish sensory experiences only by distinguishing some of their introspectible
features (just as we can visually tell part objects solely by recognising a dif-
ference in their visible properties). Since the object of our knowledge from
the inside is the subjective or conscious character of mental episodes, the in-
trospectible properties of experiences | which constitute their introspective
`appearance' | are all aspects of their character. Hence, we can discriminate
experiences introspectively only if they possess distinct characters, and only
by introspectively discriminating their characters. And we can introspectively
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discriminate distinct characters only by recognising a dierence in one or more
of the determinables which they realise. Accordingly, a given hallucination
is taken to be subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions in the sense of
satisfying the following specication of (S):
(I) None of us could introspectively know its character to be distinct from
the character shared by each member of some class of corresponding
perceptions.
14. Since it becomes important later on to distinguish introspective indiscrim-
inability from another aspect of subjective indistinguishability, namely expe-
riential indiscriminability, it is necessary to say a bit more about the nature of
introspection assumed here. In the context of (I), introspection is meant to in-
clude more than the mechanisms and products involved in the non-inferential
formation of judgements of the form `I am -ing X, or that p', where `' de-
notes some type of mental episode or state. Indeed, any form of access from
the inside to the character of mental episodes counts as introspective, as long
as our access is distinct from what is accessed. When we perceive something,
our perceptual access to it and the resulting episode of perceiving are distinct
from what is perceived. Similarly, when we introspect a given mental episode,
our introspective access to it and any resulting episodes (such as higher-order
thoughts) are distinct from the episode. Introspecting an episode is there-
fore distinct from its subject matter | that is, from being in, or having, that
episode. But otherwise, the exclusion of access from the outside is the only fur-
ther condition on introspection. Hence, any form of reection on the character
of our mental episodes, which is not based on outer perception or testimony,
counts as introspective. For instance, introspection might still involve some
kind of `inner perceptions' (i.e., non-intellectual higher-order episodes).
Although more needs to be said about this issue, the idea that experiences
and other mental episodes possess introspectible properties | that is, prop-
erties which we can come to know to be present by means of introspection |
is not necessarily incompatible with the idea that we come to know about the
presence of such properties by attending to the experienced external objects
and features (cf. Martin (2000b)). It is plausible to treat experiences, not as
objects of our focal attention, but rather as determinations of our conscious
focal attention to such objects. Furthermore, what kind of attentive aware-
ness experiences constitute is partly determined by what external objects and
features they present us with. Hence, acquiring knowledge about the former
may require attending to the latter. The intentionalist view to be put forward
in the second half of this chapter takes exactly this line of response.
15. Understanding subjective indiscriminability in terms of the introspection
of characters permits a simple and natural explanation of why certain per-
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ceptions are mutually indiscriminable from each other in introspection and
therefore form a class of corresponding perceptions: they do so because they
possess the same character and character determinables. The question is now
whether the same, or a dierent, account should be given of why (I) is true
of certain hallucinations. Conjunctivism about character claims that those
hallucinations satisfy (I) because they possess the same character as | that
is, share all character determinables with | the corresponding perceptions.
Disjunctivism about character, on the other hand, maintains that the halluci-
nations do not share any of their character determinables with the perceptions
and therefore dier in character from the latter; but that this dierence is for
us inaccessible through introspection.12
16. Introspective indiscriminability and disjunctivism about character are typ-
ically spelled out in slightly dierent terms than (I). Instead of maintaining
that the hallucinations are indistinguishable from perceptions relative to their
character (i.e., that the character of the hallucinations is indistinguishable from
that of the perceptions), it is claimed that the indistinguishability of the hallu-
cinations from perceptions is a constituent of their character (cf. Martin (2004,
2006), Siegel (2008) and Sturgeon (2008)). Accordingly, perceptions and hallu-
cinations are taken to share a character determinable, namely their subjective
indiscriminability from perceptions. But this alternative characterisation still
presupposes that the hallucinations dier in character from the perceptions,
and that this dierence cannot be noticed by us from the inside. Hence, it
comes with an endorsement of (I), too. Indeed, this should be expected since
being indiscriminable from the inside just means being indiscriminable relative
to those features accessible from the inside | that is, relative to the subjective
character.
The main reason for adopting the dierent characterisation is that it can
provide an account of the character of perception-like hallucinations solely by
reference to their subjective indiscriminability from corresponding perceptions.
Assuming (contrary to Fish (2009)) that hallucinations do possess a charac-
ter, the claim that it is indistinguishable from that of perceptions, but does
not share any aspects with the latter, leaves its positive identity completely
12In what follows, I ignore two possible mixed views. The rst claims that conjunctivism
is true of some cases, and disjunctivism of others. My objections to the general form of
disjunctivism have the same force against the disjunctivist part of this view. The second
mixed theory adopts a middle way between conjunctivism and disjunctivism about character
by maintaining that the hallucinations share some, but not all character determinables with
the corresponding perceptions. Although I think that this position merits more detailed
discussion, I would surmise that it, too, faces problems similar to those for disjunctivism
about character in its pure form. Besides, it is not clear what could plausibly motivate us
to endorse it, rather than one of its more radical two rivals.
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open. This issue becomes particularly pressing in the case of causally matching
hallucinations | that is, hallucinations which satisfy (S) because they have
exactly the same proximal causes as the corresponding perceptions. The posi-
tive aspects of character of such hallucinations cannot be due to their proximal
causes, since then the character of the perceptions would involve these aspects
as well | which would contradict the claim put forward. Hence, the character
of the hallucinations should be understood as being a matter of distal causes
or certain contextual features. However, it is not clear whether, for instance,
the absence of a perceived object among the causes can constitute part of
the character of hallucinations. And there do not seem to be other obvious
candidates for the role of relevant factor (cf. Martin (2004, 2006) and Nudds
(2010)).
Identifying the character of perception-like hallucinations with the latter's
property of being subjectively indistinguishable from corresponding percep-
tions | and with nothing else | solves this problem by providing a positive
characterisation of the character of those hallucinations. Moreover, it leads
to the strengthening of the epistemic conception introduced at the beginning
(cf. section 2), since it denies that the character of perception-like halluci-
nations involves other aspects than their subjective indistinguishability from
perceptions.
But now, the diculty is that this character turns out to lack determi-
nacy. According to disjunctivism about character, mental episodes can be
subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions in at least two ways: by being a
perception, or by being a perception-like hallucination. The view can assume
that, in the case of perceptions, this determinable aspect of character is re-
alised by some more determinate aspect (e.g., their special relationality), which
is furthermore responsible for the dierence in character between the percep-
tions and the hallucinations. But since the character of the latter is taken to
be exhausted by the determinable aspect of subjective indistinguishability, it
remains indeterminate. However, it is doubtful that genuine entities could in-
stantiate determinable features without instantiating determinations of them.
And there is no reason to assume that mental episodes are an exception to this
rule. Hence, perception-like hallucinations (in contrast to perceptions) cannot
any more count as genuine entities | that is, in this case, as episodes in the
stream of consciousness. Instead, they should be treated as situations or states
of mind in which subjects can be (cf. the talk of `situations' in Martin (2004,
2006)). But this is in tension with our subjective impression that we are
actually undergoing an episodic experience when unknowingly hallucinating
something.
For what follows, it does not matter to settle the issue of which of the two
versions of disjunctivism about character is to be preferred. The subsequent
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considerations and objections apply equally to both. Hence, I continue to as-
sume that the subjective indiscriminability of hallucinations from correspond-
ing perceptions is not a constituent of the character of those hallucinations, but
rather an indiscriminability in | or relative to | their character. I therefore
also do not assume that the epistemic conception of perception-like hallucina-
tions should give rise to the stronger view discussed. In accordance with this,
it is compatible with that conception that such hallucinations may still possess
positively describable individual natures, even though their experiential kind
as a whole can be positively characterised only in epistemic terms.
IV. Three Challenges for Conjunctivism about Character
The Challenge of Introspective Error
17. There is an important explanatory dierence between disjunctivism and
conjunctivism about character: while the former has the resources to eluci-
date the nature of the error involved in judging perception-like hallucinations
to be perceptions, the latter does not | or at least not yet. According to
disjunctivism about character, the hallucinations satisfying (S) and the corre-
sponding perceptions do not share any character determinables; but we are, in
introspection, ignorant about the distinctness of the latter. The error in taking
the hallucinations to be perceptions is therefore introspective in nature. By
contrast, conjunctivism assumes that the hallucinations are subjectively in-
discriminable from corresponding perceptions because both possess the same
introspectible properties, that is, the same character. The error can there-
fore not be located at the level of introspection, but has to arise either at an
earlier or at a later stage in the epistemic process. But there are also other
reasons why disjunctivism about character should perhaps be preferred over
its conjunctivist counterpart.
The Challenge of Subjective Impact
18. Perceptual experiences are essentially conscious phenomena, that is, phe-
nomena with a subjective character. This means that a theory, which tries
to capture their nature, has to characterise and individuate them in terms of
what they are like from, or how they are given to, the subjective perspective.
This has the consequence that features | such as structure, functional role or
representationality | matter for such a characterisation only if they, in one
way or another, make a dierence for the subject. If their presence or absence
has no subjective resonance, they do not have a bearing on which fundamental
kind the experiences concerned belong to. This does not necessarily rule out
reductionist accounts of experience. If experiences turn out to be identical
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with, say, certain brain states, the latter arguably make a dierence for the
subject because the former do. They are just not given to the subject as the
brain states that they essentially are. From the inside, they are simply identi-
able as conscious experiences.
19. However, if the property of making a dierence for the subject is un-
derstood in introspective terms, conjunctivism about character is left with a
problem. What is central to this view is the claim that all perceptual experi-
ences | that is, both perceptions and perception-like hallucinations (and illu-
sions) | share the same perceptual character. In addition, and independently
of one's stance on the character(s) of perceptual experiences, it is natural to
assume that non-perceptual experiences | such as episodes of imagining or
recalling, or hallucinations which are, from the inside, easily recognisable as
non-perceptual | dier in character from perceptual experiences. Conjunc-
tivism about character, together with this further assumption, entails that
experiences count as perceptual in virtue of their character: sharing a char-
acter with perceptions is both sucient and necessary for being a perceptual
experiences. Mental episodes, which do not possess a perceptual character,
are not perceptual experiences, but belong to some other kind of experience.
Hence, to be able to claim that their view captures the nature of perceptual
experiences, conjuntivists about character have to assume that the presence
or absence of a distinctively perceptual character makes a dierence for the
subject.
The problem is now that there seems to be no good reason to rule out the
possibility of cases in which the absence of a perceptual character does not
make a dierence in introspection (cf. Martin (2004, 2006)). In such cases, an
experience lacks the character distinctive of perceptions, but cannot be intro-
spectively discriminated from the latter. But this gives rise to a dilemma for
conjunctivism about character. On the one hand, the fact that the character
of the experience concerned is distinct from that of perceptions is taken to
be relevant for its characterisation as a non-perceptual experience. But, on
the other hand, this dierence in character does not have any impact on how
the experience is given to the subject in introspection, so it should not matter
for our identication of the fundamental kind to which the experience belongs
to. The only way out for the conjunctivists seems to be to deny that there
can be such experiences which satisfy (I), despite not sharing a character with
perceptions and, hence, with perceptual experiences.
What therefore needs to be shown is that introspection is infallible with
respect to the detection of the absence of a perceptual character. That is, it
has to be argued that, each time an experience without a perceptual character
occurs, we are in principle able to subjectively recognise this aspect of their
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character in which they dier from perceptual experiences. But why should
it be assumed that introspection is infallible in this specic manner? Percep-
tion, for instance, does not show a comparable infabillibity. There are distinct
shapes or shades of colour, for instance, which we | that is, any possible sub-
ject with the apparatus distinctive of humans as they actually are | cannot
perceptually discriminate under suitable circumstances, even though we might
be able to distinguish them in dierent settings. So conjunctivism about char-
acter seems to be forced to present an argument of why introspection diers
from perception in not allowing for a certain kind of ignorance.
20. Disjunctivism about character does not have the same problem since it
identies the satisfaction of (I), rather than the possession of a perceptual
character, as the distinctive mark of perceptual experiences.13 Accordingly, an
experience which is introspectively indiscriminable from a perception counts
as a perceptual experience, independently of whether it has a character in
common with perceptions or not. In contrast to the possession of a percep-
tual character, the introspective indistinguishability from perceptions is always
recognisable from the inside. This is not in conict with the idea that the non-
perceptual character of perception-like hallucinations is still to some extent
introspectively accessible | if only with respect to its introspective indiscrim-
inability from the character of perceptions. But it has the consequence that
perceptual experiences do not form a natural, but rather only an epistemic
kind. This ts well with the epistemic conception of perception-like hallucina-
tions: they are all perceptual experiences (i.e., are subjectively indiscriminable
from perceptions), but each possibly for very dierent reasons. By contrast,
perceptions are all perceptual experiences for the very same reason, namely
because of their distinctive relationality. Hence, they still can be said to form
a natural kind due to this shared essential feature.
The Phenomenological Challenge
21. Another motivation for adopting disjunctivism about character is the
acceptance of a certain disjunctivist view about the nature of perceptual ex-
periences. In general, disjunctivism about perceptual experiences combines two
claims: (i) perceptions and hallucinations have dierent essences (or belong to
dierent fundamental mental kinds); and (ii) it is essential to perceptions |
but not to hallucinations | that they relate us, in the specied manner, to
13It is perhaps more precise to say that disjunctivism about character takes the satisfaction
of (S) to be the distinctive mark of perceptual experiences, but then understands (S) in terms
of introspective indiscriminability. In sections 44., I return to this issue and argue that a
conjunctivist about character should reject this focus on introspection and replace it with a
focus on experience.
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some mind-independent object and its features. In other words, disjunctivism
treats the dierence in relationality noted at the beginning as an essential
dierence.
Importantly, disjunctivism about perceptual experiences is distinct from
disjunctivism about character; and the same is true for their conjunctivist
counterparts. One dierence to note is that, while the two approaches to per-
ceptual experiences make claims about the essence(s) of these experiences, the
two approaches to character do not | although it is plausible to further as-
sume, for independent reasons, that the character of an experience is essential
to it. Another relevant point is that, so far, disjunctivism about perceptual
experiences stays neutral on whether perceptions and hallucinations share all,
some, or none, of their character determinables. As the view to be defended
later on illustrates, it is, for instance, possible to combine conjunctivism about
character with disjunctivism about perceptual experiences.
22. None the less, there are more concrete versions of disjunctivism about
perceptual experiences, which further specify or back up (ii) in such a way that
they come to adopt a stance on the issue of character as well. Experiential
disjunctivism about perceptual experiences is a good example of this. This
version of disjunctivism understands (ii) in the following manner: (ii*) it is
essential to perceptions that their establish a relation of awareness to some
mind-independent object and its perceivable properties, and that each of their
character determinables is determined by, or otherwise constitutively linked to,
this relation of awareness. That is, the nature of perceptions consists in their
establishment of a conscious contact with external entities and is accessible to
introspection.14
Disjunctivism about character is a direct consequence of experiential dis-
junctivism. For if all character determinables of perceptions are constitutively
linked to their special relationality, the characters of the non-relational hallu-
cinations cannot realise any of these determinables. Accordingly, experiential
disjunctivism denies that hallucinations can share any character determinables
with perceptions. However, the two types of experience still have some other
property in common, namely their satisfaction of (I), a relational epistemic
property. Perceptions satisfy (I) trivially, namely simply by being perceptions.
And perception-like hallucinations satisfy (I) because of one of the factors
mentioned above | notably the fact that introspection is insensitive to the
relational nature of characters. Given that perception-like hallucinations also
14See Martin (2004, 2006). Again, I ignore the possibility of weaker variants of experien-
tial disjunctivism, such as the view that only certain, but not all, character determinables
of perceptions are relational properties | which would be compatible with, but not necessi-
tated by, the view that hallucinations may share some of their character determinables with
perceptions.
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do not share any structural aspects with perceptions, but are instead charac-
terised by their lack of the relationality distinctive of perceptions, experiential
disjunctivism embraces the epistemic conception of hallucinations. Moreover,
it includes the idea that what unies the class of perceptual experiences is
precisely the property of satisfying (I).
There is no room here to properly discuss and evaluate the arguments in
favour of experiential disjunctivism. But one of its advantages is that it can
preserve well our ordinary conception of perceptions, according to which it is
part of their nature that they bring us into contact with the external world,
that is, genuinely relate us in a distinctive manner to mind-independent ob-
jects or facts (cf. Martin (2002b) and chapter 8). By contrast, other prominent
views about the nature of perceptual experiences have to adopt an error theory
concerning some aspect or another of our ordinary opinions about perceptions.
This is the case, for instance, if perceptions are construed as relations to mind-
dependent or non-physical entities (i.e., to some form of sense-data); or if they
are construed as involving an intentional and, hence, non-relational form of
awareness of the external objects (cf. Martin (2000a)).
23. Conjunctivism about character has to address the challenges outlined in
the last few sections. Since intentionalists about perceptual experiences are
typically also conjunctivists about character, they have to confront these chal-
lenges as well. I return below (cf. sections VI and 45.) to the issue of how
experiential intentionalism | the unorthodox intentionalist version of conjunc-
tivism to be defended here | is able to do this, namely: (i) to explain the
error involved in taking perception-like hallucinations to be perceptions; (ii) to
ensure that the absence of a perceptual character always makes a dierence for
the subject; and (iii) to accommodate our ordinary opinions about perceptions.
For the time being, however, it is worthwhile to understand why disjunctivism
about character and, more specically, experiential disjunctivism are at least
as problematic as conjunctivism about character.
V. Three Challenges for Disjunctivism about Character
24. That this task is perhaps less easy than might be thought is illustrated
by the fact that conjunctivists about character cannot simply appeal to the
satisfaction of (I) when arguing for the claim that the perceptual experiences
concerned possess some common character determinables (cf. Martin (2006)).
More needs to be said to establish the claim that introspective indiscriminabil-
ity should count as tracking a sameness in character. To see this more clearly,
it may be helpful to compare introspection with perception.
When we are trying to determine the visible features of objects, we have
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a fairly good grasp of which viewing conditions are optimal for this task, and
which not. Moreover, this distinction between optimal and non-optimal view-
ing conditions enables us to draw a distinction between how objects seem in
visual experience and how they really are. That is, it allows us to conceive of
the visible features of objects as mind-independent in the sense of being instan-
tiated independently of any particular of our visual experiences. The visible
features should count as mind-independent because brute error is possible in
vision: we may misperceive or otherwise err about such features, despite being
epistemically not at fault (e.g., despite being completely rational and possess-
ing a well-functioning mind and brain). And brute error is possible in vision
because we may view things under non-optimal conditions (e.g., in unusual
light, or when immersed in water), which need not guarantee that there is no
gap between how objects seem in visual experience and how they really are.
Now, the distinction between optimal and non-optimal viewing conditions
and the resulting mind-independence of the features of things accessible
through vision ensure also that, if we cannot tell apart two things by vi-
sion alone when viewing them under optimal conditions, then they possess
the same mind-independent visible features. This means that we are entitled
to take visual indiscriminability under optimal conditions as an indication of
a commonality on the level of mind-independent visible features.
This line of reasoning cannot, however, be easily applied to the introspec-
tive indiscriminability of hallucinations. For we do not have a similar grasp
of a distinction between optimal and non-optimal conditions in the case of
introspection (cf. Burge (2003) and Martin (2000b, 2006)). This need not
mean that introspection does not allow for brute error, or that what is intro-
spected is mind-dependent. But in the absence of such a distinction, we have
yet no good reason to assume that introspective indiscriminability indicates
some underlying sameness in character, which occurs independently of our in-
trospective awareness of it. Conjunctivists could maintain that all conditions
are optimal for introspection, and that the latter is consequently infallible.
But this would give rise to the dicult challenge of identifying those mech-
anisms, which underlie introspection and guarantee that we always correctly
notice the similarities and dierences among the characters of our experiences.
Therefore, it is better to look for other reasons to prefer the conjunctivist view
over its disjunctivist counterpart.
The Challenge of Rational Sameness
25. One of the main challenges for disjunctivism about character is to explain
the fact that hallucinations possess the same rational force as corresponding
perceptions when they are subjectively indiscriminable from the latter. That
two experiences share the same rational force means that they make it rea-
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sonable for the subject to form the same judgements, beliefs, intentions, and
so on. What thus needs explaining is that perception-like hallucinations do
not only move us to form the same judgements about the world and about
themselves as the perceptions, but that it is also reasonable for us to form
these judgements | such as the judgement that our current experience is a
perception.
Returning to our example, if Macbeth had been rational and completely
unaware of the absence and death of Banquo, as well as of his own agitated
and traumatic state of mind, he would have come to believe that he really
saw Banquo there before him. And, moreover, it would have been reasonable
for him to develop this belief. Similarly, if he had seen Banquo after having
been erroneously assured by everyone else that the latter had died, a rational
Macbeth would not have formed the belief that he actually saw Banquo (but
perhaps instead the belief that he `saw a ghost', meaning that he hallucinated
Banquo). And, in fact, it would have been unreasonable for him to believe in a
perceptual encounter with Banquo, assuming that the people around him had
been trustworthy. In short, it is reasonable for us to trust our hallucinations,
unless we become aware of evidence about their hallucinatory character | just
as it is reasonable for us to trust our perceptions, unless we believe them to
be hallucinatory.
26. To get clearer about its impact and avoid potential misunderstandings, it
is worthwhile to qualify the challenge raised here against disjunctivism about
character in several respects.
First, that perception-like hallucinations render certain judgements and
beliefs reasonable need not imply that they provide us with (access to) some
epistemic reasons for the latter. Accordingly, the challenge stays neutral on
whether the subject has epistemic reasons solely when he is perceiving, or also
when he is hallucinating (assuming the absence of defeaters). None the less, the
rational force of our perceptual experiences | whether they are perceptual or
hallucinatory | remains closely linked to our subjective take on the presence
of epistemic reasons for us. When we are rational, we form our judgements and
beliefs in response to what we take our reasons to be. Accordingly, whether it
is reasonable for us to rely on a given experience depends on whether we take
the experience to be reason-providing.
Second, the challenge does not impose the requirement that the rational
powers of perceptions and perception-like hallucinations should receive ex-
actly the same explanation. For the sake of argument, it is assumed here
that perceptions render certain judgements and beliefs reasonable in virtue of
the reason-providing power of their relational to the world; while the rational
force of perception-like hallucinations is to be understood as deriving from the
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rational force of the perceptions and their priority over the perception-like hal-
lucinations, which is part of the subjective indiscriminability of the latter from
the former (cf. Williamson (1990): 60., for such an explanatory approach).
The present challenge thus does not presume that sameness of rational power
implies sameness in the features responsible for that power. It simply asks for
some satisfactory explanation of why subjectively indiscriminable hallucina-
tions share their rational force with the relevant perceptions.
Third, it is also important to note that the rational force common to per-
ceptions and hallucinations is accessible from the inside | perhaps not always
by the subject concerned, but at least in principle by some possible human
subject in the same situation (just as in the case of subjective indiscriminabil-
ity). Had his judgement about the presence of Banquo been challenged by
the people surrounding him, a rational Macbeth's initial reaction might have
been surprise or disbelief, since he would have taken his judgement to be per-
fectly reasonable until the moment of the challenge. Indeed, it would have
needed very convincing external evidence for him to change his assessment of
his judgement and its grounding in his experience. The situation would have
been very dierent, if Macbeth had merely visualised Banquo and been able
to distinguish this experience from a perception. He would have recognised
that it would not be reasonable for him to believe that Banquo was there be-
fore him. Perceptual and imaginative experiences dier in whether they make
it reasonable for the subject to form perceptual judgements and judgements
about perceiving. And this dierence is accessible from the inside, even if
imaginative experiences are compared with perception-like hallucinations.
Fourth, this is one reason why reasonableness is not the same as entitle-
ment (i.e., whatever is third-personally distinctive of knowledge, in addition
to truth). If a given hallucination is subjectively indiscriminable from cor-
responding perceptions, we cannot tell from our subjective perspective that
forming a judgment on its basis does not lead to knowledge (or even just true
belief). For if we could, this would, after all, means that we do have access
from the inside to a feature which distinguishes this hallucination from per-
ceptions. Rational force and the power to put us into a position to know may
also dier in that the latter may actually contribute to a dierence in nature
between perceptions and hallucinations. It may, for instance, be argued that
the two kinds of perceptual experience dier essentially in whether they can
be grounds for knowledge | or be veridical, for that matter (cf. McDowell
(1998a)). If this is true, hallucinations cannot entitle us to form judgements
(other than the judgement that we are hallucinating). In particular, it would
be false to assume that, if a given hallucinatory experience had been veridical,
it would have put us in a position to acquire knowledge (or, indeed, it would
be false to assume that a given hallucination could have been veridical in the
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rst place).
This perhaps suggests that hallucinations do not provide us with epistemic
reasons, even if they sometimes seem to do so. But it does not prevent hal-
lucinations from making the formation of certain judgements reasonable when
the former are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding perceptions.
Judgements based on perception-like hallucinations cease to be reasonable rel-
ative to the subject's perspective only if the subject (rightly or wrongly) takes
them to be false or lacking proper grounding | for instance, in response to
recognising the underlying experiences as hallucinatory. The mere lack of truth
and entitlement, on the other hand, does not yet suce to undermine the rea-
sonableness of such judgements. Macbeth's experience might have failed to put
him in a position to acquire knowledge about the world or about his experience
and, in this sense, might have been epistemically defective (e.g., by violating
truth- or knowledge-related epistemic norms). But it still rendered it reason-
able for him to judge that he was seeing Banquo before him, as long as he
lacked evidence from the outside for the hallucinatory status of his experience.
And it still enabled him to make a claim to the reasonableness of his judge-
ment. Indeed, he would have been at fault and blameworthy (e.g., for being
rationally insensitive or akratic) if he would have failed to take his experience
at face value and to form the belief about Banquo's presence in response to it.15
27. How can disjunctivism about character | or experiential disjunctivism,
for that matter | explain that hallucinating something makes it reasonable for
the subject concerned to judge that we are perceiving when the hallucination
in question is subjectively indiscriminable from a comparable perception?
One natural answer is to say that this rational force just comes already
with being perception-like. That one of our experiences is subjectively in-
distinguishable from a perception means in part that, if we lack any opposing
evidence from the outside, we are inclined to take this experience to be reason-
providing (assuming that we are rational). Were we lacking this incliniation,
we would be able to subjectively tell the experience apart from a perception.
One fact in support of this conclusion is that the presence or absence of such
15See section 42 for a sketch of an intentionalist explanation of how hallucinations ren-
der certain beliefs reasonable in situations in which we are unaware of their hallucinatory
status, even if they do not enable us to satisfy truth- or knowledge-related norms (though
the explanation does not, for instance, address the problem of bootstrapping discussed in
Kolodny (2005)). If one | like McDowell (1998a) | prefers to count judgements and beliefs
as reasonable only if they conform to all epistemic norms (in addition to being formed in
the light of the evidence available), my subsequent considerations should be read as being
exclusively concerned with the partial reasonableness coming with the blameless formation
of a judgement in response to a perceptual experience, the perceptual status of which is not
under doubt. For the sake of simplicity, I do not mention any more in what follows this
potential partiality of the reasonableness of our reliance on perception-like hallucinations.
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an inclination is accessible from the inside, since we can discover by introspec-
tion which judgements our experiences move us to form (e.g., in response to
asking ourselves whether our experience provides us with a reason to believe).
The other fact in support is that perceptions do compel us to take them to be
reason-providing, as long as we are not aware of defeaters. That is, when we
perceive something, we are inclined to judge, not only that our experience is
a perception, but also that it provides us with certain epistemic reasons. We
can therefore discover that an experience is not a perception by introspecting
that it does not incline us to judge that it is reason-giving, despite of the lack
of any evidence from the outside concerning its non-perceptual status.
Now, in the light of the close link between rational force and our subjective
take on reason-provision spelled out above, it might be assumed that being
inclined to take an experience to be a reason-giving perception suces for it
being reasonable for us to rely on it in the formation of respective judgements
and beliefs. This assumption promises a direct route from subjective indistin-
guishability to sameness in rational force. The subjective indiscriminability
of a hallucination comes with the inclination to take it to be reason-giving,
which again is assumed to ensure the reasonableness of our reliance on the
hallucination when forming our beliefs.16 The assumption under considera-
tion should, however, be rejected since the reasonableness of relying on an
experience cannot simply be a matter of what that experience inclines us to
do.
One reason for this is that reasonableness is a normative feature, while
inclination is not. In particular, it is no option to introduce the idea of realia-
bility or conduciveness to truth, in the hope that this might be able to bridge
the gap between the descriptive and the normative. Granted, our judgements
in response to our perceptual experiences generally tend to be true because
the latter are normally perceptions. But disjunctivists about character main-
tain that perceptions and hallucinations form two distinct fundamental kinds
of experience, which do not share any relevant aspects of their essential char-
acter or structure. This means that the inclinations coming with hallucinat-
ing something in a perception-like manner are completely independent from
the inclinations coming with perceiving something. Hence, the latter's con-
nection to truth does not extend to the former. But while the reliability
or truth-conduciveness of perceptual experience is limited to perception, the
reasonableness of relying on experience pertains also to perception-like hallu-
cinations.
16See Martin (2004): 66., for a similar proposal. Again, this line of thought is compatible
with the idea that perception-like hallucinations cannot gure as grounds of knowledge (Mc-
Dowell (1998a)). Rendering the formation of a certain perceptual or introspective judgement
reasonable relative to the subjective take on reasons is distinct from putting the subject into
the position to acquire the related piece of perceptual or introspective knowledge.
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The other reason for rejecting the assumption that inclination is sucient
for reasonableness is that being inclined to form a certain belief if prompted
does not amount to forming or having that belief. More specically, that an
experience inclines us to take it to be a reason-giving perception does not
imply that we actually take it to be so. Part of the explanation of this is
that the kind of inclinations at issue depend solely on the occurrence of the
experiences in question and our possession of the relevant concepts; and no
belief is required or involved. As a consequence, the impossibility to distin-
guish a hallucination from reason-giving perceptions does not amount to the
positive recognition of the hallucination as reason-giving. Our unavoidable ig-
norance cannot so easily be turned into knowledge.17 But this is problematic
since | as observed above | it is reasonable for us to rely on a given experi-
ence just in case we take the experience to be reason-providing. Accordingly,
the rational force of experiences is linked to our actual take on them | and
not on the take on them which we would develop if prompted in a suitable way.
28. So, perhaps, the reasonableness of our reliance on our perception-like hal-
lucinations is not due to their subjective indiscriminability from perceptions,
but instead to the fact that we actually take them to be reason-providing. The
suggestion cannot be that what makes it reasonable for us to trust a given hal-
lucination is our judgement (or belief) that it is a reason-giving perception.
There is no need for us to gather respective evidence from the outside to come
to judge in a reasonable manner that one of our experiences is a perception
and, hence, provides us with epistemic reasons. Forming this judgement from
the inside, however, is precisely what is at issue. We are concerned with the
question of what renders our introspective judgement that our experience is a
reason-giving perception reasonable. Hence, this judgement cannot contribute
to the rational force of perception-like hallucinations.
Hence, the thought should rather be that we take perception-like halluci-
nations to be reason-giving by recognising their subjective indiscriminability
from corresponding perceptions. Experiential disjunctivism maintains that
perceptions provide us with reasons for belief mainly because they acquaint us
with aspects of the world, or make them manifest to us.18 Since this relational
aspect of perceptions constitutes part of their character, it is subjectively ac-
17A similar general thought is central to Siegel's observation that some instance of un-
knowability | namely the subjective indistinguishability of a hallucination from a perception
of, say, a sausage | does not suce to ground some instance of knowability | namely the
fact that we can come to know, from the inside, that the hallucination in question is not a
perception of something else, say, a pyramid (cf. Siegel (2008): 218.).
18See Martin (2002b) and Nudds (2010). See also McDowellMind for a very similar epis-
temic claim in the context of a slightly dierent form of disjunctivism about perceptual
experiences.
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cessible to us. So we may perhaps be said to recognise the reason-giving
power of our perceptions by becoming aware of their distinctive relationality
and, hence, of their perceptual status. Perception-like hallucinations | the
thought continues | possess the same rational force because they are sub-
jectively indistinguishable from corresponding reason-giving perceptions (and
because the latter enjoy priority over the former). Accordingly, it may be
claimed that we take such hallucinations to be reason-proiding because we
recognise them to be indiscriminable from perceptions. However, it is doubt-
ful that this type of ignorance is very often subjectively accessible to us (if at
all). For acquiring knowledge of it requires taking into account the possible
cases of other | and more rational and attentive | human subjects being
in our current mental situation. Moreover, even if we could in principle come
to know about our own necessary ignorance, this would presumably involve a
considerable amount of theoretical reection (such as engaging with Martin's
writings on the subjective indistinguishability of hallucinations). But relying
on hallucinations satisfying (S) | just as relying on perceptions | is far from
being intellectually demanding in this way.
29. This leaves experiential disjunctivism perhaps with the option to identify a
more basic feature of perception-like hallucinations, which is responsible both
for their satisfaction of (S) and their possession of the same rational force as
the corresponding perceptions. But such a feature is dicult to nd. The
hallucinations in question are not in any interesting way linked to the external
world. They need not share among each other, or with the corresponding
perceptions, any relevant aspect of their causal origins. And neither their
links to the world, nor their causal origins are accessible from the inside; so
our awareness of them cannot ground our subjective knowledge of the rational
force of the hallucinations concerned.
The best candidate for the third feature would probably be a character
determinable shared by all hallucinations which satisfy (S). But experiential
disjunctivists remain silent about the character determinables of those hallu-
cinations | and for good reasons. One motivation for | and advantage of |
their view has been to assume that there need not be such a common character
determinable, and that nothing more can be said about the hallucinations at
issue, other than that they are subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions,
but lack the relationality of the latter (cf. Martin (2004, 2006)). However, if no
third feature can be identied, experiential disjunctivism cannot explain why
hallucinations, which are subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions, share
their rational force with the latter. The view might outweigh this shortcoming
by its power to account for other aspects of perceptual experiences. But it may
be equally benecial to look for an alternative theory which can elucidate the
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sameness of rational force, while perhaps not being less explanatorily powerful
in other respects (cf. chapters 8 and 13 for more discussion).
The Challenges of Consciousness and of Rational Force
30. Before moving on to the presentation and discussion of such an alternative
view, I would like to outline two other challenges to experiential disjunctivism
and, thus, indirectly also to disjunctivism about character. So far, the ob-
jection has been primarily that experiential disjunctivism cannot account for
a certain fact about perception-like hallucinations. But there are also some
doubts about whether it can satisfactorily illuminate two central features of
perceptions, namely their conscious status and their rational force (as well as,
relatedly, their power to provide epistemic reasons).
According to experiential disjunctivism, the essence of perceptions consists
primarily in their property of relating us to mind-independent objects or facts.
However, there are many relations between subjects and the world which do
not give rise to conscious states with rational powers. This is why experiential
disjunctivism takes the relation in question to be a special kind of relation |
a relation of awareness, or of acquaintance, by means of which aspects of the
world become manifest to us. But even if it is granted that there is such a
relation, and that its power to give us awareness of aspects of the world is a
primitive feature of our conscious minds, two questions remain.19
The rst concerns the issue of how the relation of awareness can have both
the power to make us aware of the world and the power of make us aware of
our mind. When seeing a green tree, we are not only conscious of the tree, but
also of our experience of it | notably of how we are of the tree (e.g., whether
we see, remember or imagine it). Indeed, this is part of what it means that our
experience of the tree is a conscious experience with a subjective character.
The question is how these two types or aspects of awareness are linked to each
other, and why they occur together. Perhaps the fact that our experiences of
the world are conscious is a primitive aspect of our minds, too. But even so,
it can be no accident that awareness of the world and awareness of the mind
come together. In other words, it can be no accident that the two capacities
of the relation of acquaintance are compatible with each other and, indeed,
co-exist. And this fact needs explaining, even if it is accepted that each of the
powers on its own need | or can | not be elucidated much further.20
19One question here is whether conscious presentation can be such as not to allow for
error, as proponents of the idea of relational awareness are claiming. In particular, it is
unclear how a presentation can get it `right' (e.g., count as `veridical' or a `good case' (cf.
Martin (2006)), if it could not go `wrong' in any way (cf. Dretske (1986).
20This challenge does not arise for views which maintain that we are aware only of external
objects, but not of how we are aware of them, or of any other aspect of our experiences
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The second question problematises the fact that experiential disjunctivism
has to identify the obtaining relation of awareness as the source of percep-
tual reasons and the resulting rational force of perceptions. It asks how this
is compatible with the fact that it is not intellectually demanding to come
to recognise perceptions | say, when comparing them with their imaginative
counterparts | as reason-giving and, hence, as having the power to render cer-
tain judgements and beliefs reasonable (in the absence of relevant defeaters).
For the experiential disjunctivist, what gives perceptions their rational force
is, ultimately, the fact that they put us into conscious contact with the world.
Hence, becoming aware of the rational force of perceptions requires becoming
aware of their property of establishing a relation of awareness between us and
the world. The question is then how the disjunctivist position can ensure that
we are able to recognise the relationality of our perceptions and its rational rel-
evance with relative ease. It is not obvious how being acquainted with objects
or facts in the world can account for the easy availability of our knowledge that
perceptions provide us with reasons and therefore have the power to render
certain judgements and beliefs reasonable.21
VI. Meeting the Challenge of Introspective Error
31. In the light of the diculties and questions which disjunctivism about
character | and, notably, experiential disjunctivism about perceptual expe-
riences | face, it seems worthwhile to look at conjunctivism about character
as a viable alternative. Of course, any account of perceptual experiences and
their character | whether disjunctivist or conjunctivist | should be able to
satisfactorily address the three challenges raised in the last sections. But while
it is indeed unclear how disjunctivism about character might be able to achieve
this, I aim to show that conjunctivism about characters has no problems with
this task | as well as with meeting the other three challenges described even
earlier.
Conjunctivism about character states that the hallucinations satisfying (S)
share their character with the corresponding perceptions. Perhaps it is possible
to identify a character determinable common to both kinds of experience which
explains their shared rational force. And perhaps reference to this character
(cf., e.g., Tye (1995) and Dretske (1995)). But these views are perhaps to be rejected on
indepenent grounds.
21One issue here is, of course, how our recognition of the relationality of perceptions
ts together with the observation that attending to our experience just leads to attending
to their external objects (cf. Evans (1982) and Martin (2000b)). I propose a solution to
this problem, which is compatible with experiential intentionalism, in chapter 2. The central
thought is that perceptual experiences are given to us as relational by means of our awareness
of the external objects involved as the determinants of our experiences.
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determinable can also help us to elucidate in which sense perceptual experi-
ences count as conscious, and how they are able to provide us with reasons.22
According to conjunctivism about character, the hallucination and the cor-
responding perceptions satisfy (I) because they share their character. As al-
ready noted above, this means that, in nding the two introspectively indis-
criminable, we correctly recognise their sameness in character; and the error
in judging the hallucinations to be perceptions cannot be an error due to a
specically introspective failure or limitation. Instead, the error has to occur
either before or after introspection.
32. One way to spell out the latter option is to say that the error is inferential
in nature. The idea may be that we inferentially judge perceptual experiences
(whether they are perceptual or hallucinatory) to be perceptions on the ba-
sis of introspectively judging them to be perceptual experiences, plus some
ancillary belief | such as the belief that perceptual experiences are normally
perceptions, or that we have good reason to take them to be perceptions in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Or, alternatively, the introspective judge-
ment may be that it seems that we are perceiving; and, from that, we conclude
that we are perceiving on the basis of the belief that what is introspectively
judged as seeming to be the case is typically the case.
Both views t very well with the fact that, once we become aware of ev-
idence for its hallucinatory status, we stop taking a given experience to be
perceptual.23 But their main problem is that they cannot easily accommodate
the immediacy with which we often come to judge that we are perceiving.
When challenged about his unusual words and behaviour, Macbeth did not
have to engage in any form of reasoning in order to be able to reply that he
had seen Banquo.
It might be suggested that Macbeth had learned to automatise or inter-
nalise such inferences in some way or another. The thought is that, while the
justication for his judgements about the perceptual character of his experi-
ence was still inferential, he was able to form that warranted judgement with-
out having to engage in any conscious inference. However, if further pressed,
22Again, I ignore any middle position according to which hallucinations share such a
character determinable with the corresponding perceptions, without thereby sharing the
whole character of the latter.
23The second view, which assumes that we introspectively judge that it seems as if we
are perceiving, naturally combines with the idea of a preceding experiential or intellectual
seeming (e.g., an intuition) that we are perceiving. However, this latter idea introduces
the error involved in taking perception-like hallucinations to be perceptions already at a
pre-introspective level and therefore cannot be adopted by someone trying to capture this
error in purely inferential terms. It is therefore more plausible to prefer talk of introspective
judgements about having a perceptual experience over talk of introspective judgements about
it seeming that one has a perception.
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Macbeth would not have provided such an inferential justication, but instead
continued to simply point to the perceptual status of his experience. Indeed,
Macbeth's conduct would have looked strange (or, rather, even stranger than
it already did) if he would have answered that he had a visual experience as
if of Banquo, and that his experiences are normally perceptions. He very well
realised that the others were believing that there was no Banquo to be seen.
And this deeply worried and unsettled him and let him question his own sanity.
None the less, he kept on insisting that he had seen Banquo (as illustrated,
say, by the piece of dialogue quoted at the beginning). If his judgement would
have been inferentially justied, he would probably have dismissed it in the
light of the testimony of the others. But this was not what was happening.
33. If the error in taking perception-like hallucinations to be perceptions is
neither introspective, nor inferential, it has to be non-judgemental and occur
at a prior level of awareness. It is natural to identify this prior level of aware-
ness with conscious awareness which comes with having conscious experiences
and occurs prior to, and independently of, introspective awareness of those
experiences.
Consciousness comes with subjectivity. When we are conscious, things are
given to us as conscious subjects. That is, we are consciously aware of them
from our subjective perspective. But things can be consciously given in two
dierent ways. Certain things | namely episodes in the stream of conscious-
ness | are present in (or to) consciousness. That is, they are determinations
of consciousness, and we consciously experience them while being in them.
By contrast, other things | such as aspects of the external world or, indeed,
our mental episodes | are presented to us as being a certain way. A rose
may appear to be long and red; and the respective mental image of the rose
may seem to be actively produced, or instead to have occurred unbidden. We
are conscious of these entities and experience them as being a certain way.24
Many mental episodes involve both forms of conscious awareness. But there
are perhaps some which are only present in consciousness and do not come
with the presentation of something as being a certain way. This may be, for
instance, what is happening when we are consciously enjoying a feeling of ennui
or anxiety, or are undergoing an experience of vertigo.
The character of mental episodes is in fact identical with how they are
present in, or determines, consciousness. To be present in consciousness just
24See chapter 5 for a discussion of our experience of mental images and thoughts as active
or passive. The distinction between the two ways in which things may be given to con-
sciousness may also be cashed out in terms of `experiencing something' versus `experiencing
something as being a certain way' | whereby `experiencing' is equivalent to the German
`erleben', and to be distinguished from the more narrow notion of `experiencing something
perceptually or sensorily'.
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means to be conscious and to have a character. It is perhaps worthwhile to
point out here that talk of what a mental episode `is like' may be understood
in at least two dierent ways. On the one hand, it can be interpreted meta-
physically, as denoting the nature of the episode (leaving it open whether this
nature is rst- or third-personally accessible). On the other hand, the phrase
can be understood epistemically, as denoting how we consciously experience
the episode. The character of mental episodes combines both elements: it is
part of their nature and consists in how they seem to the subject in the sense
of being present in, or a determination of, consciousness. As a result, there
is no distinction between how the character of a mental episode is and how it
experientially seems (cf. Husserl (1996)). By contrast, it is certainly possible
that how an episode is intentionally presented to us as being | whether in
experience or in introspection | does not match how it really is.
34. The suggestion is now that hallucinatory experiences are presented to
consciousness as being a certain way. More precisely, they are given to us as
being perceptions, that is, as relating us to some mind-independent objects
and their features in the manner characteristic of perceptions. And given
that they are not perceptions, our conscious awareness of them involves some
kind of error: there is a mismatch between how the experiences really are
and how they are presented to consciousness. The error concerned is one
about the underlying objective structure of the hallucinations: namely their
lack | rather than their possession | of the property of relating us to some
mind-independent entities. And the wrongness of the resulting introspective
judgement is merely a consequence of the error which occurs at the prior level
of conscious awareness.
It is perhaps worthwhile to stress that the proposed type of error is not an
error about the character of the hallucinations concerned. Indeed, this would
be impossible since it would mean that how these hallucinations are given to
us in consciousness is wrong about itself. For the character of experiences
| what we have so far specied as their most determinate introspectible fea-
ture | is identical with their presence in consciousness, that is, with what it
is like to consciously experience them. Having a character just means being
conscious, that is, being given to consciousness. And the character of an ex-
perience cannot present itself, let alone in a mistaken manner. The only types
of error possible are introspective error about the character of an experience,
and experiential (or rst-personal) error about its objective (or third-personal)
structure (cf. chapter 13). The proposal here is that the former is a result of
the latter.
This presupposes that we form the introspective judgement about the per-
ceptuality of the hallucinatory experiences in direct response to our conscious
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awareness of them: we judge them to be perceptions because they are given to
us in consciousness as perceptions, and because we introspect this feature of
theirs. In accordance with this, the property of being presented to conscious-
ness as relating us to mind-independent things or facts is to be understood as a
character determinable which is common to all hallucinations that satisfy (S).
But it is also shared by the corresponding perceptions, thus ensuring that the
two kinds of perceptual experience end up possessing the same character. For
perceptions are equally given to us as relations to mind-independent entities.
In this introspectibly accessible respect, perceptions and perception-like hallu-
cinations dier from sensory (or episodic) memories and sensory imaginings:
the latter are not given to consciousness as perceptions. If Macbeth would
have recalled or visualised Banquo as being at the banquet, instead of halluci-
nating him to be there, he would not have had the conscious impression of his
experience bringing him into direct contact with something that was present
before him independently of his actual experience of it.
VII. Experiential Intentionalism
35. So far, it remains unclear whether, or how, the new proposal can meet
the challenges to disjunctivism about character and experiential disjunctivism.
And it is also left open why the fact that hallucinations are given to us as per-
ceptions should count as involving an error, given that some kind of mismatch
between two facts does not automatically manifest a genuine mistake. Both
sets of issues can be resolved by understanding consciousness partly in inten-
tional terms. More specically, the presence of something to consciousness as
being a certain way | or its appearance to the conscious subject as being a
certain way | should be interpreted as a form of intentional awareness. The
resulting view is experiential intentionalism | the view that we are intention-
ally aware, not only of the world, but also of our own conscious experiences.25
36. The intentionality of conscious mental states consists minimally, and cen-
trally, in their subjection to some norm which requires the states to occur just
in case the world is in a certain state, or meets a certain condition.26 The
intentional content of the states | if one wants to introduce this notion at all
| can then be understood as being determined by the nature of the relevant
25See chapter 13 for a detailed discussion of the motivation and nature of the resulting
experiential intentionalism about perceptual experiences and their subjective character.
26Of course, there is more to intentionality | notably subjectivity. Intentional presen-
tation is always presentation to a subject, or a subjective perspective, and therefore to a
waking or dreaming conscious mind. The normative element then distinguishes intentional
from non-intentional consciousness, that is, something being presented to consciousness as
being a certain way from something merely being present in consciousness.
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truths about the world. The judgement that it rains, for instance, should oc-
cur only if it rains (and this is thinkable); and it should occur if the fact that
it rains is evident to the subject (e.g., when he sees that it rains). The norm
for perceptual experiences, on the other hand, consists in the requirement that
they should occur just in case they actually relate us | in the manner charac-
teristic of perceptions | to particular mind-independent objects with certain
perceivable features. Accordingly, the visual experience of a green tree is ade-
quate just in case it relates us in the right way to a certain visible green tree
before us.27
The intentionality of perceptual experiences is therefore directed both at
the world and at the experiences themselves. In particular, the specic con-
dition on the world, which is characteristic of the norm governing perceptual
experiences (and which determines their intentional content), concerns not
only how certain external entities are like independently of the particular sub-
ject and experience concerned, but also how these entities are linked to that
subject and experience. This is further reected in the fact that consciously
enjoying a perceptual experience enables us to demonstratively refer, not only
to aspects of the mind-independent world, but also to the mental experience
itself. And it is in this sense that the intentionality of perceptual experiences
may be said to be self-presentational or token-reexive (despite, perhaps, not
necessarily involving or requiring any conceptual capacities). Indeed, their
self-directed intentionality is identical with their property of being given to us
| and, indeed, to themselves | as perceptions. The resulting error in the
case of hallucinations is therefore intentional and self-presentational in nature.
It consists in their violation of the norm constitutive of their intentionality
| and intentionality which is self-directed and shared with the corresponding
perceptions.
37. This raises the question of why perceptual experiences | and, especially,
perception-like hallucinations | are given to consciousness as perceptions. I
discuss this issue in more detail further below (as well as in chapter 8), but
it may already be helpful to provide a sketch of the answer to be presented
later on (cf. section 42). One of its central claims is that perceptions are in-
tentionally given to consciousness as relations because they are relations, and
because it is of epistemic | and, ultimately, also practical | importance for
us to become aware of their relationality. Similarly, it is of value for us that
hallucinations are consciously marked as hallucinatory. Perception-like hallu-
27Perhaps not all attitudinal and presentational dierences among intentional states can
be captured in terms of normative dierences. But this approach may promise to go a long
way. For example, it may be plausible to say that desires should occur only if something is
valuable, instances of visualising only if something is visible, and imaginative thoughts only
if something is possible or, perhaps more generally, thinkable.
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cinations | which may occur for a variety of reasons | are worse than their
non-perceptual counterparts because they disguise themselves as perceptions.
They should not occur because their misleading character is counter-productive
with respect to our epistemic and practical aims. Indeed, they are accidents;
and not much of interest can be said about why it is possible for experiences,
which satisfy (S) despite not being perceptions, to occur. This is part of what
it means that perceptions enjoy priority over their hallucinatory counterparts.
38. Two further qualications may help to forestall potential objections. First,
the normativity at issue need not be very strong. That is, it need not put any
demands on the subject and his rationality. Accordingly, that certain mental
states should occur just in case certain things are true of the world need not
mean more than that it is better for the states to occur under those condition
than to occur under all other conditions. This allows for the possibility, for
instance, that the intentionality of perceptual experiences may be partially
accounted for in terms of some more basic cognitive function which they have
in our mental lives. However, second, intentionality is not the same as |
and may not be reducible to | representationality, if the latter is understood
as the possession of some teleological function concerning, or the presence of
some nomological correlation with, the world. Representational states need
not be conscious. By contrast, intentionality is inseparably linked to con-
sciousness and subjectivity. This is the main point behind taking the presence
of something to consciousness as being a certain way to consist in intentional
awareness of it as being that way.
Meeting the Challenge of Consciousness
39. One of the challenges raised above against experiential disjunctivism was
that assuming a relation of awareness does not shed enough light on how
experiences makes us aware, not only of the world, but also of itself, and
on why the two are so intimately linked. Treating perceptual experiences as
token-reexively intentional states may do a bit better on this count.
The twofold character of the intentionality of perceptual experiences corre-
sponds to two ways in which we can become consciously aware of | and pay
attention to | something while enjoying such an experience. On the one hand,
we can become perceptually aware of something | typically some physical en-
tities in the external world. Such awareness is not only sensory in character,
but it also allows for the possibility of focal attention to the mind-independent
objects of awareness. On the other hand, we can become experientially (or
phenomenally) aware of something | this time of our mental episodes them-
selves. This kind of awareness is not sensory and does not involve the episodes
as objects of awareness and of focal attention. Indeed, any attempts to attend
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to conscious experiences as objects inevitably give way to attempts to attend
to the perceptually conscious external entities (cf. Martin (2000b)).
40. What we are concerned with here is the special transparency of percep-
tual experiences. Having them consists in occupying a certain subjective and
conscious perspective on external objects and features. But this perspective
is not itself presented to us as being a certain way. We do not see our own
point of view. Rather, this perspective is present to consciousness only in so
far as it is the perspective from which other entities are presented to us as
being a certain way. This is reected, for instance, in the fact that perceptions
inform us about one object being to the left of another relative to our point of
view without explicitly presenting that point of view and its location in space.
Instead, they simply present the one object as being left to the other, while
our perspective on them enters consciousness just implicitly, as part of how
the spatial relationship between the two objects is given to us.28 Similarly,
perceptual experiences as a whole are not objects of awareness and attention,
but rather determinations of both. We experience them as relating us to ex-
ternal objects, but we do not experience both relata in the same way. While
the external object of awareness are given to us as being a certain way, the ex-
periences are given to us as determinate aspects of our subjective perspective
onto such objects.
The intentionality of perceptual experiences is characterised by the fact
that it combines the two noted ways of becoming consciously aware of things.
Given that the self-presentational part of this intentionality consists in the
experiential awareness of the episodes themselves, the intentional error under
discussion is experiential | and not perceptual, inferential or introspective |
in nature. But the two ways of becoming aware of things have also something
important in common, namely their intentional nature. Assuming that we
have a fairly good grasp of how intentionality works, we are able to provide an
answer to the question of how | or in which sense | we become conscious of
our own perceptual experiences: they are intentionally directed at themselves
and, in this way, present themselves to us.
41. Does this mean that the conscious status of experiences is a matter of their
being the object of some intentional awareness? This would come dangerously
close to higher-order accounts of consciousness and would in addition render
the view vulnerable to objections against the thesis that mental states are
conscious by being objects of awareness (cf. Martin (1997b) for such an objec-
tion). But experiential intentionalists need not accept this conclusion. On the
one hand, intentional presentation | just as the relational presentation put
28I discuss this feature of perceptual experiences in more detail in chapter 8.
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forward by experiential disjunctivism | may simply be taken to presuppose a
conscious subject or mind to which things are presented. So while the intro-
duction of intentionality | or acquaintance | is meant to explain how we are
linked to the objects of our awareness, it is not intended to shed light on what
it means for a subject, or one of its mental episodes, to count as conscious.
On the other hand, experiential intentionalism assumes that, in experiential
awareness, the mental episodes do not become objects of awareness, but in-
stead are determinations of awareness. That is, while they help us to become
aware of external objects as objects, they do not present themselves as objects,
but are instead given as subjective parts or aspects of consciousness (see the
two previous sections). Accordingly, intentional awareness need not always, or
not entirely, be object awareness | even in the case of visual experiences.
Meeting the Challenge of Rational Force
42. The second challenge was to account for the capacity of perceptions to
render certain judgements and beliefs reasonable. The intentionalist approach
explains this power in terms of the normative intentionality pertaining to per-
ceptual experiences. Its account applies therefore not only to perceptions, but
also to perception-like hallucinations. The rational force of the latter is ac-
counted for in the same way, and at the same time, as that of the former. There
is no need | as with disjunctivism about character | to make the detour of
referring to the priority of the perceptions and the subjective indiscriminabil-
ity of the hallucinations to account for the rational force of the latter. But, as
will become clear shortly, the power of perception-like hallucinations to render
certain judgements reasonable is still in some sense derivative from the power
of the corresponding perceptions to render those judgements reasonable.
Perceptual experiences are intentional in so far as they are subject to the
requirement to occur only if they relate us, in the right way, to some perceivable
and mind-independent aspects of the world. The normative status of this
requirement is due | or at least inseparably linked | to the fact that it is
of value for perceptual experiences to establish the required relations between
us and the world, and of disvalue for them to fail to do so. The value of
those perceptual relations derives from the fact that they put us into the
position to acquire knowledge about the world, as well as about the respective
experiences themselves (cf. Burge (2003) and Haddock et al. (2009) for similar
ideas). When we are having perceptual experiences, both the world and the
experiences appear to be certain ways. And when we are actually perceiving,
taking these appearances at face value will lead to knowledge about the world
and the experiences.
Now, perceptual experiences are presented to consciousness as being rela-
tional (cf. endnote 21). That is, they are given to us as possessing precisely
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that feature which renders them valuable with respect to the attainment of
knowledge. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is therefore reason-
able for us to trust them and to form the respective rst- and higher-order
judgements or beliefs | even if the result will not be knowledge. Hence, what
is responsible for the rational force of perceptual experiences is the fact that
they are intentional | that is, appear to satisfy a certain norm. And which
judgements or beliefs they render reasonable is determined by which particu-
lar norm they purport to satisfy (or, if one prefers, which specic intentional
content they possess).29
The rational force of our reliance on perceptual experiences is thus a matter
of their intentionality; while their status as grounds of knowledge depends on
their actual structure. The two epistemic aspects are intimately linked in so
far as their intentionality partly concerns their structure. But only in the case
of perceptions does the rational force correspond to their power to put us into
a position to acquire knowledge. Hallucinations, by contrast, lack the latter
power since they are not relational in the required manner; and their rational
force is not matched by a capacity to ground knowledge. So there is still a
sense in which perception-like hallucinations derive their rational force from
perceptions. Perceptions possess their intentional character and, hence, their
rational force (and reason-giving power) because this reects their intimate
link to knowledge and renders it subjectively accessible to us. Hallucinations
that satisfy (S), on the other hand, are mere accidents deviating from the
perceptual norm: they loose the value of being grounds for knowledge, but
keep the rational force of perceptions by remaining subject to the relevant
intentional norm.30
Meeting the Challenge of Rational Sameness
43. The third and main challenge for disjunctivism about character was to ac-
count for the fact that perception-like hallucinations share their rational force
with the corresponding perceptions. What is to be explained is thus that, in
situations in which we lack relevant evidence from the outside, a hallucina-
tion makes the same judgements reasonable as the respective corresponding
perceptions when it satises (S). The intentionalist strategy for answering this
challenge should be clear by now. Again, the central thought is that the ratio-
29Again, these considerations stay neutral on the issue of whether hallucinations may
provide us with reasons, or merely seem to do so. Correspondingly, they stay neutral on
whether perceptual reasons consist in the relevant aspects of the world and our relation to
them or, alternatively, in our fallible awareness of those aspects and our relation to them.
30In chapter 8, I discuss another sense in which perceptions enjoy priority over perception-
like hallucinations: the latter possess a specically perceptual character, that is, a character
which is characteristic of the former; and not vice versa.
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nal force of perceptual experiences derives from their intentionality. Accord-
ingly, two such experiences share their rational force just in case, and because,
they share the same specic intentionality | that is, are subject to the same
specic norm. In short, sameness in rational power comes with sameness in
intentionality. Given that their shared intentionality is independent of whether
we have any evidence from the outside about their perceptual or hallucinatory
status, we can safely ignore what happens if such evidence becomes available.
Now, according to conjunctivism about character, a hallucination is indis-
criminable from the inside from corresponding perceptions just in case, and
because, it possesses the same character as the latter. Given that sameness
in character presupposes sameness in intentionality, it follows that, if a hal-
lucination is subjectively like certain perceptions, then it also possesses the
same rational force as the latter. On the other hand, a hallucination pos-
sesses the same rational force as certain corresponding perceptions only if it
also shares the latter's intentionality | including the appearance of relating
us perceptually to the world. And there is no other character determinable in
respect of which the hallucination might dier from the perceptions at issue.
For instance, if the hallucination involves blur, and blur is not a matter of
intentionality, there will be a comparison class of possible corresponding per-
ceptions which equally involve blur; and so for any other potential character
dierences between hallucinations and perceptions, that share the same inten-
tionality. Accordingly, for such experiences, sameness in intentionality comes
with sameness in character and, hence, with indiscriminability from the inside.
VIII. The Experiential Indiscriminability of Hallucina-
tions
44. The kind of subjective indistinguishability at issue is not merely introspec-
tive in nature: it occurs already at the level of experiential awareness. That
is, access from the inside is characterised by the fact that it does not involve
perception, testimony, inference based on either, or any combination thereof.
But introspective awareness is not the only form of access which satises this
condition. Experiential awareness | how mental episodes are given to con-
sciousness | is another one. While the former provides us with access to the
character of independently occurring mental episodes, the latter is already in-
herent to having such episodes. Now, perceptual experiences are given to us as
relations to the world, that is, as possessing a certain third-personal structure.
However, this awareness is misleading in the case of the hallucinatory expe-
riences, given that they do not actually possess this structure. Accordingly,
each of the hallucinations can be taken to be subjectively indiscriminable from
perceptions in the sense of satisfying the following specication of (S):
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(E) None of us could, in experiential awareness, recognise its structure to
be distinct from the structure shared by each member of some class of
corresponding perceptions.
All perceptions satisfy (E) trivially because there is no distinct structure to be
noticed in their case. And hallucinations satisfy (E) just in case, and because,
they possess the same intentionality and therefore | as has been argued above
| the same character as the perceptions concerned. Mental episodes, which
satisfy (E), also satisfy (I). For if an experience possesses the same character
as a perception, it is introspectively indistinguishable from it. Assuming that
experiential and introspective awareness exhaust the possibilities in which we
can access something from the inside, experiential indiscriminability implies
not only introspective, but also subjective indiscriminability. Moreover, given
that subjective indiscriminability requires both experiential and introspective
indiscriminability, it turns out that an experience satises (E) just in case it
satises (S).
But, importantly, the same does not hold with respect to (I) and (S). The
reason for this is that the relationship between the introspective and the ex-
periential indiscriminability of hallucinations (as well as of other experiences)
may be asymmetric. For while experiential indistinguishability entails intro-
spective indistinguishability, the opposite is not necessarily true. Following
disjunctivists about character in their assumption that we cannot always tell
apart two distinct characters when introspecting them, it is possible that an
experience conforms to (I) without sharing its character with perceptions and,
hence, without conforming to (E). There is a dierence in how the episodes
concerned are given to consciousness, and we consciously experience this dif-
ference, even though we cannot pick up on it in introspection | for instance,
because we lack the required conceptual capacities. A similar gap between ex-
perience and introspection is present in other cases, too. We may, for example,
start to be in and consciously experience pain, while continuing to judge or
believe that we do not feel any pain. Such a case may indicate some psycho-
logical problem or pathology, but there does not seem to be any good reason
to deny its possibility (cf. chapter 13 for a more detailed discussion).
Meeting the Challenge of Subjective Impact
45. This raises again the question of whether experiences, which satisfy (I),
but not (E) and (S), should count as perceptual or not | a question which
relates back to the rst challenge against conjunctivism about character pre-
sented above. Disjunctivists about perceptual experiences answer positively
since they take the introspective indiscriminability from perceptions to be nec-
essary and sucient for being a perceptual experience. Indeed, they are likely
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to equate subjective indistinguishability with introspective indiscriminability,
and thus to deny | or, rather, ignore | the distinct existence of experiential
indiscriminability. Experiential intentionalists, on the other hand, give a neg-
ative answer since they take the possession of a perceptual character to be the
distinctive mark of a perceptual experience, which is lacking in the example
case. As a consequence, they accept that there are in fact two ways in which
experiences can be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions; and that
these two ways need not necessarily coincide.
The challenge raised against views of the latter kind has been to ensure
that the features responsible for counting as a perceptual experience make a
dierence for the subject. And its prospects of success have been doubted in
response to the possible case under consideration, which shows that the absence
of a perceptual character cannot always be introspectively detected from the
inside. But the shift of focus from introspective to experiential awareness
enables experiential intentionalism to answer this challenges, without having
to deny the noted fallibility of introspection.
Remember the distinction between something being present in conscious-
ness and something being presented to consciousness as being a certain way
(cf. section 33). As I have argued, the latter is best understood in intentional
terms. And there are dierent ways in which something can be intentionally
given to us as being a certain way | notably in a perceptual or in an experi-
ential way. But perceptual (and other) experiences do not simply present us
with themselves or external objects as being a certain way (e.g., as having a
relational structure, or as being red). They are also present in consciousness
as one of its episodic determinations and, in this sense, make a dierence for
the subject and his or her stream of consciousness.
Experiential intentionalism can therefore respond to the challenge by point-
ing out that a dierence in character between two experiences constitutes a
dierence in how they determine consciousness, that is, in how we experience
them. And this remains true even if we cannot tell them apart in introspection.
If the dierence in character is not open to introspection, its discovery requires
substantial theoretical reection which may very well go beyond introspective
reection. But this just illustrates that phenomenology, although being con-
cerned with our subjective perspective and with how things are given to it,
cannot always be pursued exclusively from the inside (cf. Husserl (1984)).
Moreover, presence in consciousness | that is, our conscious experience of
mental episodes | may be understood as a non-intentional instance of ex-
periential awareness. For both are characterised by the fact that they are
not instances of object awareness. They consist in the awareness of mental
episodes, but do not present them as objects and do not allow us to focally
attend to them (in contrast to any external entities that they present us with).
338
Chapter 11 Experience and Introspection
46. Apart from saving conjunctivism about character from the objection raised
by their disjunctivist opponents, there is some independent reason to accept the
distinction between experiential and introspective awareness and to prefer the
former over the latter when considering the issue of why an experience counts
as perceptual. The subjective perspective matters only because experiences are
essentially conscious. Capturing their nature therefore means capturing how
they are linked to consciousness. However, on the assumption that higher-
order accounts of consciousness are to be rejected, there is no good reason
to posit any signicant connection between consciousness and introspection
| or introspectability, for that matter. It is true that what introspection
provides us with direct access to is the character of an experience. But if
higher-order accounts of consciousness are indeed inadequate, the presence
of an experience in consciousness cannot be a matter of how it is, or can
be, introspected. In particular, it should not be doubted that there may be
beings which enjoy conscious experiences, but lack introspective capacities.31
Consequently, perceptual (and other) experiences should be characterised in
terms of how they determine consciousness | that is, of how they are given
to the subject in non-intentional and non-introspective experiential awareness.
This is why mental episodes which satisfy (I), but not (P), should not count
as perceptual experiences.
Meeting the Phenomenological Challenge
47. Another important point is that the proposed intentionalist version of
conjunctivism about character | in contrast to many other instances of that
view | can save some of the central elements and advantages of experiential
disjunctivism.32 Among the main elements preserved is the idea that we have
introspective access to the relationality of perceptions. According to experien-
tial intentionalism, we can introspect the character of perceptions. But part of
that character is constituted by the token-reexive intentionality directed at
the specic relationality of perceptions. Hence, we can introspect the fact that
perceptions present themselves as relations to the world. And this suces to
come to know that they indeed are such relations. It is true that this access
to their relationality is less direct than has been thought by experiential dis-
junctivists. But introspective access mediated by intentional awareness on the
31See Siegel (2008) who takes this to be another problem for experiential disjunctivism.
But see also Martin's reply to this objection in Martin (2006). Martin none the less accepts
the falsity of higher-order accounts of consciousness.
32See also chapter 8 for the related discussion of how experiential intentionalism can
provide an account of the transparency and non-neutrality of episodes of visualising, which
is very similar to that put forward by experiential disjunctivism.
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experiential level is still introspective access.
The fact that intentionalism can preserve this element of experiential dis-
junctivism allows it also to uphold our ordinary conception of perceptions as
genuinely and distinctively relating us to mind-independent entities. First of
all, it can explain why we are of this opinion by reference to the fact that per-
ceptions are given to us in consciousness as relational. In fact, given that expe-
riential disjunctivism has diculties to account for our conscious awareness of
the relationality of our perceptions (cf. section 30), experiential intentionalism
seems to fare better than its disjunctivist counterpart with respect to the eluci-
dation of why we have this specic conception of perceptions, and not another.
Then, the former can also match the latter's ability to avoid an error theory
about our ordinary views. The more straightforward option is simply to adopt
structural disjunctivism about perceptual experiences | the view that percep-
tions and hallucinations dier essentially in their third-personal structures (cf.
chapter 8). This permits the experiential intentionalist to embrace the ordi-
nary opinion that perceptions are essentially relational. A slightly revisionary
alternative is to argue that this opinion does not concern how perceptions are,
but how they are given to us in consciousness. Accordingly, what we ordinar-
ily assume to be essential to perceptions is that they present themselves as
relational, and not that they are relational.
IX. The Nature of Perceptual Experiences
48. In order to accommodate our common views about perceptual experi-
ences, both options take a certain stance on the nature of those experiences.
The specic commitments of experiential intentionalism on this issue depend
on the underlying conception of the relationship between the rst-personally
accessible character of experiences and their (also) third-personally accessible
structure.
To get clearer about why this conception matters, consider the contrast
with experiential disjunctivism. The latter's postulation of a relation of aware-
ness can be interpreted as an attempt to combine or reconcile the relationality
of perceptions with their character by identifying the former as the main (or
even sole) constituent of the latter. Furthermore, experiential disjunctivism
maintains that their relational character is essential to perceptions. But their
structure plays no role in the provided account of their nature, and the issue
of how character relates to structure does not become pressing. This is neatly
captured by Martin's focus on the `phenomenal nature' of perceptions (Martin
(2006): 14).
In comparison, experiential intentionalism takes the relationality of per-
ceptions to be part of their non-experiential structure | along with, say, their
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representationality or their functional role. The relation in question may be
understood in causal, informational or rational terms, for instance; and nat-
ural candidates for it are the relations of nomological dependence, reference,
object-dependence or reason-constitution. In particular, it is natural to as-
sume that perceptions but not hallucinations are relational in so far as their
power to provide us with reason for belief and put us into a position to ac-
quire knowledge constitutively depends on the perceived external facts. That
is, those facts and our perceptions of them instantiate the property of consti-
tuting an epistemic reason; and this property is relational in so far as neither
the facts, nor the perceptions could constitute a reason for us to believe on
their own. It is this relational aspect of the structure of perceptions which is
adequately reected by their character, and which hallucinations merely seem
to possess.
But the distinction between the character and the relationality of percep-
tions raises the issue of which of the two forms part of the nature of perceptions.
Part of this question is how character and relationality | or, more generally,
structure | are related to each other, given that the latter is not said to
be a constituent of the former. It is not easy to come up with a plausible
and illuminating view about the relationship between the rst-personal and
the third-personal aspects of our minds. And this diculty becomes manifest
when considering the possibilities for experiential intentionalists concerning
the identication of the nature of perceptual experiences.
49. A natural explanation of the fact that the satisfaction of (E) is both nec-
essary and sucient for being a perceptual experience is that the character
of such experiences | that is, what is responsible for their satisfaction of (E)
| either constitutes (and exhausts) their essence, or is entirely determined
by whatever constitutes their essence. This ts well with the more general
idea that consciousness is central to the nature of particular mental episodes:
they are not merely essentially conscious, but the specic ways in which they
are present in consciousness are also part of, or determined by, their nature.
However, there is still room for several dierent views about the nature of
perceptual experiences, each of which is compatible with experiential inten-
tionalism and with the idea that the character of an experience is essential to
it.
First, it is possible | as already suggested | to adopt structural disjunc-
tivism about perceptual experiences. Contrary to what might be thought, this
view can be combined with intentionalism. The resulting position claims that
perceptions and perception-like hallucinations possess dierent essences, de-
spite having the same character (cf. chapter 8). One way of spelling this out
is to maintain that the shared character of the two kinds of perceptual expe-
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rience is to be understood as being realised by dierent underlying structural
essences. The essence common to all perceptions is thereby identied with
their specic relationality. By contrast, it is left open which essence(s) hallu-
cinations possess, as well as whether they all possess the same nature | apart
from the restriction that their essence(s) should imply that they necessarily
lack the relationality distinctive of perceptions. One of the main problems of
this view is to explain how dierent relational and non-relational structures
can give rise to the same intentional character.
Second, it may instead be suggested that perceptions and perception-like
hallucinations possess the same nature, and that the latter consists in some as-
pects of their common third-personal structure | such as their representation-
ality or functional role. This view denies that the relationality of perceptions
is essential to them. As a consequence, it has the advantage that it is probably
easier to elucidate intentionality in terms of representation or function, rather
than in terms of a relational link to the world. But the close link between
intentionality and consciousness still remains largely unexplained, given that
representationality or functional role are not tied to consciousness in the same
way. And the view is also at odds with our ordinary conception of perceptions
as relational and therefore has to adopt an error theory in this respect.
Third, it might be assumed that the common nature of all perceptual ex-
periences is exhausted by their character and does not extend to the lower
structural level. This position could then be further supplemented with the
idea that, in the case of perceptions, their character is in some sense realised
by their relational structure; while leaving it to further investigations to dis-
cover the structural realiser(s) in the case of hallucinations. The resulting view
diers from the rst one only in so far as it limits the essence of perceptual
experiences to the level of character and does not include the underlying struc-
tural dierences. As a result, it still faces the diculty of having to make sense
of how both a relational and some non-relational structures can give rise to
(the same) intentionality. And, in addition, since the view does not take the
relationality of perceptions to be essential to them, it seems forced to embrace
a respective error theory about our ordinary opinions.
The second option may seem to be the least problematic. In particular, it
is arguable that all theories about perceptual experiences | including disjunc-
tivism | have to take our common view about perception-like hallucinations
to be erroneous, given that we judge them to be perceptions from our sub-
jective perspective. But perhaps, we should instead renounce the need | or
even the possibility | of being able to account for our rst-personal perspec-
tive on mental episodes in terms of our third-personal perspective on them.
There is, after all, a sense in which experiences are not accessible from the
outside: we can acquire knowledge about their character | what they are like
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as conscious episodes | only by experiencing or introspecting them. Indeed,
the main source of the problems for the rst and the third view outlined above
is our expectation of being able to explain the rst-personal character of per-
ceptual experiences in terms of their third-personal structure. Giving up this
expectation may perhaps lead to a more promising picture.33
In accordance with this, a fourth possible view claims that the essence
of perceptions contains two relatively independent elements: their intentional
character and their relational structure. This is not meant to deny that there
is some link between the two. For instance, the latter may still determine
part of the former by determining part of the intentionality involved. More
precisely, that perceptions relate us to the world, as well as which aspects of
the world they relate us to, may x the conditions on the world relative to the
satisfaction of which the perceptions should, or should not, occur. However,
that perceptions are conscious and intentional in the rst place need not be a
matter of their relationality. The connection between their character and their
relational structure may be intentional, and nothing more. If this is the case, a
complete and general account of the intentionality of perceptions should make
reference to more than their relationality. Perhaps it is possible to identify
other aspects of their common structure | and aspects which they share with
other types of mental episode | that are responsible for their conscious and
intentional status. But maybe the latter should instead be taken to be primi-
tive aspects of subjectivity | at least in the sense that they evade explanation
in terms of structural aspects and hence, explanation from a third-personal
point of view.
50. The rst and the fourth option have in common that they combine expe-
riential intentionalism with structural disjunctivism, and that they take both
the character and the structure of perceptual experiences to be essential to
them. They just dier in how they conceive of the relationship between char-
acter and structure | whether it is one of mere intentionality or also one
of realisation. The two proposed elements of the essence of perceptual experi-
ences correspond to our two perspectives onto them: while their third-personal
essence concerns how they are in objective reality, their rst-personal essence
concerns how they determine consciousness, that is, are given to the subjective
perspective. To say, from the rst-personal point of view, that an experience
possesses a certain character is therefore not to say, from the third-personal
point of view, that it possesses a certain structure.
One advantage of this separation of perspectives is that experiential inten-
tionalism | when combined with structural disjunctivism | can hold on to
the epistemic conception of hallucinations (cf. also chapter 2). From the third-
33See chapter 1 for a similar conclusion in the case of our experiences of colour similarities.
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personal stance, perception-like hallucinations lack the relationality distinctive
of perceptions, but may otherwise dier greatly in their structural essences.
From the rst-personal stance, they possess the same conscious character as
corresponding perceptions, that is, are experientially indiscriminable from the
latter. And nothing more positive may perhaps be said about what these hal-
lucinations have in common with each other, or with perceptions but not with
other mental episodes. None the less, the subjective perspective can still count
as being concerned with the metaphysics of perceptual experiences. Indeed,
the proposed view does not dier in this respect from experiential disjunc-
tivism, which, as noted above, focusses primarily | or even exclusively | on
the rst-personal nature of experiences.34
34Part of this material was presented in 2008 at the University of Crete in Rethymno
during the `Hallucination on Crete' conference, in 2009 at the University of Fribourg as
part of their research colloquium, and in 2009 at the University of Bremen during the
seventh conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy. I would like to thank
the respective audiences for their comments, in particular David Bain, Johannes Brandl,
Paul Coates, Tim Crane, Katalin Farkas, Martine Nida-Rumelin, Matthew Nudds, Howard
Robinson and Susanna Schellenberg. Special thanks are due to the two editors of this
volume, Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias, for all their work; to Mike Martin and
Matthew Soteriou for the many discussions; and nally to Gianfranco Soldati with whom
together I developed many of the ideas | and probably also introduced some of the errors |
present in this chapter and in chapter 13. Part of the research for this work was generously
funded | in the form of a Fellowship for Advanced Researchers | by the Swiss National









Written together with Gianfranco Soldati
The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the
past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always
propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether
propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-
articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are
conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
In this paper, we would like to render two ideas plausible and defend them
against certain objections that have been raised against them. The rst, per-
haps less controversial idea is that at least certain propositional mental states
| such as judgements, thoughts or felt desires | involve a particular kind
of consciousness, which has often been called phenomenal or qualitative con-
sciousness. The second and more important, since far more controversial, idea
is that propositions | and concepts as their constituents | possess distinct
and specic phenomenal characters, or qualia, in virtue of which they are
experienced dierently when entertained or held in thought.
Both claims, we shall see, have immediate consequences on our conception
of understanding and communication. Contrary to a widespread view, a view
which has its roots in the linguistic turn, we maintain that phenomenal quality
is constitutive of the understanding and grasping of meanings.
Phenomenal Consciousness and Propositional States
Franz Brentano (1924), and many authors after him (e.g., Block (1995); Rosen-
thal (1986, 1997); Carruthers (2000)), have noted that the notion of conscious-
ness is ambiguous. One particular contrast which they have drawn is that be-
tween the intentionality of mental states | our being conscious of and directed
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at objects (understood in a wide sense) | and their phenomenology | their
being phenomenally conscious to, or experienced by, us in a certain way.1
Assume that I judge that p: in which sense am I then conscious of p? To
judge that p is an intentional state: it is a mental state which is directed at
some object or another. If my judgement is directed at the proposition p, then
I am conscious of that proposition in the sense that I am intentionally directed
at it, by means of my judgement. But is this the only, or even the main way,
in which judgements or other mental states are conscious? What does it really
mean to be intentionally conscious of something? After all, it seems possible to
be unconsciously directed at something: we seem to be able to unconsciously
fear, or desire, something; and there may be beings with primitive intentional
states to which we might not want to ascribe consciousness. It therefore ap-
pears that fears and desires involve something else than mere intentionality
when we consciously experience them, and it seems at least possible that, like-
wise, judgements may possess this further form of consciousness, in addition
to their directedness at propositions.
To understand what kind of consciousness this additional feature of mental
states may be, consider the case of sensations, such as pain experiences. It is
usually (though not universally) accepted to speak of the phenomenal character
of such mental states; whereby the phenomenal character is typically taken to
consist in the way in which the respective states are experienced. For instance,
a person who is in a state of pain, has a certain feeling or experience: there is
a specic way of how it is, or feels like for her to be in pain.2 Experiences of
pain are phenomenally conscious in this particular sense. Sensory perceptions,
on the other hand, are phenomenally conscious in virtue of something being
presented to us in a specic way: when we see something, it appears to us in a
certain way.3 Thus, the letter M may be presented to the subject either as an
`M', or as a sigma turned onto its side; a certain depiction may seem at one
time to be of a duck, and at another to be of a rabbit; and the glass to my left
is experienced by me to be a certain way, while a patient with blindsight may
1Brentano, for instance, distinguishes between \primary" and \secondary" consciousness.
The former consists in the intentional directedness towards some object (understood in a
wide sense) and presupposes | but does not itself generate | the latter, which in contrast
is responsible for the mental act being conscious of itself in a particular way (cf. Brentano
(1924, 141.); Brentano (1968, 1-21)). It is a matter of debate how exactly Brentano de-
scribes and explains the \secondary" form of consciousness (cf. Bell (1990, 9.); Brandl
(9923)); but here, it suces to focus on the phenomenon he was getting at | that is,
phenomenal consciousness.
2Compare the common talk, introduced by Thomas Nagel, of \something it is like to
be..." (Nagel, 1974). Even a naturalist such as Carruthers adopts this way of speaking
(Carruthers, 2000, 13.).
3Again, this manner of speaking is accepted by philosophers of fundamentally dierent
opinions (cf. Carruthers (2000, 241); Siewert (1998, 86)).
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experience it very dierently, or not at all.
There are philosophers who are sceptical of the idea of phenomenal con-
sciousness (cf. Dennett (1988)). Much more common seems to be the attempt
to reduce phenomenal consciousness to other kind of consciousness (cf. Tye
(1995); Dretske (1995)). Here we will, however, not be concerned with the
project of reducing or eliminating phenomenal consciousness to other forms
of consciousness, but only with the following, more specic issues. First, as-
suming that phenomenal consciousness exists, is it reasonable to ascribe it to
mental states that have propositions as their content? And second, if this
turns out to be reasonable, do these states possess qualitative aspects that
are specic enough to distinguish them from other states that involve dierent
concepts and propositions? It is thereby important to note that a positive
answer to the rst question does not imply a positive one to the second. That
is, while one can remain sceptical with respect to the existence of very spe-
cic phenomenal characters of judgements and other propositional states, one
may nevertheless allow for them to be phenomenally conscious in virtue of a
broader qualitative character (e.g., one that all judgements share because of
their common attutide towards their respective propositions).
These questions arise since the scope of phenomenal consciousness is usually
restricted to a certain group of mental phenomena, mainly those of a sensory
nature, as discussed above. For, in contrast to sensations and perceptions,
many intentional states do not seem to involve phenomenal consciousness:
in particular mental dispositions or standing conditions, such as prejudices,
beliefs or desires. These states may manifest themselves in the shape of phe-
nomenally conscious experiences, feelings or thoughts. But it appears that
they need not do so (at least not during the whole, or even most of the, period
of their existence); and they do not seem to involve any phenomenal qualities
on their own, that is, in their non-manifest state, without the mediation of
phenomenally conscious experiences, feelings or thoughts.4
The rst question may be answered very briey. It concerns the issue of
whether judgements, manifest beliefs and similar occurrent thoughts are phe-
nomenally conscious, or whether they are rather more like mental dispositions
or unconscious states. To answer this question it should suce to take a look
at two of the features of the propositional states under consideration. First,
just like experiences and feelings, they seem to be part of what has been called
the \stream of consciousness": they occur in our minds and disappear again,
4This has led philosophers (e.g., Wittgenstein) to distinguish between mental episodes
| that is, mental states which are phenomenally conscious, such as perceptions, sensations,
feelings and, presumably, judgements or thoughts | and mental dispositions, or standing
conditions | that is, mental states which are not phenomenally conscious, such as beliefs,
desires, prejudices or emotions. According to this distinction, the latter become phenome-
nally consious only if they manifest themselves by means of the former.
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and they alternate with, or accompany, sensations, perceptions and feelings.
Second, they can be introspected; in particular, we can tell when they occur in
our mind and of what kind they are. In respect to both features judgements
and similar propositional states dier strictly from mental dispositions; and
both features strongly suggest that the former are phenomenally conscious.
On the one hand, \stream of consciousness" appears to be only a dierent
name for what people have in mind when they speak of \phenomenal con-
sciousness": for a mental state to occur in the mind simply means for it to be
phenomenally conscious. And on the other hand, it seems widely accepted that
the features of mental states that we can introspect are | if not exclusively,
then at least primarily | their phenomenal ones. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that the propositional states in question are themselves experienced:
there is something it is, or feels, like to be in or have them; or they present
things as appearing in a certain way. Indeed, it seems plausible to maintain
that judgements and other occurrent thoughts play a role in the manifesta-
tion of mental dispositions, rather than that they are dispositional themselves.
It appears, for instance, that we sometimes acquire, entertain and revise our
beliefs by means of judgements.
But there is a further source of support for the idea that at least some
propositional states are phenomenally conscious. Imagine two people listening
to the news on a French radio programme. One of them| let's call him Jack |
speaks only English, while the other | Jacques | speaks only French. Galen
Strawson, in whose writings this particular example can be found, asks whether
Jacques, who understands what the newsspeaker is saying, has an experience
of a dierent kind than Jack, who merely hears the French-sounding words
without grasping their meaning (Strawson, 1994, 5f.). If so | and it indeed
seems intuitively plausible -, there are experiences of understanding which
are signicantly dierent from the mere auditory perceptions of the sounds
produced by a voice (or from mere visual perceptions of signs while reading).
As Strawson writes: \There is [...] something it is like for you to read and
understand these words" (ibid., 10).
This insight alone, he points out, does not force us to accept that un-
derstanding is a deliberate, goal-directed action; nor does it imply that each
experience of understanding is characterised by a distinct qualitative nature.
But his fundamental conclusion | that we have phenomenally conscious expe-
riences of understanding | suggests that there are propositional states which
possess some qualitative aspects. For grasping the meaning of what some-
one has said surely involves some states which are directed at propositions
| namely states which have propositions, that correspond to the expressed
meaning, as their intentional objects. Hence, experiences of understanding
seem to be both propositional and consciously experienced.
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It therefore remains to answer the second question: whether judgements
and similar states possess specic phenomenal characters that distinguish them
from each other and are at least as ne-grained as their propositional contents.
And in what follows, we would like to argue that this question is best answered
positively. As a matter of fact, most proponents of the existence of phenome-
nal consciousness would in contrast provide a negative answer. But they could
not easily avoid giving an answer at all because of their own positive stance to-
wards phenomenal consciousness in general: the issue of whether propositional
states possess specic qualitative characters, and which role these characters
play, arises once one has generally grown sympathetic towards the idea of
phenomenal consciousness.5
This question becomes relevant also in the light of two other discussions.
Some philosophers believe that the intentional content of phenomenally con-
scious experiences is partly, or even fully, determined by their phenomenal
character. Since judgements (and similar states) possess an intentional con-
tent, it becomes interesting for these philosophers to know whether judgements
show a specic phenomenal character, and if so, whether their claim about ex-
periences is also true of judgements (i.e., that the content of the latter is
likewise determined by their qualitative character). As mentioned at the be-
ginning there has also been a debate about whether all conscious states |
including sensations and perceptions | are propositional . If this were true,
and it would turn out that propositional states do not possess a specic phe-
nomenal character, the result would be a rather untenable position, according
to which experiences of pain and colours would not show any distinctive qual-
itative character. Hence, proponents of both the claim, that the intentional
content of mental states is somehow determined by their phenomenal char-
acter, and the claim, that all conscious states are propositional, should focus
their attention on the issue raised in this paper.
The First Consideration: the Phenomenal Dierences
between Thoughts
The rst source of support for the idea that there is a specic qualitative char-
acter of propositional states is the idea that we can tell apart our judgements,
manifest beliefs, desires, and so on, by means of introspection. We can tell,
say, whether our current thoughts are about the fog in Ivrea, or about some
features of the Himalaya; and we can tell whether they involve the endorse-
5Only a few philosophers have recently discussed the issue of the phenomenal character
of propositional states, among them Brian Loar (2003), John Searle (1992), Owen Flanagan
(1992), Galen Strawson (1994), Horgan and Tienson (2002) and, especially, Charles Siewert
(1998).
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ment of the respective states of aairs as really obtaining, or as to be brought
about, or whether we instead consider the relevant propositions neutrally, that
is, without any evaluation or commitment. Furthermore, it is widely accepted
that we do not have to observe our behaviour or ask other people in order
to discover what we are currently thinking, judging or longing for; it simply
suces to introspect our actual state of mind to nd out.
But it seems equally plausible to assume that what we introspect of mental
states are their phenomenal features. First of all, both how it is like to be in a
certain mental state or to undergo a certain experience, and how things appear
or present themselves to us, seem to be accessible to us in introspection. For,
again, we do not need to observe ourselves in other ways (e.g., by means of our
senses), or to talk to other people, in order to come to know such facts. And
then, the qualitative features appear to constitute the bulk, if not the totality,
of those features of mental states that we actually can access by means of
introspection.
Both these considerations path the way for the conclusion that the in-
trospectible dierences between the propositional states in question have to
be manifest in their respective phenomenal characters; and hence that these
states possess such characters which are at least as specic as their intentional
contents. Of course, one could challenge this line of reasoning by arguing that
there are other, non-phenomenal features that are given in introspection and
can distinguish the dierent propositional states from each other. But it is not
clear at all what kind of features these could be. Since it also seems untenable
to deny the fact that we can introspect such dierences, the conclusion put
forward appears to be dicult to avoid.
The Second Consideration: the Role of Phenomenal Con-
sciousness in Linguistic Understanding
But even if one is not convinced by the initial force of this argument, there
is another, more complex reasoning that supports the same conclusion and is
founded on perhaps less controversial premises. It does not concern the intro-
spection of our own mental states, but instead the experience of understanding
the linguistic expressions of other people. Its main ingredient is thus a the-
ory of verbal expression, understanding and communication. This theory, we
should emphasise, was rst put forward by Edmund Husserl, the founder of
phenomenology (for more on this see Soldati (1994, 2000)).
If we want to speak, that is, express ourselves verbally, we have to produce
complex sounds with our voice. Now, according to the theory under considera-
tion, the dierence between an articulated utterance of words or sentences and
the mere generation of meaningless sounds is that only the former is produced
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by the speaker as the expression of one of her mental states, such as one of her
thoughts or judgements. It is this particular relation to an underlying mental
state which provides verbally produced sounds with a meaning and thus turns
them into speech that expresses the mental state in question.
Conventions, it is true, play a crucial role in xing the meaning of a word
in public language over a certain period of time. But most linguistic con-
ventions are far from explicit; they are rather the product of an equilibrium
reached by the interaction of dierent agents with dierent goals, beliefs and
behaviours, linguistic and other. But even if explicit, without mental states
to start from, conventions, normatively binding linguistic rules, would hardly
get o the ground.
To understand the meaning of an utterance we hear or read we have to have
some kind of access to the mental state it expresses. Of course, this access can
go wrong and we can misunderstand each other. But, as the theory claims,
any attempt to understand someone else's speech nevertheless presupposes that
one somehow represents certain mental states of the speaker as those which are
expressed by his speech and hence render his utterances meaningful. Grasping
the meaning of a linguistic expression therefore simply means to have an access
to the expressed mental state. And since understanding someone does not only
require to recognize that he has meant something by his utterance, but also
what he has meant, understanding the meaning of a linguistic expression has
to involve an access to the particular nature of the expressed mental state and,
in particular, of its intentional content.
Now, as the example above of Jack and Jacques has already made plausible,
linguistic understanding is (at least in most cases) a consciously experienced
process. There is a subjective, qualitative dierence between merely hearing
certain sounds and understanding them as having a specic meaning, that is,
as expressing a certain thought. But if understanding is generally speaking a
consciously experienced process, the question arises whether it involves a spe-
cic phenomenal character: that is, whether our experiences of understanding
dier phenomenally in respect to which particular meanings are grasped. We
grasp distinct expressed meanings by recognizing distinct underlying inten-
tional states. Hence, what is really at issue is whether we consciously experi-
ence the dierences that characterize the specic ways in which we recognize
dierent mental states as being expressed by certain utterances. That there
has to be a dierence between our dierent recognitions should be obvious
since we can, with their help, understand dierent linguistic meanings; the
question is rather whether these dierences among our recognitional states are
phenomenally conscious.
We think that the best way of explaining these dierences | and how we
come to grasp what other people mean by their linguistic utterances | is in-
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deed by postulating such a form of phenomenal consciousness. And a positive
answer to this question entails the acceptance of the existence of conceptual
qualia | that is, of specic phenomenal characters of states with propositional
content. Qualia are concerned in so far as consciously experienced, phenome-
nal aspects of mental states are concerned. And they are conceptual since the
intentional contents of these states possess a propositional and hence concep-
tual content. The latter observation has already been made above: we have
to be in some kind of propositional state in order to be able to grasp a lin-
guistic meaning, since this kind of meaning shows itself a propositional, and
conceptual, structure.
In the remainder of the paper, we would like to show the plausibility of
this idea | that specic conceptual qualia play an important role in linguistic
understanding | and defend it against certain common objections. But before
that, it is necessary to formulate some qualications about the thesis under
consideration in order to clarify the scope of the argument and to prevent
possible misunderstandings.
First, it is important to note that the example of Jack and Jacques alone is
not sucient to shed more light on the phenomenal nature of the experience of
understanding; it merely supports the claim that there is a qualitative dier-
ence between understanding and not understanding something. The idea that
understanding involves specic conceptual qualia requires more support than
the idea that experiences of understanding have some qualitative character.
Second, it is not at issue whether all propositional states possess a specic
phenomenal character. Rather, we try to argue only that some mental states
with propositional content possess a specic phenomenal character. In partic-
ular, we do not intend to extent our claim to dispositional states; after all, we
are concerned with occurring experiences of understanding.
Third, we also do not want to claim that all understanding must be phe-
nomenally conscious. Angels | if they exist | may perhaps understand each
other in a dierent way. We do not argue that phenomenal consciousness is
necessary for understanding, but only that it is specically relevant for the
manner in which we human beings usually come to understand each other's
utterances. Analogously, it is one thing to maintain that sensations of pain
are consciously experienced by us humans; but it is a much stronger claim to
say that there could not be pain without such a form of consciousness.
And fourth, the qualitative character of experiences is introspectively ac-
cessible. We usually know very well how it is like for us if someone drills a
hole into one of our teeth, or how the rails appear to us in the distance, and
we typically do not let us be inuenced by our additional knowledge or by
what other people have to say about these issues. The dentist can keep on
insisting that our root is dead, but this does not make our pain disappear.
354
Chapter 12 Conceptual Qualia and Communication
And although I know that the rails run parallel, they still continue to seem
meet in the distance. This does not mean, however, that introspection cannot
go wrong. And our considerations are also neutral with respect to particular
theories of introspection; in particular, they do not commit us to the idea that
introspection is a form of inner perception or observation. We only assume
that we have introspective access to some aspects of some propositional states.
A First Objection: Fallacious Inferences by Analogy
The picture of communication, with which we have so far operated, has been
criticized as naive and as facing many diculties. Here, we have space to rebut
only one of the objections often put forward against it. We have suggested
that, in order to grasp the meaning of a linguistic expression, it is necessary
to recognize the underlying expressed mental state and its intentional content.
But we yet have to say a bit more about how this recognition may come
about. And precisely here, the following problem arises. I know, from the
rst person perspective, what pain is since I have had pain experiences. But
when I see you showing the same behaviour that I normally show when I am
in pain, how can I come to know, now from the third person perspective, that
you undergo an experience that is of the same kind as mine? As far as I
am concerned, you may have a completely dierent kind of experience (e.g.,
you may phenomenally experience it very dierently). On the other hand, we
usually seem to be able, after all, to come to know whether someone else is in
pain solely on the basis of observing his behaviour. So how can we make the
step from our own experiences to those of others?
It has often been stressed that the problem is not so much whether we
are justied in our assumption that our experiences are very similar to those
of others, but rather whether our own concept of pain, acquired on the basis
of our own experiences, could also apply to the experiences of others. In my
case, I have acquired a concept of pain that I have good reason to apply to my
own sensations of pain because of the way in which I experience them. But
since I cannot experience the sensations that occur in your mind, when you
show the same behaviour that I show when I am in pain, I do not have a good
reason to assume that my concept of pain likewise applies to your sensations.
In other words, as Wittgenstein has once written, what is at issue is \that I
am expected to imagine experiences of pain, which I do not have, on the basis
of experiences of pain, that I do have" (Wittgenstein, 1984a, x 302).
One idea that has been suggested to close the gap between knowing one's
own and knowing other's mental states is that we come to know the nature of
the mental states, and in particular the experiences, of other people by means
of an inference by analogy. According to this \simple theory" (Peacocke, 1984,
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97f.), we assume that other people are exactly like us: if they show the same
behaviour that we show when we feel pain, then they must feel pain as well |
that is, they must have the same experience as us. In other words, it is said
that we use our own case as an analogy for the case of the other person in
question and infer accordingly from our own experiences to those of the other.
For instance, if I know what it means for me to have tooth- ache and observe
you expressing yourself in the way in which I would express myself when feeling
tooth-ache, I could simply conclude that you have the same kind of tooth- ache
and hence would come to know what it means for you to feel this kind of pain.
For I would, according to the \simple theory", be able to assume that you and
me are similar in that we have the same kind of experiences and express them
in similar ways | that we are analogous to each other. As Peacocke stresses,
however, such a theory would be circular. It presupposes precisely that what
it tries to prove, namely that there are concepts of mental states (such as pain)
that apply to both my own and other peoples' experiences. It simply assumes
that this is the case. That is, it does not really answer the problem identied
by Wittgenstein, but ignores altogether its existence.
Now, it might be suspected that the account of linguistic communication
put forward by us is circular in a similar way. To see the possible force of this
challenge, it is necessary to look a bit closer at how we come to recognize the
mental states that others express linguistically. In order for the interpreter
to understand the speaker's expression, the expressed sentence must be one
that the interpreter might have uttered himself. Furthermore, if he would have
uttered it, he would have himself expressed a certain mental state. The idea
is now that the interpreter can come to know which mental state the speaker
has expressed by coming to know which mental state he himself would have
expressed if he would have made the same kind of utterance. The interpreter
thus recognizes the expressed mental state of the speaker by putting himself
in the position of the speaker, that is, in the position of using the utterance
in question in order to express one of his own mental states. But even if one
accepts that linguistic behaviour can serve us as prima facie evidence for the
belief that the speaker intends to express a certain meaning, there still seems
to be the problem | the objection goes | that we cannot so easily infer from
our own mental states to those of other people, again because we cannot be
sure whether our concepts of the former can likewise apply to the latter. That
is, to know that you use an utterance, that I would use to express a belief
which I can conceptualize myself as a belief about, say, the current weather,
does not guantaree that I have a good reason to conceptualize the mental
state underlying your expression in the same way. After all, there may not be
a concept that applies to both; and I cannot simply assume the existence of
such a concept.
356
Chapter 12 Conceptual Qualia and Communication
Using inferences from oneself to others and applying the concepts that
capture one's own mental states to the states of the others is not the only way
by means of which the hearer can put himself in the position of the speaker
and recognize what he has expressed by his utterance. Instead, a theory of our
knowledge of other minds can be formulated in terms of empathy, according
to which a person grasps what is going on in someone else's mind, not by
means of the application of mental concepts on the basis of observations, but
by means of imagining herself to be in the position of the other person and
grasping what is happening in her own mind as a result.6 According to this
proposal, if I hear you making a certain utterance and try to understand it, I
imagine what it would take to make that utterance myself. And in order to do
so, I have to imaginatively entertain a corresponding propositional state that
could be expressed by the utterance in question. I come to understand what
you have meant with your utterance simply by imaginatively entertaining that
propositional state. Of course, I can be wrong since I may fail to appropriately
imagine being in your position of making that utterance. But what is more
important is that this account of how we come to recognize the mental states
that other people express does not require that we conceptualize the other's
mental states in any way. For the proposal suggests that we grasp them simply
by imaginatively entertaining them ourselves. To put it briey, it conceives of
communication as a very straightforward and direct way of putting one's own
thoughts into the listener's mind. Hence, it can avoid the problem that the
inference-by-analogy model faces.
A Second Objection: the Sensory Aspects of Thought
When people speak of phenomenal character, they usually refer to an aspect of
sensory experiences, such as sensations of pain or perceptions of colour. This
might suggest the idea that thinking, understanding and judging possess a
qualitative character only in the sense that they involve, or are accompanied
by, some related sensory state. The idea is that my experience of understanding
or judging that p is experiential only in so far as I sensorily hear or read or
imagine the utterance \p". Some philosophers have indeed believed that the
propositional states in question occur only in conjunction with the perception
or imagination of signs or symbols.
However, even if this were true, the phenomenal character of these sen-
sory states would be only contingently linked to the content of the respective
propositional state. For instance, that fact that we express in English a thought
about a house by means of the symbol \house", and not by means of another
one, is not essential to what the thought actually means. Therefore, the spe-
6See Husserl (1950, x 50) and Husserl (1954, x 67).
357
Conceptual Qualia and Communication Chapter 12
cic phenomenal character of thoughts and judgements | if it exists | could
not be of a sensory kind.7
Nevertheless, this kind of reasoning leaves some room for an objection
against the thesis that propositional states possess a specic phenomenal char-
acter. For one could insist that the qualitative character of these experiences
belongs exclusively to the accompanying sensory representations and that it
is, in this sense, independent of their conceptual content. We often entertain
symbolic, acoustic or diagrammatic representations, while we think, under-
stand or judge something. Hence, it seems plausible to maintain that, since
the sensory representations of such signs occur usually in conjunction with
particular thoughts, we have the tendency to take the phenomenal character
of the sensory representations to be a feature of the non-sensory thoughts.
But this objection can be dealt with by making it plausible that the propo-
sitional states in question can, and often do, occur without the simultaneous
presence of sensory representations of symbols or signs. Already Karl Buhler
(1907) has argued, on the basis of an empirical investigation of the mental
states to which we have introspective access while thinking, that visual, acous-
tic or motoric representations are not necessary components of thought. And
Charles Siewert (1998, 264; 277) has, to the same eect, put forward examples
of thoughts (e.g., one that occured in his mind while he was walking from his
table to the till of a restaurant) that are too complex and appear and disap-
pear in such an immediate way and in a brief period of time, that it would
seem to be impossible for us to sensorily represent the respective sentences
at the same time. Finally, there are features of sensory representations that
do not seem to occur in pure thought. For instance, acoustic perceptions and
imaginations must have at least some acoustic characteristics: the represented
sentence or symbol must possess, say, a certain volume, a certain pitch and a
certain duration or speed. In the case of an acoustic imagination, it might not
be necessary that all such acoustic features be present or determined, but it
would be strange to speak of an acoustic representation, if none of them would
occur. By contrast, it seems perfectly possible to think something without
being conscious of any sensory feature | whether visual or acoustic | at all.
Hence, the phenomenal character of the propositional states in question cannot
be analysed in terms of the phenomenal character of possibly accompanying
7Wittgenstein writes in the Philosophical Investigations: \In the sense that/in so far as
there are no characteristic processes/experiences (even mental processes/experiences) of un-
derstanding, understanding is no mental process/experience. (The increase and decrease of
a sensation of pain, the hearing of a melody, of a sentence: mental processes/experiences)."
(Wittgenstein, 1984a, x 154). Wittgenstein seems here to reject that understanding is
a mental process/experience on the basis of the argument that it is not a sensory pro-
cess/experience. But the argument does not address the possibility of there being non-
sensory processes/experiences.
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sensory representations of symbols or signs.
A Third Objection: the Vagueness of Phenomenal Char-
acters
One more thing remains to be made plausible, namely that the phenomenal
character of the recognition is indeed specic enough to individuate the ex-
pressed mental state. It might be suspected that the qualitative character of
thoughts or judgements is too imprecise in order to determine a particular
intentional content.
For it seems that we may not always be able, on the basis of our introspec-
tive access to our phenomenal consciousness, to tell for sure which thought we
are currently having. Consider the following example put forward by Charles
Siewert (1998, 287f.). I am driving to work and suddenly realize that I have
left my briefcase at home. This realization happens by means of a conscious
thought. But which one exactly? The thought that I have forgotten my
briefcase? Or the thought that it still lies on my desk at home? Have I been
thinking that I have unintentionally moved myself away from my briefcase? Or
that I have moved while my briefcase stayed where it were? Has my thought
involved the idea that I have left the briefcase where I and my family live?
Or the idea that I left the thing with which I usually transport my books,
papers and pens? When I wonder about the precise nature of my thought and
begin to concentrate on how I have phenomenally experienced the thought in
question, I may for some while consider these and similar options and accept
them as appropriate descriptions of my thought. But when and where exactly
will my acceptance stop? Will there be a point during my considerations at
which I will begin to say to myself: \no, I haven't thought that"? As Siewert
has concluded, the argument suggests that there is good reason to assume that
there is no such clear and precise border (cf. Siewert (1998, 290)).However, he
has also argued that the qualitative characters are not more vague than the
corresponding intentional contents (cf. Siewert (1998, 284.)).
Accordingly, the potential vagueness of the former does not seem to prevent
them from being able to determine the latter. In order to see how this claim is
supported, it is not necessary to concern oneself with our more or less successful
transformation of thoughts into language. For it is not at issue whether, for
instance, a particular utterance is the most appropriate one to express a certain
thought. Instead, we are confronted with the question as to whether our mental
concepts are vague with respect to the mental states they are supposed to
pick out. Is the concept \thinking that p", for instance, capable of precisely
determining which thought I have been thinking on a certain occasion? It
seems not.
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The problem is due neither to my inability to nd the right concept to
express my thought, nor to the possibility that my thought has no specic
intentional content (we take it that we can assume that in many, if not most
cases, our thoughts have determined contents). Rather, it is due to the nature
of our concepts of intentional states and to the general criteria for their appli-
cation. Althought the thought that I have forgotten the briefcase at home and
the thought that I have left it where my family lives dier in their content, it
is normally not possible to determine, neither by means of concepts of inten-
tional states, nor by means of concepts of phenomenal characters, which of the
two thoughts I have actually experienced and expressed. Consequently, there
does not seem to be any dierence with respect to vagueness between the two
kinds of concepts. The objection that the phenomenal character is too vague
to determine the intentional content is hence untenable.
Conclusion
To sum up, we have suggested that we can understand the way in which we
understand linguistic expressions of other people in terms of empathy: we
imaginatively entertain a propositional state that we would have expressed if
we were in the position of the speaker, and thereby experience the content
of the mental state that he actually has expressed. Furthermore, we have
tried to show that, in order to be able to individuate the expressed mental
state in this way, we have to fall back on a characteristic and easily accessible
aspect of our own imaginative state, namely its specic phenomenal character.
And our theory has also included the claim that we refer to this very same
character, too, when we try in general to distinguish and individuate our own
conscious mental states. One main source for the plausibility of our account of
the role of phenomenal consciousness in thought and understanding has been
its explanatory power: it can explain how we come to recognize or grasp the
mental states of ourselves and others. The other source has been the possibility
to rebut the challenges and objections that have been raised against accounts
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I. Introduction
Is the claim that perceptual experiences are by nature relational incompatible
with the view that they are intentional? In this article we shall argue that it is
not. As we shall see, much depends on the way one understands the possibility
for one to be wrong about the phenomenal nature of one's own experience. We
shall describe and distinguish a variety of errors that can occur in our rst-
personal access to our perceptual experiences. We shall argue that once the
nature of these dierent kinds of error is properly understood, the metaphysical
claim that perceptual experiences are relational can be made compatible with
the view that they are intentional.
Before presenting the argument, we shall articulate some elements of an
intentionalist approach concerning the role of experience in our relation to
ourselves and to our environment. The picture should oer a motivation for
the argument that follows. To oer an intentionalist motivation for an argu-
ment is not to oer an argument in favour of intentionalism. Our concern is
not with the truth of intentionalism, or of relationalism. Our main claim con-
cerning the divide between intentionalism and its relationalist opponent may
however block at least those arguments against intentionalism that depend on
the incompatibility claim mentioned above.1
Sections 2 and 3 describe the version of intentionalism we are presupposing
in our argument. The position is described in broad terms, in order to re-
main as neutral as possible on further options one may wish to take. If we are
1We have provided independent arguments in favour of intentionalism elsewhere: see, for
instance, Soldati (1994), as well as chapters 8 and 11.
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right, the result of our analysis will not depend on any decision with respect
to those options. The central assumption in the version of intentionalism we
are presupposing is that there is an intimate relation between the claim that
perceptual experiences have motivational force, for instance with respect to
our activity of judging, and the common claim that they possess correctness
conditions. There are various qualms a relationalist may express against this
assumption. Since we do not intend to present a defence of intentionalism, we
shall not discuss them here. Doubts that depend on the claim that percep-
tual experiences are by nature relational should however be deated by our
argument.
Our main argument is presented in the remaining four sections. Two ideas
are central to this argument. The rst is that an intentionalist understand-
ing of the phenomenal nature of perceptions is compatible with a relationalist
understanding of their non-phenomenal nature. A tension arises only if it is
attempted to account for one and the same aspect of experiences in either way.
The second crucial thought is that the non-phenomenal status of the relation-
ality of perceptions does not prevent it from being manifest in consciousness.
For it may be part of how things intentionally appear to us in perception that
the experiences themselves are presented as relating us to the world.
In section 4, we rst clarify what a claim about the nature of an experience
involves. It is a claim about the essential properties of experiences, properties
that determine, for instance, the identity conditions of experiences over time.
The common idea that experiences have a phenomenal nature thus implies
that at least some of their phenomenal properties are essential to them. We
then elucidate the notion of appearance and distinguish between properties
that may be said to appear in an experience and properties by virtue of which
an experience may be said to be an appearance.
In section 5, we specify how the way we understand the distinction between
pure phenomenal properties and phenomenal properties which are determined
by the way how something appears in a perceptual experience. We then con-
sider the hypothesis that experiences may have properties that are not mani-
fest in consciousness. We explain what this means and we show that if those
properties are essential to the experience then the nature of the experience is
not (entirely) manifest in consciousness. We then consider the idea that an
experience may possess a relational nature and show under what conditions
that nature may be manifest in consciousness. We show that one way for the
relational nature to be manifest in consciousness would be for the experience
to be an appearance of itself as standing in relation to something. This very
possibility makes room for a kind of error what we call experiential error |
that is, a special kind of error a subject may fall prey to with respect to the
nature of his own experience: it may appear to be relational while it is not.
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In section 6, we look more carefully at this kind of error and distinguish it
from two other errors one can apparently make about one's own experiences.
There is rst doxastic error, an error attributable to a higher order introspec-
tive belief concerning the properties, and possibly even the nature, of one's own
experience. We ask whether the experience itself, by virtue of the way it oc-
curs in consciousness, can be the source of this kind of error. In our discussion,
we compare introspective with perceptual beliefs and come to the conclusion
that doxastic error is possible when the experience occurs in consciousness in
a way that misleads about its own non-phenomenal nature. We show that this
kind of situation involves an experiential error and conclude that a doxastic
error can originate from an experiential error. A further question is whether
an experience can occur in consciousness in a way that deceives us about its
own phenomenal nature. We distinguish several cases and come to the con-
clusion that such a phenomenal error is not possible: it is not possible that
the phenomenal nature of an experience is not manifest in consciousness. We
suggest that this is the sense one should give to the traditional claim that in
the realm of experience there is no dierence between appearance and being.
In section 7, we apply the results obtained so far to a prominent version
of the relational view, as it has recently been advocated by M. G. F. Martin.
One important point speaking in favour of the relational view is the fact that
it seems best suited to account for an obvious asymmetry between perception
and hallucination: there is nothing wrong with the rst, and much wrong with
the latter, although they are introspectively indistinguishable. We argue that
the relationalist should not appeal to phenomenal error in order to account for
this intuitive asymmetry. Explaining it in terms of experiential error permits
the combination of relationalism with intententionalism. We conclude that a
relational view that does not assume the possibility of phenomenal error is
compatible with the kind of intentionalism presented at the beginning of the
paper.
II. The Role of Experience
Experiences, occurrences in the ow of consciousness, play a central role in
our engagement with the world. The way things and people appear to us in
experience is intimately connected to the way we think about them and to the
way we interact with them. The way we experience the world matters to us.
There are experiences we enjoy and we are glad to expect. Other experiences
are painful and we would rather avoid having them. Sometimes, however, we
accept undergoing a painful experience because we value the understanding
we obtain through it. And we can learn to distance ourselves from experiences
we nd supercial although quite pleasurable. So experiences do not simply
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impose themselves on our life. With time and with the help of others, we get to
know more about their nature and we learn to let them play a sensible role in
our life. Moreover, we discover that experiences can lead us astray and we thus
learn not to fall prey to them. We can come to understand a person's reaction
to a certain situation by getting a grasp on the way she experiences it. We
sometimes manage to predict a person's behaviour by putting ourselves in her
shoes and thus experiencing her situation as if it were our own. Appreciation
of the fact that experiences can lead us astray is crucial in our understanding
of other persons and their behaviour.
When experiences matter to us, this is sometimes due to the fact that their
simple presence commands a certain kind of response on our part. This is
not a mere process, taking place in us, with us playing the role of a detached
observer. When we are engaged in responding to an experience, the experience
may indeed provide us with a reason for our response. In fact, the experience
and our reaction are often part of a unity that may constitute a project we aim
to realise. If one aims to understand better a friend's behaviour in a certain
kind of circumstance, one may wish that one's own beliefs about that person
and her motives are properly responsive to one's experiential, e.g. empathic,
take of her situation. And if one wishes to learn something about the quality
of wine, one wants one's judgement to be properly responsive to one's complex
olfactory and taste sensations. Advances in such epistemic projects are not
just a matter of collecting evidence for the corroboration of a hypothesis. It
is rather a matter of getting one's own cognitive behaviour to be increasingly
guided by the relevant experiences. The more one advances in this direction,
the more one senses the cognitive obligation that stems from the presence of
the experience. This is not a question of one having lost one's freedom to
believe in front of the tribunal of experience. It is rather a manifestation of
the fact that one comes to feel the responsibility one would have to carry if one
were not to trust one's own experience. As such, this is the situation where
believing one thing rather than another starts to become something we really
care about. Beliefs one cares about are beliefs that impinge on one's web of
experience.
Much of what is true of experiences in general is also true of perceptual
experiences in particular.2 When it comes to our knowledge concerning the
2In using the expression perceptual experience we mean the most fundamental kind of
conscious experience involved in perception. As it should become obvious in the light of our
later discussion, we take conjunctivists to claim that perception and hallucination involve
the same fundamental kind of experience, and disjunctivists to deny this very claim. Unfor-
tunately the terminology in this domain is not settled and one sometimes nds authors using
the expression perceptual experience in order to refer to the kind of experience, whether fun-
damental or not, involved both in hallucinations and perceptions. As a consequence of this
terminological choice, these authors nd themselves obliged to describe the disjunctivist as
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external world, perceptual experiences play a central role. Typically, we come
to know that the there is a red sphere in front of us by having an experience
of something appearing red and spherical in front of us. Such a simple way of
gaining knowledge presupposes that our experience is sensitive to shape, colour
and orientation in egocentric space. There would not be much point in our
experience possessing that kind of sensitivity if our beliefs were not responsive
to the fact that they do possess it. Indeed, when one experiences a red sphere
appearing in front of one, one is strongly inclined, in fact, one is motivated to
judge that there is a red sphere in front of one.
Philosophers have not always agreed that this rational relation between
perceptual experience and belief is constitutive of our knowledge about the
external world. A subject may full all the responsibilities that ow from
her perceptual experiences and yet fail to be a reliable source of information
about her environment. Establishing criteria for the satisfaction of the sort
of rational requirement at issue, then, would fall short of providing genuine
criteria for knowledge.
One may be tempted to react to such a line of argument by questioning
the very notion of perceptual experience it appears to rely on. Indeed, it has
been argued that once it is allowed that our experience does not put us into
direct contact with the world, once it is allowed that the experience could
occur without establishing such a contact to the world, the relation between
perceptual experience and knowledge breaks down.3 One should thus rather
conceive of perceptual experiences in a way which makes it essential to them to
put us in direct contact with the world. In this sense, perceptual experiences,
as such, could not be faulty. Hallucinations and illusions would have to be
experiences of a dierent kind.4
claiming not that perceptual experience as such, but that veridical perceptual experience
is of a dierent fundamental kind than hallucination. This can easily lead to a trivialis-
ing interpretation following which perception, on the disjunctivist account, would be of a
dierent fundamental kind simply because it is veridical. If that were the argument, then
one would expect it to apply by analogy to the domain of belief, thus yielding the result
that true beliefs belong to a dierent fundamental kind than false beliefs simply by virtue
of their veridicality. But, as we shall see, this is precisely not the argument the disjunctivist
is relying on in the case of perception.
3Hilary Putnam has famously written: \I agree with James, as well as with McDowell,
that the false belief that perception must be so analyzed is at the root of all the problems with
the view of perception that, in one form or another, has dominated Western philosophy since
the seventeenth century. James's idea is that the traditional claim that we must conceive of
our sensory experiences as intermediaries between us and the world has no sound arguments
to support it, and, worse, makes it impossible to see how persons can be in genuine cognitive
contact with a world at all" (Putnam, 1994, 454).
4This, of course, does not imply that those dierent kinds of experiences cannot have,
at least on some occasions, if not always, a common feature, such as the property of being
indistinguishable from a perception. The point would rather be that such a shared feature
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Perceptual experiences, it is generally admitted, are intentional; they are
directed to something. But for an experience to be intentional, it needs to pos-
sess correctness conditions. This, at least, seems to be suggested by Brentano's
famous idea that an intentional `relation' does not presuppose the existence
of its object.5 Should we thus consider the claim that perceptual experiences
put us into direct contact with the world as relying on the idea that per-
ceptions are not intentional? Or should we abandon the idea of a connection
between intentionality and correctness conditions and accept a modied notion
of intentionality as referring simply to an asymmetrical relation between the
experience and its object, such that the experience is directed onto its object
while the object is not directed onto the experience?
One of the central problems with the relational view sketched above con-
cerns the way perceptual experiences can guide us in the formation of beliefs.
In order to rationally ground our beliefs, perceptions should provide reasons.
Reasons for beliefs, it used to be said, need to be inferential. And so, it was
concluded, not perceptual experiences as such, but the beliefs caused by them,
provide reasons. In spite of its well-known weaknesses, this argument relies
on a strong intuitive basis. It is the idea that a fact or event as such cannot
provide any rational guidance for one's beliefs. For something to rationally
guide one's cognitive activity there must be something normative about its
very nature. Intentional content conceived as the possession of correctness
conditions is one way of fullling this requirement. Let us explain.
III. Intentionality, Correctness Conditions, and the Phe-
nomenology of Experience
Consider experiences such as a pain in one's foot and the visual experience of
two parallel lines that appear to converge.6 There is an ordinary sense in which
there can be something misleading about experiences of this kind. A pain in
the foot is misleading when there is no ailment in the foot.7 The perception of
would not count as the sort of property that characterises both perceptual experiences and
hallucinations at their most fundamental level (see Martin (2004), Siegel (2004), and chapter
11).
5See Brentano (1995, Book 2, Chapter 1). An interpretation that questions the claim
made above can be found in Crane (2006).
6Examples of such cases are provided in the Zollner Illusion.
7We shall suppose, in what follows, that the experience of pain possesses correctness
conditions just as much as the visual experience of two converging lines does. We shall not
argue here for this intentional analysis of pain. As a matter of fact, nothing in our argument
depends on the specic claim that pain is an intentional state. The present paper should
be compatible with, but does not depend on, the view that the phenomenal properties of
experiences are entirely determined by their intentional content.
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the two lines as converging is misleading when the lines are actually parallel.
How should one account for the very possibility of experiences being faulty, or
leading us astray, in the way described above?
One prominent line of thought suggests that the mistakes under considera-
tion are related to the fact that those experiences are essentially intentional in
the following sense: they possess correctness conditions, and the possession of
those conditions is constitutive for their identity. The experiences would not
be what they are if they did not have the correctness conditions they have.
One's experience of pain would not be the pain it is if it did not present the
foot as having an ailment, and one's visual experience of two lines appearing
to join each other would not be the visual experience it is if it did not present
the lines as joining each other.
Correctness conditions are conditions an experience typically imposes on
something else, on something external to the experience, something that tran-
scends the experience.8 The ailment in the foot is external to the experience
of pain, and the convergence of the lines is external to the visual experience
of them appearing to converge. The externality under consideration can be
captured with the notion of ontological independence: the experience does not
depend for its existence on the satisfaction of its correctness conditions.9 One
can experience a pain in the foot although there is no ailment there and the
lines can appear to converge although they do not.
Externality of experience as such does not yield mind-independence. It
is required that the experience be independent of the satisfaction of its cor-
rectness conditions, not that whatever satises those conditions be mind-
independent. Cases where the correctness conditions are obviously satised
by mind-dependent states, properties or events are readily available. One's
second order belief that one is in pain is correct if and only if one is in pain,
a plain mental state. The intentional character of those second order states
would however be questionable if it could be shown that one's thought that
one is in pain depends for its very existence on one's being in pain.
We can now see how experiences can be misleading. Experiences, one may
surmise, are misleading when their correctness conditions are not satised.
This is ne, but one must be fully aware of what one is thereby putting into
the notion of correctness conditions. The simple fact that an experience has
correctness conditions that are not satised does not make it faulty. We fur-
8This notion of `transcendence' is common in Husserl and in the phenomenological tra-
dition.
9The converse relation requires more articulation. Properties an object can have only
in so far as it is perceived by a subject yield correctness conditions that depend on the
experience. It may still be true that the satisfaction of those conditions does not depend only
on perceptual experiences. An object may be red only in so far as subjects can experience
it, but this does not imply that any subject?s particular experience makes it red.
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ther need the requirement that the experience's occurrence should be related
to those conditions being satised. Since we saw that externality prevents the
existence of the experience from depending on the satisfaction of those condi-
tions, the relation cannot be one of existential dependence. We should rather
say that in order to be correct the experience ought to occur only when its
correctness conditions are satised, which of course does not mean that it can
occur only under such circumstances. Correctness conditions of experiences
thus generate a twofold constraint: an external constraint on whatever might
satisfy those conditions, and an internal constraint on the very occurrence of
the experience.10 The possibility for the experiences to be faulty depends on
the intertwining of these two constraints. For an experience to be intentional
| for it to have intentional content, as it is slightly misleadingly said | means,
then, for it to be subject to the intertwining of those two constraints.11
We can now see how the intentionality of perceptual experience is related
to its guiding role. It is because perceptual experiences ought to occur only
if their correctness conditions are satised, that their occurrence provides one
with a reason to believe that the world is as it perceptually appears to be. The
mere occurrence of the perceptual state, void of the norm that applies to it,
would not provide such a reason.12
On one prominent view, a view we share, the claim that perceptual expe-
10The external constraint of the perception of a red circle is that the circle should be red.
The internal constraint is that the experience should occur only if the circle is red. In none
of those cases does the presence of the constraint imply that there is something somebody
can and should do in order for it to be satised.
11The distinction under consideration is sometimes expressed by opposing the content to
the mode of an experience, to the eect that experiences of a dierent mode are sometimes
said to possess the same content. One may submit that a scene can be visualised in the same
way as it can appear in vision, but that only the perceptual experience stands under the
constraint that it should not occur if the scene were not as it appears. Would this show that
perception and imagination can have the same correctness conditions? We do not think so.
On the contrary: if imaginings posses any correctness conditions at all then those ought to
be dierent from the correctness conditions of the corresponding perceptual experiences (in
some cases, for instance, the imagining might be correct by providing access to a possibility,
rather then an actuality).
12One may wonder whether the constraint described above applies in the same way to all
kinds of intentional states. If desires provide reasons for action, for instance, one may expect
this to hold by virtue of a constraint of a dierent nature. This may indeed be related to the
common metaphor about the desire's direction of t (see, for instance, Smith (1994, 111.),
Humberstone (1992) and Tenenbaum (2006) for a discussion of the idea). For the desire
that p to rationally motivate an action, for instance, the occurrence of the desire should
precisely not depend on the obtaining of p. Independently of the merits of this proposal
with respect to the distinction between the way perceptions provide reasons for beliefs and
the way desires provide reasons for action, it might be useful to note that even in the case
of the desire that p, if not p itself, then at least the desirability of p might indeed constitute
a normative constraint on the occurrence of the desire.
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riences are intentional is part of their descriptive phenomenology. By saying
this one means that the property of having certain correctness conditions is
constitutive of how the experience is consciously presented to the subject. It is
part of what it is like for someone to have that experience. We shall not argue
in favour of this view in the present paper, but some elements of the relation
between intentionality and the phenomenology of experience will be set out in
what follows.
A terminological clarication may help at this point. Suppose that in
perception the lines appear to a subject S as converging. The perception is
veridical only if the lines converge. Call this condition F.13 A possible world
w, or something in a possible world (a situation), can satisfy this condition. A
world w may thus have the property of being a world where the lines converge.
Condition F would be a property of w, w would be an F -world, w would be a
member of the set of worlds where the lines converge. The phenomenological
claim under consideration is that F determines a conscious feature of S 's
perceptual experience. Contrary to w, the experience does not possess the
property F, the experience is not an element of the extension of F. Rather:
having F as an intentional content is part of how the experience is given in
consciousness. Since we said that an object perceptually appears to the subject
as F, we might classify the subject's experience as an F -appearance. Obviously,
being an F -world and being an F -appearance are properties of very dierent
kinds.14
It is one thing to determine the intentional content of an experience. It
is another thing to determine whether that content correlates de facto with
conditions external to the experience. Take the example of colours. It is one
thing to say that the visual experience of a red tomato presents the tomato as
being red independently of one's experience of it. It is another thing to claim
that redness is a property something can instantiate without the subject expe-
riencing it. The rst claim concerns the phenomenology of the experience; the
second claim concerns the metaphysical constraints on the correctness con-
ditions of the experience. The intentional content of an experience may be
constituted by correctness conditions that cannot, or can only partially be
satised. Even under such conditions, it may still be true that those correct-
13The condition might be described by the proposition that the lines converge. This
should not be taken to imply that perceptions have propositional content. As a matter
of fact, the correctness conditions of one and the same perception may be represented by
an indeterminate set of propositions. Or one may opt to specify the correctness condition
demonstratively: the condition would then be that the lines are in this way, where the
demonstrative refers to the perceptual appearance involved in the experience.
14The distinction may sound trivial. Yet one nds Martin complaining that Dennett and
Dretske indulge in formulations that suggest precisely the kind of confusion the distinction
is meant to avoid (see Martin (1998).
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ness conditions stand in a signicant relation to conditions that do possibly
obtain in the world. There may not be, as some think, any colour properties
in the world, but it may still be true that there is an interesting set of proper-
ties that are instantiated in the external world whenever an object looks red.
Elaborating on such connections and constraints is no part of descriptive phe-
nomenology. It is part of the metaphysics of colour and of the epistemology of
colour perception (see 1).
IV. Phenomenal Properties and the Metaphysics of Ex-
perience
Experiences possess various properties. They are likely to possess properties
that do not constitute the way it is like to have them. They may possess
properties that are sometimes, or maybe even typically, unconscious (i.e. not
conscious). For instance, perceptions of a certain kind may cause modications
in our body we are not aware of, modications nobody knows about. Having
that sort of causal power is a property of the experience that does not belong
to its phenomenology. Properties that belong to its phenomenology are prop-
erties that characterise the way the experience presents itself in the stream of
consciousness. They constitute what it is like to have those experiences. Let
us call these properties phenomenal properties.
Among the phenomenal properties there are properties an experience has
by virtue of things appearing to one in the experience. They are phenomenal
properties constituted by the intentional content of the experience.
There is a philosophical position, pure intentionalism, as we should call it,
which claims that all phenomenal properties are constituted by the intentional
content of the experience. That means that every property which inuences
how an experience is given when it occurs in the stream of consciousness is
determined by a property the object presented in the experience appears to
have. The determination is the one we specied above: if the experience
represents something as F, then the experience has the property of representing
something to be F, in short of being an F -appearance.15
Let us now look for a moment at the identity conditions of experiences.
Consider identity over time. Suppose there is a strong pain in the leg.16 As
15The expression `appearance' is notoriously ambiguous (see for instance Husserl's famous
complaints in Husserl (1984, B 233) or Husserl (1970, 341), respectively. We use it in order
to characterise experiences. When something appears F to the subject, then the subject has
an F -appearance. The property F is the way the object appears, but the way the object
appears is not an appearance.
16When we use the expression `pain' we mean the pain experience. So assertions such as
`the pain is in the leg' ought to be interpreted not as meaning that the experience is in the
leg, but that the experience presents the ailment as being in the leg. The case is not specic
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time goes by it decreases and eventually disappears. Being strong, then, was
not an essential property of the pain. The very same pain could have been
less strong. Or consider the power a certain pain has to cause one's heart to
beat quicker. Again, the heart may beat slower and the pain remain just the
same. A pain sometimes moves: it started in the knee, now it is in the thigh.
So, location too is no essential property of the pain.
The point is not to establish these specic claims. We rather aim at un-
derstanding what is at issue when one inquires into them. If some properties
are not essential to the experience, then this may be expressed by saying that
some properties do not constitute the nature of the experience.17 Are there
properties that constitute the nature of an experience? Are there essential
properties of an experience? Many philosophers have submitted that at least
some, if not all the phenomenal properties of an experience are essential to it.
It would then be essential for a pain, for instance, to be painful, to hurt. An
experience cannot be a pain, it is said, if it does not hurt. What does this
mean?
Should we say that the experience appears as hurting, that hurting is the
way the experience appears? Although philosophers sometimes talk like that,
this way of speaking can be seriously misleading. It is misleading when it
suggests that a pain experience appears hurting in the sense in which an apple
appears red in perception. For to be hurting would then be the property the
pain experience appears to have, instead of being a property it simply pos-
sesses. For the former to be the case there should be something, some further
experience, in which the pain experience appears as hurting, just as much as
we need a perception for the apple to have the property of appearing red.
There are many serious philosophical problems with this picture of introspec-
to pains. When I say that my thoughts are with you, I do not intend to say that you are
thinking my thoughts.
17In what follows we shall assume that the essential properties of an entity determine the
nature of the entity and that the nature of the entity determines the fundamental kind to
which it belongs. Thus if Socrates is essentially human, then his nature is to be a human
being and he belongs fundamentally to the human kind. Socrates is also Greek, but if he is
not essentially Greek, then he is not Greek by nature; and although he belongs to the kind
of Greek things, he is fundamentally not a Greek thing. Greek salads are of the same kind
as Socrates, but not of the same fundamental kind. Twin Socrates, who is as wise, clever
and virtuous as Socrates, but who is not human, does not have the same nature as Socrates
and does not belong to the same fundamental kind as Socrates. This view has its limits
when it comes to essential relational properties, such as being the son of a and b. If Socrates
has that property essentially, and if he is the only son of a and b, then he has a nature no
other object has and he is the only member of that fundamental kind. This prompts the
need to make a distinction between essential properties that determine an individual nature
and essential properties that determine a fundamental kind. This is not the place to dwell
on this issue, but we shall have to come back to some aspect of it when it comes to the role
particularity plays in perception (see footnote 20).
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tion. But apart from those problems, the issue at stake here is simply that
there is a dierence between the claim that the pain possesses the property of
hurting and the claim that the pain appears to possess that property. When
we say that a pain experience has the essential feature of hurting, we are not
saying that it has the essential feature of appearing to hurt.18
Remember the dierence we made above. An experience in which some-
thing appears F is an F -appearance. But: an F -appearance does not appear
F. Thus: a red-appearance is an experience of something appearing red. The
experience itself, however, does not appear red. Being a red-appearance is one
of the experience's phenomenal properties: the experience represents some-
thing as being red and this intentional content constitutes one of the features
the experience presents itself as having when occurring in the stream of con-
sciousness. Similar considerations apply in the case of pain. Hurting is one of
the ways in which a certain region of the body appears in the experience of
pain: the foot hurts. The experience has the property of presenting the foot as
hurting, just as much as the visual perception presents the lines as converging.
To be an appearance of something as hurting, then, is a phenomenal property
of the experience of pain. Strictly speaking, we should not say that the pain
hurts. We should rather say that the pain has the property of representing
something as hurting and that this property constitutes part of what it is like
to have a pain. The essentialist claim under consideration is that this phenom-
enal property is a necessary property of the pain: it constitutes the nature of
the experience of pain.
Is this true for all phenomenal properties of an experience? Some of the
examples mentioned above seem to suggest that it is not. The object of a pain
appears to be located at a certain place in one's body, but it is not immediately
clear that the location it appears to have could not change without the pain
experience stopping to be the very same experience (i.e., that very same pain
could `move' or could `be' somewhere else in the body). Does the essentialist
claim apply only to phenomenal properties? Could it not be essential for a
pain to cause a certain kind of behaviour? These are all genuine questions,
but we shall not address them in what follows. As mentioned above, we do not
intend to propose a theory about pain experiences; we rather want to suggest
an understanding of the philosophical claims at issue.
18The argument does not involve the rejection of the claim that the properties an object
appears to possess can be identical to properties the object possess simpliciter. But it does
presuppose that for a property to qualify as a property an object appears to have, it needs
to constitute a way the object appears in experience.
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V. The Nature of Experience
Suppose that there are phenomenal properties that are not determined by an
intentional content and thus are not appearances. It is not easy to nd clear
examples of such phenomenal properties. Blurredness is sometimes given as
an example in point.19 But maybe even painfulness is such a case. In fact,
it may be submitted that there are two distinct phenomenal properties: the
painfulness-appearance on the one side, and the pure painfulness on the other.
To claim that there is a sense in which painfulness is a property an experience
has by virtue of there being something that appears painful, is not to deny
that a pain may also have a pure phenomenal property of painfulness. All we
need, for our purpose, is to be clear about the fact that these are dierent
properties.
Some would submit that only phenomenal properties, whether appearances
or not, can count as determining the nature of a conscious experience. But
our argument need not depend on such an assumption. Suppose thus that an
experience has an unconscious property G that is essential to it. It belongs
to the nature of the experience to be a G. G is not experienced in the ow of
consciousness. Although being essentially a G, the experience does not possess
any phenomenal G-ish property. In that case, the nature of the experience,
or part of it, is not manifest in consciousness. This does not imply that one
cannot come to judge, by some other means, that one's own experience is G.
Now, take a relational property of standing in relation R to an object of a
certain kind.20 Suppose that the relational property is essential to the experi-
ence: it corresponds to part of its nature. Suppose further that the property
is in fact given in experience. When a subject has an experience that pos-
sesses that relational property, then the experience is an appearance of itself
19See Boghossian and Velleman (1989, 94), Crane (2001, 143), TyeBlurry and Pace (2007).
More considerations about blurredness as a non-intentional phenomenal property follow
below.
20Two relations are particularly salient for perceptual experiences: causality and acquain-
tance. We shall come back later to the precise status of those relations with respect to the
nature of perceptual experiences. More should also be said, but can't be said here, about
particularity. In perception, typically, we perceive particular objects. Is it essential for a
perceptual experience to be an experience of a rather then b? If all essential properties con-
stitute the nature of the experience and if the nature of the experience determines the most
fundamental kind to which the experience belongs (see footnote 17), than this would yield
the result that the perception of a and the perception of b belong to dierent fundamental
kinds, even when a and b are perceptually indistinguishable. Whatever the merits of this
answer, and the assumptions it relies on, it would not be tting for the view that percep-
tions in general belong to a dierent fundamental kind than hallucinations. A further issue
concerns the question of how the particularity can manifest itself in the phenomenology of
experience, if perceptions of qualitatively identical objects are supposed to be experientially
and introspectively indistinguishable.
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as standing in the relevant relation to an object of a certain kind. We may
say that the experience is a reexive R-appearance. This is a token-reexive
phenomenal property of the experience. It is not a case of the experience ap-
pearing in a certain way to another experience, it is instead the case of the
experience appearing to itself in a certain way.21 In such a case, then, the
experience possesses a phenomenal property that corresponds to an essential
correctness condition satised by the experience itself. The very nature of the
experience (or part of it) is consciously manifest through a phenomenal feature
of the experience.
Consider at present another experience with the same intentional content
and the same phenomenal properties as the experience above, with the notable
dierence, however, that it does not satisfy the condition set by its intentional
content. If R is taken to be a casual relation, then the case under consideration
would be one where the experience is not caused by an external object. Now,
if being caused by an external object is an essential property of any experience
that has it, then representing an experience as being caused by an external
object when it is not is to represent the experience has having a nature it does
not have. When the intentional content determines the phenomenal property
of the experience, that is, when the experience has the phenomenal property of
being a reexive R-appearance, then the experience appears to itself as having
a nature it does not have. One of the experience's phenomenal properties
misleads the subject of the experience about the very nature of the experience.
This, of course, leaves the possibility open for the phenomenal property to
be essential to the experience. Thus, an experience may possess an essential
phenomenal property that misleads the subject about the nature of the ex-
perience. This happens precisely when standing in relation to an object of a
certain kind is an essential condition on experiences, the experience is essen-
21The proposal has obvious similarities with Searle's idea that \perceptual experience is
causally self-referential" (Searle, 1983, 49). Searle's view has been widely criticised, i.a.
because it appears to make the content of perceptual experiences too sophisticated, and
because it underestimates the role the demonstrative, non descriptive relation to the world
plays in perception (see Burge (1991)). A proper discussion of Searle's proposal, and of the
role demonstration plays in perception, will have to take place elsewhere (some elements
deriving from a Husserlian conception of the relation between perception and demonstrative
content can be found in Soldati (2008)). For the moment it might be enough to note that
the view described so far should not commit one to the idea that the correctness conditions
of a perceptual experience are propositional, nor to the claim that the perceptual experience
is \experience of being caused" (Searle, 1983, 74). Although we do mention causality as an
example of the relation R under consideration, and although we do think that causality plays
a crucial role with respect to the correctness conditions of perceptual experiences, we wish
to remain neutral for the moment about the precise way in which the experience manifests
this trait of its correctness conditions in the way it is given in consciousness. As we shall
later see, actuality and transparency can however be shown to play an important role in this
respect.
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tially a reexive R-appearance, but the experience does not stand in relation
to an object of the intended kind. In our example: the relational property of
being caused by an external object and the phenomenal property of appearing
itself to be caused by an external object would both be essential properties of
experiences, they would determine together the nature of the experience and
thus the fundamental kind to which it belongs. Under these conditions, an
experience that reexively appears to be caused by an external object when in
fact it is not, misleads the subject about its own nature.
VI. Experiential and Phenomenal Error
The case described above concerns one of the ways the experience can mislead
the subject about its own nature. Let us try to better understand the kind of
error that occurs in such a case and let us distinguish it from other, related
errors.22
Forget about phenomenal properties for a moment, and consider the sort of
unconscious causal powers of an experience we mentioned above. The subject
can clearly be wrong about that sort of property: the subject can believe that
the pain does not cause the heart to beat faster although it does. Now, if that
specic causal power is an essential property of the experience, one has a false
belief about the nature of the experience. If this is possible with unconscious
properties of an experience, why should it not be possible with respect to the
phenomenal properties of an experience? Suppose we have a pain experience,
it hurts, but for some reason we do not believe that it hurts. Maybe we should
start to worry about ourselves, maybe this is the starting point of serious
psychological problems, but it is hard to see what in principle could prevent
that kind of situation from happening. Now, if it happens, and if hurting is
an essential property of our experience, then it seems again right to say that
we are wrong about the nature, in fact about the phenomenal nature of our
experience.
This kind of doxastic error would have to be attributed not to the percep-
tual experience itself, but to a higher order introspective belief that is inten-
tionally directed to it. The mistake concerns a belief the subject has about her
own experience. The question may now be raised whether the way the expe-
rience is given in the stream of consciousness could be the very source of this
kind of error. Consider the following analogy. When looking at an articially
produced banana one may mistake it for a real one. It is not just that one
wrongly judges that the articial banana is real; the way it looks provides a
22Some of the non-phenomenal errors we shall consider in this section may arguably be
impossible. By being more liberal then one probably should be we wish to concede as much
as possible to our possible disputant.
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reason to believe that it is. The source of the false belief lies in the very way
the articial banana is given in perception. In perception the fake banana,
one may say, conceals its true nature. The parallel question would then be
whether a perceptual experience could conceal its nature by the way it is given
in consciousness. We have seen that the nature of an experience may be de-
termined by dierent kinds of properties. Suppose, as above, that among the
properties that determine the nature of an experience, some are phenomenal
and some are not. Being an F -appearance is a phenomenal property, being G
is not, and both properties constitute the nature of the experience.23 There
is a fundamental kind of experience that is both an F -appearance and a G.
Now, if it is possible that some F -appearance are G-experiences and some
are not, then we may obtain a situation in which the subject would not only
erroneously believe that his experience is G, the experience itself, by being an
F -appearance, would provide him a reason to believe so.
This line of argument would not be uncontroversial. One may wonder
how the way the articial banana looks could provide a reason for the (false)
belief that the banana is real, given that the articial and the real banana are
supposed to be indistinguishable on the basis of how they look. Could one not,
by symmetry, consider the way the real banana looks to provide a reason for
the (false) belief that the banana is articial? Should one thus not conclude
that the way a banana looks cannot provide any more reason for the belief
that it is real than it does for the belief that it is articial? Yet if such a result
could be secured in the perceptual case, the analogy would be useless with
respect to the introspective case.
Once again it ought to be stressed that we are not committed to defend
the asymmetry under consideration. We simply intend to locate the possi-
bility of error one would have to accommodate if one were to maintain the
asymmetry claim. This being said, an argument in favour of the asymmetry
in the perceptual case might be provided by a combination of common consid-
erations concerning relevant alternatives and warrant transmission. One may
thus submit that where the appearance of a real banana can provide a reason
to believe that there is a real banana without having to provide a reason to
believe that it is not an articial one, any appearance that would provide a
reason to believe that it is an articial one would have to provide a reason to
believe that it is not a real one. The asymmetry may be rooted in the fact
that our perceptual system is tuned to represent real bananas, rather than
fake ones, without having been tuned to distinguish the real from the fakes
bananas by the way they look. This priority may, but need not, be explained
23If one accepts such a situation, then one will be led to say that the experience has a
phenomenal and a non-phenomenal nature, or that its nature is partly phenomenal and
partly not (cf. chapters 2 and 11).
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in statistical or nomological terms. A better explanation may be provided by
considering the evolutionary function of perception: the perceptual experience
represents real bananas because real bananas, and not fake ones, lead to an
evolutionary advantage and thus to the selection of the kind of perceptual
experience under consideration.24
Whatever the merits of this line of argument, its application to the in-
trospective case would obviously require further instructions. If one intends
to argue that an F -appearance equips the subject with a reason to believe
that the experience is G rather than non-G, and that an F -appearance thus
misleads about its true nature when in fact it is not G, one needs a specic
argument for the priority of F -appearances that are G over those that are not.
This will obviously depend on the specic instances taken into consideration,
such as perception and hallucination. A point to which we shall return below.
The relevant result at this stage is that this kind of error, if it could oc-
cur, would not concern the phenomenal nature of the experience: although
the experience conceals some of its nature, it does not conceal its phenomenal
nature. This, at least, holds when G is not itself a phenomenal property of
the experience. When the experience provides the subject with a reason to
believe that it is G by being an F -appearance, then the way the experience is
given in consciousness misleads the subject about one of its non-phenomenal
properties. We suggest calling this kind of error, where the experience occurs
in consciousness in a way that misleads about its non-phenomenal properties,
experiential error. An experiential error can certainly be the source of a doxas-
tic error, in this case of a false introspective belief about the non-phenomenal
nature of one's own experience (see chapter 11).
Suppose now that the F -appearance we have been considering has a further
phenomenal property, the property H. The question would now be whether it
is possible for an F -appearance to mislead the subject about its own H -ness.
Several situations would have to be distinguished here, depending on whether
H is an essential phenomenal property of the experience and on whether H
is determined by the intentional content of the experience. Consider rst the
case where the F -appearance is also a J -appearance. An example would be
a perceptual experience of a red square. The object appears red and square,
the experience is both a red-appearance and a square-appearance.25 Now,
could an F -appearance mislead the subject with respect to its being a J -
appearance? By denition, if the F -appearance is also a J -appearance, then
the experience presents itself as a J -appearance in consciousness. And if being
24Elements of this inuential view can be found in Dretske (1971, 1988, 2005). See also
Soldati (1996).
25In the experience we are considering the two properties are related to each other by the
fact that they appear to belong to one and the same object.
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a J -appearance is an essential property of the experience, then in cases of the
kind under consideration the phenomenal nature of the experience is manifest
in consciousness.
Could an F -appearance not warrant the subject's belief that she is not
having a J -appearance although she is? Consider circumstances where one
and the same object appears to have incompatible properties: the object may
look both F and J although no ordinary material object can be both F and
J.26 In such a case the fact that the object looks J provides a reason to believe
that it is J but the fact that it looks F also provides a reason to believe that
it is not J. One and the same experience grounds contradictory judgements
about the perceived object. We may call this a case of phenomenal dissonance.
A situation of this kind may eventually lead the subject to cast doubt on the
reliability of her own introspective abilities.27 She may conclude that she has
an F -appearance but not really a J -appearance, thus entertaining a false be-
lief about the nature of her own experience. The most obvious explanation
for this kind of doxastic error, it appears, would appeal to the pressure gen-
eral assumptions about material objects and their properties exercise on the
particular case. The source of the false belief is not the way the experience
is given in consciousness, but general background beliefs about the nature of
objects given in perception.28
Consider further the case of a F -appearance that has some pure phenom-
enal property. Imagine a subject with blurred vision who reasons about the
origin of the blurred character of his visual experience. Two kinds of questions
would have to be distinguished. The subject may wonder rst whether the
object's edges actually are fuzzy, or if it just appears to him as if they were.
This is a question about the correctness of his perceptual experience. But the
subject might also wonder whether the blurredness comes from the fact that
the object actually appears fuzzy to him or rather from the experience itself.
Consider an analogy. Suppose you are looking at a photograph representing an
unidentied object on a uniformly coloured background. Suppose the image
of the object is blurred. You may genuinely wonder whether the object really
has fuzzy borders, like a cloud. Suppose instead that you identify the depicted
26One may naturally think of the sort of visual eects generated by some of M. C. Escher's
famous paintings such as Ascending and Descending, where the stairs at the top of the tower
appear both to lead up and down. There obviously are special issues related to the perception
of depiction, as opposed to the perception of objects, that one would have to consider here.
27This of course need not occur. In fact, we often settle precisely with the idea that
our experience has dissonant properties and that our judgement about the perceived object
cannot be made on the basis of the experience alone.
28A similar situation may occur in the case of one expecting to touch something hot that
is in fact cold. The expectation may cancel the evidential power of the experience. Notice
that there could also be phenomenal contamination, as we shall explain below.
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object as being of a kind you are much more familiar with, like a knife, say.
It would then be peculiar for you to wonder whether the knife has fuzzy bor-
ders. The default assessment would be that there is something wrong with the
picture.29
In analogy, the subject might come to consider blurredness as a pure phe-
nomenal property of his experience, instead of being linked to the presentation
of an object as having a certain property. More should obviously be said
about this distinction. But suppose one accepts it. Could then the way the
experience is given in consciousness mislead the subject in a way such that
he judges, for instance, that the experience has the pure phenomenal prop-
erty of blurredness while in fact the experience is rather a presentation of an
object with fuzzy borders? It is important for this line of thought to admit
that the intentional blurredness (Bi) be phenomenally distinct from the pure
blurredness (Bp). If this were not the case, then the introspective judgement
that one has one kind of experience rather than the other would in any case
not be based on the way the experience is given in consciousness.30 So, if the
subject mistakenly comes to judge that her experience is Bp while in fact it is
Bi, where could the source of the mistake lie? Could the way the experience
is given in consciousness provide a reason for the subject to judge erroneously
that her experience is Bp?
If a subject has a Bi-experience, then the experience provides him with a
reason to believe that he has an experience of something with fuzzy edges.
If the subject nevertheless nds a reason to judge that his experience is a
Bp-experience, then this will typically come from supplementary considera-
tions that undercut the rational power stemming from the fact that it is a
Bi-experience. Typically, such considerations will concern the nature of the
perceived object. If one believes that the object is of a kind that cannot have
fuzzy borders, then one will normally resist the idea that it appears blurred
on some particular occasion.
The result above would be compatible with the fact that the undercutting
considerations might have an impact on the phenomenal properties of the
experience. The object might in fact stop to appear blurred when one comes
29One might of course insist on the fact that in such a case there is no room for doubt
simply because the default position is that one believes that the knife cannot have the
property the picture represents it as having. The question may however be formulated in
more general terms: can the picture have perceptually accessible properties that do not
correspond to a way the depicted object appears? If the answer is yes, as it certainly should
be, then the subject might be described as wondering, on a specic occasion, whether the
property he sees while looking at the picture is precisely of that kind. This obviously does
not settle the question as to whether the analogy holds in the introspective case under
consideration.
30Unless other phenomenal properties can provide the same sort of ground.
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to believe that it cannot be fuzzy. This kind of phenomenal contamination
may occur not only by virtue of pressure coming from background beliefs. It
may also emerge from relations between phenomenal properties: an object
that appears to have fuzzy edges when seen on its own may appear not to
have such edges, but simply to be more distant, when seen in the background
of a focussed object.
There nally is a very specic kind of error one might need to consider
in our context. Remember the case mentioned above of an experience that
is essentially relational and that presents itself in consciousness as such. The
experience is, as we said above, a reexive R-appearance. Now, suppose that
the relation R itself constitutes a further phenomenal property, R*.31 This
would be a pure phenomenal property of the experience, not an appearance
property. An experience of this kind, let us assume, would provide the subject
with a reason to judge that his experience is indeed relational and with a
reason to believe that it has the pure phenomenal property R*.
Suppose now an experience that presents itself in consciousness as standing
in relation to an external object while it does not. We said that the experience
would then mislead the subject about its own non-phenomenal nature. We
called this kind of error an experiential error. But if the relation in question
constitutes a phenomenal property, would we then not have to say that the
experience misleads the subject about one of its phenomenal properties, and
thus, when the phenomenal property under consideration is an essential one,
about the experience's phenomenal nature?
It is again important to distinguish the pure phenomenal property R*, from
the experience's property of being a reexive R-appearance. If the two prop-
erties where not phenomenally distinct, then the presence of the latter would
not be compatible with the absence of the former.32 It is further important to
recognise that even if the relation R constitutes the phenomenal property R*,
the fact that the experience is a self-reexive R-appearance does not imply that
it is a self-reexive R* -appearance. This being so, the fact that the property
of being a reexive R-appearance can mislead the subject about the relational
nature of the experience does not imply as such that it can mislead the subject
about the phenomenal property that is constituted by the relation. The fact
that an experience is given in consciousness as a reexive R-appearance pro-
vides a reason for the subject to believe that the experience is relational, but
not as such a reason to believe that it has the phenomenal property R*. In
order to obtain this further reason the subject would have to be credited with
31Acquaintance may be taken to be such an essentially relational phenomenal quality.
More about this later.
32The very assumption that the two properties are phenomenally distinct might appear
implausible. We shall however assume it for the sake of the argument. Besides, phenomenal
distinctness may be compatible with introspective undistinguishability.
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a reason to believe that the phenomenal property R* is constituted by, or at
least strongly correlated with, R. Such a supplementary reason may of course
be available to the subject (if needed through philosophical investigation)33,
but it would not be a reason he has simply by virtue of the way the experience
is given in consciousness. If the subject comes to form the false belief that he is
having and R* -experience, the origin of his mistake cannot be the simple fact
he has a reexive R-appearance. The origin of his mistake must rather lie in
the assumption that when one has a reason for believing that one's experience
is relational, then one thereby obtains a reason for believing that it is R* by
virtue of the fact that he property R* is constituted by the relation under
consideration. A warrant concerning that constitutive constraint cannot be
obtained simply by virtue of having the experience.
Phenomenal error, in the way we suggest to understand it34, would be
a case of one being mislead about the phenomenal properties of one's own
experience by the way the experience is given in the stream of consciousness.
When the phenomenal properties are essential to the experience, phenomenal
error would lead to a situation where the phenomenal nature of the experience
is not manifest in consciousness. The arguments presented above appear to
show that, strictly speaking, phenomenal error is impossible. If a subject has
a false belief about a phenomenal property of her own perceptual experience,
then the source of her mistake cannot lie in the way the experience is given
in consciousness. A perceptual experience manifests each of its phenomenal
properties in consciousness. This, we submit, is the sense one ought to give to
the common claim that, for an experience, there is no gulf between being and
appearing. Thus Husserl writes:35
In the psychic sphere there is ... no dierence between appearance and
being, and if nature is a being that appears in appearances, then appear-
ances ... are not themselves beings that appear in further appearances.
(Husserl, 1996, 311-312)
33The result may also be attained through empirical research. The relational property
R might be `hardwired' to R*. The simple fact that it is does not provide an experiential
reason to believe that it is, a reason the subject has access to through the way the experience
is given in consciousness.
34Our understanding is close, although not identical, to the one Hellie appears to use when
he claims that \[...] while the phenomenal character of an experience might have crucial
gaps as to its nature, there is no way that phenomenal character could mislead" (Hellie,
2006, 2). In the related footnote Hellie writes: \I nd the idea of phenomenal error most
repugnant" (ibid.).
35Husserl accepted the strong claim that the nature of appearances is uniquely and entirely
phenomenal and that experiences do not belong to the realm of nature. He thought that
experiences, phenomena, as he called them, \have no real parts, and are not subject to any
real change" (ibid.). Our argument so far should help to see that the point Husserl makes in
the passage quoted above can be made independently from this strong metaphysical view.
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What Husserl suggests here is that, while a non-mental entity may `appear'
in the sense of being the intentional objects of an experience, the experience
itself `appears' in a dierent sense. And this may be identied with the way
the experience is given in the stream of consciousness. Furthermore, what is
distinctive of this second of kind of `appearing' is that, according to Husserl,
there is indeed no distinction between the way an experience `appears' and the
way it is: a way an experience `appears' is a way for it to be.
A similar claim is eective in Kripke's view, when he contends that:
To be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain if one had a
pain is to have a pain; to be in the same epistemic situation that would
obtain in the absence of pain is not to have a pain ... (Kripke, 1980,
152)
If \to be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain if one had a pain"
means to be in a situation where the way an experience is given in consciousness
constitutes a reason for the belief that one is in pain, then Kripke's claim is
indeed that an experience cannot oer by the way it is given in consciousness an
epistemic ground that misleads the subject about the experience's phenomenal
properties. And if \to be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain in
the absence of pain" means to be in a situation where the way an experience
is given in consciousness does not constitute a reason to believe that one is in
pain, then Kripke's claim is indeed that an experience cannot oer by the way
it occurs in the stream of consciousness the epistemic ground for attributing
to the experience a phenomenal property it does not posses.
These results should not be confused with the common claim that intro-
spective beliefs are infallible:
Not only people seem to have a special epistemic access to their pains,
they seem to have a very special epistemic authority with respect to
their pain: they seem to be incorrigible, or even infallible, about their
pains and pain reports: necessarily, if I sincerely believe that I am in
pain, then I am in pain. Conversely, if I feel pain, then I know that I
am in pain. Again this conditional seems necessarily true. This is the
self-intimating aspect of pain experiences. (Aydede, 2010)
As we have seen above, one can perfectly form a sincere incorrect belief about
one of one's own experience. This may happen, for instance, as a consequence
of phenomenal dissonance. The claim cannot be that necessarily, if I sincerely
believe to be in pain, then I am pain. The claim should rather be that neces-
sarily, if my reason to believe that I am in pain lies in the way the experience
is given to me in consciousness, then I am in pain.36
36The impossibility of phenomenal error should thus not be confused with the infallibility
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VII. Where Disjunctivism Can Lead Us Astray
Mike Martin, an inuential advocate of disjunctivism, writes:
The idea that introspection will lead us into error about how things seem
to us is hardly an attractive one. Yet given the considerations about
phenomenal transparency, it is dicult to avoid. In contrast to the kind
of global errors in introspection posited by sense-datum theories and in-
tentional accounts, the disjunctivist can claim that veridical perceptual
experiences are exactly as they seem to us to be: states in which parts
of how the world is are manifest to us. But even the disjunctivist is
forced to concede that we are misled about the nature of some of our
experiences by introspection: after all, it can hardly be denied that it
is possible for one to have an illusion or hallucination which is indistin-
guishable for one from a veridical perception. Given the disjunctivist's
account of veridical perception, he is required to deny that such expe-
riences are as they seem to us to be. Such experience is misleading not
only about the world, but about its own nature. So in the end, sense-
datum theories, intentional theories and disjunctivist accounts all have
to endorse some form of error-theory concerning perceptual appearances
and the introspection of experience. (Martin, 2002b, 421)
In the current context, the suggestion is that in the light of introspection,
our experience of the world seems to have a certain nature, i.e. that
articulated by nave realism, which it does not have. An account of
perception then needs not only to tell us what the nature of appearances
is, but also how states of being appeared to can come to seem to be
dierent from how they really are. (Martin, 2010, Ch. 1: 41)
What sort of errors is Martin appealing to in these passages? What does
he mean, when he says that \introspection will lead us into error about how
things seem to us"? What sort of seeming is he appealing to when he writes
that a disjunctivist \is required to deny that such experiences [hallucinations]
are as they seem to us to be". Is Martin suggesting that these are cases of
phenomenal error? We shall see that this need not be Martin's view. Once this
is made clear, however, some of Martin's disjunctivist conclusions can bee seen
to be compatible with the sort of intentionalism presented at the beginning of
this paper.37
of introspective beliefs. The view we are presenting is not committed to deny Armstrong's
famous claim that experiences and beliefs about them have a distinct existence (Armstrong,
1993, 324). Nor are we committed to the self-intimation claim (see Alston (1976) and
Shoemaker (1996)). A view of introspection that is compatible with the analysis of rst
personal error presented above can be found in Soldati (1998).
37See the chapters 8 and 11 for further discussion.
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In order to understand Martin's point it may be useful to recall the sort of
errors he thinks the traditional alternatives to disjunctivism have been obliged
to accept.38 These errors concern two distinct phenomenal properties of per-
ceptual experiences: transparency and actuality. In the light of the distinctions
made above, transparency may now be characterized as the property of being
an appearance of an object as external and mind-independent. So, for instance,
in perception an object appears to stand in front of one. The corresponding
phenomenal property is the property of being an appearance of something
standing in front of one. The phenomenal property is not identical to the
appearing property, but no intrinsic feature of the experience would need to
be added to the appearing property in order to characterise the phenomenal
property. The experience simply has the property of being an appearance of
something outside of one: it is an externality-appearance. Actuality, on the
other hand, is the phenomenal property of being an appearance of an existent
object. We may say that in the experience the object appears to exist and that
the phenomenal property is the property of representing an object as existent.
The experience is, we may say, an existence-appearance. On Martin's view,
sense-data theorists maintain that in perception we are always in contact with
existing objects, but that those objects do not possess most of the properties we
represent them as having. They are sense data, so they are not really red, not
really located in the external world, and so on.39 The intentionalist, instead,
is said to claim that the objects of perception may be correctly represented as
red, in front of us, etc., but sometimes, i.e. in the case of hallucination, they
simply do not exist.
What sort of errors are those theories then supposed to admit? As men-
tioned above, actuality and transparency are among the phenomenal properties
of perceptual experiences. It appears, in fact, that all perceptual experiences
possess those properties. An experience that lacks the phenomenal property
of transparency is not an experience of something appearing to one as external
and mind-independent. And an experience that lacks actuality is not an expe-
rience of there appearing to be something existent one stands in relation to. In
the rst case we might have something like a pure sensation40, in the second
case we might have an imagination. So transparency and actuality are not
38Dierent version of the argument that follows can be found in Martin (2002b, 392.).
39Some defenders of sense data are prepared to attribute to them some of the properties
material objects are supposed to have (cf. Moore (1993)). Here we are supposing that at
least some of the properties the objects appear to have, such as being denizens of public
space, are properties sense data do not have. An argument concerning positions that would
maintain that sense data and material objects can share all perceptually appearing properties
would obviously have to be developed in a dierent way.
40In the light of what has been said above, a pure sensation would be an experience that
possess only pure phenomenal properties.
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only pervasive; they are more fundamental, too, since they contribute to the
determination of the kind of experience under consideration (e.g. perception
as opposed to imagination and sensation). But transparency and actuality
are not pure phenomenal properties: they are both associated with correct-
ness conditions that concern not only the external world, but the experiences
themselves. Transparency concerns the nature of some (if not all) phenomenal
properties of perceptual experiences, actuality concerns the relational charac-
ter of perception. There is thus room for error concerning the satisfaction of
those correctness conditions.
The sense data theorist can now be seen as arguing that the objects of per-
ception not only do not generally possess the properties they appear to possess,
but that because of transparency perceptual experiences present those prop-
erties in a systematically misleading way, namely as properties of external
objects. It is not just the fact that the objects that appear to be red, square,
distant from us, etc., do not really possess those properties; it is much more
the fact that the objects of perception are of a kind that could not possess
them. The intentionalist, on the other side, can be seen as arguing that per-
ceptual experiences misleadingly present themselves as standing in relation to
existing things, as experiences whose instances depend on there actually being
an object one stands in perceptual relation to. So the errors both theories
appeal to concern the correctness conditions associated to specic phenomenal
properties. In so far as those phenomenal properties are essential to perceptual
experiences, we obtain cases where essential phenomenal properties misrepre-
sent the experiences themselves.
Do these errors concern the nature of the experiences? Two important as-
sumptions are at work at this stage. First, both theories maintain that percep-
tions and hallucinations belong to the same fundamental (phenomenal) kind:
they share their essential phenomenal properties. And second, both theories as-
sume that if perceptions and hallucinations have the same phenomenal nature,
then they ought to have the same non-phenomenal nature, too. And here the
two theories part company. Sense-data theorists maintain that perception is
essentially relational; intentionalists argue that it is not. Intentionalists submit
that (most if not all) phenomenal properties of the perceptual experience are
fully determined by the appearing properties of the object, sense-data theorists
deny it. On both theories the essential phenomenal properties of perceptual
experiences involve an error concerning their non-phenomenal nature. It is not
a phenomenal error since the mistake concerns precisely the non-phenomenal
nature of the experience. It is rather a case of an essential phenomenal prop-
erty that misrepresents the non-phenomenal nature of the experience. This
generates a mismatch between phenomenal and non-phenomenal nature | an
experiential error.
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Among the dierent reasons one may have to be unsatised with intention-
alism and sense-data theory there is the fact that they appear not to be in a
position to articulate a basic intuitive asymmetry between perception and hal-
lucination. There is a sense in which there is nothing wrong with perception,
but much wrong with hallucination. On the conjunctive solution there would
be something wrong with both, perception and hallucination. At this point
disjunctivism can be seen as a view that aims to restore and articulate the in-
tuitive asymmetry. Indeed, along with the nave realist, the disjunctivist will
typically argue that in perception we do enter into a relation with an external
object, and that most (if not all) phenomenal properties of the perceptual ex-
perience are determined by this relation to the external object.41 Accordingly,
transparency and actuality correctly represent the non-phenomenal properties
in the case of perceptions. The asymmetry would thus be explained by the
fact that the same is not true of hallucinations.
In this line of thought the disjunctivist would assume that hallucinations
share their phenomenal properties with perceptions, notably their transparency
and actuality. But he would then have to maintain that perceptions and hal-
lucinations dier in their non-phenomenal nature. This requires treating their
dierence with respect to their relation to the external object both as non-
phenomenal and as essential. Transparency and actuality would thus correctly
represent the non-phenomenal nature of perceptual experiences; while they
would misrepresent the non-phenomenal nature of hallucinations.
But if hallucinations and perceptions are experiences of a dierent fun-
damental kind by virtue of their dierent non-phenomenal natures, how can
they share their phenomenal properties? If one accepts the two assumptions
mentioned above, the assumptions that are common to intentionalism and
sense-data theory, then the version of disjunctivism under consideration nds
itself in an uncomfortable position. If perception and hallucination possess
dierent non-phenomenal natures then, by virtue of the second assumption,
they should also have dierent phenomenal natures. This, however, is precisely
what the rst assumption denies.42
The disjunctivist might be willing to challenge this assumption. Martin has
indeed insisted on the fact that the indiscriminability of experiences does not
imply their phenomenal identity (Martin, 2004, 74.). Whatever the merits of
that argument, it is important to see that on pain of admitting phenomenal
41Classical formulations of the disjunctivist claim can be found in Hinton (1973, 37),
Snowdon (1980, 159) and McDowell (1998b, 387).
42The fact that a hallucination shares all the phenomenal properties with a perception
does not imply on its own that those properties are essential to the hallucination as it is for
the perception. But this obviously depends on how the essentiality of those properties is
established in the case of perception. If the metaphysical point is that, for any experience
that has F, F is essential to x, then F is essential to x even if x is an hallucination.
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error, the disjunctivist needs to accept that the mistaken judgement cannot
be based on the way the experience is given in consciousness. If one cannot
discriminate a hallucination from a perception, although they are supposed
to be phenomenally dierent, then this cannot have its source in the way the
hallucination is given in consciousness. The hallucination cannot be said to
present itself in consciousness as a perception. So the disjunctivist would need
to show that the error has an independent source.
Considerations related to acquaintance might be relevant at this stage. Re-
member the case of the pure phenomenal relational property R* mentioned
above. Acquaintance might be such a property. The argument could then be
that hallucinations lack indeed that essential phenomenal property and thus
possess a dierent phenomenal nature than perceptions. We are mislead about
the phenomenal nature of hallucinations, not because of the way they are given
in consciousness, but because of background assumptions concerning the rela-
tion between phenomenal properties hallucinations share with perceptions and
acquaintance. We typically associate, for instance, the phenomenal properties
of actuality and transparency with acquaintance. This is the source of our
false introspective belief about the phenomenal nature of hallucination.
But this proposal would have to be confronted with the possibility of re-
moving the background assumptions under consideration. If the reason I have
to believe that my present hallucination has the phenomenal property of being
an acquaintance, although it is not given as such in my consciousness, is the
presence of some background assumption, then discovering that those assump-
tions are misleading should open the experience to my cognitive scrutiny. One
would then expect that the phenomenal dierence between perception and hal-
lucination should become accessible to my introspective scrutiny. But this does
not seem right. Hallucinations do not show their supposedly true phenomenal
nature once one ceases to fall prey to the cognitive illusion generated by some
background assumptions. The disjunctivist must thus postulate a brute and
thoroughly inaccessible phenomenal dierence that would be responsible for
the distinction in phenomenal nature of the experiences.
This is the point where the intentionalist may be in a position to oer an
attractive alternative. Instead of challenging the rst assumption common to
traditional sense-data theory and intentionalism, he could suggest to forgo the
second. He would thus argue that although perception and hallucination do
in fact have the same phenomenal nature, they have dierent non-phenomenal
natures. Perceptions are indeed states in which we enter in contact with ex-
ternal objects in such a way that this relation determines how the objects
appear. In contrast, there are no external objects to which one stands in rela-
tion when hallucinating, but hallucinations present themselves as if they were
relations to such objects. Hallucinations misrepresent their non-phenomenal
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nature. Again, this would not be a case of a phenomenal error, but a case of
an experiential error.
The brand of intentionalism under consideration can thus readily admit
that there is an asymmetry between perception and hallucination: perception
manifests its true (non-phenomenal) nature in consciousness while hallucina-
tion does not. Indeed, a hallucination misleadingly provides one with a reason
to believe that it is a perception, whereas a perception does not provide one
with a reason to believe that it is a hallucination. The intentionalist can ex-
plain this asymmetry with the fact that the phenomenal properties of actuality
and transparency are themselves intentional, they have correctness conditions
that are satised by perceptions, and not by hallucinations.
We can now understand why phenomenologists such as Husserl seem to
have been rather agnostic about disjunctivism concerning the non-phenomenal
nature of experiences. Husserl was quite clear about the actuality and trans-
parency of perception.43 In the Logical Investigations he also states that in
perception, in opposition to hallucination, the object itself is given to us. Yet
this fact, the fact that in perception we stand in relation to an object, does
not constitute the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience. In the
light of what we saw so far we know why.
43It is of course a basic tenet of Husserl's theory of intentionality, that the most crucial
conscious features of an intentional act correspond to ways in which an object is experienced
(e.g. in thought or perception). He uses the term `Gegenwartigeit' for actuality. He thus
writes in the Logical Investigations that in perception, as opposed to imagination, \the
object [seems] to achieve fool-bodied presence [leibhaft gegenwrtig], to be there in propria
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